When doing nothing is an option: the neural correlates of deciding whether to act or not

Neural correlates of static and dynamic social decision-making in real-time sibling interactions

In traditional game theory tasks, social decision-making is centered on the prediction of the intentions (i.e., mentalizing) of strangers or manipulated responses. In contrast, real-life scenarios often involve familiar individuals in dynamic environments. Further research is needed to explore neural correlates of social decision-making with changes in the available information and environmental settings. This study collected fMRI hyperscanning data (N = 100, 46 same-sex pairs were analyzed) to investigate sibling pairs engaging in an iterated Chicken Game task within a competitive context, including two decision-making phases. In the static phase, participants chose between turning (cooperate) and continuing (defect) in a fixed time window. Participants could estimate the probability of different events based on their priors (previous outcomes and representation of other's intentions) and report their decision plan. The dynamic phase mirrored real-world interactions in which information is continuously changing (replicated within a virtual environment). Individuals had to simultaneously update their beliefs, monitor the actions of the other, and adjust their decisions. Our findings revealed substantial choice consistency between the two phases and evidence for shared neural correlates in mentalizing-related brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus. Specific neural correlates were associated with each phase; increased activation of areas associated with action planning and outcome evaluation were found in the static compared with the dynamic phase. Using the opposite contrast, dynamic decision-making showed higher activation in regions related to predicting and monitoring other's actions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and insula. Cooperation (turning), compared with defection (continuing), showed increased activation in mentalizing-related regions only in the static phase, while defection, relative to cooperation, exhibited higher activation in areas associated with conflict monitoring and risk processing in the dynamic phase. Men were less cooperative and had greater TPJ activation. Sibling competitive relationship did not predict competitive behavior but showed a tendency to predict brain activity during dynamic decision-making. Only individual brain activation results are included here, and no interbrain analyses are reported. These neural correlates emphasize the significance of considering varying levels of information available and environmental settings when delving into the intricacies of mentalizing during social decision-making among familiar individuals.

Functional localization and categorization of intentional decisions in humans: A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies

Brain-imaging research on intentional decision-making often employs a "free-choice" paradigm, in which participants choose among options with identical values or outcomes. Although the medial prefrontal cortex has commonly been associated with choices, there is no consensus on the wider network that underlies diverse intentional decisions and behaviours. Our systematic literature search identified 35 fMRI/PET experiments using various free-choice paradigms, with appropriate control conditions using external instructions. An Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analysis showed that, compared with external instructions, intentional decisions consistently activate the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the left insula and the inferior parietal lobule. We then categorized the studies into four different types according to their experimental designs: reactive motor intention, perceptual intention, inhibitory intention, and cognitive intention. We conducted conjunction and contrast meta-analyses to identify consistent and selective spatial convergence of brain activation within each specific category of intentional decision. Finally, we used meta-analytic decoding to probe cognitive processes underlying free choices. Our findings suggest that the neurocognitive process underlying intentional decision incorporates anatomically separated components subserving distinct cognitive and computational roles.

Crossing hands behind your back reduces recall of manual action sentences and alters brain dynamics

The embodied meaning approach posits that understanding action-related language recruits motor processes in the brain. However, the functional impact of these motor processes on cognition has been questioned. The present study aims to provide new electrophysiological (EEG) evidence concerning the role of motor processes in the comprehension and memory of action language. Participants read lists of sentences including manual-action or attentional verbs, while keeping their hands either in front of them or crossing them behind their back. Results showed that posture impacted selectively the processing of manual action sentence, and not of attentional sentences, in three different ways: 1) EEG fronto-central beta rhythms, a signature of motor processes, were desynchronized while reading action sentences in the hands-in-front posture compared to the hands-behind posture. The estimated source was the posterior cingulate cortex, involved in proprioceptive regulation. 2) Recall of nouns associated with manual sentences decreased when learning occurred in the hands-behind posture. 3) ERPs analysis revealed that the initial posture at learning modulates neural processes during subsequent recall of manual sentences in the left superior frontal gyrus, which is related to motor processes. These results provide decisive evidence for the functional involvement of embodied simulations in the encoding and retrieval of action-related language.

