In the mind's eye: provider and patient attitudes on functional brain imaging

Neuroimaging for precision medicine in psychiatry

Although the lifetime burden due to mental disorders is increasing, we lack tools for more precise diagnosing and treating prevalent and disabling disorders such as major depressive disorder. We lack strategies for selecting among available treatments or expediting access to new treatment options. This critical review concentrates on functional neuroimaging as a modality of measurement for precision psychiatry, focusing on major depressive and anxiety disorders. We begin by outlining evidence for the use of functional neuroimaging to stratify the heterogeneity of these disorders, based on underlying circuit dysfunction. We then review the current landscape of how functional neuroimaging-derived circuit predictors can predict treatment outcomes and clinical trajectories in depression and anxiety. Future directions for advancing clinically appliable neuroimaging measures are considered. We conclude by considering the opportunities and challenges of translating neuroimaging measures into practice. As an illustration, we highlight one approach for quantifying brain circuit function at an individual level, which could serve as a model for clinical translation.

The Role of Exceptionalism in the Evolution of Bioethical Regulation

The paper aims to present a critical analysis of the phenomenon and notion of exceptionalism in bioethics. The authors demonstrate that exceptionalism pertains to phenomena that are not (yet) entirely familiar to us and could potentially bear risks regarding their regulation. After an overview of the state of the art, we briefly describe the origins and evolution of the concept, compared to exception and exclusion. In the second step, they look at the overall development debates on genetic exceptionalism, compared to other bioethical debates on exceptionalism, before presenting a detailed analysis of a specific case of early regulation of genetic screening. In the last part, the authors explain the historical background behind the connection between exceptionalism and exclusion in these debates. Their main conclusion is that while the initial stage of the discussion is shaped by the concept of exceptionalism and awareness of risks of exclusion, the later development centers around exceptions that are needed in detailed regulatory procedures.

Brain Circuit-Derived Biotypes for Treatment Selection in Mood Disorders: A Critical Review and Illustration of a Functional Neuroimaging Tool for Clinical Translation

Although the lifetime burden due to major depressive disorder is increasing, we lack tools for selecting the most effective treatments for each patient. One-third to one-half of patients with major depressive disorder do not respond to treatment, and we lack strategies for selecting among available treatments or expediting access to new treatment options. This critical review concentrates on functional neuroimaging as a modality of measurement for precision psychiatry. We begin by summarizing the current landscape of how functional neuroimaging-derived circuit predictors can forecast treatment outcomes in depression. Then, we outline the opportunities and challenges in integrating circuit predictors into clinical practice. We highlight one standardized and reproducible approach for quantifying brain circuit function at an individual level, which could serve as a model for clinical translation. We conclude by evaluating the prospects and practicality of employing neuroimaging tools, such as the one that we propose, in routine clinical practice.

Real-World Implementation of Precision Psychiatry: A Systematic Review of Barriers and Facilitators

Background: Despite significant research progress surrounding precision medicine in psychiatry, there has been little tangible impact upon real-world clinical care. Objective: To identify barriers and facilitators affecting the real-world implementation of precision psychiatry. Method: A PRISMA-compliant systematic literature search of primary research studies, conducted in the Web of Science, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, PsycINFO and OpenGrey databases. We included a qualitative data synthesis structured according to the ‘Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research’ (CFIR) key constructs. Results: Of 93,886 records screened, 28 studies were suitable for inclusion. The included studies reported 38 barriers and facilitators attributed to the CFIR constructs. Commonly reported barriers included: potential psychological harm to the service user (n = 11), cost and time investments (n = 9), potential economic and occupational harm to the service user (n = 8), poor accuracy and utility of the model (n = 8), and poor perceived competence in precision medicine amongst staff (n = 7). The most highly reported facilitator was the availability of adequate competence and skills training for staff (n = 7). Conclusions: Psychiatry faces widespread challenges in the implementation of precision medicine methods. Innovative solutions are required at the level of the individual and the wider system to fulfil the translational gap and impact real-world care.

