Animated brain: a functional neuroimaging study on animacy experience

Seeing social interactions

Seeing the interactions between other people is a critical part of our everyday visual experience, but recognizing the social interactions of others is often considered outside the scope of vision and grouped with higher-level social cognition like theory of mind. Recent work, however, has revealed that recognition of social interactions is efficient and automatic, is well modeled by bottom-up computational algorithms, and occurs in visually-selective regions of the brain. We review recent evidence from these three methodologies (behavioral, computational, and neural) that converge to suggest the core of social interaction perception is visual. We propose a computational framework for how this process is carried out in the brain and offer directions for future interdisciplinary investigations of social perception.

Perceiving animacy from kinematics: visual specification of life-likeness in simple geometric patterns

Since the seminal work of Heider and Simmel, and Michotte's research, many studies have shown that, under appropriate conditions, displays of simple geometric shapes elicit rich and vivid impressions of animacy and intentionality. The main purpose of this review is to emphasize the close relationship between kinematics and perceived animacy by showing which specific motion cues and spatiotemporal patterns automatically trigger visual perceptions of animacy and intentionality. The animacy phenomenon has been demonstrated to be rather fast, automatic, irresistible, and highly stimulus-driven. Moreover, there is growing evidence that animacy attributions, although usually associated with higher-level cognition and long-term memory, may reflect highly specialized visual processes that have evolved to support adaptive behaviors critical for survival. The hypothesis of a life-detector hardwired in the perceptual system is also supported by recent studies in early development and animal cognition, as well as by the issue of the "irresistibility" criterion, i.e., the persistence of animacy perception in adulthood even in the face of conflicting background knowledge. Finally, further support for the hypothesis that animacy is processed in the earliest stages of vision comes from recent experimental evidence on the interaction of animacy with other visual processes, such as visuomotor performance, visual memory, and speed estimation. Summarizing, the ability to detect animacy in all its nuances may be related to the visual system's sensitivity to those changes in kinematics - considered as a multifactorial relational system - that are associated with the presence of living beings, as opposed to the natural, inert behavior of physically constrained, form-invariant objects, or even mutually independent moving agents. This broad predisposition would allow the observer not only to identify the presence of animates and to distinguish them from inanimate, but also to quickly grasp their psychological, emotional, and social characteristics.

You are already dead: Case report of nihilistic delusions regarding others as one representation of Cotard's syndrome

Background

While the symptom of "I am already dead" is a hallmark of Cotard's syndrome, also known as nihilistic delusions, the symptom of "you are already dead" has been neglected.

Case presentation

A woman aged in her 60s diagnosed with schizophrenia was admitted to our hospital for psychotic symptoms, including delusions of reference, delusions of guilt, auditory hallucinations, cenesthetic hallucinations, agitation, depression, suicidal ideation, and catatonia. During hospitalization, her cenesthetic hallucinations progressed to include nihilistic delusions. She described cenesthetic hallucinations along with various delusional descriptions, including the belief that various objects, such as spoons, irons, nails, rulers, bins, and coins, were inside her body and that her body was being burned or in danger of exploding. She also claimed an altered sense of her own body, that her body was larger than normal or reversed. Moreover, she reported nihilistic delusions that her face and body did not exist, that her heart was not functioning, and that she was going to die soon or was already dead. She occasionally refused to eat because of the feeling of being dead. Notably, during a severe episode, she claimed that a doctor in front of her was dead. Clozapine was effective in improving her symptoms. Ultimately, the patient regained her sense of being alive and acknowledged that the doctor was alive.

Conclusion

We report the case of a patient presenting with nihilistic delusions regarding both self and others, along with prior cenesthetic hallucinations. Aberrant interoceptive processing could be a potential link between these two forms of nihilistic delusions.

A neural mechanism underlying predictive visual motion processing in patients with schizophrenia

Psychotic symptoms may be traced back to sensory sensitivity. Thereby, visual motion (VM) processing particularly has been suggested to be impaired in schizophrenia (SCZ). In healthy brains, VM underlies predictive processing within hierarchically structured systems. However, less is known about predictive VM processing in SCZ. Therefore, we performed fMRI during a VM paradigm with three conditions of varying predictability, i.e., Predictable-, Random-, and Arbitrary motion. The study sample comprised 17 SCZ patients and 23 healthy controls. We calculated general linear model (GLM) analysis to assess group differences in VM processing across motion conditions. Here, we identified significantly lower activity in right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) for SCZ patients. Therefore, right TPJ was set as seed for connectivity analyses. For patients, across conditions we identified increased connections to higher regions, namely medial prefrontal cortex, or paracingulate gyrus. Healthy subjects activated sensory regions as area V5, or superior parietal lobule. Reduced TPJ activity may reflect both a failure in the bottom-up flow of visual information and a decrease of signal processing as consequence of increased top-down input from frontal areas. In sum, these altered neural patterns provide a framework for future studies focusing on predictive VM processing to identify potential biomarkers of psychosis.

