Is subsidizing vaccination with hub agent priority policy really meaningful to suppress disease spreading?

Decision analysis of international joint prevention and control of public health emergencies

COVID-19 has caused huge losses to countries around the world, and it will not end in a short time. The lack of motivation for international joint prevention and control is one of the important reasons for the global pandemic of COVID-19. How to improve the efforts and level of international joint prevention and control has become an urgent problem to be solved. Considering the long-term and dynamic nature of international joint prevention and control, the differential game method is used to compare and analyze the optimal decisions of countries in the three scenarios of spontaneous governance, external subsidies and internal cost sharing. The results show that the optimal prevention and control efforts of countries are negatively correlated with discount rates, prevention and control cost coefficients, decay rate and risk factors. It is positively correlated with the impact degree of social benefits, the impact degree of prevention and control efforts on the level of joint prevention and control, the distribution ratio of social benefits, and the impact degree of prevention and control level on social benefits. The prevention and control efforts, joint prevention and control level, social benefits and system benefits under spontaneous governance are the lowest and highest under the internal cost sharing. The internal cost sharing will only be carried out when social benefits distribution ratio obtained reach a certain threshold. This study provides decision-making support for the joint prevention and control of countries to defeat COVID-19 under the normalization of the epidemic.

Effect of vaccine efficacy on disease transmission with age-structured

Recent outbreaks of novel infectious diseases (e.g., COVID-19, H2N3) have highlighted the threat of pathogen transmission, and vaccination offers a necessary tool to relieve illness. However, vaccine efficacy is one of the barriers to eradicating the epidemic. Intuitively, vaccine efficacy is closely related to age structures, and the distribution of vaccine efficacy usually obeys a Gaussian distribution, such as with H3N2 and influenza A and B. Based on this fact, in this paper, we study the effect of vaccine efficacy on disease spread by considering different age structures and extending the traditional susceptible-infected-recovery/vaccinator(SIR/V) model with two stages to three stages, which includes the decision-making stage, epidemic stage, and birth-death stage. Extensive numerical simulations show that our model generates a higher vaccination level compared with the case of complete vaccine efficacy because the vaccinated individuals in our model can form small and numerous clusters slower than that of complete vaccine efficacy. In addition, priority vaccination for the elderly is conducive to halting the epidemic when facing population ageing. Our work is expected to provide valuable information for decision-making and the design of more effective disease control strategies.

Free ticket, discount ticket or intermediate of the best of two worlds - Which subsidy policy is socially optimal to suppress the disease spreading?

With the aid of the evolutionary vaccination game on a scale-free network, we design a new subsidy policy, named degree dependent subsidy, where cooperative agents get incentives according to their connectivity or degree. That is, agents, having a greater degree, receive a higher incentive, and vice versa. Here we presume that vaccinators are cooperative agents. The new scheme can be said to an intermediate policy between two previously studies policies, namely free ticket and flat discount policies. The former policy distributes free tickets to cooperative hub agents as a priority, whereas the latter dispenses a fixed discount to every cooperator. We compare the efficiency of each policy in terms of having a less infectious state with a minimum social cost. While investigating the performance of the three policies in terms of average social payoff-which takes into account the cost of vaccination as well as infection-the free ticket scheme is found to be the most appealing policies among the three when the budget for subsidy is quite low. The degree dependent subsidy policy outperforms others for a moderate budget size, while the flat discount policy requires a higher budget to effectively suppress the disease. We further estimate threshold levels of the subsidy budget for each policy beyond which subsidizing results in excessive use of vaccination. As a whole, concerning vaccination coverage and final epidemic size, the degree-dependent subsidy scheme outperforms the flat discount scheme, but is dominated by the free ticket policy.

