Imagining fictitious and future experiences: evidence from developmental amnesia

Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory

The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Predictors of state-based changes in wanting and liking

People report wanting food when they are hungry, and on eating it they typically report liking the experience. After eating, both wanting and liking decline, but wanting declines to a greater extent, which we term the 'affective discrepancy effect'. In this study we examine the predictors - state, sensory and memory-based - of these affective changes. Hungry participants undertook three tasks: (1) written recollections of what certain foods are like to eat; (2) ratings of wanting and expected flavour liking and fillingness when looking at snacks, and ratings of food and flavour liking when eating them; (3) ratings of bodily state. These tasks were then repeated after lunch. State-based changes in food liking were best predicted by changes in flavour liking. For state-based change in wanting, memory-based information about flavour liking and fillingness from tasks (1) and (2) were all significant predictors. For recollections about eating (task 1), mentions of food fillingness significantly increased pre-to post-lunch and this was the best predictor of the affective discrepancy effect. Recollections of food fillingness are state-dependent, and can arise unbidden (i.e., such recollective content was unprompted). This may reflect one way that memory may selectively influence wanting, and hence whether food intake is initiated or not.

Modeling the function of episodic memory in spatial learning

Episodic memory has been studied extensively in the past few decades, but so far little is understood about how it drives future behavior. Here we propose that episodic memory can facilitate learning in two fundamentally different modes: retrieval and replay, which is the reinstatement of hippocampal activity patterns during later sleep or awake quiescence. We study their properties by comparing three learning paradigms using computational modeling based on visually-driven reinforcement learning. Firstly, episodic memories are retrieved to learn from single experiences (one-shot learning); secondly, episodic memories are replayed to facilitate learning of statistical regularities (replay learning); and, thirdly, learning occurs online as experiences arise with no access to memories of past experiences (online learning). We found that episodic memory benefits spatial learning in a broad range of conditions, but the performance difference is meaningful only when the task is sufficiently complex and the number of learning trials is limited. Furthermore, the two modes of accessing episodic memory affect spatial learning differently. One-shot learning is typically faster than replay learning, but the latter may reach a better asymptotic performance. In the end, we also investigated the benefits of sequential replay and found that replaying stochastic sequences results in faster learning as compared to random replay when the number of replays is limited. Understanding how episodic memory drives future behavior is an important step toward elucidating the nature of episodic memory.

Intact high-resolution working memory binding in a patient with developmental amnesia and selective hippocampal damage

Debate continues regarding the possible role of the hippocampus across short-term and working memory tasks. The current study examined the possibility of a hippocampal contribution to precise, high-resolution cognition and conjunctive memory. We administered visual working memory tasks featuring a continuous response component to a well-established developmental amnesic patient with relatively selective bilateral hippocampal damage (Jon) and healthy controls. The patient was able to produce highly accurate response judgments regarding conjunctions of color and orientation or color and location, using simultaneous or sequential presentation of stimuli, with no evidence of any impairment in working memory binding, categorical accuracy, or continuous precision. These findings indicate that hippocampal damage does not necessarily lead to deficits in high-resolution cognitive performance, even when the damage is severe and bilateral.

Representation of viewed and recalled film clips in patterns of brain activity in a person with developmental amnesia

As clear memories transport us back into the past, the brain also revives prior patterns of neural activity, a phenomenon known as neural reactivation. While growing evidence indicates a link between neural reactivation and typical variations in memory performance in healthy individuals, it is unclear how and to what extent reactivation is disrupted by a memory disorder. The current study characterizes neural reactivation in a case of amnesia using Multivoxel Pattern Analysis (MVPA). We tested NC, an individual with developmental amnesia linked to a diencephalic stroke, and 19 young adult controls on a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) task during which participants viewed and recalled short videos multiple times. An encoding classifier trained and tested to identify videos based on brain activity patterns elicited at perception revealed superior classification in NC. The enhanced consistency in stimulus representation we observed in NC at encoding was accompanied by an absence of multivariate repetition suppression, which occurred over repeated viewing in the controls. Another recall classifier trained and tested to identify videos during mental replay indicated normal levels of classification in NC, despite his poor memory for stimulus content. However, a cross-condition classifier trained on perception trials and tested on mental replay trials-a strict test of reactivation-revealed significantly poorer classification in NC. Thus, while NC's brain activity was consistent and stimulus-specific during mental replay, this specificity did not reflect the reactivation of patterns elicited at perception to the same extent as controls. Fittingly, we identified brain regions for which activity supported stimulus representation during mental replay to a greater extent in NC than in controls. This activity was not modeled on perception, suggesting that compensatory patterns of representation based on generic knowledge can support consistent mental constructs when memory is faulty. Our results reveal several ways in which amnesia impacts distributed patterns of stimulus representation during encoding and retrieval.