Preserved metacognition despite impaired perception of intentionality cues in schizophrenia

Social cognition and metacognition are frequently impaired in schizophrenia, and these impairments complicate recovery. Recent work suggests that different aspects of metacognition may not be impaired to the same degree. Furthermore, metacognition and the cognitive capacity being monitored need not be similarly impaired. Here, we assessed performance in detecting cues of intentional behaviour as well as metacognition about detecting those cues in schizophrenia. Thirty patients and controls categorized animations of moving dots into those displaying a dyadic interaction demonstrating a chase or no chase and indicated their confidence in these judgments. Perception and metacognition were assessed using signal detection theoretic measures, which were analysed using frequentist and Bayesian statistics. Patients showed a deficit compared to controls in detecting intentionality cues, but showed preserved metacognitive performance into this task. Our study reveals a selective deficit in the perception of intentionality cues, but preserved metacognitive insight into the validity of this perception. It thus appears that impairment of metacognition in schizophrenia varies across cognitive domains - metacognition should not be considered a monolithic stone that is either impaired or unimpaired.

The preterm social brain: altered functional networks for Theory of Mind in very preterm children

Neurodevelopmental difficulties emerge in very preterm born children (<32-week gestation) in infancy and continue to early adulthood but little is known about their social-cognitive development. This study utilized the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI and magnetoencephalography to examine the neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind in very preterm birth. Theory of Mind, one of the core social-cognitive skills, is the ability to attribute mental states to others, and is crucial for predicting others’ behaviours in social interactions. Eighty-three children (40 very preterm born, 24 boys, age = 8.7 ± 0.5 years, and 43 full-term born, 22 boys, age = 8.6 ± 0.5 years) completed the study. In functional MRI, both groups recruited classic Theory of Mind areas, without significant group differences. However, reduced Theory of Mind connectivity in the very preterm born group was found in magnetoencephalography in distinct theta, alpha and beta-band networks anchored in a set of brain regions that comprise the social brain. These networks included regions such as the angular gyrus, the medial pre-frontal cortex, the superior temporal gyrus and the temporal poles. Very preterm born children showed increased connectivity compared to controls in a network anchored in the occipital gyri rather than classical social-processing regions. Very preterm born children made significantly more attribution errors and mis-construed the social scenarios. Findings offer novel insight into the neural networks, supporting social cognition in very preterm born children and highlight the importance of multimodal neuroimaging to interrogate the social brain in clinical populations.

Judging social interaction in the Heider and Simmel movie

Simple displays of moving shapes can give rise to percepts of animacy. These films elicit impoverished narratives in some individuals, such as those with an autism spectrum disorder. However, the verbal demand of producing a narrative limits the utility of this task. Non-verbal tasks have so far focused on detecting animate objects. Lacking from previous research is a task that relies less on verbal description but more than animacy perception. Here, we presented data using a new social interaction judgement task. Healthy young adults viewed the Heider and Simmel movie and pressed one button whenever they perceived social interaction and another button when no social interaction was perceived. We measured the time points at which social judgement began, the fluctuation of the judgement in relation to stimulus kinematic properties, and the overall mean of social judgement. Participants with higher autism traits reported lower levels of social interaction. Reversing the film in time produced lower social interaction judgements, though the temporal profile was preserved. Our study suggests that both low-level motion characteristics and high-level understanding contribute to social interaction judgement. The finding may facilitate future research on other populations and stimulate computational vision work on factors that drive social judgements.

