1
|
Shen C, He Z, Shi L, Wang Z, Tanimoto J. Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players. J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20240019. [PMID: 38471533 PMCID: PMC10932715 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2024] [Accepted: 02/14/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders-who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs-and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their 'sticky effect'-an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a 'copying the majority' strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human-machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
| | - Zhixue He
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
- School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Li S, Du C, Li X, Shen C, Shi L. Antisocial peer exclusion does not eliminate the effectiveness of prosocial peer exclusion in structured populations. J Theor Biol 2024; 576:111665. [PMID: 37951564 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111665] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2023] [Revised: 10/30/2023] [Accepted: 11/06/2023] [Indexed: 11/14/2023]
Abstract
While prosocial exclusion has been proposed as a mechanism to maintain cooperation in one-shot social dilemma games, the evolution of prosocial peer exclusion in response to the threat of antisocial peer exclusion, particularly in structured populations, remains insufficiently understood. In this study, we employ an extended spatial public goods game to investigate the evolution of prosocial peer exclusion and its impact on cooperation in the presence of both prosocial and antisocial peer exclusion. Our model encompasses four primary strategies: traditional cooperation and defection, prosocial peer exclusion targeting defectors, and antisocial peer exclusion targeting cooperators. Our findings illuminate that the presence of antisocial peer exclusion significantly disrupts network reciprocity and suppresses cooperation. However, when coexisting with prosocial peer exclusion, it does not undermine the latter's efficacy in upholding cooperation, except in scenarios with low exclusion costs Unlike the cooperation-sustaining cyclic dominance pattern observed in the exclusive presence of prosocial peer exclusion, the co-presence of prosocial and antisocial peer exclusion gives rise to more intricate pathways for maintaining cooperation. These pathways include cyclic dominance involving traditional cooperation, prosocial peer exclusion, and antisocial peer exclusion, or a similar pattern involving traditional defection and the two exclusion strategies, or even cyclic dominance among all four strategies. In essence, our study enhances the theoretical framework concerning the effectiveness of the prosocial exclusion strategy, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of its dynamics.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shulan Li
- School of Accounting, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Chunpeng Du
- School of Mathematics, Kunming University, Kunming 650214, China
| | - Xingxu Li
- Yunnan Economy and Society Bigdata Research Institute, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Chen Shen
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China.
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Nirjhor MSA, Nakamaru M. The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional division of labour on a tree network. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:230830. [PMID: 38026038 PMCID: PMC10663798 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.230830] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2023] [Accepted: 10/31/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023]
Abstract
Division of labour on complex networks is rarely investigated using evolutionary game theory. We investigate a division of labour where divided roles are assigned to groups on the nodes of a general unidirectional finite tree graph network. From the network's original node, a task flows and is divided along the branches. A player is randomly selected in each group of cooperators and defectors, who receives a benefit from a cooperator in the upstream group and a part of the task. A cooperator completes their part by paying a cost and then passing it downstream until the entire task is completed. Defectors do not do anything and the division of labour stops, causing all groups to suffer losses due to the incomplete task. We develop a novel method to analyse the local stability in this general tree. We discover that not the benefits but the costs of the cooperation influence the evolution of cooperation, and defections in groups that are directly related to that group's task cause damage to players in that group. We introduce two sanction systems, one of which induces the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctions, and promote the coexistence of cooperator and defector groups.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Md Sams Afif Nirjhor
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Nirjhor MSA, Nakamaru M. The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:220856. [PMID: 36908993 PMCID: PMC9993041 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.220856] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2022] [Accepted: 02/14/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation is a puzzle in evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous studies assumed that players are equal and have symmetric relationships. In our society, players are in different roles, have an asymmetric relationship and cooperate together. We focused on the linear division of labour in a unidirectional chain that has finite roles, each of which is assigned to one group with cooperators and defectors. A cooperator in an upstream group produces and modifies a product, paying a cost of cooperation, and hands it to a player in a downstream group who obtains the benefit from the product. If players in all roles cooperate, a final product can be completed. However, if a player in a group chooses defection, the division of labour stops, the final product cannot be completed and all players in all roles suffer damage. By using the replicator equations of the asymmetric game, we investigate which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation in the division of labour. We find that not the benefit of the product but the cost of cooperation matters to the evolutionary dynamics and that the probability of finding a defector determines which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Md Sams Afif Nirjhor
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Pal S, Hilbe C. Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding. Nat Commun 2022; 13:5928. [PMID: 36207309 PMCID: PMC9547006 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-33551-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2022] [Accepted: 09/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
People routinely cooperate with each other, even when cooperation is costly. To further encourage such pro-social behaviors, recipients often respond by providing additional incentives, for example by offering rewards. Although such incentives facilitate cooperation, the question remains how these incentivizing behaviors themselves evolve, and whether they would always be used responsibly. Herein, we consider a simple model to systematically study the co-evolution of cooperation and different rewarding policies. In our model, both social and antisocial behaviors can be rewarded, but individuals gain a reputation for how they reward others. By characterizing the game’s equilibria and by simulating evolutionary learning processes, we find that reputation effects systematically favor cooperation and social rewarding. While our baseline model applies to pairwise interactions in well-mixed populations, we obtain similar conclusions under assortment, or when individuals interact in larger groups. According to our model, rewards are most effective when they sway others to cooperate. This view is consistent with empirical observations suggesting that people reward others to ultimately benefit themselves. Rewards can motivate people to cooperate, but the evolution of rewarding behavior is itself poorly understood. Here, a game-theoretic analysis shows that reputation effects facilitate the simultaneous evolution of cooperation and social rewarding policies.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Saptarshi Pal
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Plön, Germany.
