Speaking of secrets and lies: The contribution of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to vocal deception

Cognitive control and dishonesty

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Effects of Online Single Pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on Prefrontal and Parietal Cortices in Deceptive Processing: A Preliminary Study

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to test the functional role of parietal and prefrontal cortical regions activated during a playing card Guilty Knowledge Task (GKT). Single-pulse TMS was applied to 15 healthy volunteers at each of three target sites: left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and midline parietal cortex. TMS pulses were applied at each of five latencies (from 0 to 480 ms) after the onset of a card stimulus. TMS applied to the parietal cortex exerted a latency-specific increase in inverse efficiency score and in reaction time when subjects were instructed to lie relative to when asked to respond with the truth, and this effect was specific to when TMS was applied at 240 ms after stimulus onset. No effects of TMS were detected at left or right DLPFC sites. This manipulation with TMS of performance in a deception task appears to support a critical role for the parietal cortex in intentional false responding, particularly in stimulus selection processes needed to execute a deceptive response in the context of a GKT. However, this interpretation is only preliminary, as further experiments are needed to compare performance within and outside of a deceptive context to clarify the effects of deceptive intent.

Effective connectivity in cortical networks during deception: A lie detection study using EEG

Previous studies have identified activated regions associated with deceptive tasks and most of them utilized time, frequency, or temporal features to identify deceptive responses. However, when deception behaviors occur, the functional connectivity pattern and the communication between different brain areas remain largely unclear. In this study, we explored the most important information flows between different brain cortices during deception. First, we employed the guilty knowledge test protocol and recorded on 64 electrodes electroencephalogram (EEG) signals from 30 subjects (15 guilty and 15 innocent). EEG source estimation was then performed to compute the cortical activities on the 24 regions of interest (ROIs). Next, effective connectivity was calculated by partial directed coherence (PDC) analysis applied to the cortical signals. Furthermore, based on the graph-theoretical analysis, the network parameters with significant differences were extracted as features to identify two groups of subjects. In addition, the ROIs frequently involved in the above network parameters were selected, and based on the difference in the group mean of PDC values of all the edges connected with the selected ROIs, we presented the strongest information flows (MIIF) in the guilty group relative to the innocent group. Experimental results first show that the optimal classification features are mainly in-degree and out-degree measures of the ROI and the high classification accuracy for four bands demonstrated that the proposed method is suitable for lie detection. In addition, the frontoparietal network was found to be most prominent among all the MIIFs in four bands. Finally, combining the neurophysiology signification of four frequency bands, respectively, we analyzed the roles of all the important information flows to uncover the underlying cognitive processes and mechanisms used in deception.

Detecting spontaneous deception in the brain

Deception detection can be of great value during the juristic investigation. Although the neural signatures of deception have been widely documented, most prior studies were biased by difficulty levels. That is, deceptive behavior typically required more effort, making deception detection possibly effort detection. Furthermore, no study has examined the generalizability across instructed and spontaneous responses and across participants. To explore these issues, we used a dual‐task paradigm, where the difficulty level was balanced between truth‐telling and lying, and the instructed and spontaneous truth‐telling and lying were collected independently. Using Multivoxel pattern analysis, we were able to decode truth‐telling versus lying with a balanced difficulty level. Results showed that the angular gyrus (AG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and postcentral gyrus could differentiate lying from truth‐telling. Critically, linear classifiers trained to distinguish instructed truthful and deceptive responses could correctly differentiate spontaneous truthful and deceptive responses in AG and IFG with above‐chance accuracy. In addition, with a leave‐one‐participant‐out analysis, multivoxel neural patterns from AG could classify if the left‐out participant was lying or not in a trial. These results indicate the commonality of neural responses subserved instructed and spontaneous deceptive behavior as well as the feasibility of cross‐participant deception validation.