Two social brains: neural mechanisms of intersubjectivity

It is the aim of this article to present an empirically justified hypothesis about the functional roles of the two social neural systems, namely the so-called 'mirror neuron system' (MNS) and the 'mentalizing system' (MENT, also 'theory of mind network' or 'social neural network'). Both systems are recruited during cognitive processes that are either related to interaction or communication with other conspecifics, thereby constituting intersubjectivity. The hypothesis is developed in the following steps: first, the fundamental distinction that we make between persons and things is introduced; second, communication is presented as the key process that allows us to interact with others; third, the capacity to 'mentalize' or to understand the inner experience of others is emphasized as the fundamental cognitive capacity required to establish successful communication. On this background, it is proposed that MNS serves comparably early stages of social information processing related to the 'detection' of spatial or bodily signals, whereas MENT is recruited during comparably late stages of social information processing related to the 'evaluation' of emotional and psychological states of others. This hypothesis of MNS as a social detection system and MENT as a social evaluation system is illustrated by findings in the field of psychopathology. Finally, new research questions that can be derived from this hypothesis are discussed.This article is part of the themed issue 'Physiological determinants of social behaviour in animals'.

Perceiving social interactions in the posterior superior temporal sulcus

Primates are highly attuned not just to social characteristics of individual agents, but also to social interactions between multiple agents. Here we report a neural correlate of the representation of social interactions in the human brain. Specifically, we observe a strong univariate response in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) to stimuli depicting social interactions between two agents, compared with (i) pairs of agents not interacting with each other, (ii) physical interactions between inanimate objects, and (iii) individual animate agents pursuing goals and interacting with inanimate objects. We further show that this region contains information about the nature of the social interaction-specifically, whether one agent is helping or hindering the other. This sensitivity to social interactions is strongest in a specific subregion of the pSTS but extends to a lesser extent into nearby regions previously implicated in theory of mind and dynamic face perception. This sensitivity to the presence and nature of social interactions is not easily explainable in terms of low-level visual features, attention, or the animacy, actions, or goals of individual agents. This region may underlie our ability to understand the structure of our social world and navigate within it.

The attribution of animacy and agency in frontotemporal dementia versus Alzheimer's disease

Impaired attribution of animacy (state of living or being sentient) and of agency (capability of intrinsically-driven action) may underlie social behavior disturbances in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). We presented the Heider and Simmel film of moving geometric shapes to 11 bvFTD patients, 11 Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, and 12 healthy controls (HCs) and rated their recorded verbal responses for animacy attribution and agency attribution. All participants had skin conductance (SC) continuously recorded while viewing the film, and all dementia participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for regions of interest. The bvFTD patients, but not the AD patients, were impaired in animacy attribution, compared to the HCs. In contrast, both bvFTD and AD groups were impaired in agency attribution, compared to the HCs, and only the HCs had increasing SC responsiveness during viewing of the film. On MRI analysis of cortical thicknesses, animacy scores significantly correlated across groups with the right pars orbitalis and opercularis; agency scores with the left inferior and superior parietal cortices and the supramarginal gyrus; and both scores with the left cingulate isthmus involved in visuospatial context. These findings suggest that bvFTD is specifically associated with impaired animacy attribution from right inferior frontal atrophy. In contrast, both dementias may have impaired agency attribution from left parietal cortical atrophy and absent SC increases during the film, a sympathetic indicator of attribution of a social "story" to the moving shapes. These findings clarify disease-related changes in social attribution and corroborate the neuroanatomical origins of animacy and agency.

The amygdala's response to face and emotional information and potential category-specific modulation of temporal cortex as a function of emotion

The amygdala has been implicated in the processing of emotion and animacy information and to be responsive to novelty. However, the way in which these functions interact is poorly understood. Subjects (N = 30) viewed threatening or neutral images that could be either animate (facial expressions) or inanimate (objects) in the context of a dot probe task. The amygdala showed responses to both emotional and animacy information, but no emotion by stimulus-type interaction; i.e., emotional face and object stimuli, when matched for arousal and valence, generate comparable amygdala activity relative to neutral face and object stimuli. Additionally, a habituation effect was not seen in amygdala; however, increased amygdala activity was observed for incongruent relative to congruent negative trials in second vs. first exposures. Furthermore, medial fusiform gyrus showed increased response to inanimate stimuli, while superior temporal sulcus showed increased response to animate stimuli. Greater functional connectivity between bilateral amygdala and medial fusiform gyrus was observed to negative vs. neutral objects, but not to fearful vs. neutral faces. The current data suggest that the amygdala is responsive to animate and emotional stimuli. Additionally, these data suggest that the interaction between the various functions of the amygdala may need to be considered simultaneously to fully understand how they interact. Moreover, they suggest category-specific modulation of medial fusiform cortex as a function of emotion.