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Plön, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Bruner JP, Smead R. Tag-based Spite with Correlated Interactions. J Theor Biol 2022; 540:111052. [PMID: 35247376 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111052] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2021] [Revised: 01/16/2022] [Accepted: 02/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
We use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of harming behavior (spite) in settings involving both tags and (anti-)correlated interaction. Our results show an interesting interaction between these mechanisms. The presence of tags shows that pure spite is less likely to evolve when theoretically expected, but that conditional spite is more likely than expected. Moreover, we identify a novel tag-based equilibrium where spite occurs within but not between groups. We discuss implications for the evolution of spite, punishment, and the methodological approach of using exogenous parameters to represent (anti-)correlated interactions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Justin P Bruner
- Department of Political Economy and Moral Science, University of Arizona.
| | - Rory Smead
- Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University.
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Podder S, Righi S, Pancotto F. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200293. [PMID: 34601913 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the 'Loner' strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator-defector-loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment-where defectors punish cooperators-causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shirsendu Podder
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK
| | - Simone Righi
- Department of Economics, Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy
| | - Francesca Pancotto
- Department of Communication and Economics, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Salahshour M. Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0254860. [PMID: 34358254 PMCID: PMC8345862 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0254860] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2021] [Accepted: 07/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.
Collapse
|
9
|
Dhaliwal NA, Patil I, Cushman F. Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/04/2023]
|
10
|
Flores LS, Fernandes HCM, Amaral MA, Vainstein MH. Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment. J Theor Biol 2021; 524:110737. [PMID: 33930439 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110737] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2020] [Revised: 04/12/2021] [Accepted: 04/23/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge in behavioural sciences. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive environments. Here, we introduce altruistic punishers in the spatial public goods game. This strategy acts as a cooperator in the absence of defectors, otherwise it will punish all defectors in their vicinity while bearing a cost to do so. We observe three distinct behaviours in our model: i) in the absence of punishers, cooperators (who don't punish defectors) are driven to extinction by defectors for most parameter values; ii) clusters of punishers thrive by sharing the punishment costs when these are low; iii) for higher punishment costs, punishers, when alone, are subject to exploitation but in the presence of cooperators can form a symbiotic spatial structure that benefits both. This last observation is our main finding since neither cooperation nor punishment alone can survive the defector strategy in this parameter region and the specificity of the symbiotic spatial configuration shows that lattice topology plays a central role in sustaining cooperation. Results were obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice and subsequently confirmed by a pairwise comparison of different strategies' payoffs in diverse group compositions, leading to a phase diagram of the possible states.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lucas S Flores
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, CP 15051, CEP 91501-970 Porto Alegre - RS, Brazil
| | - Heitor C M Fernandes
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, CP 15051, CEP 91501-970 Porto Alegre - RS, Brazil.
| | - Marco A Amaral
- Instituto de Humanidades, Artes e Ciências, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia, CEP, 45638-000 Teixeira de Freitas - BA, Brazil
| | - Mendeli H Vainstein
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, CP 15051, CEP 91501-970 Porto Alegre - RS, Brazil.
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Okada I, Yamamoto H, Akiyama E, Toriumi F. Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment. Sci Rep 2021; 11:7642. [PMID: 33828116 PMCID: PMC8026997 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-86668-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2021] [Accepted: 03/18/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation shows that a situation containing a local game, local punishment, and global adaptation leads to the most robustly cooperative regime. Further, we show an interesting feature in local punishment. Previous studies showed that a local game and global adaptation are likely to generate cooperation. However, they did not consider punishment. We show that if local punishment is introduced in spatial public goods games, a situation satisfying either local game or local adaptation is likely to generate cooperation. We thus propose two principles. One is if interactions in games can be restricted locally, it is likely to generate cooperation independent of the interaction situations on punishment and adaptation. The other is if the games must be played globally, a cooperative regime requires both local punishment and local adaptation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Isamu Okada
- Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Hachioji, 192-8577, Japan. .,Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, 1020, Austria.
| | - Hitoshi Yamamoto
- Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Tokyo, 141-8602, Japan
| | - Eizo Akiyama
- Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, 305-8573, Japan
| | - Fujio Toriumi
- Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Fulker Z, Forber P, Smead R, Riedl C. Spite is contagious in dynamic networks. Nat Commun 2021; 12:260. [PMID: 33431873 PMCID: PMC7801472 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-20436-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2020] [Accepted: 12/01/2020] [Indexed: 01/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Spite, costly behavior that harms others, presents an evolutionary puzzle: given that both the actor and recipient do worse, how could it emerge? We show that dynamically evolving interaction networks provide a novel explanation for the evolution of costly harm. Previous work has shown that anti-correlated interaction (e.g., negative assortment or negative relatedness) among behavioral strategies in populations can lead to the evolution of costly harm. We show that these approaches are blind to important features of interaction brought about by a co-evolution of network and behavior and that these features enable the emergence of spite. We analyze a new model in which agents can inflict harm on others at a cost to themselves, and simultaneously learn how to behave and with whom to interact. We find spite emerges reliably under a wide range of conditions. Our model reveals that when interactions occur in dynamic networks the population can exhibit correlated and anti-correlated behavioral interactions simultaneously, something not possible in standard models. In dynamic networks spite evolves due to transient and partial anti-correlated interaction, even when other behaviors are positively correlated and average degree of correlated interaction in the population is low.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Zachary Fulker
- Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Patrick Forber
- Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA
| | - Rory Smead
- Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Christoph Riedl
- Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
- D'Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
- Khoury College of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
- IMT Lucca, Piazza S. Ponziano, 6, 55100, Lucca, Italy.