Chemical imbalance and etiological beliefs about depression among college students

Etiological beliefs of depression have differing impacts on motivation, hope, and treatment expectations. However, it is unclear where people are exposed to these beliefs. Objective: This study examined beliefs about depression and their relations to symptoms, attitudes about depression, and treatment preferences. Participants: 426 undergraduates attending a large midwestern university. Methods: Participants completed an online survey asking about causes of depression, if and where they had heard about the "chemical imbalance" explanation of depression, attitudes about depression, as well as measures of their symptoms, treatment history, and hypothetical treatment preferences. Results: Sixty-two percent of the sample had heard of the chemical imbalance explanation, most commonly from the classroom. Biochemical beliefs about depression were most strongly endorsed among participants with a family history of depression and who had had personal experience with treatment. The chemical imbalance belief was uniquely related to dysfunctional beliefs about depression. Etiological beliefs were largely unrelated to treatment preferences. Conclusion: College students are exposed to models of mental health that may not be ideal for treatment and recovery.

Losing Meaning: Philosophical Reflections on Neural Interventions and their Influence on Narrative Identity

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience.

"It's all about delivery": researchers and health professionals' views on the moral challenges of accessing neurobiological information in the context of psychosis

Background

The convergence of neuroscience, genomics, and data science holds promise to unveil the neurobiology of psychosis and to produce new ways of preventing, diagnosing, and treating psychotic illness. Yet, moral challenges arise in neurobiological research and in the clinical translation of research findings. This article investigates the views of relevant actors in mental health on the moral challenges of accessing neurobiological information in the context of psychosis.

Methods

Semi-structured individual interviews with two groups: researchers employed in the National Health Service (NHS) or a university in England (n = 14), and mental health professionals employed in NHS mental health services (n = 14). This article compares results in the two groups (total n = 28).

Results

This article presents findings around three conceptual areas: (1) research ethics as mostly unproblematic, (2) psychosis, neurobiological information, and mental health care, and (3) identity, relationships, and the future. These areas are drawn from the themes and topics that emerged in the interviews across the two groups of participants. Researchers and health professionals provided similar accounts of the moral challenges of accessing—which includes acquisition, communication, and use of—neurobiological information in the context of psychosis. Acquiring neurobiological information was perceived as mostly unproblematic, provided ethical safeguards are put in place. Conversely, participants argued that substantive moral challenges arise from how neurobiological information is delivered—that is, communicated and used—in research and in clinical care. Neurobiological information was seen as a powerful tool in the process through which individuals define their identity and establish personal and clinical goals. The pervasiveness of this narrative tool may influence researchers and health professionals’ perception of ethical principles and moral obligations.

Conclusions

This study suggests that the moral challenges that arise from accessing neurobiological information in the context of psychosis go beyond traditional research and clinical ethics concerns. Reflecting on how accessing neurobiological information can influence individual self-narratives will be vital to ensure the ethical translation of neuroscience and genomics into mental health.

Trial registration

The study did not involve a health care intervention on human participants. It was retrospectively registered on 11 July 2018, registration number: researchregistry4255.

Comparison of the Effects of a Genetic, a Mild Encephalitis, and a Psychosocial Causal Explanation of Schizophrenia on Stigmatizing Attitudes - a Pilot Study With a Quasi-Experimental Design

Background: Previous research has shown that the endorsement of biogenetic causal explanations of schizophrenia is associated with stronger stigmatizing attitudes against people with schizophrenia than the endorsement of psychosocial explanations. However, little is known about whether different biogenetic causal explanation beliefs differentially affect stigmatizing attitudes. This is particularly valid for the endorsement of the mild encephalitis hypothesis of schizophrenia. Aim: To examine to what extent different causal explanations of schizophrenia influence the desire for social distance from persons with schizophrenia. Methods: A study with a prospective, quasi-experimental design was carried out with students in Germany (N = 333). A case vignette depicting a person with schizophrenia-typical symptoms was presented, and a social distance scale (SDS) was used to measure the stigmatizing attitude against the person described. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups receiving different causal explanations of schizophrenia (genetic, mild encephalitis hypothesis, or psychosocial) without treatment information. Results: A one-way ANOVA showed that the mean SDS was lowest in the group with the mild encephalitis hypothesis explanation, followed by the genetic explanation group, and highest in the psychosocial explanation group. However, the differences between the groups were small and not significant. A subanalysis revealed a significant interaction between gender and causal explanation. Women showed a significantly lower desire for social distance than men when receiving the mild encephalitis hypothesis. Neither the study discipline nor the number of semesters of study had significant effects on the mean SDS. The differences between the mean SDS scores for the different items were much bigger than the differences for the different causal explanations. Regardless of the causal explanation, the extent of the desired social distance depends strongly on social proximity. Conclusion: The present study fits into previous research, which has found that biogenetic beliefs were either associated with more social distance or did not yield a statistically significant association. Although we found a small gender-specific effect of the endorsement of the mild encephalitis hypothesis, we do not recommend gender-specific anti-stigmatization campaigns because they might rightly raise suspicions of dishonesty and manipulation. Rather we support recovery-oriented messages focusing on effective treatments.