Dissociating animacy processing in high-functioning autism: neural correlates of stimulus properties and subjective ratings

When movements indicate meaningful actions, even nonbiological objects induce the impression of "having a mind" or animacy. This basic social ability was investigated in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA, n = 13, and matched controls, n = 13) by systematically varying motion properties of simple geometric shapes. Critically, trial-by-trial variations of (1) motion complexity of stimuli, and of (2) participants' individual animacy ratings were separately correlated with neural activity to dissociate cognitive strategies relying more closely on stimulus analysis vs. subjective experience. Increasing motion complexity did not yield any significant group differences, and in both groups, it correlated with neural activity in regions involved in perceptual and evaluative processing, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal gyrus (STG) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). In contrast, although there were no significant behavioral differences between the groups, increasing animacy ratings correlated with neural activity in the insula, STG, amygdala, dorsal mPFC and PCC more strongly in controls than in HFA. These results indicate that in HFA the evaluation of stimulus properties cuing for animacy is intact, while increasing subjective ratings do not seem to be robustly related to social processing, including spontaneous mental state inferences and experience of salience.

Social cognition and the cerebellum: a meta-analysis of over 350 fMRI studies

This meta-analysis explores the role of the cerebellum in social cognition. Recent meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies since 2008 demonstrate that the cerebellum is only marginally involved in social cognition and emotionality, with a few meta-analyses pointing to an involvement of at most 54% of the individual studies. In this study, novel meta-analyses of over 350 fMRI studies, dividing up the domain of social cognition in homogeneous subdomains, confirmed this low involvement of the cerebellum in conditions that trigger the mirror network (e.g., when familiar movements of body parts are observed) and the mentalizing network (when no moving body parts or unfamiliar movements are present). There is, however, one set of mentalizing conditions that strongly involve the cerebellum in 50-100% of the individual studies. In particular, when the level of abstraction is high, such as when behaviors are described in terms of traits or permanent characteristics, in terms of groups rather than individuals, in terms of the past (episodic autobiographic memory) or the future rather than the present, or in terms of hypothetical events that may happen. An activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis conducted in this study reveals that the cerebellum is critically implicated in social cognition and that the areas of the cerebellum which are consistently involved in social cognitive processes show extensive overlap with the areas involved in sensorimotor (during mirror and self-judgments tasks) as well as in executive functioning (across all tasks). We discuss the role of the cerebellum in social cognition in general and in higher abstraction mentalizing in particular. We also point out a number of methodological limitations of some available studies on the social brain that hamper the detection of cerebellar activity.

Looming animate and inanimate threats: the response of the amygdala and periaqueductal gray

Looming stimuli are processed as threatening and activate basic neural defense systems. However, it is unclear how animacy information modulates this response. Participants (N = 25) viewed threatening or neutral images that were either animate (animals) or inanimate (objects) and which either approached (loomed) or receded from the participant. The amygdala was responsive to emotional, animacy, and looming information (particularly to looming threats and looming animate stimuli). Periaqueductal gray was also sensitive to emotional information and particularly responsive to looming threats. The data are interpreted within category-specific models of the amygdala and temporal cortex.

Differences and commonalities in the judgment of causality in physical and social contexts: an fMRI study

Understanding cause and effect is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. When shown videos of simple two-dimensional shapes colliding, humans experience one object causing the other to move, e.g., one billiard-like ball seeming to hit and move the other. The impression of causality can also occur when people attribute social interactions to moving objects. Whether the judgment of social and physical causality engages distinct or shared neural networks is not known. In a functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) study, participants were presented with two types of dynamic videos: a blue ball colliding with a red ball (P; physical condition) and a blue ball ("Mr. Blue") passing a red ball ("Mrs. Red") without making contact (S; social condition). Participants judged causal relationships (C) or movement direction (D; control task) in both video types, resulting in four conditions (PC; SC; PD; SD). We found common neural activations for physical and social causality judgments (SC > SD)∩(PC > PD) in the right middle/inferior frontal gyrus, right inferior parietal lobule, the right supplementary motor area, and bilateral insulae. For social causal judgments (SC > PC), we found distinct neural activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). These results provide evidence for a common neural network underlying judgments of causality that apply to both physical and social situations. The results also indicate that social causality judgments recruit additional neural resources in an area critical for determining animacy and intentionality.

Interobject spacing explains the attentional bias toward interacting objects

Spatio-temporal interactions between simple geometrical shapes typically elicit strong impressions of intentionality. Recent research has started to explore the link between attentional processes and the detection of interacting objects. Here, we asked whether visual attention is biased toward such interactions. We investigated probe discrimination performance in algorithmically generated animations that involved two chasing objects and two randomly moving objects. In Experiment 1, we observed a pronounced attention capture effect for chasing objects. Because reduced interobject spacing is an inherent feature of interacting objects, in Experiment 2 we designed randomly moving objects that were matched to the chasing objects with respect to interobject spacing at probe onset. In this experiment, the capture effect attenuated completely. Therefore, we argue that reduced interobject spacing reflects an efficient cue to guide visual attention toward objects that interact intentionally.

