Wait for the second marshmallow? Future-oriented thinking and delayed reward discounting in the brain

Health factors that influence sustainable behaviour in a single-player resource management game

Encouraging sustainable use of limited natural, social, and economic resources requires understanding the variety of ways in which people think about how resources work and how they adjust their behaviour (or not) as available resources fluctuate. Previous investigations which have focused on understanding how individuals navigate erodible resources, have tended to use group-based, common pool games. However, such social games make it difficult to disentangle whether resource erosion is linked to difficulty navigating the dynamics of the resource or caused by social factors. Here, in two experiments, we recruited 781 participants to play a single-player resource management game in which individuals were invited to harvest monetary rewards from a fully depletable but stochastically replenishing resource over time. We find that the ability to sustain a resource over successive harvesting opportunities (in order to maximize the total harvested rewards) is reliably worse in individuals reporting elevated psychological distress, the often cooccurring hazardous alcohol use, and elevated rates of delay discounting. The associations between resource outcomes, harmful alcohol use, and psychological distress remained substantial even once we had controlled for elevated discounting rates (as a form of impulsivity and a strong risk factor for these health challenges). By contrast, individuals who reported higher levels of financial literacy and general well-being achieved better resource outcomes. Our observations demonstrate that the capacity to respond effectively to the dynamics of a resource are compromised in individuals at risk of psychological and alcohol-related disorders.

Depth and hierarchies in the predictive brain: From reaction to action

The human brain is a prediction device, a view widely accepted in neuroscience. Prediction is a rational and efficient response that relies on the brain's ability to create and employ generative models to optimize actions over unpredictable time horizons. We argue that extant predictive frameworks while compelling, have not explicitly accounted for the following: (a) The brain's generative models must incorporate predictive depth (i.e., rely on degrees of abstraction to enable predictions over different time horizons); (b) The brain's implementation scheme to account for varying predictive depth relies on dynamic predictive hierarchies formed using the brain's functional networks. We show that these hierarchies incorporate the ascending processes (driven by reaction), and the descending processes (related to prediction), eventually driving action. Because they are dynamically formed, predictive hierarchies allow the brain to address predictive challenges in virtually any domain. By way of application, we explain how this framework can be applied to heretofore poorly understood processes of human behavioral thermoregulation. Although mammalian thermoregulation has been closely tied to deep brain structures engaged in autonomic control such as the hypothalamus, this narrow conception does not translate well to humans. In addition to profound differences in evolutionary history, the human brain is bestowed with substantially increased functional complexity (that itself emerged from evolutionary differences). We argue that behavioral thermoregulation in humans is possible because, (a) ascending signals shaped by homeostatic sub-networks, interject with (b) descending signals related to prediction (implemented in interoceptive and executive sub-networks) and action (implemented in executive sub-networks). These sub-networks cumulatively form a predictive hierarchy for human thermoregulation, potentiating a range of viable responses to known and unknown thermoregulatory challenges. We suggest that our proposed extensions to the predictive framework provide a set of generalizable principles that can further illuminate the many facets of the predictive brain. This article is categorized under: Neuroscience > Behavior Philosophy > Action Psychology > Prediction.

The effects of cueing episodic future thinking on delay discounting in children, adolescents, and adults

Discounting the value of delayed rewards such that even a relatively small, immediately available reward is preferred to a larger delayed reward is a commonly observed human trait. Children are particularly steep discounters of delayed rewards as evidenced by delay of gratification studies. In recent years, however, a growing literature indicates that cueing individuals to imagine personal future events attenuates their discounting of delayed rewards. The present studies extend this literature by examining whether cueing future thinking promotes patient choices in children and adolescents. In Experiment 1 we found that cueing future thinking had no effect on 8-11-year-olds' (n = 177) delay discounting of either real or hypothetical rewards. In Experiment 2 we found that cueing adolescents (12-14-year-olds, n = 126) and adults (n = 122) to think about personal future events decreased their discounting of delayed rewards relative to three other conditions: a no cue control, an episodic memory condition and a novel 'future other' condition in which individuals imagine future events that might happen to a significant other person in their life. Cueing adults and adolescents to think about personal future events did not however affect how connected they felt to their future selves or their subjective sense of how close future time points felt to them - two constructs that have previously been shown to be related to delay discounting.