Impaired episodic simulation in a patient with visual memory deficit amnesia

For the first time, we assess episodic simulation in a patient with visual memory deficit amnesia, following damage to visual association cortices. Compared to control participants, the patient with visual memory deficit amnesia shows severely restricted responses when asked to simulate different types of future episodic scenarios. Surprisingly, the patient's responses are more limited in cases where the scenarios require less reliance on visual information. We explain this counterintuitive finding through discussing how the severe retrograde amnesia in visual memory deficit amnesia limits the patient's access to episodic memories in which vision has not been a focus of their life. As a result, we argue that the deficits in visual memory deficit amnesia continue to distinguish it from amnesia after direct damage to the hippocampus.

Measuring mental time travel: Is the hippocampus really critical for episodic memory and episodic foresight?

Mental time travel is an adaptive capacity that enables humans to engage in deliberate, prudent action on the basis of remembering past episodes (episodic memory) and simulating future scenarios (episodic foresight). This capacity has become a popular and rapidly growing topic of interdisciplinary research. Perhaps the most influential and frequently tested neuroscientific hypothesis in this domain is that the hippocampus is a hub in a critical neural network for mental time travel, support for which is now commonly assumed by most researchers in the area. In light of recent findings revealing limitations with existing measures of episodic foresight, we critically evaluate the available evidence for this hypothesis and find that it is inconclusive. We suggest that this is due in significant part to the exclusive and widespread reliance on noisy verbal measures and discuss this case as an example of a more general issue pertaining to the measurement of episodic foresight. Accordingly, we suggest that an essential focus of future research should concern the development of objective measures that capture capacity differences by requiring people to put foresight not just into words, but into action.

Episodic and semantic content of memory and imagination: A multilevel analysis

Autobiographical memories of past events and imaginations of future scenarios comprise both episodic and semantic content. Correlating the amount of "internal" (episodic) and "external" (semantic) details generated when describing autobiographical events can illuminate the relationship between the processes supporting these constructs. Yet previous studies performing such correlations were limited by aggregating data across all events generated by an individual, potentially obscuring the underlying relationship within the events themselves. In the current article, we reanalyzed datasets from eight studies using a multilevel approach, allowing us to explore the relationship between internal and external details within events. We also examined whether this relationship changes with healthy aging. Our reanalyses demonstrated a largely negative relationship between the internal and external details produced when describing autobiographical memories and future imaginations. This negative relationship was stronger and more consistent for older adults and was evident both in direct and indirect measures of semantic content. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to episodic tasks, as no relationship was observed for a nonepisodic picture description task. This negative association suggests that people do not generate semantic information indiscriminately, but do so in a compensatory manner, to embellish episodically impoverished events. Our reanalysis further lends support for dissociable processes underpinning episodic and semantic information generation when remembering and imagining autobiographical events.

A Computational Model of Perceptual and Mnemonic Deficits in Medial Temporal Lobe Amnesia

Damage to the medial temporal lobe (MTL) has long been known to impair declarative memory, and recent evidence suggests that it also impairs visual perception. A theory termed the representational-hierarchical account explains such impairments by assuming that MTL stores conjunctive representations of items and events, and that individuals with MTL damage must rely upon representations of simple visual features in posterior visual cortex, which are inadequate to support memory and perception under certain circumstances. One recent study of visual discrimination behavior revealed a surprising antiperceptual learning effect in MTL-damaged individuals: With exposure to a set of visual stimuli, discrimination performance worsened rather than improved [Barense, M. D., Groen, I. I. A., Lee, A. C. H., Yeung, L. K., Brady, S. M., Gregori, M., et al. Intact memory for irrelevant information impairs perception in amnesia. Neuron, 75, 157-167, 2012]. We extend the representational-hierarchical account to explain this paradox by assuming that difficult visual discriminations are performed by comparing the relative "representational tunedness"-or familiarity-of the to-be-discriminated items. Exposure to a set of highly similar stimuli entails repeated presentation of simple visual features, eventually rendering all feature representations maximally and, thus, equally familiar; hence, they are inutile for solving the task. Discrimination performance in patients with MTL lesions is therefore impaired by stimulus exposure. Because the unique conjunctions represented in MTL do not occur repeatedly, healthy individuals are shielded from this perceptual interference. We simulate this mechanism with a neural network previously used to explain recognition memory, thereby providing a model that accounts for both mnemonic and perceptual deficits caused by MTL damage with a unified architecture and mechanism.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Using fMRI to understand event construction in developmental amnesia

