Neural correlates of believing

The truth is in there: Belief processes in the human brain

Belief, defined by William James as the mental state or function of cognizing reality, is a core psychological function with strong influence on emotion and behavior. Furthermore, strong and aberrant beliefs about the world and oneself play important roles in mental disorders. The underlying processes of belief have been the matter of a long debate in philosophy and psychology, and modern neuroimaging techniques can provide insight into the underlying neural processes. Here, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with N = 30 healthy participants in which we presented statements about facts, politics, religion, conspiracy theories, and superstition. Participants judged whether they considered them as true (belief) or not (disbelief) and reported their certainty in the decision. We found belief-associated activations in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left superior parietal cortex, and left lateral frontopolar cortex. Disbelief-associated activations were found in an anterior temporal cluster extending into the amygdala. We found a larger deactivation for disbelief than belief in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that was most pronounced during decisions, suggesting a role of the vmPFC in belief-related decision-making. As a category-specific effect, we found disbelief-associated activation in retrosplenial cortex and parahippocampal gyrus for conspiracy theory statements. Exploratory analyses identified networks centered at anterior cingulate cortex for certainty, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for uncertainty. The uncertainty effect identifies a neural substrate for Alexander Bain's notion from 1859 of uncertainty as the real opposite of belief. Taken together, our results suggest a two-factor neural process model of belief with falsehood/veracity and uncertainty/certainty factors.

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

Default beliefs as a basis of social decision-making

Default beliefs are implicit assumptions about the future existence of oneself, others, and the environment. They differ from individual and cultural beliefs in that they are held universally, implicitly, and with high confidence. What is the content of default beliefs? How are they represented in the brain? And what is their role in social decision-making?

Believing processes during the COVID-19 pandemic in individuals with bipolar disorder: An exploratory study

BACKGROUND

Believing or “credition” refers to psychological processes that integrate the cognitions and emotions that influence our behavior. In the credition model by Angel and Seitz, four parameters are postulated: proposition, certainty, emotion and mightiness. It is assumed that believing processes are influenced by both the individual as well as socio-cultural factors and external circumstances. External or environmental circumstances can include threatening situations such as the ongoing pandemic. It has been hypothesized that believing processes related to the pandemic differ between individuals with bipolar disorder (BD) and healthy controls (HC).

AIM

To investigate credition in individuals with BD during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

METHODS

Psychiatrically stable individuals with BD (n = 52) and age- and sex matched HC (n = 52) participated in an online survey during the first lockdown of the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey took place between April 9^th and June 4^th, 2020, in Austria. Participants completed the Brief Symptom Inventory-18, the Beck Depression Inventory-II, the Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale, the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index and a dedicated Believing Questionnaire assessing four parameters of credition (proposition, certainty, emotion and mightiness). The MAXQDA software was used to analyze the qualitative data. Statistical analyses included analyses of variance, a multivariate analysis of variance and a multivariate analysis of co-variance.

RESULTS

Individuals with BD reported significantly more negative propositions [F (1,102) = 8.89, P = 0.004, η²_p = 0.08] and negative emotions [Welch´s F (1,82.46) = 18.23, P < 0.001, η²_p = 0.18], while HC showed significantly more positive propositions [F (1,102) = 7.78, P = 0.006, η²_p = 0.07] and emotions [F (1,102) = 14.31, P < 0.001, η²_p = 0.12]. In addition, individuals with BD showed a higher incongruence between their propositions and their emotions [F (1,102) = 9.42, P = 0.003, η²_p = 0.08] and showed strong correlations between the parameters of the Believing Questionnaire and their psychiatric symptoms (r = 0.51-0.77, all P < 0.001). Positive as well as negative emotions and propositions were associated with scores measuring symptoms of depression, anxiety and sleep quality.

CONCLUSION

Believing parameters were associated with psychiatric symptoms in BD during the pandemic. Findings broaden knowledge about the susceptibility of believing processes for ambient challenges in individuals with BD.