The role of anterior prefrontal cortex (area 10) in face-to-face deception measured with fNIRS

Anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC, Brodmann area 10) activations are often, but not always, found in neuroimaging studies investigating deception, and the precise role of this area remains unclear. To explore the role of the PFC in face-to-face deception, we invited pairs of participants to play a card game involving lying and lie detection while we used functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to record brain activity in the PFC. Participants could win points for successfully lying about the value of their cards or for detecting lies. We contrasted patterns of brain activation when the participants either told the truth or lied, when they were either forced into this or did so voluntarily and when they either succeeded or failed to detect a lie. Activation in the anterior PFC was found in both lie production and detection, unrelated to reward. Analysis of cross-brain activation patterns between participants identified areas of the PFC where the lead player’s brain activity synchronized their partner’s later brain activity. These results suggest that during situations that involve close interpersonal interaction, the anterior PFC supports processing widely involved in deception, possibly relating to the demands of monitoring one’s own and other people’s behaviour.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Does Abstract Mindset Decrease or Increase Deception?

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.

Testing the applied potential of the Sheffield Lie Test

The Sheffield Lie Test (SLT) has been frequently used in laboratory research investigating basic mechanisms of deception. Its applied potential as a lie detection tool has been contested. The current two experiments used a reaction time SLT and investigated whether it can discriminate between participants who committed a mock crime and participants who performed an everyday activity. Results of the first experiment revealed that guilty participants (n = 32) took longer and committed more errors when having to deceptively deny the mock crime and deceptively confirm having performed the everyday activity in contrast to truthfully admitting the mock crime and denying the everyday activity. Innocent participants (n = 29) showed the reversed pattern. Individual Cohen's d's and the area under the ROC curve revealed a high above chance discrimination between both groups. In a second experiment, we repeated this procedure, yet participants were now given a more elaborate explanation of the alibi activity that all should pretend to have done. Although results still revealed the expected pattern in innocent participants (n = 48), the effect was not significant any more for the guilty participants (n = 46). Accordingly, classification accuracies also dropped. These two experiments demonstrate the applied potential of the SLT, yet at the same time its severe limitations. Potential solutions and suggestions for future research will be discussed.

Cues to Lying May be Deceptive: Speaker and Listener Behaviour in an Interactive Game of Deception

Are the cues that speakers produce when lying the same cues that listeners attend to when attempting to detect deceit? We used a two-person interactive game to explore the production and perception of speech and nonverbal cues to lying. In each game turn, participants viewed pairs of images, with the location of some treasure indicated to the speaker but not to the listener. The speaker described the location of the treasure, with the objective of misleading the listener about its true location; the listener attempted to locate the treasure, based on their judgement of the speaker’s veracity. In line with previous comprehension research, listeners’ responses suggest that they attend primarily to behaviours associated with increased mental difficulty, perhaps because lying, under a cognitive hypothesis, is thought to cause an increased cognitive load. Moreover, a mouse-tracking analysis suggests that these judgements are made quickly, while the speakers’ utterances are still unfolding. However, there is a surprising mismatch between listeners and speakers: When producing false statements, speakers are less likely to produce the cues that listeners associate with lying. This production pattern is in keeping with an attempted control hypothesis, whereby liars may take into account listeners’ expectations and correspondingly manipulate their behaviour to avoid detection.

Lie Detection Using fNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates Infrequent but not Frequent Liars

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to test whether monitoring inhibition-related brain regions is a feasible method for detecting both infrequent liars and frequent liars. Thirty-two participants were divided into two groups: the deceptive group (liars) and the non-deceptive group (ND group, innocents). All the participants were required to undergo a simulated interrogation by a computer. The participants from the deceptive group were instructed to tell a mix of lies and truths and those of the ND group were instructed always to tell the truth. Based on the number of deceptions, the participants of the deceptive group were further divided into a infrequently deceptive group (IFD group, infrequent liars) and a frequently deceptive group (FD group, frequent liars). The infrequent liars exhibited greater neural activities than the frequent liars and the innocents in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) when performing the deception detection tasks. While performing deception detection tasks, infrequent liars showed significantly greater neural activation in the left MFG than the baseline, but frequent liars and innocents did not exhibit this pattern of neural activation in any area of inhibition-related brain regions. The results of individual analysis showed an acceptable accuracy of detecting infrequent liars, but an unacceptable accuracy of detecting frequent liars. These results suggest that using fNIRS monitoring of inhibition-related brain regions is feasible for detecting infrequent liars, for whom deception may be more effortful and therefore more physiologically marked, but not frequent liars.

