Adaptive gain control during human perceptual choice

Toward a computational role for locus coeruleus/norepinephrine arousal systems

Brain and behavior undergo measurable changes in their underlying state and neuromodulators are thought to contribute to these fluctuations. Why do we undergo such changes, and what function could the underlying neuromodulatory systems perform? Here we examine theoretical answers to these questions with respect to the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system focusing on peripheral markers for arousal, such as pupil diameter, that are thought to provide a window into brain wide noradrenergic signaling. We explore a computational role for arousal systems in facilitating internal state transitions that facilitate credit assignment and promote accurate perceptions in non-stationary environments. We summarize recent work that supports this idea and highlight open questions as well as alternative views of how arousal affects cognition.

Exploration-Exploitation and Suicidal Behavior in Borderline Personality Disorder and Depression

Importance

Clinical theory and behavioral studies suggest that people experiencing suicidal crisis are often unable to find constructive solutions or incorporate useful information into their decisions, resulting in premature convergence on suicide and neglect of better alternatives. However, prior studies of suicidal behavior have not formally examined how individuals resolve the tradeoffs between exploiting familiar options and exploring potentially superior alternatives.

Objective

To investigate exploration and exploitation in suicidal behavior from the formal perspective of reinforcement learning.

Design, Setting, and Participants

Two case-control behavioral studies of exploration-exploitation of a large 1-dimensional continuous space and a 21-day prospective ambulatory study of suicidal ideation were conducted between April 2016 and March 2022. Participants were recruited from inpatient psychiatric units, outpatient clinics, and the community in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and underwent laboratory and ambulatory assessments. Adults diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and midlife and late-life major depressive disorder (MDD) were included, with each sample including demographically equated groups with a history of high-lethality suicide attempts, low-lethality suicide attempts, individuals with BPD or MDD but no suicide attempts, and control individuals without psychiatric disorders. The MDD sample also included a subgroup with serious suicidal ideation.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Behavioral (model-free and model-derived) indices of exploration and exploitation, suicide attempt lethality (Beck Lethality Scale), and prospectively assessed suicidal ideation.

Results

The BPD group included 171 adults (mean [SD] age, 30.55 [9.13] years; 135 [79%] female). The MDD group included 143 adults (mean [SD] age, 62.03 [6.82] years; 81 [57%] female). Across the BPD (χ23 = 50.68; P < .001) and MDD (χ24 = 36.34; P < .001) samples, individuals with high-lethality suicide attempts discovered fewer options than other groups as they were unable to shift away from unrewarded options. In contrast, those with low-lethality attempts were prone to excessive behavioral shifts after rewarded and unrewarded actions. No differences were seen in strategic early exploration or in exploitation. Among 84 participants with BPD in the ambulatory study, 56 reported suicidal ideation. Underexploration also predicted incident suicidal ideation (χ21 = 30.16; P < .001), validating the case-control results prospectively. The findings were robust to confounds, including medication exposure, affective state, and behavioral heterogeneity.

Conclusions and Relevance

The findings suggest that narrow exploration and inability to abandon inferior options are associated with serious suicidal behavior and chronic suicidal thoughts. By contrast, individuals in this study who engaged in low-lethality suicidal behavior displayed a low threshold for taking potentially disadvantageous actions.

Biological motion perception in the theoretical framework of perceptual decision-making: An event-related potential study

Biological motion perception plays a critical role in various decisions in daily life. Failure to decide accordingly in such a perceptual task could have life-threatening consequences. Neurophysiology and computational modeling studies suggest two processes mediating perceptual decision-making. One of these signals is associated with the accumulation of sensory evidence and the other with response selection. Recent EEG studies with humans have introduced an event-related potential called Centroparietal Positive Potential (CPP) as a neural marker aligned with the sensory evidence accumulation while effectively distinguishing it from motor-related lateralized readiness potential (LRP). The present study aims to investigate the neural mechanisms of biological motion perception in the framework of perceptual decision-making, which has been overlooked before. More specifically, we examine whether CPP would track the coherence of the biological motion stimuli and could be distinguished from the LRP signal. We recorded EEG from human participants while they performed a direction discrimination task of a point-light walker stimulus embedded in various levels of noise. Our behavioral findings revealed shorter reaction times and reduced miss rates as the coherence of the stimuli increased. In addition, CPP tracked the coherence of the biological motion stimuli with a tendency to reach a common level during the response, albeit with a later onset than the previously reported results in random-dot motion paradigms. Furthermore, CPP was distinguished from the LRP signal based on its temporal profile. Overall, our results suggest that the mechanisms underlying perceptual decision-making generalize to more complex and socially significant stimuli like biological motion.

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Cognitive Modeling of Left-Turn Gap Acceptance Decisions in Human Drivers

OBJECTIVE

We aim to bridge the gap between naturalistic studies of driver behavior and modern cognitive and neuroscientific accounts of decision making by modeling the cognitive processes underlying left-turn gap acceptance by human drivers.

BACKGROUND

Understanding decisions of human drivers is essential for the development of safe and efficient transportation systems. Current models of decision making in drivers provide little insight into the underlying cognitive processes. On the other hand, laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. However, it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in these tasks are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving.

RESULTS

The drivers' probability of accepting the available gap increased with the size of the gap; importantly, response time increased with time gap but not distance gap. The generalized drift-diffusion model explained the observed decision outcomes and response time distributions, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that dynamic evidence accumulation is an essential mechanism underlying left-turn gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.

APPLICATION

Potential applications of our results include real-time prediction of human behavior by automated vehicles and simulating realistic human-like behaviors in virtual environments for automated vehicles.

Neurophysiological insights into sequential decision-making: exploring the secretary problem through ERPs and TBR dynamics

Decision-making under uncertainty, a cornerstone of human cognition, is encapsulated by the "secretary problem" in optimal stopping theory. Our study examines this decision-making challenge, where participants are required to sequentially evaluate and make irreversible choices under conditions that simulate cognitive overload. We probed neurophysiological responses by engaging 27 students in a secretary problem simulation while undergoing EEG monitoring, focusing on Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) P200 and P400, and Theta to Beta Ratio (TBR) dynamics.Results revealed a nuanced pattern: the P200 component's amplitude declined from the initial to the middle offers, suggesting a diminishing attention span as participants grew accustomed to the task. This attenuation reversed at the final offer, indicating a heightened cognitive processing as the task concluded. In contrast, the P400 component's amplitude peaked at the middle offer, hinting at increased cognitive evaluation, and tapered off at the final decision. Additionally, TBR dynamics illustrated a fluctuation in attentional control and emotional regulation throughout the decision-making sequence, enhancing our understanding of the cognitive strategies employed.The research elucidates the dynamic interplay of cognitive processes in high-stakes environments, with neurophysiological markers fluctuating significantly as participants navigated sequential choices. By correlating these fluctuations with decision-making behavior, we provide insights into the evolving strategies from heightened alertness to strategic evaluation. Our findings offer insights that could inform the use of neurophysiological data in the development of decision-making frameworks, potentially contributing to the practical application of cognitive research in real-life contexts.