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Gao S, Du J, Liang J. Impacts of preferences on the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:052414. [PMID: 33327072 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.052414] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2020] [Accepted: 11/04/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Behavior decision making, where individuals can efficiently express their preferences for all options, has a great impact on cooperation. Hereby, we institute a minimal model in well-mixed populations where whether and how to sanction defectors are decided by cooperators via different decision-making mechanisms. The results illustrate that whether cooperation can outbreak depends on the cooperators' preferences for sanction and complying with the electoral outcome. We highlight the role of individuals' preferences in the emergence of cooperation and show that there exists an intermediate degree of the cooperators' preference for sanction at which the cooperators' preference for complying with the electoral outcome has a negligible impact on cooperation. We point out whether conformity facilitates the emergence of cooperation depends on the cooperators' preference for sanction. We find, compared with individual decision making, whether collective decision making is more conducive to promoting cooperation crucially depends on cooperators' preferences as well as the consensus required for employing sanction.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shiping Gao
- School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China
| | - Jinming Du
- Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineering, College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110891, China
- Liaoning Engineering Laboratory of Operations Analytics and Optimization for Smart Industry, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110891, China
- Key Laboratory of Data Analytics and Optimization for Smart Industry (Northeastern University), Ministry of Education, Shenyang, 110891, China
| | - Jinling Liang
- School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Arefin MR, Kabir KMA, Jusup M, Ito H, Tanimoto J. Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas. Sci Rep 2020; 10:16092. [PMID: 32999303 PMCID: PMC7527514 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-72971-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 59] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2020] [Accepted: 09/10/2020] [Indexed: 12/25/2022] Open
Abstract
What do corruption, resource overexploitation, climate inaction, vaccine hesitancy, traffic congestion, and even cancer metastasis have in common? All these socioeconomic and sociobiological phenomena are known as social dilemmas because they embody in one form or another a fundamental conflict between immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest. A shortcut to the resolution of social dilemmas has thus far been reserved solely for highly stylised cases reducible to dyadic games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma), whose nature and outcome coalesce in the concept of dilemma strength. We show that a social efficiency deficit, measuring an actor’s potential gain in utility or fitness by switching from an evolutionary equilibrium to a social optimum, generalises dilemma strength irrespective of the underlying social dilemma’s complexity. We progressively build from the simplicity of dyadic games for which the social efficiency deficit and dilemma strength are mathematical duals, to the complexity of carcinogenesis and a vaccination dilemma for which only the social efficiency deficit is numerically calculable. The results send a clear message to policymakers to enact measures that increase the social efficiency deficit until the strain between what is and what could be incentivises society to switch to a more desirable state.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Md Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan. .,Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1000, Bangladesh.
| | - K M Ariful Kabir
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.,Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka, 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Marko Jusup
- Tokyo Tech World Research Hub Initiative (WRHI), Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, 152-8550, Japan.
| | - Hiromu Ito
- Department of International Health, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, 852-8523, Japan
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan. .,Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Gao S, Du J, Liang J. Evolution of cooperation under punishment. Phys Rev E 2020; 101:062419. [PMID: 32688481 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.101.062419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2019] [Accepted: 05/29/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy alongside cooperation and defection, and it is commonly assumed to be executed based on individual decision rules rather than collective decision rules. Differently from previous works, we employ a democratic procedure by which cooperators cast votes independently and simultaneously for whether to impose punishment on defectors, and we establish a relationship between the cooperators' willingness to punish defectors (WTPD) and whether the punishment is inflicted on defectors. The results illustrate that the population can evolve to full cooperation under consensual punishment. It is noteworthy that, compared with autonomous punishment, whether consensual punishment is more in favor of cooperation crucially depends on the minimum number of votes required for punishment execution as well as the cooperators' WTPD. Our findings highlight the importance of collective decision making in the evolution of cooperation and may provide a mathematical framework for explaining the prevalence of democracy in modern societies.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shiping Gao
- School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China
| | - Jinming Du
- Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineering, College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110891, China
- Liaoning Engineering Laboratory of Operations Analytics and Optimization for Smart Industry, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110891, China
- Key Laboratory of Data Analytics and Optimization for Smart Industry (Northeastern University), Ministry of Education, Shenyang, 110891, China
| | - Jinling Liang
- School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Liu L, Chen X. Evolutionary game dynamics in multiagent systems with prosocial and antisocial exclusion strategies. Knowl Based Syst 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.knosys.2019.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
|
17
|
Abstract
Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Redouan Bshary
- Institut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Rue Emilie-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Cui P, Wu ZX, Zhou T, Chen X. Cooperator-driven and defector-driven punishments: How do they influence cooperation? Phys Rev E 2019; 100:052304. [PMID: 31869949 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.100.052304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/14/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Economic studies have shown that there are two types of regulation schemes which can be considered as a vital part of today's global economy: self-regulation enforced by self-regulation organizations to govern industry practices and government regulation which is considered as another scheme to sustain corporate adherence. An outstanding problem of particular interest is to understand quantitatively the role of these regulation schemes in evolutionary dynamics. Typically, punishment usually occurs for enforcement of regulations. Taking into account both types of punishments to influence the regulations, we develop a game model where six evolutionary situations with corresponding combinations of strategies are considered. Furthermore, a semianalytical method is developed to allow us to give accurate estimations of the boundaries between the phases of full defection and nondefection. We find that, associated with the evolutionary dynamics, for an infinite well-mixed population, the mix of both punishments performs better than one punishment alone in promoting public cooperation, but for a networked population the cooperator-driven punishment turns out to be a better choice. We also reveal the monotonic facilitating effects of the synergy effect, punishment fine, and feedback sensitivity on the public cooperation for an infinite well-mixed population. Conversely, for a networked population an optimal intermediate range of feedback sensitivity is needed to best promote punishers' populations. Overall, a networked structure is overall more favorable for punishers and further for public cooperation, because of both network reciprocity and mutualism between punishers and cooperators who do not punish defectors. We provide physical understandings of the observed phenomena, through a detailed statistical analysis of frequencies of different strategies and spatial pattern formations in different evolution situations. These results provide valuable insights into how to select and enforce suitable regulation measures to let public cooperation remain prevalent, which has potential implications not only for self-regulation, but also for other topics in economics and social science.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Pengbi Cui
