Evaluating the roles of the inferior frontal gyrus and superior parietal lobule in deductive reasoning: an rTMS study

Dual-Process Theory of Thought and Inhibitory Control: An ALE Meta-Analysis

The dual-process theory of thought rests on the co-existence of two different thinking modalities: a quick, automatic, and associative process opposed to a slow, thoughtful, and deliberative process. The increasing interest in determining the neural foundation of the dual-process distinction has yielded mixed results, also given the difficulty of applying the fMRI standard approach to tasks usually employed in the cognitive literature. We report an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis to investigate the neural foundation of the dual-process theory of thought. Eligible studies allowed for the identification of cerebral areas associated with dual-process theory-based tasks without differentiating between fast and slow thinking. The ALE algorithm converged on the medial frontal cortex, superior frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and left inferior frontal gyrus. These structures partially overlap with the cerebral areas recurrently reported in the literature about the neural basis of the dual-process distinction, where the PARCS theory-based interpretation emphasizes the role of the right inferior gyrus. The results confirm the potential (but still almost unexplored) common ground between the dual-process literature and the cognitive control literature.

Altered interhemispheric functional connectivity in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder and its potential in therapeutic response prediction

The trajectory of voxel-mirrored homotopic connectivity (VMHC) after medical treatment in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and its value in prediction of treatment response remains unclear. This study aimed to investigate the pathophysiological mechanism of OCD, as well as biomarkers for prediction of pharmacological efficacy. Medication-free patients with OCD and healthy controls (HCs) underwent magnetic resonance imaging. The patients were scanned again after a 4-week treatment with paroxetine. The acquired data were subjected to VMHC, support vector regression (SVR), and correlation analyses. Compared with HCs (36 subjects), patients with OCD (34 subjects after excluding two subjects with excessive head movement) exhibited significantly lower VMHC in the bilateral superior parietal lobule (SPL), postcentral gyrus, and calcarine cortex, and VMHC in the postcentral gyrus was positively correlated with cognitive function. After treatment, the patients showed increased VMHC in the bilateral posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PCu) with the improvement of symptoms. SVR results showed that VMHC in the postcentral gyrus at baseline could aid to predict a change in the scores of OCD scales. This study revealed that SPL, postcentral gyrus, and calcarine cortex participate in the pathophysiological mechanism of OCD while PCC/PCu participate in the pharmacological mechanism. VMHC in the postcentral gyrus is a potential predictive biomarker of the treatment effects in OCD.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Dissociating Language and Thought in Human Reasoning

What is the relationship between language and complex thought? In the context of deductive reasoning there are two main views. Under the first, which we label here the language-centric view, language is central to the syntax-like combinatorial operations of complex reasoning. Under the second, which we label here the language-independent view, these operations are dissociable from the mechanisms of natural language. We applied continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS), a form of noninvasive neuromodulation, to healthy adult participants to transiently inhibit a subregion of Broca's area (left BA44) associated in prior work with parsing the syntactic relations of natural language. We similarly inhibited a subregion of dorsomedial frontal cortex (left medial BA8) which has been associated with core features of logical reasoning. There was a significant interaction between task and stimulation site. Post hoc tests revealed that performance on a linguistic reasoning task, but not deductive reasoning task, was significantly impaired after inhibition of left BA44, and performance on a deductive reasoning task, but not linguistic reasoning task, was decreased after inhibition of left medial BA8 (however not significantly). Subsequent linear contrasts supported this pattern. These novel results suggest that deductive reasoning may be dissociable from linguistic processes in the adult human brain, consistent with the language-independent view.

