Influencing quality of outpatient SUD care: Implementation of alerts and incentives in Washington State

Did paying drugs misuse treatment providers for outcomes lead to unintended consequences for hospital admissions? Difference-in-differences analysis of a pay-for-performance scheme in England

AIMS

To estimate how a scheme to pay substance misuse treatment service providers according to treatment outcomes affected hospital admissions.

DESIGN

A controlled, quasi-experimental (difference-in-differences) observational study using negative binomial regression.

SETTING

Hospitals in all 149 organisational areas in England for the period 2009-2010 to 2015-2016.

PARTICIPANTS

572 545 patients admitted to hospital with a diagnosis indicating drug misuse, defined based on International Classification of Diseases 10th Revision (ICD-10) diagnosis codes (37 964 patients in 8 intervention areas and 534 581 in 141 comparison areas).

INTERVENTION AND COMPARATORS

Linkage of provider payments to recovery outcome indicators in 8 intervention organisational areas compared with all 141 comparison organisational areas in England. Outcome indicators included: abstinence from presenting substance, abstinent completion of treatment and non-re-presentation to treatment in the 12 months following completion.

MEASUREMENTS

Annual counts of hospital admissions, emergency admissions and admissions including a diagnosis indicating drugs misuse. Covariates included age, sex, ethnic origin and deprivation.

FINDINGS

For 37 245 patients in the intervention areas, annual emergency admissions were 1.073 times higher during the operation of the scheme compared with non-intervention areas (95% CI = 1.049; 1.097). There were an estimated additional 3 352 emergency admissions in intervention areas during the scheme. These findings were robust to a range of secondary analyses.

CONCLUSION

A programme in England from 2012 to 2014 to pay substance misuse treatment service providers according to treatment outcomes appeared to increase emergency hospital admissions.

Effectiveness of value-based purchasing for substance use treatment engagement and retention

INTRODUCTION

Many people drop out of substance use disorder (SUD) treatment within the first few sessions, which suggests the need for innovative strategies to address this. We examined the effectiveness of incentive-based contracting for Maine's publicly funded outpatient (OP) and intensive outpatient (IOP) SUD treatment, to determine its potential for improving treatment engagement and retention.

METHODS

Maine's incentive-based contract with federally block grant-funded OP and IOP treatment agencies created a natural experiment, in which we could compare treatment engagement and retention with a group of state-licensed treatment agencies that were not part of the incentive-based contract. We used administrative data for OP (N = 18,375) and IOP (N = 5986) SUD treatment admissions from FY2005-FY2011 to capture trends prior to and after the FY2008 contract implementation date. We performed multivariable difference-in-difference logistic regression models following propensity score matching of clients.

RESULTS

Two-thirds (66%) of OP admissions engaged in treatment, defined as 4+ treatment sessions, and 85% of IOP admissions satisfied the similar criteria of 4+ treatment days. About 40-45% of OP admissions reached the threshold for retention, defined as 90 days in treatment. IOP treatment completion was attained by 50-58% of admissions. For OP, the incentive and nonincentive groups had no significant differences in percentages with treatment engagement (AOR = 1.28, DID = 5.9%, p = .19), and 90-day retention was significant in the opposite direction of what we hypothesized (AOR = 0.80, DID = -4.6%, p = .0003). For IOP, the incentive group had a significant, but still small, increase in percentage with treatment engagement (AOR = 1.52, DID = 5.5%, p = .003), but the corresponding increase in treatment completion was not similarly significant (AOR = 1.12, DID = 2.7%, p = .53). In all models, individual-level variables were strong predictors of outcomes.

CONCLUSION

We found little to no impact of the incentive-based contract on the treatment engagement, retention, and completion measures, adding to the body of evidence that shows few or null results for value-based purchasing in SUD treatment programs. The limited success of such efforts is likely to reflect the bandwidth that providers and programs have to focus on new endeavors, the importance of the incentive funding to their bottom line, and forces beyond their immediate control.