Stressors and chemical imbalances: Beliefs about the causes of depression in an acute psychiatric treatment sample

BACKGROUND

Public perceptions of mental illness are increasingly construed in neurobiological and genetic terms. Accumulating evidence suggests there are some unintended consequences of these explanations, including reduced optimism for recovery among individuals with depression. However, little is known about how these beliefs relate to treatment process and outcomes in a psychiatric treatment setting, a gap this study aimed to fill.

METHODS

We examined etiological beliefs about depression in a sample of patients (N = 279) seeking acute treatment in a behaviorally-based therapy program at a psychiatric hospital and examined relations with treatment expectations and outcomes.

RESULTS

We found that although psychosocial explanations of depression were most popular, biogenetic beliefs, particularly the belief that depression is caused by a chemical imbalance, were prevalent in this sample. Further, the chemical imbalance belief related to poorer treatment expectations. This relationship was moderated by symptoms of depression, with more depressed individuals showing a stronger relationship between chemical imbalance beliefs and lower treatment expectations. Finally, the chemical imbalance belief predicted more depressive symptoms after the treatment program ended for a 2-week measure of depression (but not for a 24-hour measure of depression), controlling for psychiatric symptoms at admission, inpatient hospitalizations, and treatment expectations.

LIMITATIONS

The sample was homogenous in terms of race and ethnicity and we did not assess how patients came to their beliefs.

CONCLUSIONS

Together, the results illustrate the correlates and possible impacts of etiological beliefs in a real-world clinical setting and invite a critical discussion about predominant messages about the etiology of depression.

Narrative Devices: Neurotechnologies, Information, and Self-Constitution

This article provides a conceptual and normative framework through which we may understand the potentially ethically significant roles that information generated by neurotechnologies about our brains and minds may play in our construction of our identities. Neuroethics debates currently focus disproportionately on the ways that third parties may (ab)use these kinds of information. These debates occlude interests we may have in whether and how we ourselves encounter information about our own brains and minds. This gap is not yet adequately addressed by most allusions in the literature to potential identity impacts. These lack the requisite conceptual or normative foundations to explain why we should be concerned about such effects or how they might be addressed. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting a normative account of identity as constituted by embodied self-narratives. It proposes that information generated by neurotechnologies can play significant content-supplying and interpretive roles in our construction of our self-narratives. It argues, to the extent that these roles support and detract from the coherence and inhabitability of these narratives, access to information about our brains and minds engages non-trivial identity-related interests. These claims are illustrated using examples drawn from empirical literature reporting reactions to information generated by implantable predictive BCIs and psychiatric neuroimaging. The article concludes by highlighting ways in which information generated by neurotechnologies might be governed so as to protect information subjects' interests in developing and inhabiting their own identities.