Uncovering neural distinctions and commodities between two creativity subsets: A meta-analysis of fMRI studies in divergent thinking and insight using activation likelihood estimation

The dual‐process theory that two different systems of thought coexist in creative thinking has attracted considerable attention. In the field of creative thinking, divergent thinking (DT) is the ability to produce multiple solutions to open‐ended problems in a short time. It is mainly considered an associative and fast process. Meanwhile, insight, the new and unexpected comprehension of close‐ended problems, is frequently marked as a deliberate and time‐consuming thinking process requiring concentrated effort. Previous research has been dedicated to revealing their separate neural mechanisms, while few studies have compared their differences and similarities at the brain level. Therefore, the current study applied Activation Likelihood Estimation to decipher common and distinctive neural pathways that potentially underlie DT and insight. We selected 27 DT studies and 30 insight studies for retrospective meta‐analyses. Initially, two single analyses with follow‐up contrast and conjunction analyses were performed. The single analyses showed that DT mainly involved the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), cuneus, and middle frontal gyrus (MFG), while the precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), parahippocampal gyrus (PG), amygdala (AMG), and superior parietal lobe were engaged in insight. Compared to insight, DT mainly led to greater activation in the IPL, the crucial part of the default mode network. However, insight caused more significant activation in regions related to executive control functions and emotional responses, such as the IFG, MFG, PG, and AMG. Notably, the conjunction analysis detected no overlapped areas between DT and insight. These neural findings implicate that various neurocognitive circuits may support DT and insight.

Audiovisual incongruence differentially impacts left and right hemisphere sensorimotor oscillations: Potential applications to production

Speech production gives rise to distinct auditory and somatosensory feedback signals which are dynamically integrated to enable online monitoring and error correction, though it remains unclear how the sensorimotor system supports the integration of these multimodal signals. Capitalizing on the parity of sensorimotor processes supporting perception and production, the current study employed the McGurk paradigm to induce multimodal sensory congruence/incongruence. EEG data from a cohort of 39 typical speakers were decomposed with independent component analysis to identify bilateral mu rhythms; indices of sensorimotor activity. Subsequent time-frequency analyses revealed bilateral patterns of event related desynchronization (ERD) across alpha and beta frequency ranges over the time course of perceptual events. Right mu activity was characterized by reduced ERD during all cases of audiovisual incongruence, while left mu activity was attenuated and protracted in McGurk trials eliciting sensory fusion. Results were interpreted to suggest distinct hemispheric contributions, with right hemisphere mu activity supporting a coarse incongruence detection process and left hemisphere mu activity reflecting a more granular level of analysis including phonological identification and incongruence resolution. Findings are also considered in regard to incongruence detection and resolution processes during production.

Age-related differences in structural and functional prefrontal networks during a logical reasoning task

In logical reasoning, difficulties in inhibition of currently-held beliefs may lead to unwarranted conclusions, known as belief bias. Aging is associated with difficulties in inhibitory control, which may lead to deficits in inhibition of currently-held beliefs. No study to date, however, has investigated the underlying neural substrates of age-related differences in logical reasoning and the impact of belief load. The aim of the present study was to delineate age differences in brain activity during a syllogistic logical reasoning task while the believability load of logical inferences was manipulated. Twenty-nine, healthy, younger and thirty, healthy, older adults (males and females) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which they were asked to determine the logical validity of conclusions. Unlike younger adults, older adults engaged a large-scale network including anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus during conclusion stage. Our functional connectivity results suggest that while older adults engaged the anterior cingulate network to overcome their intuitive responses for believable inferences, the inferior frontal gyrus network contributed to higher control over responses during both believable and unbelievable conditions. Our functional results were further supported by structure-function-behavior analyses indicating the importance of cingulum bundle and uncinate fasciculus integrity in rejection of believable statements. These novel findings lend evidence for age-related differences in belief bias, with potentially important implications for decision making where currently-held beliefs and given assumptions are in conflict.