Dissociable neural oscillatory mechanisms underlying unconscious priming of externally and intentionally initiated inhibition

Externally and intentionally initiated inhibitory processes, which are fundamental for human action control, can be unconsciously launched. However, the neural oscillatory mechanisms underlying unconscious priming of externally and intentionally generated inhibition remain unclear. This study aimed to explore this issue by extracting oscillatory power dynamics from electroencephalographic data with participants performing an unconscious version of the Go/No-Go/Choose task involving subliminally presented primes. The participants presented prolonged response times upon being instructed or intentionally deciding to commit a "Go" response following a No-Go prime compared with those following a Go prime. This indicates that unconscious inhibitory processes can be externally and intentionally initiated. Time-frequency analysis indicated increased theta band oscillatory power on the forced Go response following a No-Go prime compared with that following a Go prime. Contrastingly, there was pronounced alpha/low-beta band oscillatory power on the free-choice Go response following a No-Go prime compared with that following a Go prime. Moreover, there was a positive correlation of theta and alpha/low-beta band oscillations with human behavior performance related to the two distinct unconscious inhibitory processes. Our findings delineate dissociable neural oscillatory mechanisms underlying the unconscious priming of externally and intentionally initiated inhibition. Moreover, they might provide complementary neural oscillatory evidence supporting the discrepancy between instructed and voluntary human action control.

Incentives and voluntary stopping: The intentional hand task

Intentional inhibition, the endogenous decision to stop or cancel an action, is arguably a more ecologically valid process than automatized, reactive, inhibition which occurs in response to an external stop signal without active decision making at the moment of inhibition. Choosing to stop an act of opening the fridge door, or of reaching for a bottle of alcohol may therefore extend beyond a reactive inhibitory process, e.g. stopping at a red traffic light. Existing paradigms of intentional inhibition focus on the proportions of intentional stops. Here we developed the Intentional Hand Task, which provides stop response times for intentional and instructed trials. Participants move a cursor by initiating an arm movement, after which a Go, Stop or Choice trial occurs. In Go trials, participants are instructed to make a speeded continuation of their arm movement towards a target whereas in the Stop trials participants are instructed to rapidly stop the already initiated movement. In Choice trials, participants chose whether to continue or stop the movement. By comparing response times when movement was stopped, we found that intentionally stopping took significantly longer than externally instructed stopping. We further investigated the influence of reward incentives, by cueing trials with either the prospect of No, Low or High reward for correctly continuing in Go trials, stopping in Stop trials or achieving a random balance of intentional Go and Stops in Choice trials. Reward incentives led to greater approach behaviours, indicated by significantly higher Go accuracy in instructed Go trials and faster response times across both Go trial types. The presence of reward incentives led to significantly fewer intentional stop choices. Our findings suggest intentional inhibition of an ongoing action may require a further decisional process. Furthermore, monetary incentives may implicitly trigger an appetitive system thus facilitating approach rather than intentional inhibitory behaviour. These findings are particularly relevant to cue-related relapse in disorders of addiction where cues may facilitate approach behaviours to the detriment of intentional inhibitory control.

Non-action Learning: Saving Action-Associated Cost Serves as a Covert Reward

“To do or not to do” is a fundamental decision that has to be made in daily life. Behaviors related to multiple “to do” choice tasks have long been explained by reinforcement learning, and “to do or not to do” tasks such as the go/no-go task have also been recently discussed within the framework of reinforcement learning. In this learning framework, alternative actions and/or the non-action to take are determined by evaluating explicitly given (overt) reward and punishment. However, we assume that there are real life cases in which an action/non-action is repeated, even though there is no obvious reward or punishment, because implicitly given outcomes such as saving physical energy and regret (we refer to this as “covert reward”) can affect the decision-making. In the current task, mice chose to pull a lever or not according to two tone cues assigned with different water reward probabilities (70% and 30% in condition 1, and 30% and 10% in condition 2). As the mice learned, the probability that they would choose to pull the lever decreased (<0.25) in trials with a 30% reward probability cue (30% cue) in condition 1, and in trials with a 10% cue in condition 2, but increased (>0.8) in trials with a 70% cue in condition 1 and a 30% cue in condition 2, even though a non-pull was followed by neither an overt reward nor avoidance of overt punishment in any trial. This behavioral tendency was not well explained by a combination of commonly used Q-learning models, which take only the action choice with an overt reward outcome into account. Instead, we found that the non-action preference of the mice was best explained by Q-learning models, which regarded the non-action as the other choice, and updated non-action values with a covert reward. We propose that “doing nothing” can be actively chosen as an alternative to “doing something,” and that a covert reward could serve as a reinforcer of “doing nothing.”