Defining Ourselves: Personal Bioinformation as a Tool of Narrative Self-Conception

Where ethical or regulatory questions arise about an individual's interests in accessing bioinformation about herself (such as findings from screening or health research), the value of this information has traditionally been construed in terms of its clinical utility. It is increasingly argued, however, that the "personal utility" of findings should also be taken into account. This article characterizes one particular aspect of personal utility: that derived from the role of personal bioinformation in identity construction. The suggestion that some kinds of information are relevant to identity is not in itself new. However, the account outlined here seeks to advance the debate by proposing a conception of the relationship between bioinformation and identity that does not depend on essentialist assumptions and applies beyond the narrow genetic contexts in which identity is customarily invoked. The proposal is that the identity-value of personal bioinformation may be understood in terms of its instrumental role in the construction of our narrative identities, specifically that its value lies in helping us to develop self-narratives that support us in navigating our embodied existences. I argue that this narrative conception provides useful insights that are pertinent to the ethical governance of personal bioinformation. It illuminates a wider range of ethical considerations in relation to information access; it accounts for variations in the utility of different kinds of information; and it highlights that the context in which information is conveyed can be as important as whether it is disclosed at all. These arguments are illustrated using an example drawn from psychiatric neuroimaging research.

Global mental health and neuroethics

BACKGROUND

Global mental health is a relatively new field that has focused on disparities in mental health services across different settings, and on innovative ways to provide feasible, acceptable, and effective services in poorly-resourced settings. Neuroethics, too, is a relatively new field, lying at the intersection of bioethics and neuroscience; it has studied the implications of neuroscientific findings for age-old questions in philosophy, as well as questions about the ethics of novel neuroscientific methods and interventions.

DISCUSSION

In this essay, we address a number of issues that lie at the intersection of these two fields: an emphasis on a naturalist and empirical position, a concern with both disease and wellness, the importance of human rights in neuropsychiatric care, and the value of social inclusion and patient empowerment.

SUMMARY

These different disciplines share a number of perspectives, and future dialogue between the two should be encouraged.

Genetic Testing and Neuroimaging: Trading off Benefit and Risk for Youth with Mental Illness

According to the World Health Organization, mental illness is one of the leading causes of disability worldwide. The first onset of mental illness usually occurs during childhood or adolescence. Neuroimaging and genetic testing have been invaluable in research on behavioral and intentional disorders, particularly with their potential to lead to improved diagnostic and predictive capabilities and to decrease the associated burdens of disease. The present study focused specifically the perspectives of mental health providers on the role of neuroimaging and genetic testing in clinical practice with children and adolescents. We interviewed 38 psychiatrists, psychologists, and allied mental health professionals who work primarily with youth about their receptivity towards either the use of neuroimaging or genetic testing. Interviews probed the role they foresee for these modalities for prediction, diagnosis, and treatment planning, and the benefits and risks they anticipate. Practitioners anticipated three major benefits associated with clinical introduction of imaging and genetic testing in the mental health care for youth: (1) improved understanding of illness, (2) more accurate diagnosis than available through conventional clinical examination, and (3) validation of treatment plans. They also perceived three major risks: (1) potential adverse impacts on employment and insurance as adolescents reach adulthood, (2) misuse or misinterpretation of the imaging or genetic data, and (3) infringements on self-esteem or self-motivation. Movement of brain imaging and genetic testing into clinical care will require a delicate balance of biology and respect for autonomy in the still-evolving cognitive and affective world of young individuals.

Pupillary motility: bringing neuroscience to the psychiatry clinic of the future

Modern pupillometry has expanded the study and utility of pupil responses in many new domains, including psychiatry, particularly for understanding aspects of cognitive and emotional information processing. Here, we review the applications of pupillometry in psychiatry for understanding patients' information processing styles, predicting treatment, and augmenting function. In the past year pupillometry has been shown to be useful in specifying cognitive/affective occurrences during experimental tasks and informing clinical diagnoses. Such studies demonstrate the potential of pupillary motility to be used in clinical psychiatry much as it has been in neurology for the past century.