Computer code comprehension shares neural resources with formal logical inference in the fronto-parietal network

Despite the importance of programming to modern society, the cognitive and neural bases of code comprehension are largely unknown. Programming languages might 'recycle' neurocognitive mechanisms originally developed for natural languages. Alternatively, comprehension of code could depend on fronto-parietal networks shared with other culturally-invented symbol systems, such as formal logic and symbolic math such as algebra. Expert programmers (average 11 years of programming experience) performed code comprehension and memory control tasks while undergoing fMRI. The same participants also performed formal logic, symbolic math, executive control, and language localizer tasks. A left-lateralized fronto-parietal network was recruited for code comprehension. Patterns of activity within this network distinguish between 'for' loops and 'if' conditional code functions. In terms of the underlying neural basis, code comprehension overlapped extensively with formal logic and to a lesser degree math. Overlap with executive processes and language was low, but laterality of language and code covaried across individuals. Cultural symbol systems, including code, depend on a distinctive fronto-parietal cortical network.

Mental models use common neural spatial structure for spatial and abstract content

Mental models provide a cognitive framework allowing for spatially organizing information while reasoning about the world. However, transitive reasoning studies often rely on perception of stimuli that contain visible spatial features, allowing the possibility that associated neural representations are specific to inherently spatial content. Here, we test the hypothesis that neural representations of mental models generated through transitive reasoning rely on a frontoparietal network irrespective of the spatial nature of the stimulus content. Content within three models ranges from expressly visuospatial to abstract. All mental models participants generated were based on inferred relationships never directly observed. Here, using multivariate representational similarity analysis, we show that patterns representative of mental models were revealed in both superior parietal lobule and anterior prefrontal cortex and converged across stimulus types. These results support the conclusion that, independent of content, transitive reasoning using mental models relies on neural mechanisms associated with spatial cognition.

Alfred et al. find that there is a common spatial representation for mental models created through transitive reasoning. This is shown by probing patterns of neural activity in research participants tasked with reasoning problems with different spatial content, from visuospatial to abstract.

Patients with Lesions to Left Prefrontal Cortex (BA 9 and BA 10) Have Less Entrenched Beliefs and Are More Skeptical Reasoners

The effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making is a robust, poorly understood phenomenon, exhibiting considerable individual variation. Neuroimaging studies widely show the involvement of the left pFC in reasoning involving beliefs. However, little patient data exist to speak to the necessity and role of the left pFC in belief-based inference. To address this shortcoming, we tested 102 patients with unilateral focal penetrating traumatic brain injuries and 49 matched controls. Participants provided plausibility ratings (plausible/implausible) to simple inductive arguments and (separately) strength of believability ratings of the conclusion to those same arguments. A voxel-based lesion symptom mapping analysis identified 10 patients, all with lesions to the left pFC (BA 9 and BA 10) as rating significantly fewer arguments with highly believable conclusions as "plausible," compared with all other patients. Subsequent analyses, incorporating the right hemisphere homologue of these patients (n = 12) and normal controls (n = 24), revealed patients with lesions to left pFC found fewer arguments plausible in the high believable than either of these groups, and there was no difference in the behavioral scores of the right pFC patients and normal controls. Further analysis, utilizing the belief ratings as the dependent measure, revealed a Group × Belief Rating interaction, with left pFC patients having less intense beliefs about the conclusions of moderately believable and highly believable arguments. We interpreted these results to indicate that lesions to left pFC (BA 9, BA 10) increase incredulity and make these patients more skeptical reasoners. The former can partially, but not fully, explain the latter. The other relevant factor may be that unilateral left pFC lesions disrupt hemispheric equilibrium and allow for an increased inhibitory role of the right pFC. We speculate that individual differences in belief bias in reasoning in the normal population may be a function of individual differences in the left and right pFC interactional dynamics.