Continuous Bump Attractor Networks Require Explicit Error Coding for Gain Recalibration

Representations of continuous variables are crucial to create internal models of the external world. A prevailing model of how the brain maintains these representations is given by continuous bump attractor networks (CBANs) in a broad range of brain functions across different areas, such as spatial navigation in hippocampal/entorhinal circuits and working memory in prefrontal cortex. Through recurrent connections, a CBAN maintains a persistent activity bump, whose peak location can vary along a neural space, corresponding to different values of a continuous variable. To track the value of a continuous variable changing over time, a CBAN updates the location of its activity bump based on inputs that encode the changes in the continuous variable (e.g., movement velocity in the case of spatial navigation)-a process akin to mathematical integration. This integration process is not perfect and accumulates error over time. For error correction, CBANs can use additional inputs providing ground-truth information about the continuous variable's correct value (e.g., visual landmarks for spatial navigation). These inputs enable the network dynamics to automatically correct any representation error. Recent experimental work on hippocampal place cells has shown that, beyond correcting errors, ground-truth inputs also fine-tune the gain of the integration process, a crucial factor that links the change in the continuous variable to the updating of the activity bump's location. However, existing CBAN models lack this plasticity, offering no insights into the neural mechanisms and representations involved in the recalibration of the integration gain. In this paper, we explore this gap by using a ring attractor network, a specific type of CBAN, to model the experimental conditions that demonstrated gain recalibration in hippocampal place cells. Our analysis reveals the necessary conditions for neural mechanisms behind gain recalibration within a CBAN. Unlike error correction, which occurs through network dynamics based on ground-truth inputs, gain recalibration requires an additional neural signal that explicitly encodes the error in the network's representation via a rate code. Finally, we propose a modified ring attractor network as an example CBAN model that verifies our theoretical findings. Combining an error-rate code with Hebbian synaptic plasticity, this model achieves recalibration of integration gain in a CBAN, ensuring accurate representation for continuous variables.

Reward-based option competition in human dorsal stream and transition from stochastic exploration to exploitation in continuous space

Primates exploring and exploiting a continuous sensorimotor space rely on dynamic maps in the dorsal stream. Two complementary perspectives exist on how these maps encode rewards. Reinforcement learning models integrate rewards incrementally over time, efficiently resolving the exploration/exploitation dilemma. Working memory buffer models explain rapid plasticity of parietal maps but lack a plausible exploration/exploitation policy. The reinforcement learning model presented here unifies both accounts, enabling rapid, information-compressing map updates and efficient transition from exploration to exploitation. As predicted by our model, activity in human frontoparietal dorsal stream regions, but not in MT+, tracks the number of competing options, as preferred options are selectively maintained on the map, while spatiotemporally distant alternatives are compressed out. When valuable new options are uncovered, posterior β1/α oscillations desynchronize within 0.4 to 0.7 s, consistent with option encoding by competing β1-stabilized subpopulations. Together, outcomes matching locally cached reward representations rapidly update parietal maps, biasing choices toward often-sampled, rewarded options.

Quantifying decision-making in dynamic, continuously evolving environments

During perceptual decision-making tasks, centroparietal electroencephalographic (EEG) potentials report an evidence accumulation-to-bound process that is time locked to trial onset. However, decisions in real-world environments are rarely confined to discrete trials; they instead unfold continuously, with accumulation of time-varying evidence being recency-weighted towards its immediate past. The neural mechanisms supporting recency-weighted continuous decision-making remain unclear. Here, we use a novel continuous task design to study how the centroparietal positivity (CPP) adapts to different environments that place different constraints on evidence accumulation. We show that adaptations in evidence weighting to these different environments are reflected in changes in the CPP. The CPP becomes more sensitive to fluctuations in sensory evidence when large shifts in evidence are less frequent, and the potential is primarily sensitive to fluctuations in decision-relevant (not decision-irrelevant) sensory input. A complementary triphasic component over occipito-parietal cortex encodes the sum of recently accumulated sensory evidence, and its magnitude covaries with parameters describing how different individuals integrate sensory evidence over time. A computational model based on leaky evidence accumulation suggests that these findings can be accounted for by a shift in decision threshold between different environments, which is also reflected in the magnitude of pre-decision EEG activity. Our findings reveal how adaptations in EEG responses reflect flexibility in evidence accumulation to the statistics of dynamic sensory environments.

When the mind's eye prevails: The Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis

Throughout the 20th century, the psychological literature has considered attention as being primarily directed at the outside world. More recent theories conceive attention as also operating on internal information, and mounting evidence suggests a single, shared attentional focus between external and internal information. Such sharing implies a cognitive architecture where attention needs to be continuously shifted between prioritizing either external or internal information, but the fundamental principles underlying this attentional balancing act are currently unknown. Here, we propose and evaluate one such principle in the shape of the Internal Dominance over External Attention (IDEA) hypothesis: Contrary to the traditional view of attention as being primarily externally oriented, IDEA asserts that attention is inherently biased toward internal information. We provide a theoretical account for why such an internal attention bias may have evolved and examine findings from a wide range of literatures speaking to the balancing of external versus internal attention, including research on working memory, attention switching, visual search, mind wandering, sustained attention, and meditation. We argue that major findings in these disparate research lines can be coherently understood under IDEA. Finally, we consider tentative neurocognitive mechanisms contributing to IDEA and examine the practical implications of more deliberate control over this bias in the context of psychopathology. It is hoped that this novel hypothesis motivates cross-talk between the reviewed research lines and future empirical studies directly examining the mechanisms that steer attention either inward or outward on a moment-by-moment basis.

Experience-driven recalibration of learning from surprising events

Different environments favor different patterns of adaptive learning. A surprising event that in one context would accelerate belief updating might, in another context, be downweighted as a meaningless outlier. Here, we investigated whether people would spontaneously regulate the influence of surprise on learning in response to event-by-event experiential feedback. Across two experiments, we examined whether participants performing a perceptual judgment task under spatial uncertainty (n = 29, n = 63) adapted their patterns of predictive gaze according to the informativeness or uninformativeness of surprising events in their current environment. Uninstructed predictive eye movements exhibited a form of metalearning in which surprise came to modulate event-by-event learning rates in opposite directions across contexts. Participants later appropriately readjusted their patterns of adaptive learning when the statistics of the environment underwent an unsignaled reversal. Although significant adjustments occurred in both directions, performance was consistently superior in environments in which surprising events reflected meaningful change, potentially reflecting a bias towards interpreting surprise as informative and/or difficulty ignoring salient outliers. Our results provide evidence for spontaneous, context-appropriate recalibration of the role of surprise in adaptive learning.