Modeling the competitive diffusions of rumor and knowledge and the impacts on epidemic spreading

The interaction between epidemic spreading and information diffusion is an interdisciplinary research problem. During an epidemic, people tend to take self-protective measures to reduce the infection risk. However, with the diffusion of rumor, people may be difficult to make an appropriate choice. How to reduce the negative impact of rumor and to control epidemic has become a critical issue in the social network. Elaborate mathematical model is instructive to understand such complex dynamics. In this paper, we develop a two-layer network to model the interaction between the spread of epidemic and the competitive diffusions of information. The results show that knowledge diffusion can eradicate both rumor and epidemic, where the penetration intensity of knowledge into rumor plays a vital role. Specifically, the penetration intensity of knowledge significantly increases the thresholds for rumor and epidemic to break out, even when the self-protective measure is not perfectly effective. But eradicating rumor shouldn't be equated with eradicating epidemic. The epidemic can be eradicated with rumor still diffusing, and the epidemic may keep spreading with rumor being eradicated. Moreover, the communication-layer network structure greatly affects the spread of epidemic in the contact-layer network. When people have more connections in the communication-layer network, the knowledge is more likely to diffuse widely, and the rumor and epidemic can be eradicated more efficiently. When the communication-layer network is sparse, a larger penetration intensity of knowledge into rumor is required to promote the diffusion of knowledge.

Optimal control and differential game solutions for social distancing in response to epidemics of infectious diseases on networks

In this paper, the problem of social distancing in the spread of infectious diseases in the human network is extended by optimal control and differential game approaches. Hear, SEAIR model on simulation network is used. Total costs for both approaches are formulated as objective functions. SEAIR dynamics for group k that contacts with k individuals including susceptible, exposed, asymptomatically infected, symptomatically infected and improved or safe individuals is modeled. A novel random model including the concept of social distancing and relative risk of infection using Markov process is proposed. For each group, an aggregate investment is derived and computed using adjoint equations and maximum principle. Results show that for each group, investments in the differential game are less than investments in an optimal control approach. Although individuals' participation in investment for social distancing causes to reduce the epidemic cost, the epidemic cost according to the second approach is too much less than the first approach.

Analysis of individual strategies for artificial and natural immunity with imperfectness and durability of protection

As protection against infectious disease, immunity is conferred by one of two main defense mechanisms, namely (i) resistance generated by previous infection (known as natural immunity) or (ii) by being vaccinated (known as artificial immunity). To analyze, a modified SVIRS epidemic model is established that integrates the effects of the durability of protection and imperfectness in the framework of the human decision-making process as a vaccination game. It is supposed that immunized people become susceptible again when their immunity expires, which depends on the duration of immunity. The current theory for most voluntary vaccination games assumes that seasonal diseases such as influenza are controlled by a temporal vaccine, the immunity of which lasts for only one season. Also, a novel perspective is established involving an individual's immune system combined with self-interest to take the vaccine and natural immunity obtained from infection by coupling a disease-spreading model with an evolutionary game approach over a long period. Numerical simulations show that the longer attenuation helps significantly to control the spread of disease. Also discovered is the entire mechanism of active and passive immunities, in the sense of how they coexist with natural and artificial immunity. Thus, the prospect of finding the optimal strategy for eradicating a disease could help in the design of effective vaccination campaigns and policies.

Cost-efficiency analysis of voluntary vaccination against n-serovar diseases using antibody-dependent enhancement: A game approach

Records of epidemics acknowledge immunological multi-serotype illnesses as an important aspect of the occurrence and control of contagious diseases. These patterns occur due to antibody-dependent-enhancement (ADE) among serotype diseases, which leads to infection of secondary infectious classes. One example of this is dengue hemorrhagic fever and dengue shock syndrome, which comprises the following four serotypes: DEN-1, DEN-2, DEN-3, and DEN-4. The evolutionary vaccination game approach is able to shed light on this long-standing issue in a bid to evaluate the success of various control programs. Although immunization is regarded as one of the most accepted approaches for minimizing the risk of infection, cost and efficiency are important factors that must also be considered. To analyze the n-serovar aspect alongside ADE consequence in voluntary vaccination, this study establishes a new mathematical epidemiological model that is dovetailed with evolutionary game theory, an approach through which we explored two vaccine programs: primary and secondary. Our findings illuminate that the 'cost-efficiency' effect for vaccination decision exhibits an impact on controlling n-serovar infectious diseases and should be designed in such a manner as to avoid adverse effects. Furthermore, our numerical result justifies the fact that adopting ADE significantly boosted emerging disease incidence, it also suggest that the joint vaccine policy works even better when the complex cyclical epidemic outbreak takes place among multi serotypes interactions. Research also exposes that the primary vaccine is a better controlling tool than the secondary; however, introducing a highly-efficiency secondary vaccine against secondary infection plays a key role to control the disease prevalence.