Media reporting of neuroscience depends on timing, topic and newspaper type

The rapid developments in neuroscientific techniques raise high expectations among the general public and therefore warrant close monitoring of the translation to the media and daily-life applications. The need of empirical research into neuroscience communication is emphasized by its susceptibility to evoke misconceptions and polarized beliefs. As the mass media are the main sources of information about (neuro-)science for a majority of the general public, the objective of the current research is to quantify how critically and accurately newspapers report on neuroscience as a function of the timing of publication (within or outside of periods of heightened media attention to neuroscience, termed "news waves"), the topic of the research (e.g. development, health, law) and the newspaper type (quality, popular, free newspapers). The results show that articles published during neuroscience news waves were less neutral and more optimistic, but not different in accuracy. Furthermore, the overall tone and accuracy of articles depended on the topic; for example, articles on development often had an optimistic tone whereas articles on law were often skeptical or balanced, and articles on health care had highest accuracy. Average accuracy was rather low, but articles in quality newspapers were relatively more accurate than in popular and free newspapers. Our results provide specific recommendations for researchers and science communicators, to improve the translation of neuroscience findings through the media: 1) Caution is warranted during periods of heightened attention (news waves), as reporting tends to be more optimistic; 2) Caution is also warranted not to follow topic-related biases in optimism (e.g., development) or skepticism (e.g., law); 3) Researchers should keep in mind that overall accuracy of reporting is low, and especially articles in popular and free newspapers provide a minimal amount of details. This indicates that researchers themselves may need to be more active in preventing misconceptions to arise.

Addiction and the brain-disease fallacy

From Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience by Sally Satel and Scott Lilienfeld, copyright © 2013. Reprinted by permission of Basic Books, a member of The Perseus Books Group. The notion that addiction is a "brain disease" has become widespread and rarely challenged. The brain-disease model implies erroneously that the brain is necessarily the most important and useful level of analysis for understanding and treating addiction. This paper will explain the limits of over-medicalizing - while acknowledging a legitimate place for medication in the therapeutic repertoire - and why a broader perspective on the problems of the addicted person is essential to understanding addiction and to providing optimal care. In short, the brain-disease model obscures the dimension of choice in addiction, the capacity to respond to incentives, and also the essential fact people use drugs for reasons (as consistent with a self-medication hypothesis). The latter becomes obvious when patients become abstinent yet still struggle to assume rewarding lives in the realm of work and relationships. Thankfully, addicts can choose to recover and are not helpless victims of their own "hijacked brains."

Neuroimaging for psychotherapy research: current trends

OBJECTIVE

This article reviews neuroimaging studies that inform psychotherapy research. An introduction to neuroimaging methods is provided as background for the increasingly sophisticated breadth of methods and findings appearing in psychotherapy research.

METHOD

We compiled and assessed a comprehensive list of neuroimaging studies of psychotherapy outcome, along with selected examples of other types of studies that also are relevant to psychotherapy research. We emphasized magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) since it is the dominant neuroimaging modality in psychological research.

RESULTS

We summarize findings from neuroimaging studies of psychotherapy outcome, including treatment for depression, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and schizophrenia.

CONCLUSIONS

The increasing use of neuroimaging methods in the study of psychotherapy continues to refine our understanding of both outcome and process. We suggest possible directions for future neuroimaging studies in psychotherapy research.

Genetic Testing and Neuroimaging for Youth at Risk for Mental Illness: Trading off Benefit and Risk

BACKGROUND

According to the World Health Organization, mental illness is one of the leading causes of disability worldwide. The first onset of mental illness usually occurs during childhood or adolescence, with nearly 12 million diagnosed cases in the United States alone. Neuroimaging and genetic testing have been invaluable in research on behavioral, affective, and attentional disorders, particularly with their potential predictive capabilities, and ability to improve diagnosis and to decrease the associated burdens of disease. The present study focused specifically the perspectives of mental health providers on the role of neuroimaging and genetic testing in clinical practice with children and adolescents.

METHODS

We interviewed 38 psychiatrists, psychologists, and allied mental health professionals who work primarily with youth about their receptivity toward either the use of neuroimaging or genetic testing. Interviews probed the role they foresee for these modalities for prediction, diagnosis, treatment planning, and the benefits and risks they anticipate.

RESULTS

Practitioners anticipated three major benefits associated with clinical introduction of imaging and genetic testing in the mental health care for youth: (1) improved understanding of the brain and mental illness, (2) more accurate diagnosis than available through conventional clinical examination, and (3) legitimization of treatment plans. They also perceived three major risks: (1) misuse or misinterpretation of the imaging or genetic data, (2) potential adverse impacts on employment and insurance as adolescents reach adulthood, and (3) infringements on self-esteem or self-motivation.