Bilingual and Monolingual First Language Acquisition Experience Differentially Shapes Children's Property Term Learning: Evidence from Behavioral and Neurophysiological Measures

Studies of novel noun learning show bilingual children rely less on the Mutual Exclusivity Constraint (MEC) for word learning than monolinguals. Shifting the focus to learning novel property terms (adjectives), the present study compared 3.5- and five-year-old bilingual and monolingual preschoolers' adherence to the MEC. We found no bilingual-monolingual differences on a behavioral forced-choice task for the 3.5-year-olds, but five-year-old monolinguals adhered more to the MEC than bilinguals did. Older bilinguals adhered less to the MEC than younger ones, while there was no difference in MEC adherence between the younger and older monolinguals. In the 5-year-olds, we additionally acquired neurophysiological data using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to allow for a first explorative look at potential neuronal underpinnings. The data show that, compared to bilinguals, monolinguals reveal higher activation over three brain regions (right frontal, left temporo-parietal, and left prefrontal) that may be involved in exploiting the MEC, building on conflict detection, inhibition, solution of a disjunction, and working memory processes. Taken together, our behavioral and neurophysiological findings reveal different paths towards novel property term learning depending on children's language acquisition context.

Evidence supporting dual-process theory of medical diagnosis: a functional near-infrared spectroscopy study

PURPOSE

The objective of this study was to determine the extent to which the dual-process theory of medical diagnosis enjoys neuroscientific support. To that end, the study explored whether neurological correlates of system-2 thinking could be located in the brain. It was hypothesised that system-2 thinking could be observed as the activation of the prefrontal cortex.

METHOD

An experimental paradigm was applied that consisted of a learning and a test phase. During the learning phase, 22 medical students were trained in diagnosing chest X-rays. Four of these eight cases were presented repeatedly, to develop a high level of expertise for these cases. During the test phase, all eight cases were presented and the participants' prefrontal cortex was scanned using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Response time and diagnostic accuracy were recorded as behavioural indicators.

RESULTS

The results revealed that participants' diagnostic accuracy in the test phase was significantly higher for the trained cases as compared with the untrained cases (F[1, 21] = 138.80, p < 0.001, η²  = 0.87). Also, their response time was significantly shorter for these cases (F[1, 21] = 18.12, p < 0.001, η²  = 0.46). Finally, the results revealed that only for the untrained cases, could a significant activation of the anterolateral prefrontal cortex be observed (F[1, 21] = 21.00, p < 0.01, η²  = 0.34).

CONCLUSION

The fact that only untrained cases triggered higher levels of blood oxygenation in the prefrontal cortex is an indication that system-2 thinking is a cognitive process distinct from system 1. Implications of these findings for the validity of the dual-process theory are discussed.

Hemispheric asymmetry in the prefrontal cortex for complex cognition

With the exception of language, hemispheric asymmetry has not historically been an important issue in the frontal lobe literature. Data generated over the past 20 years is forcing a reconsideration of this position. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that the left prefrontal cortex is an inference engine that automatically makes simple conceptual, logical, and causal connections to fill in missing information and eliminate uncertainty or indeterminacy. This is a fine-tuning of the "left hemisphere interpreter" account from the callosotomy patient literature. What is new is an understanding of the important contributions of the right prefrontal cortex to formal logical inference, conflict detection, and indeterminacy tolerance and maintenance. This chapter articulates these claims and reviews the data on which they are based. The chapter concludes by speculating that the inference capabilities of the left prefrontal cortex are built into the very fabric of language and can be accounted for by the left hemisphere dominance for language. The roles of the right PFC require multiple mechanisms for explanation. Its role in formal inference may be a function of its visual-spatial processing capabilities. Its role in conflict detection may be explained as a system for checking for consistency between existing beliefs and new information coming into the system and inferences drawn from beliefs and/or new information. There are at least three possible mechanisms to account for its role in indeterminacy tolerance. First, it could contain a representational system with properties very different from those of language, and an accompanying inference engine. Second, it could just contain this different representational system, and the information is at some point passed back to the left prefrontal cortex for inference. Third, the role of the right prefrontal cortex may be largely preventative. That is, it doesn't provide alternative representational and inference capabilities but simply prevents the left prefrontal cortex from settling on initial, local inferences. The current data do not allow differentiating between these possibilities. Successful real-world functioning requires the participation of both hemispheres.

