Beyond belief: How social engagement motives influence the spread of conspiracy theories

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

Partisans neither expect nor receive reputational rewards for sharing falsehoods over truth online

A frequently invoked explanation for the sharing of false over true political information is that partisans are motivated by their reputations. In particular, it is often argued that by indiscriminately sharing news that is favorable to one's political party, regardless of whether it is true-or perhaps especially when it is not true-partisans can signal loyalty to their group, and improve their reputations in the eyes of their online networks. Across three survey studies (total N = 3,038), and an analysis of over 26,000 tweets, we explored these hypotheses by measuring the reputational benefits that people anticipate and receive from sharing different content online. In the survey studies, we showed participants actual news headlines that varied in (ⅰ) veracity, and (ⅱ) favorability to their preferred political party. Across all three studies, participants anticipated that sharing true news would bring more reputational benefits than sharing false news. Critically, while participants also expected greater reputational benefits for sharing news favorable to their party, the perceived reputation value of veracity was no smaller for more favorable headlines. We found a similar pattern when analyzing engagement on Twitter: among headlines that were politically favorable to a user's preferred party, true headlines elicited more approval than false headlines.

The motivations and reputational consequences of spreading conspiracy theories

Some people deliberately spread conspiracy theories. What are the reputational benefits and costs of doing so? The Adaptive-Conspiracism hypothesis proposes that it pays to be vigilant against possible conspiracies, especially in case of intergroup threat. Those who spread conspiracy theories may therefore be seen as valuable group members. Few studies have focused on the reputational impact of spreading a conspiracy theory. We conducted five studies (NPilot = 303; NStudy1 = 388; NStudy2 = 560; NStudy3 = 391; NStudy4 = 373) where participants rated a conspiracy spreader (vs. a neutral person) on a range of personality traits in different intergroup contexts. The results indicated that conspiracy spreaders were consistently perceived as more dominant and less warm than people making non-conspiratorial claims about certain events. Moreover, intergroup conflict attenuated the negative effects of spreading conspiracy theories on competence and warmth. These findings support the notion that besides drawbacks, spreading conspiracy theories can have benefits for the spreader's reputation, particularly during an intergroup conflict.

Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.

The (Mis)Information Game: A social media simulator

Given the potential negative impact reliance on misinformation can have, substantial effort has gone into understanding the factors that influence misinformation belief and propagation. However, despite the rise of social media often being cited as a fundamental driver of misinformation exposure and false beliefs, how people process misinformation on social media platforms has been under-investigated. This is partially due to a lack of adaptable and ecologically valid social media testing paradigms, resulting in an over-reliance on survey software and questionnaire-based measures. To provide researchers with a flexible tool to investigate the processing and sharing of misinformation on social media, this paper presents The Misinformation Game-an easily adaptable, open-source online testing platform that simulates key characteristics of social media. Researchers can customize posts (e.g., headlines, images), source information (e.g., handles, avatars, credibility), and engagement information (e.g., a post's number of likes and dislikes). The platform allows a range of response options for participants (like, share, dislike, flag) and supports comments. The simulator can also present posts on individual pages or in a scrollable feed, and can provide customized dynamic feedback to participants via changes to their follower count and credibility score, based on how they interact with each post. Notably, no specific programming skills are required to create studies using the simulator. Here, we outline the key features of the simulator and provide a non-technical guide for use by researchers. We also present results from two validation studies. All the source code and instructions are freely available online at https://misinfogame.com .