- School of Astronautics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, People's Republic of China
- National Key Laboratory of Aerospace Flight Dynamics, Xi'an, 710072, People's Republic of China
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
| | - Zhi-Xi Wu
- Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou Gansu 730000, China and Key Laboratory for Magnetism and Magnetic Materials of the Ministry of Education, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou Gansu 730000, China
| | - Tao Zhou
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
- Institute of Fundamental and Frontier Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610073, China
- Big Data Research Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 611731, China
| |
Collapse
|
19
|
Chen S, Shi J, Yang X, Ye H, Luo J. Modulating Activity in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Changes Punishment in the 3-Player Prisoner's Dilemma: A Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Study. Front Neurosci 2019; 13:1160. [PMID: 31708738 PMCID: PMC6823908 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2019.01160] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2019] [Accepted: 10/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Altruistic punishment of social norm violations plays a crucial role in maintaining widespread cooperation in human societies, and punitive behavior has been suggested to be related to the activity level of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). This study used unilateral and bilateral transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to investigate how modulating the activity of the DLPFC affects cooperation and punishment in a 3-player prisoner's dilemma. We found that none of the unilateral stimulations changed the participants' cooperation behaviors, while left anodal/right cathodal stimulation increased the participants' cooperation. For punitive behavior, we found that all unilateral stimulations (i.e., right anodal, right cathodal, left anodal, left cathodal) and bilateral stimulations (i.e., right anodal/left cathodal, left anodal/right cathodal) significantly decreased the punishment imposed by the cooperators toward the defectors. In addition, right anodal stimulation significantly decreased the participant's third-party punishment (TPP) imposed by the cooperators toward the defectors. The other three unilateral stimulations also significantly decreased the participant's TPP imposed by the cooperators toward the defectors, but only when the punishment was revealed to the punished person. Our findings indicate that the mechanisms of selfishness and negative emotions suggested by previous studies probably interact with different stimulations: for anodal stimulations, the mechanism of negative emotions may overwhelm the mechanism of selfishness, while for cathodal stimulations, the mechanism of selfishness may be more dominant than the mechanism of negative emotions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Shu Chen
- College of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- Institute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
- Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Jinchuan Shi
- Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Xiaolan Yang
- Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China
| | - Hang Ye
- Center for Economic Behavior and Decision-Making, School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, China
| | - Jun Luo
- Center for Economic Behavior and Decision-Making, School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, China
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Quan J, Li X, Wang X. The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2019; 29:103137. [PMID: 31675844 DOI: 10.1063/1.5119395] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2019] [Accepted: 10/08/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Social exclusion can prevent free riders from participating in social activities and deprive them of sharing cooperative benefits, which is an effective mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. However, traditional peer-exclusion strategies are unconditional, and as long as there are defectors in the group, they will pay a cost to exclude the defectors. In reality, one of the reasons for the complexity of these strategies is that individuals may react differently depending on the environment in which they are located. Based on this consideration, we introduce a kind of conditional peer-exclusion strategy in the spatial public goods game model. Specifically, the behavior of conditional exclusion depends on the number of defectors in the group and can be adjusted by a tolerance parameter. Only if the number of defectors in the group exceeds the tolerance threshold, conditional exclusion can be triggered to exclude defectors. We explore the effects of parameters such as tolerance, exclusion cost, and probability of exclusion success on the evolution of cooperation. Simulation results confirmed that conditional exclusion can greatly reduce the threshold values of the synergy factor above which cooperation can emerge. Especially, when the tolerance is low, very small synergy factors can promote the population to achieve a high level of cooperation. Moreover, even if the probability of exclusion success is low, or the unit exclusion cost is relatively high, conditional exclusion is effective in promoting cooperation. These results allow us to better understand the role of exclusion strategies in the emergence of cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ji Quan
- School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
| | - Xia Li
- School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
| | - Xianjia Wang
- School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Group leaders establish cooperative norms that persist in subsequent interactions. PLoS One 2019; 14:e0222724. [PMID: 31536555 PMCID: PMC6752774 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0222724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/09/2019] [Accepted: 09/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
The temptation to free-ride on others’ contributions to public goods makes enhancing cooperation a critical challenge. Solutions to the cooperation problem have centered on installing a sanctioning institution where all can punish all, i.e., peer punishment. But a new, growing literature considers whether and when the designation of a group leader—one group member, given the sole ability to administer punishment—is an effective and efficient alternative. What remains unknown is whether and to what extent these group leaders establish cooperative norms in their groups via their own contributions to the public good, their use of sanctions, or both. Nor has past work examined whether leaders’ behaviors have lasting effects on non-leaders’ cooperation in subsequent interactions, outside of the leader’s purview. Here I show that leaders’ contributions to the public good predict non-leaders’ subsequent cooperation. Importantly, the effect is not limited to cooperation within the institution: the effect of leaders’ contributions continue to predict non-leaders’ contributions in a later interaction, where sanctions are removed. This process is mediated by non-leaders’ increased contributions in the institution, suggesting that leaders have effects on followers that shape followers’ subsequent behaviors. These effects occur above and beyond a baseline tendency to be influenced by non-leader group members; they also occur above and beyond the influence of peers in groups under a peer punishment institution. Results underscore how critical it is that groups install cooperative leaders: followers model their leaders’ cooperation choices, even in decisions external to the original institution and outside of the leader’s watch.