Neural basis of self-initiative in relation to apathy in a student sample

Human behaviour can be externally driven, e.g. catching a falling glass, or self-initiated and goal-directed, e.g. drinking a cup of coffee when one deems it is time for a break. Apathy refers to a reduction of self-initiated goal-directed or motivated behaviour, frequently present in neurological and psychiatric disorders. The amount of undertaken goal-directed behaviour varies considerably in clinical as well as healthy populations. In the present study, we investigated behavioural and neural correlates of self-initiated action in a student sample (N = 39) with minimal to high levels of apathy. We replicated activation of fronto-parieto-striatal regions during self-initiation. The neural correlates of self-initiated action did not explain varying levels of apathy in our sample, neither when mass-univariate analysis was used, nor when multivariate patterns of brain activation were considered. Other hypotheses, e.g. regarding a putative role of deficits in reward anticipation, effort expenditure or executive difficulties, deserve investigation in future studies.

Roles of the Different Sub-Regions of the Insular Cortex in Various Phases of the Decision-Making Process

This paper presents a coherent account of the role of the insular cortex (IC) in decision-making. We follow a conceptualization of decision-making that is very close to one previously proposed by Ernst and Paulus (2005): that the decision process is a progression of four phases: (1) re-focusing attention; (2) evaluation; (3) action; and (4) outcome processing, and we present evidence for the insula’s role in all these phases. We review the existing work on insula’s functional anatomy that subdivides the IC into posterior, dorsal anterior and ventral anterior regions. We re-map the results provided by the existing literature into these subdivisions wherever possible, to identify the components’ role in each decision making phase. In addition, we identify a self-regulating quality of the IC focused on harm avoidance.

Neural correlates of intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition: a comparison

People can inhibit an action because of an instruction by an external stimulus, or because of their own internal decision. The similarities and differences between these two forms of inhibition are not well understood. Therefore, in the present study the neural correlates of intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition were tested in the same subjects. Participants performed two inhibition tasks while lying in the scanner: the marble task in which they had to choose for themselves between intentionally acting on, or inhibiting a prepotent response to measure intentional inhibition, and the classical stop signal task in which an external signal triggered the inhibition process. Results showed that intentional inhibition decision processes rely on a neural network that has been documented extensively for stimulus-driven inhibition, including bilateral parietal and lateral prefrontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area. We also found activation in dorsal frontomedian cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus during intentional inhibition that depended on the history of previous choices. Together, these results indicate that intentional inhibition and stimulus-driven inhibition engage a common inhibition network, but intentional inhibition is also characterized by additional context-dependent neural activation in medial prefrontal cortex.

Re-conceptualizing free will for the 21st century: acting independently with a limited role for consciousness

This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection, and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments (e.g., Wegner, 2003; Harris, 2012) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together, these findings can also support an alternative conception of free will. The constructive nature of memory and an integrative “default network” provide the means for novel and creative combinations of information, such as the imagining of counterfactual scenarios and alternative courses of action. Considering recent findings of extensive functional connections between these systems and those that subsume motor control and goal maintenance, it is argued that individuals have the capability of producing novel ideas and translating them into actionable goals. Although most of these processes take place beneath conscious awareness, it is argued that they are unique to the individual and thus, can be considered a form of independent control over behavior, or free will.