TMS applied to V1 can facilitate reasoning

Visual mental imagery is the subjective experience of seeing objects or events in front of the 'inner eye', although they are not actually present. Previous research indicates that (1) visual images help to remember what has been experienced in the past or when objects need to be inspected or manipulated, and (2) visual images are correlated with neural activity in early visual cortices, demonstrating a possible overlap between visual imagery and visual perception. However, recent research revealed that visual imagery can also disrupt cognitive processes and impede thinking. In this transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiment, participants had to solve relational reasoning problems that varied in their imageability (easy or difficult to visualize as a mental image). While solving the problems, eight 10 Hz pulses were either applied to primary visual cortex (V1) or a control site (Vertex). Our findings suggest a causal link between mental imagery, primary visual cortex, and reasoning with visual problems. Moreover, participants exhibited much lower error rates when TMS was applied to V1. We conclude that the disruption of visual images in primary visual cortex can facilitate reasoning.

Participation of the left inferior frontal gyrus in human originality

Human creative cognition is commonly described as a twofold cyclic process that involves an idea generation phase and an idea evaluation phase. Although the evaluation phase makes a crucial contribution to originality, its underlying mechanisms have not received sufficient research attention. Here, we suggest that the left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG) plays a major role in the interplay between the evaluation and generation networks and that inhibiting this region's activity may have an effect on "releasing" the generation neural network, resulting in greater originality. To examine the neural networks that mediate the generation and evaluation of ideas, we conducted an fMRI experiment on a group of healthy human participants (Study 1), in which we compared an idea generation task to an idea evaluation task. We found that evaluating the originality of ideas is indeed associated with a relative increase in lIFG activation, as opposed to generating original ideas. We further showed that temporarily inhibiting the lIFG using continuous theta-burst stimulation (Study 2) results in less strict evaluation on the one hand and increased originality scores on the other. Our findings provide converging evidence from multiple methods to show that the lIFG participates in evaluating the originality of ideas.

Uncertain relational reasoning in the parietal cortex

The psychology of reasoning is currently transitioning from the study of deductive inferences under certainty to inferences that have degrees of uncertainty in both their premises and conclusions; however, only a few studies have explored the cortical basis of uncertain reasoning. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we show that areas in the right superior parietal lobe (rSPL) are necessary for solving spatial relational reasoning problems under conditions of uncertainty. Twenty-four participants had to decide whether a single presented order of objects agreed with a given set of indeterminate premises that could be interpreted in more than one way. During the presentation of the order, 10-Hz TMS was applied over the rSPL or a sham control site. Right SPL TMS during the inference phase disrupted performance in uncertain relational reasoning. Moreover, we found differences in the error rates between preferred mental models, alternative models, and inconsistent models. Our results suggest that different mechanisms are involved when people reason spatially and evaluate different kinds of uncertain conclusions.

Targeting pain catastrophization in patients with fibromyalgia using virtual reality exposure therapy: a proof-of-concept study

[Purpose] Pain catastrophizing is a key predictor of poor compliance to exercises among patients with fibromyalgia syndrome. Alteration of pain catastrophizing in this group is thus warranted. This study aimed to provide proof-of-concept of a novel virtual reality exposure therapy program as treatment for exercise-related pain catastrophizing in patients with fibromyalgia syndrome. [Subjects and Methods] An exploratory, case-controlled study was conducted (fibromyalgia syndrome group and matched control group). Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to acquire neural correlates. The functional magnetic resonance imaging task consisted of two stimuli: active (exercise activity visuals) and passive (relaxing visuals). Structural images and blood-oxygenation-level-dependent contrasts were acquired for the conditions and compared within subjects/groups and between groups. Statistic images were thresholded using corrected clusters (determined by Z>2.3; level of significance: 0.05). [Results] Thirteen fibromyalgia syndrome subjects and nine healthy matched controls were included. The right inferior frontal gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus, right posterior cerebellum, left thalamus, and left supramarginal gyrus were activated in the fibromyalgia syndrome subjects. [Conclusion] The study results provide preliminary proof indicating that exposing patients with fibromyalgia syndrome to visuals of exercises elicits neurophysiological changes in functional brain areas associated with pain catastrophization and add to the current body of knowledge regarding the possibility of objectively identifying cognitive behavioral strategies like pain catastrophization.