Collapse
|
22
|
The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations. J Theor Biol 2019; 476:36-43. [PMID: 31150664 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.05.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2018] [Revised: 05/24/2019] [Accepted: 05/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Both experimental and theoretical studies have shown that punishment plays an important role in promoting cooperation. Various forms of punishment are proposed to explain why costly punishment could be maintained in the population and stabilize cooperation. Here we consider an altruistic behavior that cooperators perform cooperation and punishment simultaneously and share the punishment cost. We investigate the role of punishment cost shared among cooperators in the evolution of cooperation in public goods game. We show that the punishment can promote and stabilize cooperation when the penalty imposed on defectors is large enough compared to the punishment cost incurred by cooperators in well-mixed populations. In structured populations, cooperation could emerge under lower fine threshold and coexist with defection. However, as the penalty increases, cooperation will have a larger basin of attraction in the well-mixed population than that in the structured population. Our analytical and simulated results indicate that punishment indeed can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation. We also find that population structure can promote the coexistence of cooperation and defection but not always be beneficial to cooperation.
Collapse
|
23
|
Martinez-Vaquero LA, Dolci V, Trianni V. Evolutionary dynamics of organised crime and terrorist networks. Sci Rep 2019; 9:9727. [PMID: 31278354 PMCID: PMC6611905 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-46141-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2019] [Accepted: 06/18/2019] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Crime is pervasive into modern societies, although with different levels of diffusion across regions. Its dynamics are dependent on various socio-economic factors that make the overall picture particularly complex. While several theories have been proposed to account for the establishment of criminal behaviour, from a modelling perspective organised crime and terrorist networks received much less attention. In particular, the dynamics of recruitment into such organisations deserve specific considerations, as recruitment is the mechanism that makes crime and terror proliferate. We propose a framework able to model such processes in both organised crime and terrorist networks from an evolutionary game theoretical perspective. By means of a stylised model, we are able to study a variety of different circumstances and factors influencing the growth or decline of criminal organisations and terrorist networks, and observe the convoluted interplay between agents that decide to get associated to illicit groups, criminals that prefer to act on their own, and the rest of the civil society.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Luis A Martinez-Vaquero
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185, Rome, Italy.
- Lab of Socioecology and Social Evolution, Department of Biology, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 59, 3000, Leuven, Belgium.
| | - Valerio Dolci
- INFN Roma1, Rome, Italy
- Physics Department, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Vito Trianni
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185, Rome, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
24
|
Gross J, De Dreu CKW. The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization. Nat Commun 2019; 10:776. [PMID: 30770812 PMCID: PMC6377668 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 43] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2017] [Accepted: 01/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans exhibit a remarkable capacity for cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals. Yet, human cooperation is neither universal, nor stable. Instead, cooperation is often bounded to members of particular groups, and such groups endogenously form or break apart. Cooperation networks are parochial and under constant reconfiguration. Here, we demonstrate how parochial cooperation networks endogenously emerge as a consequence of simple reputation heuristics people may use when deciding to cooperate or defect. These reputation heuristics, such as "a friend of a friend is a friend" and "the enemy of a friend is an enemy" further lead to the dynamic formation and fission of cooperative groups, accompanied by a dynamic rise and fall of cooperation among agents. The ability of humans to safeguard kin-independent cooperation through gossip and reputation may be, accordingly, closely interlinked with the formation of group-bounded cooperation networks that are under constant reconfiguration, ultimately preventing global and stable cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands.