Deceptive but Not Honest Manipulative Actions Are Associated with Increased Interaction between Middle and Inferior Frontal gyri

The prefrontal cortex is believed to be responsible for execution of deceptive behavior and its involvement is associated with greater cognitive efforts. It is also generally assumed that deception is associated with the inhibition of default honest actions. However, the precise neurophysiological mechanisms underlying this process remain largely unknown. The present study was aimed to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal the underlying functional integration within the prefrontal cortex during the task which requires that subjects to deliberately mislead an opponent through the sequential execution of deceptive and honest claims. To address this issue, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which allows for statistical assessment of changes in functional relationships between active brain areas in changing psychological contexts. As a result the whole brain PPI-analysis established that both manipulative honest and deceptive claiming were associated with an increase in connectivity between the left middle frontal gyrus and right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Taking into account the role played by rTPJ in processes associated with the theory of mind the revealed data can reflect possible influence of socio-cognitive context on the process of selecting manipulative claiming regardless their honest or deceptive nature. Direct comparison between deceptive and honest claims revealed pattern enhancement of coupling between the left middle frontal gyrus and the left inferior frontal gyrus. This finding provided evidence that the execution of deception relies to a greater extent on higher-order hierarchically-organized brain mechanisms of executive control required to select between two competing deceptive or honest task sets.

Gender difference in spontaneous deception: A hyperscanning study using functional near-infrared spectroscopy

Previous studies have demonstrated that the neural basis of deception involves a network of regions including the medial frontal cortex (MFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), etc. However, to test the actual activity of the brain in the act of deceptive practice itself, existing studies have mainly adopted paradigms of passive deception, where participants are told to lie in certain conditions, and have focused on intra-brain mechanisms in single participants. In order to examine the neural substrates underlying more natural, spontaneous deception in real social interactions, the present study employed a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) hyperscanning technique to simultaneously measure pairs of participants' fronto-temporal activations in a two-person gambling card-game. We demonstrated higher TPJ activation in deceptive compared to honest acts. Analysis of participants' inter-brain correlation further revealed that the STS is uniquely involved in deception but not in honesty, especially in females. These results suggest that the STS may play a critical role in spontaneous deception due to mentalizing requirements relating to modulating opponents' thoughts. To our knowledge, this study was the first to investigate such inter-brain correlates of deception in real face-to-face interactions, and thus is hoped to provide a new path for future complex social behavior research.

When is Deceptive Message Production More Effortful than Truth-Telling? A Baker's Dozen of Moderators

Deception is thought to be more effortful than telling the truth. Empirical evidence from many quarters supports this general proposition. However, there are many factors that qualify and even reverse this pattern. Guided by a communication perspective, I present a baker’s dozen of moderators that may alter the degree of cognitive difficulty associated with producing deceptive messages. Among sender-related factors are memory processes, motivation, incentives, and consequences. Lying increases activation of a network of brain regions related to executive memory, suppression of unwanted behaviors, and task switching that is not observed with truth-telling. High motivation coupled with strong incentives or the risk of adverse consequences also prompts more cognitive exertion–for truth-tellers and deceivers alike–to appear credible, with associated effects on performance and message production effort, depending on the magnitude of effort, communicator skill, and experience. Factors related to message and communication context include discourse genre, type of prevarication, expected response length, communication medium, preparation, and recency of target event/issue. These factors can attenuate the degree of cognitive taxation on senders so that truth-telling and deceiving are similarly effortful. Factors related to the interpersonal relationship among interlocutors include whether sender and receiver are cooperative or adversarial and how well-acquainted they are with one another. A final consideration is whether the unit of analysis is the utterance, turn at talk, episode, entire interaction, or series of interactions. Taking these factors into account should produce a more nuanced answer to the question of when deception is more difficult than truth-telling.