Spatio-temporal distribution of brain activity associated with audio-visually congruent and incongruent speech and the McGurk Effect

INTRODUCTION

Spatio-temporal distributions of cortical activity to audio-visual presentations of meaningless vowel-consonant-vowels and the effects of audio-visual congruence/incongruence, with emphasis on the McGurk effect, were studied. The McGurk effect occurs when a clearly audible syllable with one consonant, is presented simultaneously with a visual presentation of a face articulating a syllable with a different consonant and the resulting percept is a syllable with a consonant other than the auditorily presented one.

METHODS

Twenty subjects listened to pairs of audio-visually congruent or incongruent utterances and indicated whether pair members were the same or not. Source current densities of event-related potentials to the first utterance in the pair were estimated and effects of stimulus-response combinations, brain area, hemisphere, and clarity of visual articulation were assessed.

RESULTS

Auditory cortex, superior parietal cortex, and middle temporal cortex were the most consistently involved areas across experimental conditions. Early (<200 msec) processing of the consonant was overall prominent in the left hemisphere, except right hemisphere prominence in superior parietal cortex and secondary visual cortex. Clarity of visual articulation impacted activity in secondary visual cortex and Wernicke's area. McGurk perception was associated with decreased activity in primary and secondary auditory cortices and Wernicke's area before 100 msec, increased activity around 100 msec which decreased again around 180 msec. Activity in Broca's area was unaffected by McGurk perception and was only increased to congruent audio-visual stimuli 30-70 msec following consonant onset.

CONCLUSIONS

The results suggest left hemisphere prominence in the effects of stimulus and response conditions on eight brain areas involved in dynamically distributed parallel processing of audio-visual integration. Initially (30-70 msec) subcortical contributions to auditory cortex, superior parietal cortex, and middle temporal cortex occur. During 100-140 msec, peristriate visual influences and Wernicke's area join in the processing. Resolution of incongruent audio-visual inputs is then attempted, and if successful, McGurk perception occurs and cortical activity in left hemisphere further increases between 170 and 260 msec.

Deductive Versus Probabilistic Reasoning in Healthy Adults: An EEG Analysis of Neural Differences

This study examined the electrophysiological signatures of deductive and probabilistic reasoning. Deduction is defined as the case in which a conclusion can be found to be true or false due to validity of argument. In probabilistic reasoning, however, conclusions can be considered to be likely or unlikely, but not with certainty due to the lack of validity in the form of the argument. 16 participants were presented with both types of arguments while response times and ERPs were carried out. Participants had to decide with the presentation of each argument, what type of reasoning was appropriate and which of four responses (certainly yes, probably yes, probably no and certainly no) was the most appropriate. Response times indicated faster processing of deductive arguments. N2 amplitude distinguished between positive and negative responses in the deductive condition, but not in the probabilistic one, suggesting partial differentiation between the cognitive processes required for the two types of reasoning.

Hemispheric lateralization in reasoning

A growing body of evidence suggests that reasoning in humans relies on a number of related processes whose neural loci are largely lateralized to one hemisphere or the other. A recent review of this evidence concluded that the patterns of lateralization observed are organized according to two complementary tendencies. The left hemisphere attempts to reduce uncertainty by drawing inferences or creating explanations, even at the cost of ignoring conflicting evidence or generating implausible explanations. Conversely, the right hemisphere aims to reduce conflict by rejecting or refining explanations that are no longer tenable in the face of new evidence. In healthy adults, the hemispheres work together to achieve a balance between certainty and consistency, and a wealth of neuropsychological research supports the notion that upsetting this balance results in various failures in reasoning, including delusions. However, support for this model from the neuroimaging literature is mixed. Here, we examine the evidence for this framework from multiple research domains, including an activation likelihood estimation analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of reasoning. Our results suggest a need to either revise this model as it applies to healthy adults or to develop better tools for assessing lateralization in these individuals.