Basal ganglia lateralization in different types of reward

Reward processing is a fundamental human activity. The basal ganglia are recognized for their role in reward processes; however, specific roles of the different nuclei (e.g., nucleus accumbens, caudate, putamen and globus pallidus) remain unclear. Using quantitative meta-analyses we assessed whole-brain and basal ganglia specific contributions to money, erotic, and food reward processing. We analyzed data from 190 fMRI studies which reported stereotaxic coordinates of whole-brain, within-group results from healthy adult participants. Results showed concordance in overlapping and distinct cortical and sub-cortical brain regions as a function of reward type. Common to all reward types was concordance in basal ganglia nuclei, with distinct differences in hemispheric dominance and spatial extent in response to the different reward types. Food reward processing favored the right hemisphere; erotic rewards favored the right lateral globus pallidus and left caudate body. Money rewards engaged the basal ganglia bilaterally including its most anterior part, nucleus accumbens. We conclude by proposing a model of common reward processing in the basal ganglia and separate models for money, erotic, and food rewards.

Imagining Events Alternative to the Present Can Attenuate Delay Discounting

Previous studies have shown that delay discounting (DD), the tendency to prefer smaller-immediate to larger-delayed rewards, decreases following vivid imagination of future events. Here, we test the hypothesis that imagining complex events alternative to direct (perceptual) experience, whether located in the future, the past, or even the present, would reduce DD. Participants (N = 250) imagined future events (Future condition), remembered past events (Past condition), imagined present events (Present-imagine condition), or reported on the current events (Present-attend condition), and then made a series of intertemporal choices about money and food. Compared to attending to the present, imagining the future reduced DD, but this only held for individuals who claimed vivid pre-experiencing of future events. Importantly, a similar attenuation of DD was found in the Past and Present-imagine conditions, suggesting that a shift in perspective from the perceptual present towards mentally constructed experience can downplay the appraisal of immediate rewards in favor of larger-delayed rewards, regardless of the location of the imagined experience in subjective time.

Intertemporal decision-making-related brain states predict adolescent drug abuse intervention responses

Adolescent drug misuse represents a major risk factor for long-term drug use disorders. However, wide individual differences in responses to first-line behavioral therapies targeting adolescent drug misuse limit critical early intervention. Identifying the neural signatures of those adolescents most likely to respond to an intervention would potentially guide personalized strategies for reducing drug misuse. Prior to a 14-week evidence-based intervention involving combinations of contingency management, motivational enhancement, and cognitive behavioral therapy, thirty adolescent alcohol and/or cannabis users underwent fMRI while performing a reward delay discounting (DD) task tapping an addiction-related cognition. Intervention responses were longitudinally characterized by both urinalysis and self-report measures of the percentage of days used during treatment and in post-treatment follow-up. Group independent component analysis (ICA) of task fMRI data identified neural processing networks related to DD task performance. Separate measures of wholesale recruitment during immediate reward choices and within-network functional connectivity among selective networks significantly predicted intervention-related changes in drug misuse frequency. Specifically, heightened pre-intervention engagement of a temporal lobe "reward motivation" network for impulsive choices on the DD task predicted poorer intervention outcomes, while modes of functional connectivity within the reward motivation network, a prospection network, and a posterior insula network demonstrated robust associations with intervention outcomes. Finally, the pre-intervention functional organization of the prospection network also predicted post-intervention drug use behaviors for up to 6 months of follow-up. Multiple functional variations in the neural processing networks supporting preference for immediate and future rewards signal individual differences in readiness to benefit from an effective behavioral therapy for reducing adolescent drug misuse. The implications for efforts to boost therapy responses are discussed.

Cuing both positive and negative episodic foresight reduces delay discounting but does not affect risk-taking

Humans frequently create mental models of the future, allowing outcomes to be inferred in advance of their occurrence. Recent evidence suggests that imagining positive future events reduces delay discounting (the devaluation of reward with time until its receipt), while imagining negative future events may increase it. Here, using a sample of 297 participants, we experimentally assess the effects of cued episodic simulation of positive and negative future scenarios on decision-making in the context of both delay discounting (monetary choice questionnaire) and risk-taking (balloon-analogue risk task). Participants discounted the future less when cued to imagine positive and negative future scenarios than they did when cued to engage in control neutral imagery. There were no effects of experimental condition on risk-taking. Thus, although these results replicate previous findings suggesting episodic future simulation can reduce delay discounting, they indicate that this effect is not dependent on the valence of the thoughts, and does not generalise to all other forms of “impulsive” decision-making. We discuss various interpretations of these results, and suggest avenues for further research on the role of prospection in decision-making.