Specific marker of feigned memory impairment: The activation of left superior frontal gyrus

Faking memory impairment means normal people complain lots of memory problems without organic damage in forensic assessments. Using alternative forced-choice paradigm, containing digital or autobiographical information, previous neuroimaging studies have indicated that faking memory impairment could cause the activation in the prefrontal and parietal regions, and might involve a fronto-parietal-subcortical circuit. However, it is still unclear whether different memory types have influence on faking or not. Since different memory types, such as long-term memory (LTM) and short-term memory (STM), were found supported by different brain areas, we hypothesized that feigned STM or LTM impairment had distinct neural activation mapping. Besides that, some common neural correlates may act as the general characteristic of feigned memory impairment. To verify this hypothesis, the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) combined with an alternative word forced-choice paradigm were used in this study. A total of 10 right-handed participants, in this study, had to perform both STW and LTM tasks respectively under answering correctly, answering randomly and feigned memory impairment conditions. Our results indicated that the activation of the left superior frontal gyrus and the left medial frontal gyrus was associated with feigned LTM impairment, whereas the left superior frontal gyrus, the left precuneus and the right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were highly activated while feigning STM impairment. Furthermore, an overlapping was found in the left superior frontal gyrus, and it suggested that the activity of the left superior frontal gyrus might be acting as a specific marker of feigned memory impairment.

The neural correlates of emotion regulation by implementation intentions

Several studies have investigated the neural basis of effortful emotion regulation (ER) but the neural basis of automatic ER has been less comprehensively explored. The present study investigated the neural basis of automatic ER supported by 'implementation intentions'. 40 healthy participants underwent fMRI while viewing emotion-eliciting images and used either a previously-taught effortful ER strategy, in the form of a goal intention (e.g., try to take a detached perspective), or a more automatic ER strategy, in the form of an implementation intention (e.g., "If I see something disgusting, then I will think these are just pixels on the screen!"), to regulate their emotional response. Whereas goal intention ER strategies were associated with activation of brain areas previously reported to be involved in effortful ER (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), ER strategies based on an implementation intention strategy were associated with activation of right inferior frontal gyrus and ventro-parietal cortex, which may reflect the attentional control processes automatically captured by the cue for action contained within the implementation intention. Goal intentions were also associated with less effective modulation of left amygdala, supporting the increased efficacy of ER under implementation intention instructions, which showed coupling of orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. The findings support previous behavioural studies in suggesting that forming an implementation intention enables people to enact goal-directed responses with less effort and more efficiency.

Decoding the processing of lying using functional connectivity MRI

Background

Previous functional MRI (fMRI) studies have demonstrated group differences in brain activity between deceptive and honest responses. The functional connectivity network related to lie-telling remains largely uncharacterized.

Methods

In this study, we designed a lie-telling experiment that emphasized strategy devising. Thirty-two subjects underwent fMRI while responding to questions in a truthful, inverse, or deceitful manner. For each subject, whole-brain functional connectivity networks were constructed from correlations among brain regions for the lie-telling and truth-telling conditions. Then, a multivariate pattern analysis approach was used to distinguish lie-telling from truth-telling based on the functional connectivity networks.

Results

The classification results demonstrated that lie-telling could be differentiated from truth-telling with an accuracy of 82.81% (85.94% for lie-telling, 79.69% for truth-telling). The connectivities related to the fronto-parietal networks, cerebellum and cingulo-opercular networks are most discriminating, implying crucial roles for these three networks in the processing of deception.