A practical guide for studying human behavior in the lab

In the last few decades, the field of neuroscience has witnessed major technological advances that have allowed researchers to measure and control neural activity with great detail. Yet, behavioral experiments in humans remain an essential approach to investigate the mysteries of the mind. Their relatively modest technological and economic requisites make behavioral research an attractive and accessible experimental avenue for neuroscientists with very diverse backgrounds. However, like any experimental enterprise, it has its own inherent challenges that may pose practical hurdles, especially to less experienced behavioral researchers. Here, we aim at providing a practical guide for a steady walk through the workflow of a typical behavioral experiment with human subjects. This primer concerns the design of an experimental protocol, research ethics, and subject care, as well as best practices for data collection, analysis, and sharing. The goal is to provide clear instructions for both beginners and experienced researchers from diverse backgrounds in planning behavioral experiments.

Context-independent scaling of neural responses to task difficulty in the multiple-demand network

The multiple-demand (MD) network is sensitive to many aspects of cognitive demand, showing increased activation with more difficult tasks. However, it is currently unknown whether the MD network is modulated by the context in which task difficulty is experienced. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined MD network responses to low, medium, and high difficulty arithmetic problems within 2 cued contexts, an easy versus a hard set. The results showed that MD activity varied reliably with the absolute difficulty of a problem, independent of the context in which the problem was presented. Similarly, MD activity during task execution was independent of the difficulty of the previous trial. Representational similarity analysis further supported that representational distances in the MD network were consistent with a context-independent code. Finally, we identified several regions outside the MD network that showed context-dependent coding, including the inferior parietal lobule, paracentral lobule, posterior insula, and large areas of the visual cortex. In sum, a cognitive effort is processed by the MD network in a context-independent manner. We suggest that this absolute coding of cognitive demand in the MD network reflects the limited range of task difficulty that can be supported by the cognitive apparatus.

Spatial attention in perceptual decision making as revealed by response-locked classification image analysis

In many situations, humans serially sample information from many locations in an image to make an appropriate decision about a visual target. Spatial attention and eye movements play a crucial role in this serial vision process. To investigate the effect of spatial attention in such dynamic decision making, we applied a classification image (CI) analysis locked to the observer's reaction time (RT). We asked human observers to detect as rapidly as possible a target whose contrast gradually increased on the left or right side of dynamic noise, with the presentation of a spatial cue. The analysis revealed a spatiotemporally biphasic profile of the CI which peaked at ~ 350 ms before the observer's response. We found that a valid cue presented at the target location shortened the RT and increased the overall amplitude of the CI, especially when the cue appeared 500-1250 ms before the observer's response. The results were quantitatively accounted for by a simple perceptual decision mechanism that accumulates the outputs of the spatiotemporal contrast detector, whose gain is increased by sustained attention to the cued location.

Dynamic Weighting of Time-Varying Visual and Auditory Evidence During Multisensory Decision Making

Perceptual decision-making in a dynamic environment requires two integration processes: integration of sensory evidence from multiple modalities to form a coherent representation of the environment, and integration of evidence across time to accurately make a decision. Only recently studies started to unravel how evidence from two modalities is accumulated across time to form a perceptual decision. One important question is whether information from individual senses contributes equally to multisensory decisions. We designed a new psychophysical task that measures how visual and auditory evidence is weighted across time. Participants were asked to discriminate between two visual gratings, and/or two sounds presented to the right and left ear based on respectively contrast and loudness. We varied the evidence, i.e., the contrast of the gratings and amplitude of the sound, over time. Results showed a significant increase in performance accuracy on multisensory trials compared to unisensory trials, indicating that discriminating between two sources is improved when multisensory information is available. Furthermore, we found that early evidence contributed most to sensory decisions. Weighting of unisensory information during audiovisual decision-making dynamically changed over time. A first epoch was characterized by both visual and auditory weighting, during the second epoch vision dominated and the third epoch finalized the weighting profile with auditory dominance. Our results suggest that during our task multisensory improvement is generated by a mechanism that requires cross-modal interactions but also dynamically evokes dominance switching.

How do (perceptual) distracters distract?

When a target stimulus occurs in the presence of distracters, decisions are less accurate. But how exactly do distracters affect choices? Here, we explored this question using measurement of human behaviour, psychophysical reverse correlation and computational modelling. We contrasted two models: one in which targets and distracters had independent influence on choices (independent model) and one in which distracters modulated choices in a way that depended on their similarity to the target (interaction model). Across three experiments, participants were asked to make fine orientation judgments about the tilt of a target grating presented adjacent to an irrelevant distracter. We found strong evidence for the interaction model, in that decisions were more sensitive when target and distracter were consistent relative to when they were inconsistent. This consistency bias occurred in the frame of reference of the decision, that is, it operated on decision values rather than on sensory signals, and surprisingly, it was independent of spatial attention. A normalization framework, where target features are normalized by the expectation and variability of the local context, successfully captures the observed pattern of results.

In the real world, visual scenes usually contain many objects. As a consequence, we often have to make perceptual judgments about a specific ‘target’ stimulus in the presence of irrelevant ‘distracter’ stimuli. For instance, when hanging a picture frame, we want to discern whether it is hanging straight, ignoring the surrounding, potentially tilted frames. Laboratory experiments have shown that the presence of distracter stimuli (i.e. other picture frames) makes this type of perceptual judgment less accurate. However, the specific effect distracters have on judgments is controversial. Here, we conducted a series of experiments to compare two alternative theories of distracter influence: one in which distracters compete with targets to determine choices (independent model) and one in which distracters wield a more indirect influence on choices (interaction model). We found evidence for the latter account. Our results suggest distracters affect perceptual decisions by adjusting how sensitive decisions are to the target stimulus.

A reference-based theory of motivation and effort allocation

Motivation is key for performance in domains such as work, sport, and learning. Research has established that motivation and the willingness to invest effort generally increase as a function of reward. However, this view struggles to explain some empirical observations-for example, in the domain of sport, athletes sometimes appear to lose motivation when playing against weak opponents-this despite objective rewards being high. This and similar evidence highlight the role of subjective value in motivation and effort allocation. To capture this, here, we advance a novel theory and computational model where motivation and effort allocation arise from reference-based evaluation processes. Our proposal argues that motivation (and the ensuing willingness to exert effort) stems from subjective value, which in turns depends on one's standards about performance and on the confidence about these standards. In a series of simulations, we show that the model explains puzzling motivational dynamics and associated feelings. Crucially, the model identifies realistic standards (i.e., those matching one's own actual ability) as those more beneficial for motivation and performance. On this basis, the model establishes a normative solution to the problem of optimal allocation of effort, analogous to the optimal allocation of neural and computational resources as in efficient coding.