Indeterminacy tolerance as a basis of hemispheric asymmetry within prefrontal cortex

There is an important hemispheric distinction in the functional organization of prefrontal cortex (PFC) that has not been fully recognized and explored. Research with split-brain patients provides considerable evidence for a left hemisphere (LH) “interpreter” that abhors indeterminacy and automatically draws inferences to complete patterns (real or imaginary). It is suggested that this “interpreter” function may be a byproduct of the linguistic capabilities of the LH. This same literature initially limited the role of the right hemisphere (RH) to little more than visual organization. Recent reviews have garnered evidence for several different roles for the right PFC in reasoning, problem solving, and decision-making. We here focus on the beneficial but neglected role of indeterminacy in real-world problem solving and argue that the right PFC complements the left PFC “interpreter” by maintaining, and even enhancing indeterminacy. Successful real-world functioning is a delicate balancing act between these two systems.

Probing the Cognitive Mechanism of Mental Representational Change During Chunk Decomposition: A Parametric fMRI Study

Chunk decomposition plays an important role in cognitive flexibility in particular with regards to representational change, which is critical for insight problem solving and creative thinking. In this study, we investigated the cognitive mechanism of decomposing Chinese character chunks through a parametric fMRI design. Our results from this parametric manipulation revealed widely distributed activations in frontal, parietal, and occipital cortex and negative activations in parietal and visual areas in response to chunk tightness during decomposition. To mentally manipulate the element of a given old chunk, superior parietal lobe appears to support element restructuring in a goal-directed way, whereas the negatively activated inferior parietal lobe may support preventing irrelevant objects from being attended. Moreover, determining alternative ways of restructuring requires a constellation of frontal areas in the cognitive control network, such as the right lateral prefrontal cortex in inhibiting the predominant chunk representations, the presupplementary motor area in initiating a transition of mental task set, and the inferior frontal junction in establishing task sets. In conclusion, this suggests that chunk decomposition reflects mental transformation of problem representation from an inappropriate state to a new one alongside with an evaluation of novel and insightful solutions by the caudate in the dorsal striatum.

Evidence for an inhibitory-control theory of the reasoning brain

In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.

Transient contribution of left posterior parietal cortex to cognitive restructuring

Cognitive restructuring is a fundamental method within cognitive behavioural therapy of changing dysfunctional beliefs into flexible beliefs and learning to react appropriately to the reality of an anxiety-causing situation. To clarify the neural mechanisms of cognitive restructuring, we designed a unique task that replicated psychotherapy during a brain scan. The brain activities of healthy male participants were analysed using functional magnetic resonance imaging. During the brain scan, participants underwent Socratic questioning aimed at cognitive restructuring regarding the necessity of handwashing after using the restroom. The behavioural result indicated that the Socratic questioning effectively decreased the participants' degree of belief (DOB) that they must wash their hands. Alterations in the DOB showed a positive correlation with activity in the left posterior parietal cortex (PPC) while the subject thought about and rated own belief. The involvement of the left PPC not only in planning and decision-making but also in conceptualization may play a pivotal role in cognitive restructuring.

Imaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigm

There has been a great expansion of research into human reasoning at all of Marr’s explanatory levels. There is a tendency for this work to progress within a level largely ignoring the others which can lead to slippage between levels (Chater et al., 2003). It is argued that recent brain imaging research on deductive reasoning—implementational level—has largely ignored the new paradigm in reasoning—computational level (Over, 2009). Consequently, recent imaging results are reviewed with the focus on how they relate to the new paradigm. The imaging results are drawn primarily from a recent meta-analysis by Prado et al. (2011) but further imaging results are also reviewed where relevant. Three main observations are made. First, the main function of the core brain region identified is most likely elaborative, defeasible reasoning not deductive reasoning. Second, the subtraction methodology and the meta-analytic approach may remove all traces of content specific System 1 processes thought to underpin much human reasoning. Third, interpreting the function of the brain regions activated by a task depends on theories of the function that a task engages. When there are multiple interpretations of that function, interpreting what an active brain region is doing is not clear cut. It is concluded that there is a need to more tightly connect brain activation to function, which could be achieved using formalized computational level models and a parametric variation approach.

Divergent hemispheric reasoning strategies: reducing uncertainty versus resolving inconsistency

Converging lines of evidence from diverse research domains suggest that the left and right hemispheres play distinct, yet complementary, roles in inferential reasoning. Here, we review research on split-brain patients, brain-damaged patients, delusional patients, and healthy individuals that suggests that the left hemisphere tends to create explanations, make inferences, and bridge gaps in information, while the right hemisphere tends to detect conflict, update beliefs, support mental set-shifts, and monitor and inhibit behavior. Based on this evidence, we propose that the left hemisphere specializes in creating hypotheses and representing causality, while the right hemisphere specializes in evaluating hypotheses, and rejecting those that are implausible or inconsistent with other evidence. In sum, we suggest that, in the domain of inferential reasoning, the left hemisphere strives to reduce uncertainty while the right hemisphere strives to resolve inconsistency. The hemispheres’ divergent inferential reasoning strategies may contribute to flexible, complex reasoning in the healthy brain, and disruption in these systems may explain reasoning deficits in the unhealthy brain.

Dissociable neural systems underwrite logical reasoning in the context of induced emotions with positive and negative valence

How emotions influence syllogistic reasoning is not well understood. fMRI was employed to investigate the effects of induced positive or negative emotion on syllogistic reasoning. Specifically, on a trial-by-trial basis participants were exposed to a positive, negative, or neutral picture, immediately prior to engagement in a reasoning task. After viewing and rating the valence and intensity of each picture, participants indicated by keypress whether or not the conclusion of the syllogism followed logically from the premises. The content of all syllogisms was neutral, and the influence of belief-bias was controlled for in the study design. Emotion did not affect reasoning performance, although there was a trend in the expected direction based on accuracy rates for the positive (63%) and negative (64%) versus neutral (70%) condition. Nevertheless, exposure to positive and negative pictures led to dissociable patterns of neural activation during reasoning. Therefore, the neural basis of deductive reasoning differs as a function of the valence of the context.

Impact of the BDNF Val66Met Polymorphism on Regional Brain Gray Matter Volumes: Relevance to the Stress Response

OBJECTIVE

Genetic imaging is used to investigate the mechanism by which genetic variants influence brain structure. In a previous study, a structural change of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was associated with symptom modulation in post-traumatic stress disorder patients. This study examined the effect of a polymorphism in the gene encoding brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) on regional gray matter (GM) volumes and the correlations between the dorsolateral prefrontal GM volume and the stress level in healthy volunteers.

METHODS

Sixty-one volunteers underwent genotyping for the BDNF Val66Met single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and completed the Stress Response Inventory (SRI). Magnetic resonance images were also acquired, and the effect of each subject's BDNF genotype and SRI subscore on his or her dorsolateral prefrontal GM volume was evaluated.

RESULTS

The Val/Val homozygotes had significantly larger GM volumes in the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus, the uncus, and the superior temporal and occipital cortices than Met carriers. The Met homozygotes demonstrated a higher stress response in depression domain than Val/Val and Val/Met groups. A negative correlation between the middle frontal cortex GM volume and the SRI depression subscore was found.

CONCLUSION

These findings indicate an interaction between genes and brain structure, and they suggest that differences in dorsolateral prefrontal GM volume related to the BDNF Val66Met SNP are associated with resilience to stressful life events, particularly in the dimension of emotion.