Neural bases of individual variation in decision time

People make decisions by evaluating existing evidence against a threshold or level of confidence. Individuals vary widely in response times even when they perform a simple task in the laboratory. We examine the neural bases of this individual variation by combining computational modeling and brain imaging of 64 healthy adults performing a stop signal task. Behavioral performance was modeled by an accumulator model that describes the process of information growth to reach a threshold to respond. In this model, go trial reaction time (goRT) is jointly determined by the information growth rate, threshold, and movement time (MT). In a linear regression of activations in successful go and all stop (Go+Stop) trials against goRT across participants, the insula, supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, thalamus including the subthalamic nucleus (STN), and caudate head respond to increasing goRT. Among these areas, the insula, SMA, and thalamus including the STN respond to a slower growth rate, the caudate head responds to an elevated threshold, and the pre-SMA responds to a longer MT. In the regression of Go+Stop trials against the stop signal reaction time (SSRT), the pre-SMA shows a negative correlation with SSRT. These results characterize the component processes of decision making and elucidate the neural bases of a critical aspect of inter-subject variation in human behavior. These findings also suggest that the pre-SMA may play a broader role in response selection and cognitive control rather than simply response inhibition in the stop signal task.

Choosing the rules: distinct and overlapping frontoparietal representations of task rules for perceptual decisions

Behavior is governed by rules that associate stimuli with responses and outcomes. Human and monkey studies have shown that rule-specific information is widely represented in the frontoparietal cortex. However, it is not known how establishing a rule under different contexts affects its neural representation. Here, we use event-related functional MRI (fMRI) and multivoxel pattern classification methods to investigate the human brain's mechanisms of establishing and maintaining rules for multiple perceptual decision tasks. Rules were either chosen by participants or specifically instructed to them, and the fMRI activation patterns representing rule-specific information were compared between these contexts. We show that frontoparietal regions differ in the properties of their rule representations during active maintenance before execution. First, rule-specific information maintained in the dorsolateral and medial frontal cortex depends on the context in which it was established (chosen vs specified). Second, rule representations maintained in the ventrolateral frontal and parietal cortex are independent of the context in which they were established. Furthermore, we found that the rule-specific coding maintained in anticipation of stimuli may change with execution of the rule: representations in context-independent regions remain invariant from maintenance to execution stages, whereas rule representations in context-dependent regions do not generalize to execution stage. The identification of distinct frontoparietal systems with context-independent and context-dependent task rule representations, and the distinction between anticipatory and executive rule representations, provide new insights into the functional architecture of goal-directed behavior.

Action initiation in the human dorsal anterior cingulate cortex

The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) has previously been implicated in processes that influence action initiation. In humans however, there has been little direct evidence connecting dACC to the temporal onset of actions. We studied reactive behavior in patients undergoing therapeutic bilateral cingulotomy to determine the immediate effects of dACC ablation on action initiation. In a simple reaction task, three patients were instructed to respond to a specific visual cue with the movement of a joystick. Within minutes of dACC ablation, the frequency of false starts increased, where movements occurred prior to presentation of the visual cue. In a decision making task with three separate patients, the ablation effect on action initiation persisted even when action selection was intact. These findings suggest that human dACC influences action initiation, apart from its role in action selection.

Motor and non-motor inhibition in the Go/NoGo task: an ERP and fMRI study

The contribution of movement-related activity to Go/NoGo ERP differences has been debated for 25 years. In this study, we examined ERP and fMRI measures of activity in twenty adults performing non-motor (count) and motor (right-handed button press) trials of the Go/NoGo task. Task performance was highly accurate and similar in the ERP and fMRI environments. No significant task-related effects were observed for the N2 component; however, we observed a substantial increase in positivity for Press NoGo compared to Count NoGo trials. The fMRI results also revealed significant deactivations for Press NoGo relative to Count NoGo trials in several left-lateralised motor-related areas, including the inferior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus and supplementary motor area. Together, the results indicate that the P3 NoGo>Go effect in motor tasks is caused not by movement-related negativity on Go trials but by inhibition-related positivity on NoGo trials, and that this is associated with deactivation of motor areas involved in the Go response.