A meta-learning BCI for estimating decision confidence

OBJECTIVE

We investigated whether a recently introduced transfer-learning technique based on meta-learning could improve the performance of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) for decision-confidence prediction with respect to more traditional machine learning methods.

APPROACH

We adapted the meta-learning by biased regularisation algorithm to the problem of predicting decision confidence from EEG and EOG data on a decision-by-decision basis in a difficult target discrimination task based on video feeds. The method exploits previous participants' data to produce a prediction algorithm that is then quickly tuned to new participants. We compared it with with the traditional single-subject training almost universally adopted in BCIs, a state-of-the-art transfer learning technique called Domain Adversarial Neural Networks (DANN), a transfer-learning adaptation of a zero-training method we used recently for a similar task, and with a simple baseline algorithm.

MAIN RESULTS

The meta-learning approach was significantly better than other approaches in most conditions, and much better in situations where limited data from a new participant are available for training/tuning. Meta-learning by biased regularisation allowed our BCI to seamlessly integrate information from past participants with data from a specific user to produce high-performance predictors. Its robustness in the presence of small training sets is a real-plus in BCI applications, as new users need to train the BCI for a much shorter period.

SIGNIFICANCE

Due to the variability and noise of EEG/EOG data, BCIs need to be normally trained with data from a specific participant. This work shows that even better performance can be obtained using our version of meta-learning by biased regularisation.

Evidence integration and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency

Evidence integration is a normative algorithm for choosing between alternatives with noisy evidence, which has been successful in accounting for vast amounts of behavioural and neural data. However, this mechanism has been challenged by non-integration heuristics, and tracking decision boundaries has proven elusive. Here we first show that the decision boundaries can be extracted using a model-free behavioural method termed decision classification boundary, which optimizes choice classification based on the accumulated evidence. Using this method, we provide direct support for evidence integration over non-integration heuristics, show that the decision boundaries collapse across time and identify an integration bias whereby incoming evidence is modulated based on its consistency with preceding information. This consistency bias, which is a form of pre-decision confirmation bias, was supported in four cross-domain experiments, showing that choice accuracy and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency. Strikingly, despite its seeming sub-optimality, the consistency bias fosters performance by enhancing robustness to integration noise.

Control over sampling boosts numerical evidence processing in human decisions from experience

When acquiring information about choice alternatives, decision makers may have varying levels of control over which and how much information they sample before making a choice. How does control over information acquisition affect the quality of sample-based decisions? Here, combining variants of a numerical sampling task with neural recordings, we show that control over when to stop sampling can enhance (i) behavioral choice accuracy, (ii) the build-up of parietal decision signals, and (iii) the encoding of numerical sample information in multivariate electroencephalogram patterns. None of these effects were observed when participants could only control which alternatives to sample, but not when to stop sampling. Furthermore, levels of control had no effect on early sensory signals or on the extent to which sample information leaked from memory. The results indicate that freedom to stop sampling can amplify decisional evidence processing from the outset of information acquisition and lead to more accurate choices.

Using top-down modulation to optimally balance shared versus separated task representations

Human adaptive behavior requires continually learning and performing a wide variety of tasks, often with very little practice. To accomplish this, it is crucial to separate neural representations of different tasks in order to avoid interference. At the same time, sharing neural representations supports generalization and allows faster learning. Therefore, a crucial challenge is to find an optimal balance between shared versus separated representations. Typically, models of human cognition employ top-down modulatory signals to separate task representations, but there exist surprisingly little systematic computational investigations of how such modulation is best implemented. We identify and systematically evaluate two crucial features of modulatory signals. First, top-down input can be processed in an additive or multiplicative manner. Second, the modulatory signals can be adaptive (learned) or non-adaptive (random). We cross these two features, resulting in four modulation networks which are tested on a variety of input datasets and tasks with different degrees of stimulus-action mapping overlap. The multiplicative adaptive modulation network outperforms all other networks in terms of accuracy. Moreover, this network develops hidden units that optimally share representations between tasks. Specifically, different than the binary approach of currently popular latent state models, it exploits partial overlap between tasks.

Response-locked classification image analysis of perceptual decision making in contrast detection

In many situations, humans make decisions based on serially sampled information through the observation of visual stimuli. To quantify the critical information used by the observer in such dynamic decision making, we here applied a classification image (CI) analysis locked to the observer's reaction time (RT) in a simple detection task for a luminance target that gradually appeared in dynamic noise. We found that the response-locked CI shows a spatiotemporally biphasic weighting profile that peaked about 300 ms before the response, but this profile substantially varied depending on RT; positive weights dominated at short RTs and negative weights at long RTs. We show that these diverse results are explained by a simple perceptual decision mechanism that accumulates the output of the perceptual process as modelled by a spatiotemporal contrast detector. We discuss possible applications and the limitations of the response-locked CI analysis.

Normative Principles for Decision-Making in Natural Environments

The decisions we make are shaped by a lifetime of learning. Past experience guides the way that we encode information in neural systems for perception and valuation, and determines the information we retrieve when making decisions. Distinct literatures have discussed how lifelong learning and local context shape decisions made about sensory signals, propositional information, or economic prospects. Here, we build bridges between these literatures, arguing for common principles of adaptive rationality in perception, cognition, and economic choice. We discuss how a single common framework, based on normative principles of efficient coding and Bayesian inference, can help us understand a myriad of human decision biases, including sensory illusions, adaptive aftereffects, choice history biases, central tendency effects, anchoring effects, contrast effects, framing effects, congruency effects, reference-dependent valuation, nonlinear utility functions, and discretization heuristics. We describe a simple computational framework for explaining these phenomena. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Adaptive circuit dynamics across human cortex during evidence accumulation in changing environments

Many decisions under uncertainty entail the temporal accumulation of evidence that informs about the state of the environment. When environments are subject to hidden changes in their state, maximizing accuracy and reward requires non-linear accumulation of evidence. How this adaptive, non-linear computation is realized in the brain is unknown. We analyzed human behavior and cortical population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography) recorded during visual evidence accumulation in a changing environment. Behavior and decision-related activity in cortical regions involved in action planning exhibited hallmarks of adaptive evidence accumulation, which could also be implemented by a recurrent cortical microcircuit. Decision dynamics in action-encoding parietal and frontal regions were mirrored in a frequency-specific modulation of the state of the visual cortex that depended on pupil-linked arousal and the expected probability of change. These findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related feedback to the sensory cortex.