| | - Carsten K W De Dreu
- Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 1551, 1001 NB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
25
|
Luo J. The Neural Basis of and a Common Neural Circuitry in Different Types of Pro-social Behavior. Front Psychol 2018; 9:859. [PMID: 29922197 PMCID: PMC5996127 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00859] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2018] [Accepted: 05/14/2018] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Pro-social behaviors are voluntary behaviors that benefit other people or society as a whole, such as charitable donations, cooperation, trust, altruistic punishment, and fairness. These behaviors have been widely described through non self-interest decision-making in behavioral experimental studies and are thought to be increased by social preference motives. Importantly, recent studies using a combination of neuroimaging and brain stimulation, designed to reveal the neural mechanisms of pro-social behaviors, have found that a wide range of brain areas, specifically the prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala, are correlated or causally related with pro-social behaviors. In this review, we summarize the research on the neural basis of various kinds of pro-social behaviors and describe a common shared neural circuitry of these pro-social behaviors. We introduce several general ways in which experimental economics and neuroscience can be combined to develop important contributions to understanding social decision-making and pro-social behaviors. Future research should attempt to explore the neural circuitry between the frontal lobes and deeper brain areas.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jun Luo
- Neuro & Behavior EconLab, School of Economics, Center for Economic Behavior and Decision-Making, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, China
| |
Collapse
|
26
|
Powers ST. The Institutional Approach for Modeling the Evolution of Human Societies. ARTIFICIAL LIFE 2018; 24:10-28. [PMID: 29369715 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00251] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Artificial life is concerned with understanding the dynamics of human societies. A defining feature of any society is its institutions. However, defining exactly what an institution is has proven difficult, with authors often talking past each other. This article presents a dynamic model of institutions, which views them as political game forms that generate the rules of a group's economic interactions. Unlike most prior work, the framework presented here allows for the construction of explicit models of the evolution of institutional rules. It takes account of the fact that group members are likely to try to create rules that benefit themselves. Following from this, it allows us to determine the conditions under which self-interested individuals will create institutional rules that support cooperation-for example, that prevent a tragedy of the commons. The article finishes with an example of how a model of the evolution of institutional rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation can be created. It is intended that this framework will allow artificial life researchers to examine how human groups can themselves create conditions for cooperation. This will help provide a better understanding of historical human social evolution, and facilitate the resolution of pressing societal social dilemmas.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Simon T Powers
- School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University. E-mail:
| |
Collapse
|
27
|
Nakamaru M, Shimura H, Kitakaji Y, Ohnuma S. The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor. J Theor Biol 2018; 437:79-91. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.10.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2017] [Revised: 08/25/2017] [Accepted: 10/05/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
|
28
|
Pfattheicher S, Keller J. A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas. EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/10463283.2017.1375662] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
|
29
|
Jordan JJ, Rand DG. Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games. J Theor Biol 2017; 421:189-202. [PMID: 28390842 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.04.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2016] [Revised: 03/06/2017] [Accepted: 04/04/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based account (Jordan et al., 2016) that invokes costly signaling. This account proposed that "trustworthy type" individuals (who are incentivized to cooperate with others) typically experience lower costs of TPP, and thus that TPP can function as a costly signal of trustworthiness. Specifically, it was argued that some but not all individuals face incentives to cooperate, making them high-quality and trustworthy interaction partners; and, because the same mechanisms that incentivize cooperation also create benefits for using TPP to deter selfish behavior, these individuals are likely to experience reduced costs of punishing selfishness. Here, we extend this conceptual framework by providing a concrete, "from-the-ground-up" model demonstrating how this process could work in the context of repeated interactions incentivizing both cooperation and punishment. We show how individual differences in the probability of future interaction can create types that vary in whether they find cooperation payoff-maximizing (and thus make high-quality partners), as well as in their net costs of TPP - because a higher continuation probability increases the likelihood of receiving rewards from the victim of the punished transgression (thus offsetting the cost of punishing). We also provide a simple model of dispersal that demonstrates how types that vary in their continuation probabilities can stably coexist, because the payoff from remaining in one's local environment (i.e. not dispersing) decreases with the number of others who stay. Together, this model demonstrates, from the group up, how TPP can serve as a costly signal of trustworthiness arising from exposure to repeated interactions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jillian J Jordan
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT, 06511, United States.
| | - David G Rand
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT, 06511, United States; Department of Economics, Yale University, United States; School of Management, Yale University, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
30
|
Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game. J Theor Biol 2017; 419:243-253. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.11.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2016] [Revised: 09/09/2016] [Accepted: 11/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
|
31
|
Wang X, Zhang L, Du X. The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment in Spatial Social Games. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND APPLICATIONS 2017. [DOI: 10.1142/s1469026817500079] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation especially among multiple participators. However, the performance of these two scenarios in spatial environment needs to be discussed. To figure out this issue, we resort to the [Formula: see text]-player Iterated Snowdrift Dilemma (ISD) game and Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. More importantly, the evolution of punishment and reward in social network-structured populations has not been formally addressed. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency can be influenced by cost-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text], the punishment-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text] and the reward-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text]. And one intriguing observation is that under the same situation, the punishment is more effective than reward to the population. Then we further probe the effectiveness of neighborhood relationship to the cooperation, which is reflected by the random rewired probability [Formula: see text]. From the distribution of the four roles of the participator we can find that individuals can cooperate easily when they have close relationship. The results of this paper may be helpful to understand the cooperation in complex project or among industry–university–research cooperation project.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Xiaoyang Wang
- Zhongshan Institute, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Zhongshan, Guangdong 528400, China
| | - Lei Zhang
- School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275, China
| | - Xiaorong Du
- School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275, China
| |
Collapse
|
32
|
Pfattheicher S, Keller J, Knezevic G. Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2017; 43:337-346. [DOI: 10.1177/0146167216684134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
In public goods situations, a specific destructive behavior emerges when individuals face the possibility of punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, little is known about the (intuitive or reflective) processes underlying antisocial punishment. Building on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis and arguing that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behavior to dominate and to harm other individuals it is assumed that everyday sadists intuitively engage in antisocial punishment. Two studies document that activating (Study 1) and inhibiting (Study 2) the intuitive system when a punishment option can be realized in one-shot iterated public goods games increased (Study 1) and reduced (Study 2) antisocial punishment, in particular among individuals who reported a proneness to sadism. In sum, the present research suggests that sadistic tendencies executed intuitively play a crucial role regarding antisocial punishment in public goods situations.