Incentives in a public addiction treatment system: Effects on waiting time and selection

Program-level financial incentives are used by some payers as a tool to improve quality of substance use treatment. However, evidence of effectiveness is mixed and performance contracts may have unintended consequences such as creating barriers for more challenging clients who are less likely to meet benchmarks. This study investigates the impact of a performance contract on waiting time for substance use treatment and client selection. Admission and discharge data from publicly funded Maine outpatient (OP) and intensive outpatient (IOP) substance use treatment programs (N = 38,932 clients) were used. In a quasi-experimental pre-post design, pre-period (FY 2005-2007) admission data from incentivized (IC) and non-incentivized (non-IC) programs were compared to post-period (FY 2008-2012) using propensity score matching and multivariate difference-in-difference regression. Dependent variables were waiting time (incentivized) and client selection (severity: history of mental disorders and substance use severity, not incentivized). Despite financial incentives designed to reduce waiting time for substance use treatment among state-funded outpatient programs, average waiting time for treatment increased in the post period for both IC and non-IC groups, as did client severity. There were no significant differences in waiting time between IC and non-IC groups over time. Increases in client severity over time, with no group differences, indicate that programs did not restrict access for more challenging clients. Adequate funding and other approaches to improve quality may be beneficial.

State Adoption of Incentives to Promote Evidence-Based Practices in Behavioral Health Systems

OBJECTIVE

Despite the critical role behavioral health care payers can play in creating an incentive to use evidence-based practices (EBPs), little research has examined which incentives are used in public mental health systems, the largest providers of mental health care in the United States.

METHODS

The authors surveyed state mental health directors from 44 states about whether they used any of seven strategies to increase the use of EBPs. Participants also ranked attributes of each incentive on the basis of key characteristics of diffusion of innovation theory (perceived advantage, simplicity, compatibility, observability, and gradually implementable) and perceived effectiveness.

RESULTS

Almost three-quarters of state directors endorsed using at least one financial incentive; most paid for training and technical assistance. Few used other incentives. Strategies perceived as simple and compatible were more readily adopted. Enhanced rates and paying for better outcomes were perceived as the most effective but were the least deployed, suggesting that simplicity and organizational compatibility may be the most decisive factors when choosing incentives.

CONCLUSIONS

Payers are not using the incentives they perceive as most effective, and they are mostly using only one strategy for reasons of simplicity and compatibility. Future work should focus on barriers to measurement that likely hinder the adoption and implementation of paying for better outcomes and enhanced reimbursement rates, with the ultimate goal of measuring the effectiveness of incentives on EBP implementation efforts.

Improving Quality of Care for SUDS: Where Do We Go From Here?

: Initiation and engagement (IET), a process quality indicator for the treatment for substance use disorders (SUDs), has been associated with better treatment outcomes and has been part of the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set for over a decade. However, nationally, IET rates tend to be low and not improving. Integration may be a promising way to improve IET and quality of care, as suggested by the findings. To guarantee that integration is a truly effective mechanism for improving patient engagement and quality would likely require providing clinicians and other primary care providers with additional support and training on SUDs and treatment, and ensure that everyone, regardless of demographic characteristics, can equally benefit from these system level changes.

Agency-level financial incentives and electronic reminders to improve continuity of care after discharge from residential treatment and detoxification

BACKGROUND

Despite the importance of continuity of care after detoxification and residential treatment, many clients do not receive further treatment services after discharged. This study examined whether offering financial incentives and providing client-specific electronic reminders to treatment agencies lead to improved continuity of care after detoxification or residential treatment.

METHODS

Residential (N = 33) and detoxification agencies (N = 12) receiving public funding in Washington State were randomized into receiving one, both, or none (control group) of the interventions. Agencies assigned to incentives arms could earn financial rewards based on their continuity of care rates relative to a benchmark or based on improvement. Agencies assigned to electronic reminders arms received weekly information on recently discharged clients who had not yet received follow-up treatment. Difference-in-difference regressions controlling for client and agency characteristics tested the effectiveness of these interventions on continuity of care.

RESULTS

During the intervention period, 24,347 clients received detoxification services and 20,685 received residential treatment. Overall, neither financial incentives nor electronic reminders had an effect on the likelihood of continuity of care. The interventions did have an effect among residential treatment agencies which had higher continuity of care rates at baseline.

CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of agency-level financial incentives and electronic reminders did not result in improvements in continuity of care, except among higher performing agencies. Alternative strategies at the facility and systems levels should be explored to identify ways to increase continuity of care rates in specialty settings, especially for low performing agencies.