Subject- and task-independent neural correlates and prediction of decision confidence in perceptual decision making

Objective.In many real-world decision tasks, the information available to the decision maker is incomplete. To account for this uncertainty, we associate a degree of confidence to every decision, representing the likelihood of that decision being correct. In this study, we analyse electroencephalography (EEG) data from 68 participants undertaking eight different perceptual decision-making experiments. Our goals are to investigate (1) whether subject- and task-independent neural correlates of decision confidence exist, and (2) to what degree it is possible to build brain computer interfaces that can estimate confidence on a trial-by-trial basis. The experiments cover a wide range of perceptual tasks, which allowed to separate the task-related, decision-making features from the task-independent ones.Approach.Our systems train artificial neural networks to predict the confidence in each decision from EEG data and response times. We compare the decoding performance with three training approaches: (1) single subject, where both training and testing data were acquired from the same person; (2) multi-subject, where all the data pertained to the same task, but the training and testing data came from different users; and (3) multi-task, where the training and testing data came from different tasks and subjects. Finally, we validated our multi-task approach using data from two additional experiments, in which confidence was not reported.Main results.We found significant differences in the EEG data for different confidence levels in both stimulus-locked and response-locked epochs. All our approaches were able to predict the confidence between 15% and 35% better than the corresponding reference baselines.Significance.Our results suggest that confidence in perceptual decision making tasks could be reconstructed from neural signals even when using transfer learning approaches. These confidence estimates are based on the decision-making process rather than just the confidence-reporting process.

Neurophysiology of Human Perceptual Decision-Making

The discovery of neural signals that reflect the dynamics of perceptual decision formation has had a considerable impact. Not only do such signals enable detailed investigations of the neural implementation of the decision-making process but they also can expose key elements of the brain's decision algorithms. For a long time, such signals were only accessible through direct animal brain recordings, and progress in human neuroscience was hampered by the limitations of noninvasive recording techniques. However, recent methodological advances are increasingly enabling the study of human brain signals that finely trace the dynamics of the unfolding decision process. In this review, we highlight how human neurophysiological data are now being leveraged to furnish new insights into the multiple processing levels involved in forming decisions, to inform the construction and evaluation of mathematical models that can explain intra- and interindividual differences, and to examine how key ancillary processes interact with core decision circuits.

The virtual loss function in the summary perception of motion and its limited adjustability

Humans can grasp the "average" feature of a visual ensemble quickly and effortlessly. However, it is largely unknown what is the exact form of the summary statistic humans perceive and it is even less known whether this form can be changed by feedback. Here we borrow the concept of loss function to characterize how the summary perception is related to the distribution of feature values in the ensemble, assuming that the summary statistic minimizes a virtual expected loss associated with its deviation from individual feature values. In two experiments, we investigated a random-dot motion estimation task to infer the virtual loss function implicit in ensemble perception and see whether it can be changed by feedback. On each trial, participants reported the average moving direction of an ensemble of moving dots whose distribution of moving directions was skewed. In Experiment 1, where no feedback was available, participants' estimates fell between the mean and the mode of the distribution and were closer to the mean. In particular, the deviation from the mean and toward the mode increased almost linearly with the mode-to-mean distance. The pattern was best modeled by an inverse Gaussian loss function, which punishes large errors less heavily than the quadratic loss function does. In Experiment 2, we tested whether this virtual loss function can be altered by feedback. Two groups of participants either received the mode or the mean as the correct answer. After extensive training up to five days, both groups' estimates moved slightly towards the mode. That is, feedback had no specific influence on participants' virtual loss function. To conclude, the virtual loss function in the summary perception of motion is close to inverse Gaussian, and it can hardly be changed by feedback.

Choices change the temporal weighting of decision evidence

Many decisions result from the accumulation of decision-relevant information (evidence) over time. Even when maximizing decision accuracy requires weighting all the evidence equally, decision-makers often give stronger weight to evidence occurring early or late in the evidence stream. Here, we show changes in such temporal biases within participants as a function of intermittent judgments about parts of the evidence stream. Human participants performed a decision task that required a continuous estimation of the mean evidence at the end of the stream. The evidence was either perceptual (noisy random dot motion) or symbolic (variable sequences of numbers). Participants also reported a categorical judgment of the preceding evidence half-way through the stream in one condition or executed an evidence-independent motor response in another condition. The relative impact of early versus late evidence on the final estimation flipped between these two conditions. In particular, participants' sensitivity to late evidence after the intermittent judgment, but not the simple motor response, was decreased. Both the intermittent response as well as the final estimation reports were accompanied by nonluminance-mediated increases of pupil diameter. These pupil dilations were bigger during intermittent judgments than simple motor responses and bigger during estimation when the late evidence was consistent than inconsistent with the initial judgment. In sum, decisions activate pupil-linked arousal systems and alter the temporal weighting of decision evidence. Our results are consistent with the idea that categorical choices in the face of uncertainty induce a change in the state of the neural circuits underlying decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The psychology and neuroscience of decision-making have extensively studied the accumulation of decision-relevant information toward a categorical choice. Much fewer studies have assessed the impact of a choice on the processing of subsequent information. Here, we show that intermittent choices during a protracted stream of input reduce the sensitivity to subsequent decision information and transiently boost arousal. Choices might trigger a state change in the neural machinery for decision-making.

Concurrent visual working memory bias in sequential integration of approximate number

Previous work has shown bidirectional crosstalk between Working Memory (WM) and perception such that the contents of WM can alter concurrent percepts and vice versa. Here, we examine WM-perception interactions in a new task setting. Participants judged the proportion of colored dots in a stream of visual displays while concurrently holding location- and color information in memory. Spatiotemporally resolved psychometrics disclosed a modulation of perceptual sensitivity consistent with a bias of visual spatial attention towards the memorized location. However, this effect was short-lived, suggesting that the visuospatial WM information was rapidly deprioritized during processing of new perceptual information. Independently, we observed robust bidirectional biases of categorical color judgments, in that perceptual decisions and mnemonic reports were attracted to each other. These biases occurred without reductions in overall perceptual sensitivity compared to control conditions without a concurrent WM load. The results conceptually replicate and extend previous findings in visual search and suggest that crosstalk between WM and perception can arise at multiple levels, from sensory-perceptual to decisional processing.

Flexible categorization in perceptual decision making

Perceptual decisions rely on accumulating sensory evidence. This computation has been studied using either drift diffusion models or neurobiological network models exhibiting winner-take-all attractor dynamics. Although both models can account for a large amount of data, it remains unclear whether their dynamics are qualitatively equivalent. Here we show that in the attractor model, but not in the drift diffusion model, an increase in the stimulus fluctuations or the stimulus duration promotes transitions between decision states. The increase in the number of transitions leads to a crossover between weighting mostly early evidence (primacy) to weighting late evidence (recency), a prediction we validate with psychophysical data. Between these two limiting cases, we found a novel flexible categorization regime, in which fluctuations can reverse initially-incorrect categorizations. This reversal asymmetry results in a non-monotonic psychometric curve, a distinctive feature of the attractor model. Our findings point to correcting decision reversals as an important feature of perceptual decision making.