Conclusions

The current study may shed new light on the neural pattern of deception from a functional integration viewpoint.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12993-014-0046-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Neural correlates of self-deception and impression-management

Self-deception and impression-management comprise two types of deceptive, but generally socially acceptable behaviours, which are common in everyday life as well as being present in a number of psychiatric disorders. We sought to establish and dissociate the 'normal' brain substrates of self-deception and impression-management. Twenty healthy participants underwent fMRI scanning at 3T whilst completing the 'Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding' test under two conditions: 'fake good', giving the most desirable impression possible and 'fake bad' giving an undesirable impression. Impression-management scores were more malleable to manipulation via 'faking' than self-deception scores. Response times to self-deception questions and 'fake bad' instructions were significantly longer than to impression-management questions and 'fake good' instructions respectively. Self-deception and impression-management manipulation and 'faking bad' were associated with activation of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC). Impression-management manipulation was additionally associated with activation of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left posterior middle temporal gyrus. 'Faking bad' was additionally associated with activation of right vlPFC, left temporo-parietal junction and right cerebellum. There were no supra-threshold activations associated with 'faking good'. Our neuroimaging data suggest that manipulating self-deception and impression-management and more specifically 'faking bad' engages a common network comprising mPFC and left vlPFC. Shorter response times and lack of dissociable neural activations suggests that 'faking good', particularly when it comes to impression-management, may be our most practiced 'default' mode.

The motor cost of telling lies: electrocortical signatures and personality foundations of spontaneous deception

Although universal, lying is generally considered immoral behavior. Most neuroscience studies on lying sanction or instruct deceptive behaviors and thus might fail to acknowledge the significance of lie-related moral conflicts. By combining electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings with a novel paradigm in which participants decided freely whether to deceive another person, we have generated indices of the cognitive (reaction times and stimulus-locked event-related components) and moral (readiness potential and its correlations with deception-related personality traits) cost of spontaneous deception. Our data fail to support the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling, suggesting that spontaneous deception, as opposed to lying out of requirement, might not mandate additional cognitive workload. Interestingly, lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an event-related potential (ERP) component that is linked to motor preparation of self-determined actions and modulated when we face moral dilemmas. Notably, this reduction was less extensive in manipulative participants and greater in those who cared highly about their impression management. Our study expands on previous findings on deception by associating a cortical marker of reduced preparation to act with individual differences in moral cognition.

Pants on fire: the electrophysiological signature of telling a lie

Even though electroencephalography has played a prominent role for lie detection via personally relevant information, the electrophysiological signature of active lying is still elusive. We addressed this signature with two experiments in which participants helped a virtual police officer to locate a knife. Crucially, before this response, they announced whether they would lie or tell the truth about the knife's location. This design allowed us to study the signature of lie-telling in the absence of rare and personally significant oddball stimuli that are typically used for lie detection via electrophysiological markers, especially the P300 component. Our results indicate that active lying attenuated P300 amplitudes as well as N200 amplitudes for such non-oddball stimuli. These results support accounts that stress the high cognitive demand of lie-telling, including the need to suppress the truthful response and to generate a lie.

I want to lie about not knowing you, but my precuneus refuses to cooperate

Previously identified neural correlates of deception, such as the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal regions, have proven to be unreliable neural markers of deception, most likely because activity in these regions reflects executive processes that are not specific to deception. Herein, we report the first fMRI study that provides strong preliminary evidence that the neural activity associated with perception but not executive processes could offer a better marker of deception with regard to face familiarity. Using a face-recognition task, activity in the left precuneus during the perception of familiar faces accurately marked 11 of 13 subjects who lied about not knowing faces that were in fact familiar to them. This level of classification accuracy is much higher than the level predicted by chance and agrees with other findings by experts in lie detection.

Lying in neuropsychology

The issue of lying occurs in neuropsychology especially when examinations are conducted in a forensic context. When a subject intentionally either presents non-existent deficits or exaggerates their severity to obtain financial or material compensation, this behaviour is termed malingering. Malingering is discussed in the general framework of lying in psychology, and the different procedures used by neuropsychologists to evidence a lack of collaboration at examination are briefly presented and discussed. When a lack of collaboration is observed, specific emphasis is placed on the difficulty in unambiguously establishing that this results from the patient's voluntary decision.