Recently, neuroimaging and patient-lesion methods have been combined to explain anomalies such as patients' intact performance on tasks on which they would be predicted to perform poorly. In some cases, preserved performance has been attributed to activation of residual tissue within the damaged region. However, activation of remnant tissue can also occur in relation to impaired performance and, thus, may not necessarily correspond to successful recruitment. To constrain these neuroimaging interpretations, what is needed is a paradigm with closely matched conditions that yields intact and impaired performance in the same patient. We investigated this in H.C., an amnesic person with congenital abnormalities of the hippocampus and its connections, who was scanned during remembering and imagining, abilities known to depend on the hippocampus. Specifically, we examined whether differences in activation and/or functional connectivity would explain H.C.'s compromised ability to construct events relating to herself in autobiographical memory (SELF condition) and events relating to personally familiar others (FAMILIAR condition) versus her intact ability to construct events relating to unknown others (UNFAMILIAR condition). Despite behavioral dissociations in H.C., the pattern of activation and functional connectivity supporting her performance was strikingly similar to that of controls across conditions. Most notably, like controls, H.C. showed robust hippocampal activation and functional connectivity to the hippocampus, both when her performance was intact and impaired. Across all conditions, H.C. activated several extra-hippocampal regions to a greater extent than did controls, and modest differences were observed in functional connectivity between extra-hippocampal regions. Taken together, these findings urge caution when drawing conclusions about the functional integrity of a structurally compromised brain region even when it is activated and/or co-activated with other regions.

Deficits in remembering the past and imagining the future in patients with prefrontal lesions

OBJECTIVE

Neuroimaging studies suggest that remembering the past and imagining the future engage a common brain network including several areas of the prefrontal cortex. Although patients with prefrontal damage often are described as blind to the future consequences of their decisions, and inclined to 'live in the here and now', little is known as to how the prefrontal cortex mediates past and future mental time travel.

METHOD

Nine patients with prefrontal lesions and nine healthy controls generated past and future events in response to different time periods. Event transcriptions were scored using the Autobiographical Interview protocol (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002), which provides a reliable system for categorizing internal (episodic) and external (semantic) information. For each event, participants answered a series of questions to assess self-reported phenomenal characteristics.

RESULTS

Patients with prefrontal lesions exhibited deficits in both remembering past events and imagining future events by generating fewer internal details than controls. This effect of group was larger in the past condition than in the future condition. In contrast, no group differences were seen in the number of external details, which were at the same level for patients and controls for both temporal conditions. There were no group differences in ratings of phenomenal characteristics.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that damage to prefrontal structures adversely affects the retrieval of past and the construction of future events. In particular, prefrontal structures are critical for the production of episodic event-specific details when engaging in past and future mental time travel.

Scripts and information units in future planning: Interactions between a past and a future planning task

Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to create future thoughts, but has not yet examined the role of semantic scripts. In this study, participants recalled how they planned a past camping trip in Australia (past planning task) and imagined how they would plan a future camping trip (future planning task), set either in a familiar (Australia) or an unfamiliar (Antarctica) context. Transcripts were segmented into information units that were coded according to semantic category (e.g., where, when, transport, material, actions). Results revealed a strong interaction between tasks and their presentation order. Starting with the past planning task constrained the future planning task when the context was familiar. Participants generated no new information when the future camping trip was set in Australia and completed second (after the past planning task). Conversely, starting with the future planning task facilitated the past planning task. Participants recalled more information units of their past plan when the past planning task was completed second (after the future planning task). These results shed new light on the role of scripts in past and future thinking and on how past and future thinking processes interact.