Modeling pupil responses to rapid sequential events

Pupil size is an easily accessible, noninvasive online indicator of various perceptual and cognitive processes. Pupil measurements have the potential to reveal continuous processing dynamics throughout an experimental trial, including anticipatory responses. However, the relatively sluggish (~2 s) response dynamics of pupil dilation make it challenging to connect changes in pupil size to events occurring close together in time. Researchers have used models to link changes in pupil size to specific trial events, but such methods have not been systematically evaluated. Here we developed and evaluated a general linear model (GLM) pipeline that estimates pupillary responses to multiple rapid events within an experimental trial. We evaluated the modeling approach using a sample dataset in which multiple sequential stimuli were presented within 2-s trials. We found: (1) Model fits improved when the pupil impulse response function (PuRF) was fit for each observer. PuRFs varied substantially across individuals but were consistent for each individual. (2) Model fits also improved when pupil responses were not assumed to occur simultaneously with their associated trial events, but could have non-zero latencies. For example, pupil responses could anticipate predictable trial events. (3) Parameter recovery confirmed the validity of the fitting procedures, and we quantified the reliability of the parameter estimates for our sample dataset. (4) A cognitive task manipulation modulated pupil response amplitude. We provide our pupil analysis pipeline as open-source software (Pupil Response Estimation Toolbox: PRET) to facilitate the estimation of pupil responses and the evaluation of the estimates in other datasets.

Peak-at-end rule: adaptive mechanism predicts time-dependent decision weighting

Humans make decisions under various natural circumstances, integrating multiple pieces of information that are distributed over space and time. Although psychophysical and physiological studies have investigated temporal dynamics underlying perceptual decision making, weighting profiles for inliers and outliers during temporal integration have yet to be fully investigated in most studies. Here, we examined the temporal weighting profile of a computational model characterized by a leaky integrator of sensory evidence. As a corollary of its leaky nature, the model predicts the recency effect and overweights outlying elements around the end of the stream. Moreover, we found that the model underweights outlying values occurring earlier in the stream (i.e., robust averaging). We also show that human observers exhibit exactly the same weighting profile in an average estimation task. These findings suggest that the adaptive decision process in the brain results in the time-dependent decision weighting, the “peak-at-end” rule, rather than the peak-end rule in behavioral economics.

A map of decoy influence in human multialternative choice

Imagine you are deciding between two goods: A is simple but inexpensive, B is luxurious but more costly. Introducing a less advantageous option (e.g., lower quality than A, same price) should not alter your choice between A and B. However, this principle is often violated; three classic biases known as “decoy effects” have been identified, each describing a stereotyped choice pattern in the presence of irrelevant information. Through behavioral testing in human participants and computer simulations, we show that these decoy effects are special cases of a wider principle, whereby stimulus value information is encoded in a relative, rather than an absolute, format. This work clarifies the origin of three behavioral phenomena that are widely studied in psychology and economics.

Human decisions can be biased by irrelevant information. For example, choices between two preferred alternatives can be swayed by a third option that is inferior or unavailable. Previous work has identified three classic biases, known as the attraction, similarity, and compromise effects, which arise during choices between economic alternatives defined by two attributes. However, the reliability, interrelationship, and computational origin of these three biases have been controversial. Here, a large cohort of human participants made incentive-compatible choices among assets that varied in price and quality. Instead of focusing on the three classic effects, we sampled decoy stimuli exhaustively across bidimensional multiattribute space and constructed a full map of decoy influence on choices between two otherwise preferred target items. Our analysis reveals that the decoy influence map is highly structured even beyond the three classic biases. We identify a very simple model that can fully reproduce the decoy influence map and capture its variability in individual participants. This model reveals that the three decoy effects are not distinct phenomena but are all special cases of a more general principle, by which attribute values are repulsed away from the context provided by rival options. The model helps us understand why the biases are typically correlated across participants and allows us to validate a prediction about their interrelationship. This work helps to clarify the origin of three of the most widely studied biases in human decision-making.

A circuit mechanism for decision-making biases and NMDA receptor hypofunction

Decision-making biases can be features of normal behaviour, or deficits underlying neuropsychiatric symptoms. We used behavioural psychophysics, spiking-circuit modelling and pharmacological manipulations to explore decision-making biases during evidence integration. Monkeys showed a pro-variance bias (PVB): a preference to choose options with more variable evidence. The PVB was also present in a spiking circuit model, revealing a potential neural mechanism for this behaviour. To model possible effects of NMDA receptor (NMDA-R) antagonism on this behaviour, we simulated the effects of NMDA-R hypofunction onto either excitatory or inhibitory neurons in the model. These were then tested experimentally using the NMDA-R antagonist ketamine, a pharmacological model of schizophrenia. Ketamine yielded an increase in subjects' PVB, consistent with lowered cortical excitation/inhibition balance from NMDA-R hypofunction predominantly onto excitatory neurons. These results provide a circuit-level mechanism that bridges across explanatory scales, from the synaptic to the behavioural, in neuropsychiatric disorders where decision-making biases are prominent.

Confluence of Timing and Reward Biases in Perceptual Decision-Making Dynamics

Although the decisions of our daily lives often occur in the context of temporal and reward structures, the impact of such regularities on decision-making strategy is poorly understood. Here, to explore how temporal and reward context modulate strategy, we trained 2 male rhesus monkeys to perform a novel perceptual decision-making task with asymmetric rewards and time-varying evidence reliability. To model the choice and response time patterns, we developed a computational framework for fitting generalized drift-diffusion models, which flexibly accommodate diverse evidence accumulation strategies. We found that a dynamic urgency signal and leaky integration, in combination with two independent forms of reward biases, best capture behavior. We also tested how temporal structure influences urgency by systematically manipulating the temporal structure of sensory evidence, and found that the time course of urgency was affected by temporal context. Overall, our approach identified key components of cognitive mechanisms for incorporating temporal and reward structure into decisions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In everyday life, decisions are influenced by many factors, including reward structures and stimulus timing. While reward and timing have been characterized in isolation, ecologically valid decision-making involves a multiplicity of factors acting simultaneously. This raises questions about whether the same decision-making strategy is used when these two factors are concurrently manipulated. To address these questions, we trained rhesus monkeys to perform a novel decision-making task with both reward asymmetry and temporal uncertainty. In order to understand their strategy and hint at its neural mechanisms, we used the new generalized drift diffusion modeling framework to model both reward and timing mechanisms. We found two of each reward and timing mechanisms are necessary to explain our data.