Mind Reading Using Neuroimaging

Traditional lie detection tools, such as the polygraph, voice stress analysis, or special interrogation techniques, rely on behavioral or psychophysiological manifestations of deception. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, the question emerged whether it would be possible to directly identify deceit in the part of the body where it is generated: the brain. After a few promising studies, these techniques became soon commercially available and there have been attempts to use such results in the court in recent years. The current article reviews the development of neuroimaging techniques in the field of deception detection and critically discusses the potential but also the shortcomings of such methods. Unfortunately, the majority of research in this field was rather unsystematic and neglected the accumulated knowledge regarding methodological pitfalls that were extensively discussed in the scientific community in conjunction with the polygraph. Therefore, neuroimaging studies on deception largely differ with respect to the experimental paradigm (the interrogation technique), the methods for analyzing the data, and the procedures to obtain individual diagnoses. Moreover, most studies used artificial laboratory settings that differ considerably from real-life applications. As a consequence, neuroimaging techniques are not applicable for detecting deception in individual field cases at the moment. However, recent advantages such as multivariate pattern analysis might yield novel neuroimaging applications in the near future that are capable of improving established techniques for detecting deception or concealed knowledge.

Who is honest and why: baseline activation in anterior insula predicts inter-individual differences in deceptive behavior

Humans engage in deceptive behavior that negatively affects others. The propensity to deceive is, however, characterized by vast inter-individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. Attempts to investigate the origins of this heterogeneity have so far mainly relied on subjective measures and have shown little predictive power. Here, we used resting electroencephalography to measure objective and stable individual differences in neural baseline activation in combination with an ecologically valid deception paradigm. Results showed that task-independent baseline activation in the anterior insula, a brain area implicated in mapping internal bodily states and in representing emotional arousal and conscious feelings, predicts individuals' propensity for deceptive behavior. The higher the neural baseline activation in this area is, the lower individuals' propensity to deceive. Moreover, results provide evidence that high baseline activation in the anterior insula is associated with negative affect and dispositional tendencies to avoid aversive emotional situations. These results provide converging neural and psychological evidence that individuals might avoid a deceptive act due to a highly active negative emotional system which would make a deceptive act too stressful and bothersome.

Telling lies: the irrepressible truth?

Telling a lie takes longer than telling the truth but precisely why remains uncertain. We investigated two processes suggested to increase response times, namely the decision to lie and the construction of a lie response. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were directed or chose whether to lie or tell the truth. A colored square was presented and participants had to name either the true color of the square or lie about it by claiming it was a different color. In both experiments we found that there was a greater difference between lying and telling the truth when participants were directed to lie compared to when they chose to lie. In Experiments 3 and 4, we compared response times when participants had only one possible lie option to a choice of two or three possible options. There was a greater lying latency effect when questions involved more than one possible lie response. Experiment 5 examined response choice mechanisms through the manipulation of lie plausibility. Overall, results demonstrate several distinct mechanisms that contribute to additional processing requirements when individuals tell a lie.

When Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception

Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

The neural correlates of identity faking and concealment: an FMRI study

The neural basis of self and identity has received extensive research. However, most of these existing studies have focused on situations where the internal representation of the self is consistent with the external one. The present study used fMRI methodology to examine the neural correlates of two different types of identity conflict: identity faking and concealment. Participants were presented with a sequence of names and asked to either conceal their own identity or fake another one. The results revealed that the right insular cortex and bilaterally inferior frontal gyrus were more active for identity concealment compared to the control condition, whereas identity faking elicited a significantly larger percentage signal increase than the control condition in the right superior frontal gyrus, left calcarine, and right caudate. These results suggest that different neural systems associated with both identity processing and deception were involved in identity concealment and faking.