LIMITATIONS

The nature of the interview questions focused on the future of neuroimaging and genetic testing testing research in the context of clinical neuroscience. Therefore, the responses from interview participants are based on anticipated rather than actual experience.

CONCLUSIONS

Continued expansion of brain imaging and genetic testing into clinical care will require a delicate balance of brain biology and respect for autonomy in the still-evolving cognitive and affective world of young individuals.

How has neuroscience affected lay understandings of personhood? A review of the evidence

The prominence of neuroscience in the public sphere has escalated in recent years, provoking questions about how the public engages with neuroscientific ideas. Commentaries on neuroscience's role in society often present it as having revolutionary implications, fundamentally overturning established beliefs about personhood. The purpose of this article is to collate and review the extant empirical evidence on the influence of neuroscience on commonsense understandings of personhood. The article evaluates the scope of neuroscience's presence in public consciousness and examines the empirical evidence for three frequently encountered claims about neuroscience's societal influence: that neuroscience fosters a conception of the self that is based in biology, that neuroscience promotes conceptions of individual fate as predetermined, and that neuroscience attenuates the stigma attached to particular social categories. It concludes that many neuroscientific ideas have assimilated in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge existing modes of understanding self, others and society.

Neurobiological narratives: experiences of mood disorder through the lens of neuroimaging

Many scientists, healthcare providers, policymakers and patients are awaiting in anticipation the application of biomedical technologies such as functional neuroimaging for the prediction, diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. The potential efficacy of such applications is controversial, and functional neuroimaging is not yet routinely used in psychiatric clinics. However, commercial ventures and enthusiastic reporting indicate a pressing need to engage with the social and ethical issues raised by clinical translation. There has been little investigation of how individuals living with mental illness view functional neuroimaging, or of the potential psychological impacts of its clinical use. We conducted 12 semi-structured interviews with adults diagnosed with major depression or bipolar disorder, probing their experiences with mental health care and their perspectives on the prospect of receiving neuroimaging for prediction, diagnosis and planning treatment. The participants discussed the potential role of neuroimages in (i) mitigating stigma; (ii) supporting morally loaded explanations of mental illness due to an imbalance of brain chemistry; (iii) legitimising psychiatric symptoms, which may have previously been de-legitimised since they lacked objective representation, through objective representations of disorder; and (iv) reifying DSM-IV-TR disorder categories and links to identity. We discuss these anticipated outcomes in the context of participant lived experience and attitudes to biologisation of mental illness, and argue for bringing these voices into upstream ethics discussion.

Neuroimaging in mental health care: voices in translation

Images of brain function, popularly called "neuroimages," have become a mainstay of contemporary communication about neuroscience and mental health. Paralleling media coverage of neuroimaging research and the high visibility of clinics selling scans is pressure from sponsors to move basic research about brain function along the translational pathway. Indeed, neuroimaging may offer benefits to mental health care: early or tailored intervention, opportunities for education and planning, and access to resources afforded by objectification of disorder. However, risks of premature technology transfer, such as misinterpretation, misrepresentation, and increased stigmatization, could compromise patient care. The insights of stakeholder groups about neuroimaging for mental health care are a largely untapped resource of information and guidance for translational efforts. We argue that the insights of key stakeholders-including researchers, healthcare providers, patients, and families-have an essential role to play upstream in professional, critical, and ethical discourse surrounding neuroimaging in mental health. Here we integrate previously orthogonal lines of inquiry involving stakeholder research to describe the translational landscape as well as challenges on its horizon.

fMRI at 20: has it changed the world?

The prevalence of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience research is clear, but the overall impact of the associated research in the broader scope of our scientific community, and of society, is less obvious. The first reports of fMRI garnered huge interest in many areas, giving rise to a wide range of applications and technical developments over the past 20 years. Using five primary areas, i.e. scientific impact, clinical practice, cognitive neuroscience, mental illness, and society-this essay examines the question: Has fMRI changed the world?

Beyond Depression Commentary: Wherefore Art Thou, Depression Clinic of Tomorrow?