Evidence accumulation during perceptual decision-making is sensitive to the dynamics of attentional selection

The ability to select and combine multiple sensory inputs in support of accurate decisions is a hallmark of adaptive behaviour. Attentional selection is often needed to prioritize task-relevant stimuli relative to irrelevant, potentially distracting stimuli. As most studies of perceptual decision-making to date have made use of task-relevant stimuli only, relatively little is known about how attention modulates decision making. To address this issue, we developed a novel 'integrated' decision-making task, in which participants judged the average direction of successive target motion signals while ignoring concurrent and spatially overlapping distractor motion signals. In two experiments that varied the role of attentional selection, we used regression to quantify the influence of target and distractor stimuli on behaviour. Using electroencephalography, we characterised the neural correlates of decision making, attentional selection and feature-specific responses to target and distractor signals. While targets strongly influenced perceptual decisions and associated neural activity, we also found that concurrent and spatially coincident distractors exerted a measurable bias on both behaviour and brain activity. Our findings suggest that attention operates as a real-time but imperfect filter during perceptual decision-making by dynamically modulating the contributions of task-relevant and irrelevant sensory inputs.

Distinct strategies for estimating the temporal average of numerical and perceptual information

Humans can estimate global trends in dynamic information presented either as perceptual features or as symbolic codes such as numbers. Previous studies on temporal statistics estimation have shown that observers judge the temporal average of visual attributes according to information from the last few frames of the presentation sequence (in what is referred to as the recency effect). Here, we investigated how humans estimate the temporal average of number vs. orientation using identical stimuli for the two tasks. In Experiment 1, a randomly-selected single-digit number was serially presented at orientations randomly varying over time. In Experiment 2, a texture comprising a random number of Gabor elements was shown at orientations randomly varying over time. In both experiments, observers judged the temporal averages of the numerical values and orientations in separate blocks. Results showed that observers judging the temporal average of orientation relied upon information from later frames as predicted by a typical model of perceptual decision making. By contrast, for the judgement of numerical values, we found that the impacts of each temporal frame were constant or varied little across temporal frames regardless of whether the numerical information was given as digits or by the number of texture elements. The results are interpreted as evidence that distinct computational strategies may be involved in estimating the temporal averages of perceptual features and numerical information.

Confidence drives a neural confirmation bias

A prominent source of polarised and entrenched beliefs is confirmation bias, where evidence against one's position is selectively disregarded. This effect is most starkly evident when opposing parties are highly confident in their decisions. Here we combine human magnetoencephalography (MEG) with behavioural and neural modelling to identify alterations in post-decisional processing that contribute to the phenomenon of confirmation bias. We show that holding high confidence in a decision leads to a striking modulation of post-decision neural processing, such that integration of confirmatory evidence is amplified while disconfirmatory evidence processing is abolished. We conclude that confidence shapes a selective neural gating for choice-consistent information, reducing the likelihood of changes of mind on the basis of new information. A central role for confidence in shaping the fidelity of evidence accumulation indicates that metacognitive interventions may help ameliorate this pervasive cognitive bias.

A divisive model of evidence accumulation explains uneven weighting of evidence over time

Divisive normalization has long been used to account for computations in various neural processes and behaviours. The model proposes that inputs into a neural system are divisively normalized by the system’s total activity. More recently, dynamical versions of divisive normalization have been shown to account for how neural activity evolves over time in value-based decision making. Despite its ubiquity, divisive normalization has not been studied in decisions that require evidence to be integrated over time. Such decisions are important when the information is not all available at once. A key feature of such decisions is how evidence is weighted over time, known as the integration kernel. Here, we provide a formal expression for the integration kernel in divisive normalization, and show that divisive normalization quantitatively accounts for 133 human participants’ perceptual decision making behaviour, performing as well as the state-of-the-art Drift Diffusion Model, the predominant model for perceptual evidence accumulation.

Divisive normalization is thought to be a ubiquitous computation in the brain, but has not been studied in decisions that require integrating evidence over time. Here, the authors show in humans that dynamic divisive normalization accounts for the uneven weighting of perceptual evidence over time.

Perception and decision mechanisms involved in average estimation of spatiotemporal ensembles

A number of studies on texture and ensemble perception have shown that humans can immediately estimate the average of spatially distributed visual information. The present study characterized mechanisms involved in estimating averages for information distributed over both space and time. Observers viewed a rapid sequence of texture patterns in which elements' orientation were determined by dynamic Gaussian noise with variable spatial and temporal standard deviations (SDs). We found that discrimination thresholds increased beyond a certain spatial SD if temporal SD was small, but if temporal SD was large, thresholds remained nearly constant regardless of spatial SD. These data are at odds with predictions that threshold is uniquely determined by spatiotemporal SD. Moreover, a reverse correlation analysis revealed that observers judged the spatiotemporal average orientation largely depending on the spatial average orientation over the last few frames of the texture sequence - a recency effect widely observed in studies of perceptual decision making. Results are consistent with the notion that the visual system rapidly computes spatial ensembles and adaptively accumulates information over time to make a decision on spatiotemporal average. A simple computational model based on this notion successfully replicated observed data.

Neural dynamics of the attentional blink revealed by encoding orientation selectivity during rapid visual presentation

The human brain is inherently limited in the information it can make consciously accessible. When people monitor a rapid stream of visual items for two targets, they typically fail to see the second target if it occurs within 200–500 ms of the first, a phenomenon called the attentional blink (AB). The neural basis for the AB is poorly understood, partly because conventional neuroimaging techniques cannot resolve visual events displayed close together in time. Here we introduce an approach that characterises the precise effect of the AB on behaviour and neural activity. We employ multivariate encoding analyses to extract feature-selective information carried by randomly-oriented gratings. We show that feature selectivity is enhanced for correctly reported targets and suppressed when the same items are missed, whereas irrelevant distractor items are unaffected. The findings suggest that the AB involves both short- and long-range neural interactions between visual representations competing for access to consciousness.

People often fail to perceive the second of two brief visual targets, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink (AB). Here the authors modelled behaviour and brain activity to show that the AB arises from short- and long-range interactions between representations of elementary visual features.

Optimal or not; depends on the task

Decision-making involves a tradeoff between pressures for caution and urgency. Previous research has investigated how well humans optimize this tradeoff, and mostly concluded that people adopt a sub-optimal strategy that over-emphasizes caution. This emphasis reduces how many decisions can be made in a fixed time, which reduces the “reward rate”. However, the strategy that is optimal depends critically on the timing properties of the experiment design: the slower the rate of decision opportunities, the more cautious the optimal strategy. Previous studies have almost uniformly adopted very fast designs, which favor very urgent decision-making. This raises the possibility that previous findings—that humans adopt strategies that are too cautious—could either be ascribed to human caution, or to the experiments’ design. To test this, we used a slowed-down decision-making task in which the optimal strategy was quite cautious. With this task, and in contrast to previous findings, the average strategy adopted across participants was very close to optimal, with about equally many participants adopting too-cautious as too-urgent strategies. Our findings suggest that task design can play a role in inferences about optimality, and that previous conclusions regarding human sub-optimality are conditional on the task settings. This limits claims about human optimality that can be supported by the available evidence.