The centre of the brain: topographical model of motor, cognitive, affective, and somatosensory functions of the basal ganglia

The basal ganglia have traditionally been viewed as motor processing nuclei; however, functional neuroimaging evidence has implicated these structures in more complex cognitive and affective processes that are fundamental for a range of human activities. Using quantitative meta-analysis methods we assessed the functional subdivisions of basal ganglia nuclei in relation to motor (body and eye movements), cognitive (working-memory and executive), affective (emotion and reward) and somatosensory functions in healthy participants. We document affective processes in the anterior parts of the caudate head with the most overlap within the left hemisphere. Cognitive processes showed the most widespread response, whereas motor processes occupied more central structures. On the basis of these demonstrated functional roles of the basal ganglia, we provide a new comprehensive topographical model of these nuclei and insight into how they are linked to a wide range of behaviors.

Dis-regulation of response inhibition in adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): an ERP study

OBJECTIVE

To define the brain activity involved in impaired response inhibition of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in adults.

METHODS

Performance measures and brain activity of 14 adult ADHD subjects and 14 controls, matched for age, gender, and overall intelligence were compared in an auditory Go-NoGo paradigm to tones. The task required a button press (Go) to 80% and inhibition of response (NoGo) to 20% of the tones, according to the tone's pitch.

RESULTS

In NoGo trials ADHD subjects made significantly more commission errors compared to controls. ERPs of ADHD subjects showed smaller amplitudes of P3 (but not N2), and longer latencies of both N2 and P3. Source current density estimation revealed reduced activity in the right frontal dorsolateral cortex and in the posterior cingulate of the ADHD group. In addition, ADHD subjects showed an unexpected significantly enhanced response inhibition in Go trials, with excessive omission errors associated with significantly larger N2 amplitudes.

CONCLUSION

In ADHD the neural networks sub-serving response inhibition are impaired.

SIGNIFICANCE

ADHD is a general dis-regulation of behavioral inhibition, not limited to response inhibition.

Planning not to do something: Does intending not to do something activate associated sensory consequences?

The present fMRI study investigated the central assumptions of ideomotor theory that actions become associated with their sensory consequences. Furthermore, we tested whether sensory effects can also become associated with the voluntary omission of an action. In a training phase, participants had to decide between executing an action and not executing it. Both decisions were followed by a specific effect tone. In the test phase, the participants had to carry out actions without hearing the effect tone. They either had to decide whether to execute an action or not or were instructed to execute an action or not. Our results reveal an increased activity in the auditory cortex elicited by responses that formerly elicited a tone-namely, self-chosen actions and self-chosen nonactions. Moreover, we found binding effects for stimulus-cued actions, but not for stimulus-cued nonactions. These findings support ideomotor theory by showing that a link exists between actions and their effects. Furthermore, our data demonstrate on a neural level that effect tones can become associated with intentionally not acting, therewith supporting the idea of a binding between the voluntary omission of an action and its effects in the environment.

How does neuroscience affect our conception of volition?

Although there is no clear concept of volition or the will, we do have intuitive ideas that characterize the will, agency, and voluntary behavior. Here I review results from a number of strands of neuroscientific research that bear upon our intuitive notions of the will. These neuroscientific results provide some insight into the neural circuits mediating behaviors that we identify as related to will and volition. Although some researchers contend that neuroscience will undermine our views about free will, to date no results have succeeded in fundamentally disrupting our common sense beliefs. Still, the picture emerging from neuroscience does raise new questions, and ultimately may put pressure on some intuitive notions about what is necessary for free will.

The hidden side of intentional action: the role of the anterior insular cortex

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to reveal the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. This research has primarily pointed to the role of the medial frontal cortex for the voluntary control of behaviour. However, a closer inspection of the literature reveals that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) is also routinely activated in tasks that involve different aspects of intentional action. In the present article, we outline studies that have found AIC activation in various intentional action paradigms. Based on these findings, we discuss two hypotheses about the AIC's contribution to voluntary control. One hypothesis states that AIC is involved in forming intentions, by providing information about the internal states of the system. The alternative view suggests that AIC evaluates the outcomes of intentional action decisions that have been previously formed elsewhere. The limited evidence so far favours the evaluative hypothesis. AIC may provide interoceptive signals that play an essential role in evaluating the consequences of intentional action. AIC is therefore a key structure for the adaptive, affective training of the individual will, on which human society depends.