Collapse
|
33
|
Galanter N, Silva D, Rowell JT, Rychtář J. Resource competition amid overlapping territories: The territorial raider model applied to multi-group interactions. J Theor Biol 2017; 412:100-106. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.10.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2015] [Revised: 10/04/2016] [Accepted: 10/17/2016] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
|
34
|
Morese R, Rabellino D, Sambataro F, Perussia F, Valentini MC, Bara BG, Bosco FM. Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0166357. [PMID: 27835675 PMCID: PMC5106004 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166357] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2015] [Accepted: 10/27/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
This research aims to explore the neural correlates involved in altruistic punishment, parochial altruism and anti-social punishment, using the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In particular, this study considered these punishment behaviors in in-group vs. out-group game settings, to compare how people behave with members of their own national group and with members of another national group. The results showed that participants act altruistically to protect in-group members. This study indicates that norm violation in in-group (but not in out-group) settings results in increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, brain regions involved in the mentalizing network, as the third-party attempts to understand or justify in-group members' behavior. Finally, exploratory analysis during anti-social punishment behavior showed brain activation recruitment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area associated with altered regulation of emotions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Rosalba Morese
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Faculty of Communication Sciences, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
| | - Daniela Rabellino
- Department of Psychiatry, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
| | - Fabio Sambataro
- Department of Experimental and Clinical Medical Sciences (DISM), University of Udine, Udine, Italy
| | - Felice Perussia
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Maria Consuelo Valentini
- Department of Neuroradiology, Hospital-Città della Salute e della Scienza di Torino, Turin, Italy
| | - Bruno G. Bara
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Neuroscience Institute of Turin, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Francesca M. Bosco
- Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- Neuroscience Institute of Turin, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
35
|
Altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of norm violations in the field. Nat Commun 2016; 7:13327. [PMID: 27802261 PMCID: PMC5097122 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms13327] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2016] [Accepted: 09/22/2016] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation is maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for promoting large-scale cooperation among strangers. Lab experiments have shown that people will punish violators of social norms, with the severity of punishment increasing with the degree of violation. Here, Balafoutas et al. show that, outside of the lab, larger violations are not punished more severely and are associated with a greater risk of reprisal.
Collapse
|
36
|
Riehl C, Frederickson ME. Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2016; 371:20150090. [PMID: 26729930 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones-hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as 'cheating' may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christina Riehl
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, 106A Guyot Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
| | - Megan E Frederickson
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Toronto, 25 Willcocks Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3B2
| |
Collapse
|
37
|
Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment. Nat Commun 2016; 7:12288. [PMID: 27504898 PMCID: PMC4980489 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms12288] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2015] [Accepted: 06/20/2016] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Human cooperation is enigmatic, as organisms are expected, by evolutionary and economic theory, to act principally in their own interests. However, cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice resources for each other's benefit. We conducted a series of novel experiments in a foraging society where social institutions make the study of social image and punishment particularly salient. Participants played simple cooperation games where they could punish non-cooperators, promote a positive social image or do so in combination with one another. We show that although all these mechanisms raise cooperation above baseline levels, only when social image alone is at stake do average economic gains rise significantly above baseline. Punishment, either alone or combined with social image building, yields lower gains. Individuals' desire to establish a positive social image thus emerges as a more decisive factor than punishment in promoting human cooperation. Cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice individual rewards for group benefits. Here, Grimalda, Pondorfer and Tracer show in a foraging society of Papua New Guinea that social image building is a more powerful motivator of social cooperation than altruistic punishment.
Collapse
|
38
|
Abstract
Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of free-riders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, PO Box 49, Budapest 1525, Hungary
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, Maribor 2000, Slovenia Department of Physics, Faculty of Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia CAMTP-Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, Maribor 2000, Slovenia
| |
Collapse
|
39
|
Abstract
Why should organisms incur a cost in order to inflict a (usually greater) cost on others? Such costly harming behavior may be favored when competition for resources occurs locally, because it increases individuals' fitness relative to close competitors. However, there is no explicit experimental evidence supporting the prediction that people are more willing to harm others under local versus global competition. We illustrate this prediction with a game theoretic model, and then test it in a series of economic games. In these experiments, players could spend money to make others lose more. We manipulated the scale of competition by awarding cash prizes to the players with the highest payoffs per set of social partners (local competition) or in all the participants in a session (global competition). We found that, as predicted, people were more harmful to others when competition was local (Study 1). This result still held when people "earned" (rather than were simply given) their money (Study 2). In addition, when competition was local, people were more willing to harm ingroup members than outgroup members (Study 3), because ingroup members were the relevant competitive targets. Together, our results suggest that local competition in human groups not only promotes willingness to harm others in general, but also causes ingroup hostility.
Collapse
|
40
|
Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans. Sci Rep 2016; 6:20767. [PMID: 26888519 PMCID: PMC4757890 DOI: 10.1038/srep20767] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2015] [Accepted: 01/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.