Pattern classification differentiates decision of intertemporal choices using multi-voxel pattern analysis

In daily life, individuals frequently make trade-offs between the small-but-immediate benefits and large-but-delayed profits. This type of decision is known as intertemporal choice. Previous studies have uncovered the neurobiological mechanism of the intertemporal choice, but it still remains unclear how the patterns of brain activity predict the decisions of intertemporal choices. To fill this gap, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), in conjunction with the machine learning technique of multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), to ascertain the predictive capability of the neuronal pattern for classifying individuals' intertemporal decisions across two independent samples. To further probe how this neuronal pattern worked in predicting individual intertemporal decision, we drew on the Power Atlas to examine the accuracies of classification within each regional mask as well. Classification findings showed that the pattern of neuronal activity over the whole-brain can correctly classify the accuracies of individual decisions up to 84.3%. Encouragingly, further analysis shows that the neuronal information encoded in three brain functional networks can predict individuals' decisions with significant discriminative power in cross-samples, namely the valuation network (e.g., striatum), the cognitive control network (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and the episodic prospection network (e.g., amygdala, parahippocampus gyrus, insula). Collectively, these findings advance our comprehension of the neuronal mechanism of human intertemporal decisions, and substantially reshape our understanding for this cardinal behaviour from behavioural-brain scheme to brain-behavioural configuration.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

The consciousness state space (CSS)-a unifying model for consciousness and self

Every experience, those we are aware of and those we are not, is embedded in a subjective timeline, is tinged with emotion, and inevitably evokes a certain sense of self. Here, we present a phenomenological model for consciousness and selfhood which relates time, awareness, and emotion within one framework. The consciousness state space (CSS) model is a theoretical one. It relies on a broad range of literature, hence has high explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the relationship between different aspects of experience. Briefly, it is suggested that all phenomenological states fall into two categories of consciousness, core and extended (CC and EC, respectively). CC supports minimal selfhood that is short of temporal extension, its scope being the here and now. EC supports narrative selfhood, which involves personal identity and continuity across time, as well as memory, imagination and conceptual thought. The CSS is a phenomenological space, created by three dimensions: time, awareness and emotion. Each of the three dimensions is shown to have a dual phenomenological composition, falling within CC and EC. The neural spaces supporting each of these dimensions, as well as CC and EC, are laid out based on the neuroscientific literature. The CSS dynamics include two simultaneous trajectories, one in CC and one in EC, typically antagonistic in normal experiences. However, this characteristic behavior is altered in states in which a person experiences an altered sense of self. Two examples are laid out, flow and meditation. The CSS model creates a broad theoretical framework with explanatory and unificatory power. It constructs a detailed map of the consciousness and selfhood phenomenology, which offers constraints for the science of consciousness. We conclude by outlining several testable predictions raised by the CSS model.

Nicotinamide, NAD(P)(H), and Methyl-Group Homeostasis Evolved and Became a Determinant of Ageing Diseases: Hypotheses and Lessons from Pellagra

Compartmentalized redox faults are common to ageing diseases. Dietary constituents are catabolized to NAD(H) donating electrons producing proton-based bioenergy in coevolved, cross-species and cross-organ networks. Nicotinamide and NAD deficiency from poor diet or high expenditure causes pellagra, an ageing and dementing disorder with lost robustness to infection and stress. Nicotinamide and stress induce Nicotinamide-N-methyltransferase (NNMT) improving choline retention but consume methyl groups. High NNMT activity is linked to Parkinson's, cancers, and diseases of affluence. Optimising nicotinamide and choline/methyl group availability is important for brain development and increased during our evolution raising metabolic and methylome ceilings through dietary/metabolic symbiotic means but strict energy constraints remain and life-history tradeoffs are the rule. An optimal energy, NAD and methyl group supply, avoiding hypo and hyper-vitaminoses nicotinamide and choline, is important to healthy ageing and avoids utilising double-edged symbionts or uncontrolled autophagy or reversions to fermentation reactions in inflammatory and cancerous tissue that all redistribute NAD(P)(H), but incur high allostatic costs.

Future decision-making without episodic mental time travel

Deficits in episodic memory are associated with deficits in the ability to imagine future experiences (i.e., mental time travel). We show that K.C., a person with episodic amnesia and an inability to imagine future experiences, nonetheless systematically discounts the value of future rewards, and his discounting is within the range of controls in terms of both rate and consistency. Because K.C. is neither able to imagine personal uses for the rewards nor provide a rationale for selecting larger future rewards over smaller current rewards, this study demonstrates a dissociation between imagining and making decisions involving the future. Thus, although those capable of mental time travel may use it in making decisions about future rewards, these results demonstrate that it is not required for such decisions.