Remembering Preservation in Hippocampal Amnesia

The lesion-deficit model dominates neuropsychology. This is unsurprising given powerful demonstrations that focal brain lesions can affect specific aspects of cognition. Nowhere is this more evident than in patients with bilateral hippocampal damage. In the past 60 years, the amnesia and other impairments exhibited by these patients have helped to delineate the functions of the hippocampus and shape the field of memory. We do not question the value of this approach. However, less prominent are the cognitive processes that remain intact following hippocampal lesions. Here, we collate the piecemeal reports of preservation of function following focal bilateral hippocampal damage, highlighting a wealth of information often veiled by the field's focus on deficits. We consider how a systematic understanding of what is preserved as well as what is lost could add an important layer of precision to models of memory and the hippocampus.

Effects of prospective thinking on intertemporal choice: The role of familiarity

Imagining future events while performing an intertemporal choice task can attenuate the devaluation of future rewards. Here, we investigated whether this effect and its neural basis depend on the degree of personal prior experience associated with the simulated future scenarios. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was combined with a modified intertemporal choice task in which the delayed options were either purely monetary, or linked with a social event. Subject-specific events differed regarding familiarity, that is, meeting a close, familiar person or a celebrity in a café. In line with recent hypotheses on episodic construction, the simulation of future familiar and unfamiliar events equally attenuated delay discounting behavior in comparison with the control condition and both were imagined with similar richness. Imaging data, however, indicate that these results rely on differential neural activation patterns. The hippocampus was particularly involved in the simulation of unfamiliar future scenarios, probably reflecting enhanced construction processes when personal experience with similar past events is lacking. Consequently, functional coupling of the hippocampus with neural valuation signals in the anterior cingulate cortex predicted the subjective value only of rewards offered in the unfamiliar context. In contrast, valuation of rewards in a familiar context was predicted by activation in key nodes of emotional and autobiographical memory retrieval and dynamically modulated by frontal-striatal connectivity. The present data emphasize that the mechanisms underlying neural valuation of prospective rewards largely depend on the pre-experience with the context in which they are offered.

Cueing the personal future to reduce discounting in intertemporal choice: Is episodic prospection necessary?

How does the ability to imagine detailed future experiences (i.e., episodic prospection) contribute to choices between immediate and delayed rewards? Individuals with amnesia do not show abnormally steep discounting in intertemporal choice, suggesting that neither medial temporal lobe (MTL) integrity nor episodic prospection is required for the valuation of future rewards (Kwan et al. (), Hippocampus, 22:1215-1219; Kwan et al. (2013), J Exp Psychol, 142:1355-1369 2013). However, hippocampally mediated episodic prospection in healthy adults reduces the discounting of future rewards (Peters and Büchel (2010), Neuron, 66:138-148; Benoit et al. (2011), J Neurosci, 31:6771-6779), raising the possibility that MTL damage causes more subtle impairments to this form of decision-making than noted in previous patient studies. Intertemporal choice appears normal in amnesic populations, yet they may be unable to use episodic prospection to adaptively modulate the value assigned to future rewards. To investigate how the extended hippocampal system, including the hippocampus and related MTL structures, contributes to the valuation of future rewards, we compared the performance of six amnesic cases with impaired episodic prospection to that of 20 control participants on two versions of an intertemporal choice task: a standard discounting task, and a cued version in which cues prompted them to imagine specific personal future events temporally contiguous with the receipt of delayed rewards. Amnesic individuals' intertemporal choices in the standard condition were indistinguishable from those of controls, replicating previous findings. Surprisingly, performance of the amnesic cases in the cued condition indicates that amnesia does not preclude flexible modulation of choices in response to future event cues, even in the absence of episodic prospection. Cueing the personal future to modulate decisions appears to constitute a less demanding or a qualitatively different (e.g., personal semantic) form of prospection that is not as sensitive to MTL damage as prospective narrative generation.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events