Collapse
|
41
|
Rabellino D, Morese R, Ciaramidaro A, Bara BG, Bosco FM. Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2016. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2016.1138961] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
|
42
|
Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2015; 386:69-77. [PMID: 26408337 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2015] [Revised: 09/09/2015] [Accepted: 09/12/2015] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Investigation of anti-social punishment has shaken the positive role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. However, punishment is ubiquitous in nature, and the centralized, apposed to decentralized, punishment is more favored by certain modern societies in particular. To explore the underlying principle of such phenomenon, we study the evolution of cooperation in the context of pro- and anti-social punishments subject to two distinct patterns: costly centralized and decentralized punishments. The results suggest that the pattern of punishment has a great effect on the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. In the absence of anti-social punishment, the costly centralized punishment is more effective in promoting the emergence of cooperation. Anti-social punishment can subvert the positive role of punishment when anti- and pro-social punishments are in the same pattern. However, driven by centralized pro-social punishment, cooperation can be more advantageous than defection even in the presence of decentralized anti-social punishment.
Collapse
|
43
|
van Dijk E, Molenmaker WE, de Kwaadsteniet EW. Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas: the use of sanctions. Curr Opin Psychol 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
|
44
|
Abstract
Cooperation is a paradox: Why should one perform a costly behavior only to increase the fitness of another? Human societies, in which individuals cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals on a considerably larger scale than most mammals do, are especially puzzling in this regard. Recently, the threat of punishment has been given substantial attention as one of the mechanisms that could help sustain human cooperation in such situations. Nevertheless, using punishment to explain cooperation only leads to further questions: Why spend precious resources to penalize free-riders, especially if others can avoid this investment and cheaters can punish you back? Here, it is argued that current evidence supports punishment as an efficient means for the maintenance of cooperation, and that the gravity of proposed limitations of punishment for maintaining cooperation may have been overestimated in previous studies due to the features of experimental design. Most notably, the importance of factors as characteristic of human societies as reputation and language has been greatly neglected. Ironically, it was largely the combination of the two that enabled humans to shape costly punishment into numerous low-cost and less detrimental strategies that clearly can promote human cooperation.
Collapse
|
45
|
Espín AM, Exadaktylos F, Herrmann B, Brañas-Garza P. Short- and long-run goals in ultimatum bargaining: impatience predicts spite-based behavior. Front Behav Neurosci 2015; 9:214. [PMID: 26347625 PMCID: PMC4538919 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00214] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2014] [Accepted: 07/30/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In this game, two players have to agree on how to split a sum of money. The proposer makes an offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If the responder rejects, neither player gets anything. The prevailing view is that, beyond self-interest, the desire to equalize both players’ payoffs (i.e., fairness) is the crucial motivation in the UG. Based on this view, previous research suggests that fairness is a short-run oriented motive that conflicts with the long-run goal of self-interest. However, competitive spite, which reflects an antisocial (not norm-based) desire to minimize others’ payoffs, can also account for the behavior observed in the UG, and has been linked to short-run, present-oriented aspirations as well. In this paper, we explore the relationship between individuals’ intertemporal preferences and their behavior in a citywide dual-role UG experiment (N = 713). We find that impatience (short-run orientation) predicts the rejection of low, “unfair” offers as responder and the proposal of low, “unfair” offers as proposer, which is consistent with spitefulness but inconsistent with fairness motivations. This behavior systematically reduces the payoffs of those who interact with impatient individuals. Thus, impatient individuals appear to be keen to minimize their partners’ share of the pie, even at the risk of destroying it. These findings indicate that competitively reducing other’s payoffs, rather than fairness (or self-interest), is the short-run goal in ultimatum bargaining.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Antonio M Espín
- Department of Economics, Business School, Middlesex University London London, UK ; GLOBE, Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada Granada, Spain
| | - Filippos Exadaktylos
- Department of Economics, Business School, Middlesex University London London, UK ; BİLGİ Economics Lab of Istanbul Istanbul, Turkey
| | | | - Pablo Brañas-Garza
- Department of Economics, Business School, Middlesex University London London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
46
|
Szabó G, Bodó KS, Allen B, Nowak MA. Four classes of interactions for evolutionary games. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2015; 92:022820. [PMID: 26382467 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.92.022820] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
The symmetric four-strategy games are decomposed into a linear combination of 16 basis games represented by orthogonal matrices. Among these basis games four classes can be distinguished as it is already found for the three-strategy games. The games with self-dependent (cross-dependent) payoffs are characterized by matrices consisting of uniform rows (columns). Six of 16 basis games describe coordination-type interactions among the strategy pairs and three basis games span the parameter space of the cyclic components that are analogous to the rock-paper-scissors games. In the absence of cyclic components the game is a potential game and the potential matrix is evaluated. The main features of the four classes of games are discussed separately and we illustrate some characteristic strategy distributions on a square lattice in the low noise limit if logit rule controls the strategy evolution. Analysis of the general properties indicates similar types of interactions at larger number of strategies for the symmetric matrix games.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- György Szabó
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Kinga S Bodó
- Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budafoki t 8, H-1111 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
| |
Collapse
|
47
|
dos Santos M. The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games. Proc Biol Sci 2015; 282:20141994. [PMID: 25429015 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1994] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Miguel dos Santos
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, Biophore, University of Lausanne, Lausanne 1015, Switzerland
| |
Collapse
|
48
|
Roos P, Gelfand M, Nau D, Lun J. Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 137] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
|
49
|
Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods. GAMES 2015. [DOI: 10.3390/g6020124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
|
50
|
Hintze A, Adami C. Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis. Phys Biol 2015; 12:046005. [DOI: 10.1088/1478-3975/12/4/046005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022]
|