Does the inferior frontal sulcus play a functional role in deception? A neuronavigated theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation study

By definition, lying involves withholding the truth. Response inhibition may therefore be the cognitive function at the heart of deception. Neuroimaging research has shown that the same brain region that is activated during response inhibition tasks, namely the inferior frontal region, is also activated during deception paradigms. This led to the hypothesis that the inferior frontal region is the neural substrate critically involved in withholding the truth. In the present study, we critically examine the functional necessity of the inferior frontal region in withholding the truth during deception. We experimentally manipulated the neural activity level in right inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) by means of neuronavigated continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS). Individual structural magnetic resonance brain images (MRI) were used to allow precise stimulation in each participant. Twenty-six participants answered autobiographical questions truthfully or deceptively before and after sham and real cTBS. Deception was reliably associated with more errors, longer and more variable response times than truth telling. Despite the potential role of IFS in deception as suggested by neuroimaging data, the cTBS-induced disruption of right IFS did not affect response times or error rates, when compared to sham stimulation. The present findings do not support the hypothesis that the right IFS is critically involved in deception.

Neural correlates of feigned memory impairment are distinguishable from answering randomly and answering incorrectly: an fMRI and behavioral study

Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have identified activation in the prefrontal-parietal-sub-cortical circuit during feigned memory impairment when comparing with truthful telling. Here, we used fMRI to determine whether neural activity can differentiate between answering correctly, answering randomly, answering incorrectly, and feigned memory impairment. In this study, 12 healthy subjects underwent block-design fMRI while they performed digit task of forced-choice format under four conditions: answering correctly, answering randomly, answering incorrectly, and simulated feigned memory impairment. There were three main results. First, six areas, including the left prefrontal cortex, the left superior temporal lobe, the right postcentral gyrus, the right superior parietal cortex, the right superior occipital cortex, and the right putamen, were significantly modulated by condition type. Second, for some areas, including the right superior parietal cortex, the right postcentral gyrus, the right superior occipital cortex, and the right putamen, brain activity was significantly greater in feigned memory impairment than answering randomly. Third, for the areas including the left prefrontal cortex and the right putamen, brain activity was significantly greater in feigned memory impairment than answering incorrectly. In contrast, for the left superior temporal lobe, brain activity was significantly greater in answering incorrectly than feigned memory impairment. The results suggest that neural correlates of feigned memory impairment are distinguishable from answering randomly and answering incorrectly in healthy subjects.

The contribution of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the preparation for deception and truth-telling

Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with creating deceptive responses. However, the neural basis of the preparatory processes that create deception has yet to be explored. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the preparation for a certain task activates brain areas relevant to the execution of that task, leading to the question of whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity is observed during the preparation for deception. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity, which increases during the execution of deception compared with the execution of truth-telling, also increases during the preparation for deception compared with the preparation for truth-telling. Our data show that the execution of deception was associated with increased activity in several brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, compared with truth-telling, confirming the contribution of this region to the production of deceptive responses. The results also reveal that the preparations for both deception and truth-telling were associated with increased activity in certain brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that the preparations for truth-telling and deception make similar demands on the brain and that the dorsolateral prefrontal activity identified in the preparation phase is associated with general preparatory processes, regardless of whether one is telling a lie or the truth.

Effect of prefrontal transcranial magnetic stimulation on spontaneous truth-telling

Brain-process foundations of deceptive behaviour have become a subject of intensive study both in fundamental and applied neuroscience. Recently, utilization of transcranial magnetic stimulation has enhanced methodological rigour in this research because in addition to correlational studies causal effects of the distinct cortical systems involved can be studied. In these studies, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been implied as the brain area involved in deceptive behaviour. However, combined brain imaging and stimulation research has been concerned mostly with deceptive behaviour in the contexts of mock thefts and/or denial of recognition of critical objects. Spontaneous, "criminally decontextuated" propensity to lying and its dependence on the activity of selected brain structures has remained unexplored. The purpose of this work is to test whether spontaneous propensity to lying can be changed by brain stimulation. Here, we show that when subjects can name the colour of presented objects correctly or incorrectly at their free will, the tendency to stick to truthful answers can be manipulated by stimulation targeted at dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Right hemisphere stimulation decreases lying, left hemisphere stimulation increases lying. Spontaneous choice to lie more or less can be influenced by brain stimulation.