Cultural differences in neurocognitive mechanisms underlying believing

Believing as a fundamental mental process influences other cognitive/affective processes and behavior. However, it is unclear whether believing engages distinct neurocognitive mechanisms in people with different cultural experiences. We addressed this issue by scanning Chinese and Danish adults using functional MRI during believing judgments on personality traits of oneself and a celebrity. Drift diffusion model analyses of behavioral performances revealed that speed/quality of information acquisition varied between believing judgments on positive and negative personality traits in Chinese but not in Danes. Chinese adopted a more conservative strategy of decision-making during celebrity- than self-believing judgments whereas an opposite pattern was observed in Danes. Non-decisional processes were longer for celebrity- than for self-believing in Danes but not in Chinese. Believing judgments activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in both cultural groups but elicited stronger left anterior insular and ventral frontal activations in Chinese. Greater mPFC activity in Chinese was associated with longer duration of non-decision processes during believing-judgments, which predicted slower retrieval of self-related information in a memory test. Greater mPFC activity in Danes, however, was associated with a less degree of adopting a conservative strategy during believing judgments, which predicted faster retrieval of self-related information. Our findings highlight different neurocognitive processes engaged in believing between individuals from East Asian and Western cultures.

Believing processes around COVID-19 vaccination: An exploratory study investigating workers in the health sector

BACKGROUND

The processes underlying believing have been labeled "creditions", which are important brain functions between emotion and cognition. Creditions are influenced by both internal and external factors, one of which is the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the vaccination against the disease.

METHODS

To investigate believing processes shortly before the implementation of a mandatory vaccination in Austria, both vaccinated and unvaccinated workers in the health sector (WHS) were surveyed in December 2021/January 2022. In total, 1,062 vaccinated and 97 unvaccinated WHS (920 females) completed the online survey. Beliefs were assessed using the parameters of the credition model (narrative, certainty, emotion, and mightiness) with regard to (1) the COVID-19 pandemic in general, and (2) the vaccination. Type of emotion and narrative were divided into positive, negative, and indifferent. Moreover, the congruence between emotion and narrative was calculated.

RESULTS

The vaccination rate of the sample was 91.6%, with a significantly higher percentage of men being in the group of vaccinated (21.1%) as compared to unvaccinated individuals (12.4%). Pertaining beliefs about the COVID-19 vaccination, unvaccinated WHS reported more negative and less positive emotions as well as content of narrative than vaccinated WHS. In addition, they showed higher levels of certainty as well as mightiness while believing and felt less sufficiently informed about governmental and workplace-related COVID-19 measures. The groups did not differ in the type of emotion or content of narrative in their beliefs about the pandemic in general.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, unvaccinated WHS had more negative and less positive emotions and thoughts than vaccinated WHS in their beliefs about the COVID-19 vaccination and their motivations for not having received it. They were more certain about their beliefs and felt stronger negative emotions in their beliefs compared to vaccinated individuals. Providing unvaccinated WHS with adequate information might be helpful in reducing their mental burden.

Beliefs: A challenge in neuropsychological disorders

INTRODUCTION

Beliefs have recently been defined as the neural product of perception of objects and events in the external world and of an affirmative internal affective state reflecting personal meaning. It is, however, undetermined in which way diseases of the brain affect these integrative processes.

METHODS

Here, the formation and updating of abnormal beliefs in cerebral disorders are described.

RESULTS

It will be shown that well-defined neuropsychological syndromes resulting from brain lesions also interfere with the neural processes that enable the formation, up-dating and communication of beliefs. Similarly, in neuropsychiatric disorders abnormal and delusional beliefs appear to be caused by altered perception and/or misattribution of aversive meaning.

CONCLUSION

Given the importance of beliefs for ordinary social behaviour, abnormal beliefs are a challenge in neuropsychological disorders.

Belief formation - A driving force for brain evolution

The topic of belief has been neglected in the natural sciences for a long period of time. Recent neuroscience research in non-human primates and humans, however, has shown that beliefs are the neuropsychic product of fundamental brain processes that attribute affective meaning to concrete objects and events, enabling individual goal setting, decision making and maneuvering in the environment. With regard to the involved neural processes they can be categorized as empirical, relational, and conceptual beliefs. Empirical beliefs are about objects and relational beliefs are about events as in tool use and in interactions between subjects that develop below the level of awareness and are up-dated dynamically. Conceptual beliefs are more complex being based on narratives and participation in ritual acts. As neural processes are known to require computational space in the brain, the formation of inceasingly complex beliefs demands extra neural resources. Here, we argue that the evolution of human beliefs is related to the phylogenetic enlargement of the brain including the parietal and medial frontal cortex in humans.

From Believing to Belief: A General Theoretical Model

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing are. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.