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Hopp FR, Amir O, Fisher JT, Grafton S, Sinnott-Armstrong W, Weber R. Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical activation modulated by political ideology. Nat Hum Behav 2023; 7:2182-2198. [PMID: 37679440 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2022] [Accepted: 08/03/2023] [Indexed: 09/09/2023]
Abstract
Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral foundations but where and how these foundations are represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms, reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind. Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT, individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm that each moral foundation recruits domain-general mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable accounts of morality and their neurological support for MFT.
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Affiliation(s)
- Frederic R Hopp
- Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Ori Amir
- Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA
| | - Jacob T Fisher
- Department of Communication, Michigan State University, Lansing, MI, USA
| | - Scott Grafton
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
| | | | - René Weber
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA.
- Department of Communication, Media Neuroscience Lab, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA.
- School of Communication and Media, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea.
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Khoudary A, Hanna E, O’Neill K, Iyengar V, Clifford S, Cabeza R, De Brigard F, Sinnott-Armstrong W. A Functional Neuroimaging Investigation of Moral Foundations Theory. Soc Neurosci 2022; 17:491-507. [PMID: 36378272 DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC) analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty, Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm from moral foundation violations, and distinguished individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence for neural modularity and motivate further research on the novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ari Khoudary
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Eleanor Hanna
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Kevin O’Neill
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Vijeth Iyengar
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Scott Clifford
- Department of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, Texas, USA
| | - Roberto Cabeza
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Felipe De Brigard
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
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3
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Popal H, Wang Y, Olson IR. A Guide to Representational Similarity Analysis for Social Neuroscience. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2019; 14:1243-1253. [PMID: 31989169 PMCID: PMC7057283 DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsz099] [Citation(s) in RCA: 49] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2019] [Revised: 10/13/2019] [Accepted: 10/22/2019] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Representational similarity analysis (RSA) is a computational technique that uses pairwise comparisons of stimuli to reveal their representation in higher-order space. In the context of neuroimaging, mass-univariate analyses and other multivariate analyses can provide information on what and where information is represented but have limitations in their ability to address how information is represented. Social neuroscience is a field that can particularly benefit from incorporating RSA techniques to explore hypotheses regarding the representation of multidimensional data, how representations can predict behavior, how representations differ between groups and how multimodal data can be compared to inform theories. The goal of this paper is to provide a practical as well as theoretical guide to implementing RSA in social neuroscience studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Haroon Popal
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA
| | | | - Ingrid R Olson
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA
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4
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The computational and neural substrates of moral strategies in social decision-making. Nat Commun 2019; 10:1483. [PMID: 30940815 PMCID: PMC6445121 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-019-09161-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2018] [Accepted: 02/20/2019] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Individuals employ different moral principles to guide their social decision-making, thus expressing a specific ‘moral strategy’. Which computations characterize different moral strategies, and how might they be instantiated in the brain? Here, we tackle these questions in the context of decisions about reciprocity using a modified Trust Game. We show that different participants spontaneously and consistently employ different moral strategies. By mapping an integrative computational model of reciprocity decisions onto brain activity using inter-subject representational similarity analysis of fMRI data, we find markedly different neural substrates for the strategies of ‘guilt aversion’ and ‘inequity aversion’, even under conditions where the two strategies produce the same choices. We also identify a new strategy, ‘moral opportunism’, in which participants adaptively switch between guilt and inequity aversion, with a corresponding switch observed in their neural activation patterns. These findings provide a valuable view into understanding how different individuals may utilize different moral principles. The authors show that individuals apply different ‘moral strategies’ in interpersonal decision-making. These strategies are linked to distinct patterns of neural activity, even when they produce the same choice outcomes, illuminating how distinct moral principles can guide social behavior.
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Tsoi L, Dungan JA, Chakroff A, Young LL. Neural substrates for moral judgments of psychological versus physical harm. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2018; 13:460-470. [PMID: 29718384 PMCID: PMC6007614 DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsy029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2017] [Accepted: 04/16/2018] [Indexed: 01/12/2023] Open
Abstract
While we may think about harm as primarily being about physical injury, harm can also take the form of negative psychological impact. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the extent to which moral judgments of physical and psychological harms are processed similarly, focusing on brain regions implicated in mental state reasoning or theory of mind, a key cognitive process for moral judgment. First, univariate analyses reveal item-specific features that lead to greater recruitment of theory of mind regions for psychological harm versus physical harm. Second, multivariate pattern analyses reveal sensitivity to the psychological/physical distinction in two regions implicated in theory of mind: the right temporoparietal junction and the precuneus. Third, we find no reliable differences between neurotypical adults and adults with autism spectrum disorder with regard to neural activity related to theory of mind during moral evaluations of psychological and physical harm. Altogether, these results reveal neural sensitivity to the distinction between psychological harm and physical harm.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lily Tsoi
- Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
| | - James A Dungan
- Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
| | | | - Liane L Young
- Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
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