An exciting review in this issue (Forgeard et al., 2011) highlights a number of emerging themes in contemporary translational research in this area. A primary challenge for the next generation of researchers reading this work will be how to carry out the grand charges levied by Forgeard et al., on the ground, i.e., to lay the foundations for moving the emerging basic science of depression into the Depression Clinic of Tomorrow. Addressing these challenges could suggest changes in the nature of the basic science, and questions that are being asked, and employed approaches in contemporary depression research. Preconditions for clinical adoption discussed in the review include 1) beginning to hold neuroscience-based measures of features of depression to the same standards held for other depression measures in the clinic, 2) attending to how the proposed methods might actually end up being feasibly imported into the clinic, and 3) what interventions targeted at mechanisms of depression might look like in the next decade.

"This is Why you've Been Suffering": Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care

Mental health care providers increasingly confront challenges posed by the introduction of new neurotechnology into the clinic, but little is known about the impact of such capabilities on practice patterns and relationships with patients. To address this important gap, we sought providers' perspectives on the potential clinical translation of functional neuroimaging for prediction and diagnosis of mental illness. We conducted 32 semi-structured telephone interviews with mental health care providers representing psychiatry, psychology, family medicine, and allied mental health. Our results suggest that mental health providers have begun to re-conceptualize mental illness with a neuroscience gaze. They report an epistemic commitment to the value of a brain scan to provide a meaningful explanation of mental illness for their clients. If functional neuroimaging continues along its projected trajectory to translation, providers will ultimately have to negotiate its role in mental health. Their perspectives, therefore, enrich bioethical discourse surrounding neurotechnology and inform the translational pathway.

Neurosurgeons' perspectives on psychosurgery and neuroenhancement: a qualitative study at one center

Object

Advances in the neurosciences are stirring debate regarding the ethical issues surrounding novel neurosurgical interventions. The application of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for treating refractory psychiatric disease, for instance, has introduced the prospect of altering disorders of mind and behavior and the potential for neuroenhancement. The attitudes of current and future providers of this technology and their position regarding its possible future applications are unknown. The authors sought to gauge the opinions of neurosurgical staff and trainees toward various uses of neuromodulation technology including psychosurgery and neuroenhancement.

Methods

The authors conducted a qualitative study involving in-depth interviews with 47 neurosurgery staff, trainees, and other neuroclinicians at a quaternary care center.

Results

Several general themes emerged from the interviews. These included universal support for psychosurgery given adequate informed consent and rigorous scientific methodology, as well as a relative consensus regarding the priority given to patient autonomy and the preservation of personal identity. Participants' attitudes toward the future use of DBS and other means of neuromodulation for cognitive enhancement and personality alteration revealed less agreement, although most participants felt that alteration of nonpathological traits is objectionable.

Conclusions

There is support in the neurosurgical community for the surgical management of refractory psychiatric disease. The use of neuromodulation for the alteration of nonpathological traits is morally and ethically dubious when it is out of sync with the values of society at large. Both DBS and neuromodulation will have far-reaching and profound public health implications.

Biogenetic models of psychopathology, implicit guilt, and mental illness stigma

Whereas some research suggests that acknowledgment of the role of biogenetic factors in mental illness could reduce mental illness stigma by diminishing perceived responsibility, other research has cautioned that emphasizing biogenetic aspects of mental illness could produce the impression that mental illness is a stable, intrinsic aspect of a person ("genetic essentialism"), increasing the desire for social distance. We assessed genetic and neurobiological causal attributions about mental illness among 85 people with serious mental illness and 50 members of the public. The perceived responsibility of persons with mental illness for their condition, as well as fear and social distance, was assessed by self-report. Automatic associations between Mental Illness and Guilt and between Self and Guilt were measured by the Brief Implicit Association Test. Among the general public, endorsement of biogenetic models was associated with not only less perceived responsibility, but also greater social distance. Among people with mental illness, endorsement of genetic models had only negative correlates: greater explicit fear and stronger implicit self-guilt associations. Genetic models may have unexpected negative consequences for implicit self-concept and explicit attitudes of people with serious mental illness. An exclusive focus on genetic models may therefore be problematic for clinical practice and anti-stigma initiatives.