Social Verification Theory: A New Way to Conceptualize Validation, Dissonance, and Belonging

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT

In the present review, we propose a theory that seeks to recontextualize various existing theories as functions of people's perceptions of their consistency with those around them. This theory posits that people seek social consistency for both epistemic and relational needs and that social inconsistency is both negative and aversive, similar to the experience of cognitive dissonance. We further posit that the aversive nature of perceiving social inconsistency leads people to engage in various behaviors to mitigate or avoid these inconsistencies. When these behaviors fail, however, people experience chronic social inconsistency, which, much like chronic rejection, is associated with physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. Finally, we describe how mitigation and avoidance of social inconsistency underlie many seemingly unrelated theories, and we provide directions for how future research may expand on this theory.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

In the present review, we propose that people find inconsistency with those around them to be an unpleasant experience, as it threatens people's core need to belong. Because the threat of reduced belongingness evokes negative feelings, people are motivated to avoid inconsistency with others and to mitigate the negative feelings that are produced when it inevitably does arise. We outline several types of behaviors that can be implemented to avoid or mitigate these inconsistencies (e.g., validation, affirmation, distancing, etc.). When these behaviors cannot be implemented successfully, people experience chronic invalidation, which is associated with reduced physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. We discuss how invalidation may disproportionately affect individuals with minoritized identities. Furthermore, we discuss how belongingness could play a key role in radicalization into extremist groups.

Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis)information

The extent to which belief in (mis)information reflects lack of knowledge versus a lack of motivation to be accurate is unclear. Here, across four experiments (n = 3,364), we motivated US participants to be accurate by providing financial incentives for correct responses about the veracity of true and false political news headlines. Financial incentives improved accuracy and reduced partisan bias in judgements of headlines by about 30%, primarily by increasing the perceived accuracy of true news from the opposing party (d = 0.47). Incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political allies, however, decreased accuracy. Replicating prior work, conservatives were less accurate at discerning true from false headlines than liberals, yet incentives closed the gap in accuracy between conservatives and liberals by 52%. A non-financial accuracy motivation intervention was also effective, suggesting that motivation-based interventions are scalable. Altogether, these results suggest that a substantial portion of people's judgements of the accuracy of news reflects motivational factors.

The intrinsic and extrinsic factors predicting fake news sharing among social media users: the moderating role of fake news awareness

Research on fake news is growing, yet the relative influence of different factors on fake news sharing and how it can be reduced are still understudied. To fill this gap, this study treats user motivation and online environment as intrinsic and extrinsic factors and examines the role of fake news awareness as a prevention against the spread of fake news. This study describes the results of a Malaysian sample (N = 451) to determine the effects of intrinsic factor (altruism, information sharing, socialization and status seeking) and extrinsic factor (trust in network, homophily, norm of reciprocity and tie strength) on fake news sharing using Partial Least Square (PLS). Unlike past research, we treated the two main factors as higher order-constructs. Our findings revealed a stronger appeal of online environment than user motivation in determining fake news sharing among social media users in Malaysia. We also found that high fake news awareness determined low fake news sharing. This result suggests the importance of fake news awareness as an intervention strategy to curtail the spread of fake news. Future research is needed to build upon our findings to be tested at cross-cultural settings and also employ time series analysis to better understand the effect of increasing awareness of fake news over time.

The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs

Understanding the individual-level characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs is vital to addressing and combatting those beliefs. While researchers have identified numerous psychological and political characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs, the generalizability of those findings is uncertain because they are typically drawn from studies of only a few conspiracy theories. Here, we employ a national survey of 2021 U.S. adults that asks about 15 psychological and political characteristics as well as beliefs in 39 different conspiracy theories. Across 585 relationships examined within both bivariate (correlations) and multivariate (regression) frameworks, we find that psychological traits (e.g., dark triad) and non-partisan/ideological political worldviews (e.g., populism, support for violence) are most strongly related to individual conspiracy theory beliefs, regardless of the belief under consideration, while other previously identified correlates (e.g., partisanship, ideological extremity) are inconsistently related. We also find that the correlates of specific conspiracy theory beliefs mirror those of conspiracy thinking (the predisposition), indicating that this predisposition operates like an 'average' of individual conspiracy theory beliefs. Overall, our findings detail the psychological and political traits of the individuals most drawn to conspiracy theories and have important implications for scholars and practitioners seeking to prevent or reduce the impact of conspiracy theories.