How the brain shapes deception: an integrated review of the literature

How do people tell a lie? One useful approach to addressing this question is to elucidate the neural substrates for deception. Recent conceptual and technical advances in functional neuroimaging have enabled exploration of the psychology of deception more precisely in terms of the specific neuroanatomical mechanisms involved. A growing body of evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in deception, and some researchers have recently emphasized the importance of other brain regions, such as those responsible for emotion and reward. However, it is still unclear how these regions play a role in making effective decisions to tell a lie. To provide a framework for considering this issue, the present article reviews current accomplishments in the study of the neural basis of deception. First, evolutionary and developmental perspectives are provided to better understand how and when people can make use of deception. The ensuing section introduces several findings on pathological lying and its neural correlate. Next, recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience of deception based on functional neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies are summarized, and possible neural mechanisms underlying deception are proposed. Finally, the priority areas of future neuroscience research-human honesty and dishonesty-are discussed.

The neurobiology of deception: evidence from neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Visualization of how the brain generates a lie is now possible because of recent conceptual and technical advances in functional neuroimaging; this has led to a rapid increase in studies related to the cognitive neuroscience of deception. The present review summarizes recent work on the neural substrates that underlie human deceptive behavior.

RECENT FINDINGS

Functional neuroimaging studies in healthy individuals have revealed that the prefrontal cortex plays a predominant role in deception. In addition, recent evidence obtained from loss-of-function studies with neuropsychological investigation and transcranial direct current stimulation has demonstrated the functional contribution of the prefrontal cortex to deception. Other research into the relationship between deception and the brain has focused on the potential use of functional MRI for lie detection, neural correlates of pathological lying, and brain mechanisms underlying inference of deceit by others.

SUMMARY

Converging evidence from multiple sources suggests that the prefrontal cortex organizes the processes of inhibiting true responses and making deceptive responses. The neural mechanisms underlying various other aspects of deception are also gradually being delineated, although the findings are diverse, and further study is needed. These studies represent an important step toward a neural explanation of complex human deceptive behavior.

Lying about the valence of affective pictures: an fMRI study

The neural correlates of lying about affective information were studied using a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methodology. Specifically, 13 healthy right-handed Chinese men were instructed to lie about the valence, positive or negative, of pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) while their brain activity was scanned by a 3T Philip Achieva scanner. The key finding is that the neural activity associated with deception is valence-related. Comparing to telling the truth, deception about the valence of the affectively positive pictures was associated with activity in the inferior frontal, cingulate, inferior parietal, precuneus, and middle temporal regions. Lying about the valence of the affectively negative pictures, on the other hand, was associated with activity in the orbital and medial frontal regions. While a clear valence-related effect on deception was observed, common neural regions were also recruited for the process of deception about the valence of the affective pictures. These regions included the lateral prefrontal and inferior parietal regions. Activity in these regions has been widely reported in fMRI studies on deception using affectively-neutral stimuli. The findings of this study reveal the effect of valence on the neural activity associated with deception. Furthermore, the data also help to illustrate the complexity of the neural mechanisms underlying deception.

The production and detection of deception in an interactive game

This experiment tests how people produce and detect deception while playing a computerized version of the dice game, Meyer. Deception is an integral part of this game, and the participants played it as in real life, without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent, and whether or when to accuse them of deception. We stress that deception is a complex act that cannot be exclusively associated with telling a falsehood, and that it is facilitated by hierarchical decision-making and risk evaluation. In comparison with a non-competitive control condition, both claiming truthfully and claiming falsely were associated with activity in fronto-polar cortex (BA10). However, relative to true claims, false claims were associated with greater activity in the premotor and parietal cortices. We speculate that the activity in BA10 is associated with the development of high-level executive strategies involved in both types of claim, while the premotor and parietal activity is associated with the need to select which particular claim to make.