Designing and Interpreting Psychophysical Investigations of Cognition

Scientific experimentation depends on the artificial control of natural phenomena. The inaccessibility of cognitive processes to direct manipulation can make such control difficult to realize. Here, we discuss approaches for overcoming this challenge. We advocate the incorporation of experimental techniques from sensory psychophysics into the study of cognitive processes such as decision making and executive control. These techniques include the use of simple parameterized stimuli to precisely manipulate available information and computational models to jointly quantify behavior and neural responses. We illustrate the potential for such techniques to drive theoretical development, and we examine important practical details of how to conduct controlled experiments when using them. Finally, we highlight principles guiding the use of computational models in studying the neural basis of cognition.

Eye pupil signals information gain

In conditions of constant illumination, the eye pupil diameter indexes the modulation of arousal state and responds to a large breadth of cognitive processes, including mental effort, attention, surprise, decision processes, decision biases, value beliefs, uncertainty, volatility, exploitation/exploration trade-off, or learning rate. Here, I propose an information theoretic framework that has the potential to explain the ensemble of these findings as reflecting pupillary response to information processing. In short, updates of the brain’s internal model, quantified formally as the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between prior and posterior beliefs, would be the common denominator to all these instances of pupillary dilation to cognition. I show that stimulus presentation leads to pupillary response that is proportional to the amount of information the stimulus carries about itself and to the quantity of information it provides about other task variables. In the context of decision making, pupil dilation in relation to uncertainty is explained by the wandering of the evidence accumulation process, leading to large summed KL divergences. Finally, pupillary response to mental effort and variations in tonic pupil size are also formalized in terms of information theory. On the basis of this framework, I compare pupillary data from past studies to simple information-theoretic simulations of task designs and show good correspondance with data across studies. The present framework has the potential to unify the large set of results reported on pupillary dilation to cognition and to provide a theory to guide future research.

Statistical context dictates the relationship between feedback-related EEG signals and learning

Learning should be adjusted according to the surprise associated with observed outcomes but calibrated according to statistical context. For example, when occasional changepoints are expected, surprising outcomes should be weighted heavily to speed learning. In contrast, when uninformative outliers are expected to occur occasionally, surprising outcomes should be less influential. Here we dissociate surprising outcomes from the degree to which they demand learning using a predictive inference task and computational modeling. We show that the P300, a stimulus-locked electrophysiological response previously associated with adjustments in learning behavior, does so conditionally on the source of surprise. Larger P300 signals predicted greater learning in a changing context, but less learning in a context where surprise was indicative of a one-off outlier (oddball). Our results suggest that the P300 provides a surprise signal that is interpreted by downstream learning processes differentially according to statistical context in order to appropriately calibrate learning across complex environments.

Reference effects on decision-making elicited by previous rewards

Substantial evidence has highlighted reference effects occurring during decision-making, whereby subjective value is not calculated in absolute terms but relative to the distribution of rewards characterizing a context. Among these, within-choice effects are exerted by options simultaneously available during choice. These should be distinguished from between-choice effects, which depend on the distribution of options presented in the past. Influential theories on between-choice effects include Decision-by-Sampling, Expectation-as-Reference and Divisive Normalization. Surprisingly, previous literature has focused on each theory individually disregarding the others. Thus, similarities and differences among theories remain to be systematically examined. Here we fill this gap by offering an overview of the state-of-the-art of research about between-choice reference effects. Our comparison of alternative theories shows that, at present, none of them is able to account for the full range of empirical data. To address this, we propose a model inspired by previous perspectives and based on a logistic framework, hence called logistic model of subjective value. Predictions of the model are analysed in detail about reference effects and risky decision-making. We conclude that our proposal offers a compelling framework for interpreting the multifaceted manifestations of between-choice reference effects.

Choice history biases subsequent evidence accumulation

Perceptual choices depend not only on the current sensory input but also on the behavioral context, such as the history of one's own choices. Yet, it remains unknown how such history signals shape the dynamics of later decision formation. In models of decision formation, it is commonly assumed that choice history shifts the starting point of accumulation toward the bound reflecting the previous choice. We here present results that challenge this idea. We fit bounded-accumulation decision models to human perceptual choice data, and estimated bias parameters that depended on observers' previous choices. Across multiple task protocols and sensory modalities, individual history biases in overt behavior were consistently explained by a history-dependent change in the evidence accumulation, rather than in its starting point. Choice history signals thus seem to bias the interpretation of current sensory input, akin to shifting endogenous attention toward (or away from) the previously selected interpretation.

Regulation of evidence accumulation by pupil-linked arousal processes

Effective decision-making requires integrating evidence over time. For simple perceptual decisions, previous work suggests that humans and animals can integrate evidence over time, but not optimally. This suboptimality could arise from sources including neuronal noise, weighting evidence unequally over time (that is, the 'integration kernel'), previous trial effects and an overall bias. Here, using an auditory evidence accumulation task in humans, we report that people exhibit all four suboptimalities, some of which covary across the population. Pupillometry shows that only noise and the integration kernel are related to the change in pupil response. Moreover, these two different suboptimalities were related to different aspects of the pupil signal, with the individual differences in pupil response associated with individual differences in the integration kernel, while trial-by-trial fluctuations in pupil response were associated with trial-by-trial fluctuations in noise. These results suggest that different suboptimalities relate to distinct pupil-linked processes, possibly related to tonic and phasic norepinephrine activity.

Human noise blindness drives suboptimal cognitive inference

Humans typically make near-optimal sensorimotor judgements but show systematic biases when making more cognitive judgements. Here we test the hypothesis that, while humans are sensitive to the noise present during early sensory encoding, the “optimality gap” arises because they are blind to noise introduced by later cognitive integration of variable or discordant pieces of information. In six psychophysical experiments, human observers judged the average orientation of an array of contrast gratings. We varied the stimulus contrast (encoding noise) and orientation variability (integration noise) of the array. Participants adapted near-optimally to changes in encoding noise, but, under increased integration noise, displayed a range of suboptimal behaviours: they ignored stimulus base rates, reported excessive confidence in their choices, and refrained from opting out of objectively difficult trials. These overconfident behaviours were captured by a Bayesian model blind to integration noise. Our study provides a computationally grounded explanation of human suboptimal cognitive inference.

Santiago Herce Castañón and colleagues show that people are blind to mental errors that arise when combining multiple pieces of discordant information. This blindness helps explain why cognitive judgements often are suboptimal.