A second-person neuroscience in interaction

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.

Toward a second-person neuroscience

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

Perceiving nonverbal behavior: neural correlates of processing movement fluency and contingency in dyadic interactions

Despite the fact that nonverbal dyadic social interactions are abundant in the environment, the neural mechanisms underlying their processing are not yet fully understood. Research in the field of social neuroscience has suggested that two neural networks appear to be involved in social understanding: (1) the action observation network (AON) and (2) the social neural network (SNN). The aim of this study was to determine the differential contributions of the AON and the SNN to the processing of nonverbal behavior as observed in dyadic social interactions. To this end, we used short computer animation sequences displaying dyadic social interactions between two virtual characters and systematically manipulated two key features of movement activity, which are known to influence the perception of meaning in nonverbal stimuli: (1) movement fluency and (2) contingency of movement patterns. A group of 21 male participants rated the "naturalness" of the observed scenes on a four-point scale while undergoing fMRI. Behavioral results showed that both fluency and contingency significantly influenced the "naturalness" experience of the presented animations. Neurally, the AON was preferentially engaged when processing contingent movement patterns, but did not discriminate between different degrees of movement fluency. In contrast, regions of the SNN were engaged more strongly when observing dyads with disturbed movement fluency. In conclusion, while the AON is involved in the general processing of contingent social actions, irrespective of their kinematic properties, the SNN is preferentially recruited when atypical kinematic properties prompt inferences about the agents' intentions.

Developmental changes in within- and between-network connectivity between late childhood and adulthood

A number of behavioral changes occur between late childhood and adulthood, including maturation of social cognition, reward receptivity, impulsiveness, risk-taking and cognitive control. Although some of these abilities show linear improvements with age, some abilities may temporarily worsen, reflecting both the restructuring and/or strengthening of connections within some brain systems. The current study uses resting state functional connectivity to examine developmental differences between late childhood and adulthood in task positive (TP) regions, which play a role in cognitive control functions, and task negative (TN) regions, which play a role in social cognition, self-referential, and internally-directed thought. Within the TP network, developmental differences in connectivity were found with the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Within the TN network, developmental differences in connectivity were found with a broad area of the medial prefrontal cortex and the right parahippocampal gyrus. Connections between the two networks also showed significant developmental differences. Stronger anticorrelations were found in the TN maps of the adult group for the right anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral anterior inferior parietal lobule, bilateral superior parietal lobule and an anterior portion of the right posterior cingulate cortex. There was a significant brain-behavior relationship between the strength of anticorrelation in these regions and inhibitory control performance on two Go/No-go tasks suggesting that the development of anticorrelations between late childhood and adulthood supports mature inhibitory control. Overall, maturation of these networks occurred in specific regions which are associated with cognitive control of goal-directed behavior, including those involved in working memory, social cognition, and inhibitory control.

Imaging derived cortical thickness reduction in high-functioning autism: key regions and temporal slope

Cortical thickness (CT) changes possibly contribute to the complex symptomatology of autism. The aberrant developmental trajectories underlying such differences in certain brain regions and their continuation in adulthood are a matter of intense debate. We studied 28 adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) and 28 control subjects matched for age, gender, IQ and handedness. A surface-based whole brain analysis utilizing FreeSurfer was employed to detect CT differences between the two diagnostic groups and to investigate the time course of age-related changes. Direct comparison with control subjects revealed thinner cortex in HFA in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) of the left hemisphere. Considering the time course of CT development we found clusters around the pSTS and cuneus in the left and the paracentral lobule in the right hemisphere to be thinner in HFA with comparable age-related slopes in patients and controls. Conversely, we found clusters around the supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) in the left and the precentral and postcentral gyrus in the right hemisphere to be thinner in HFA, but with different age-related slopes in patients and controls. In the latter regions CT showed a steady decrease in controls but no analogous thinning in HFA. CT analyses contribute in characterizing neuroanatomical correlates of HFA. Reduced CT is present in brain regions involved in social cognition. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that aberrant brain development leading to such differences is proceeding throughout adulthood. Discrepancies in prior morphometric studies may be induced by the complex time course of cortical changes.