An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

Mental simulation of future scenarios in transient global amnesia

Researchers exploring mental time travel into the future have emphasized the role played by episodic memory and its cerebral substrates. Recently, owing to controversial findings in amnesic patients, this role has become a matter of intense debate. In order to understand whether episodic memory is indeed crucial to future thinking, we assessed this ability in 11 patients during an episode of transient global amnesia (TGA), a unique and severe amnesic syndrome that primarily affects episodic memory. In the first of two experiments, TGA patients were asked to recall personal past events as well as to imagine personal future events, without any guidance regarding content. Under this condition, compared with controls, they provided fewer past and fewer future events, and the latter were less closely related to their personal goals. Furthermore, TGA patients׳ descriptions of past and future events were scant, containing fewer descriptive elements in total and fewer internal details. In order to assess whether TGA patients might have been basing their future event narratives on their general knowledge about how these events usually unfold, in our second experiment, we asked them to imagine future events in response to short descriptions of common scenarios. Under this condition, inherently eliciting less detailed descriptions, not only were all the TGA patients able to describe common events as happening in the future, but their narratives contained comparable amounts of internal detail to those of controls, despite being less detailed overall. Taken together, our results indicate that severe amnesia interferes with TGA patients׳ ability to envisage their personal past and future on a general level as well as in detail, but less severely affects their ability to imagine common scenarios, which are not related to their personal goals, probably owing to their preserved semantic memory, logical reasoning and ability to create vivid mental images.

From memory to prospection: what are the overlapping and the distinct components between remembering and imagining?

Reflecting on past events and reflecting on future events are two fundamentally different processes, each traveling in the opposite direction of the other through conceptual time. But what we are able to imagine seems to be constrained by what we have previously experienced, suggesting a close link between memory and prospection. Recent theories suggest that recalling the past lies at the core of imagining and planning for the future. The existence of this link is supported by evidence gathered from neuroimaging, lesion, and developmental studies. Yet it is not clear exactly how the novel episodes people construct in their sense of the future develop out of their historical memories. There must be intermediary processes that utilize memory as a basis on which to generate future oriented thinking. Here, we review studies on goal-directed processing, associative learning, cognitive control, and creativity and link them with research on prospection. We suggest that memory cooperates with additional functions like goal-directed learning to construct and simulate novel events, especially self-referential events. The coupling between memory-related hippocampus and other brain regions may underlie such memory-based prospection. Abnormalities in this constructive process may contribute to mental disorders such as schizophrenia.

How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.

Covert rapid action-memory simulation (CRAMS): a hypothesis of hippocampal-prefrontal interactions for adaptive behavior

Effective choices generally require memory, yet little is known regarding the cognitive or neural mechanisms that allow memory to influence choices. We outline a new framework proposing that covert memory processing of hippocampus interacts with action-generation processing of prefrontal cortex in order to arrive at optimal, memory-guided choices. Covert, rapid action-memory simulation (CRAMS) is proposed here as a framework for understanding cognitive and/or behavioral choices, whereby prefrontal-hippocampal interactions quickly provide multiple simulations of potential outcomes used to evaluate the set of possible choices. We hypothesize that this CRAMS process is automatic, obligatory, and covert, meaning that many cycles of action-memory simulation occur in response to choice conflict without an individual's necessary intention and generally without awareness of the simulations, leading to adaptive behavior with little perceived effort. CRAMS is thus distinct from influential proposals that adaptive memory-based behavior in humans requires consciously experienced memory-based construction of possible future scenarios and deliberate decisions among possible future constructions. CRAMS provides an account of why hippocampus has been shown to make critical contributions to the short-term control of behavior, and it motivates several new experimental approaches and hypotheses that could be used to better understand the ubiquitous role of prefrontal-hippocampal interactions in situations that require adaptively using memory to guide choices. Importantly, this framework provides a perspective that allows for testing decision-making mechanisms in a manner that translates well across human and nonhuman animal model systems.

Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time

The metaphor that individuals with episodic amnesia due to hippocampal damage are "stuck in time" persists in science, philosophy, and everyday life despite mounting evidence that episodic amnesia can spare many central aspects of temporal consciousness. Here we describe some of this evidence, focusing specifically on KC, one of the most thoroughly documented and severe cases of episodic amnesia on record. KC understands the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future. He expresses typical attitudes toward his past and future, and he is able to make future-regarding decisions. Theories claiming that the hippocampus plays an essential role in temporal consciousness need to be revised in light of these findings.

Suicidal behavior and loss of the future self in semantic dementia

Semantic dementia impairs semantic autobiographical memory, but tends to spare its episodic components that are critical for the sense of self. Investigators have recently discovered disturbances in the "future self" in semantic dementia. We report a 63-year-old man with semantic dementia who was hospitalized after suicide attempts that he attributed to his loss of a sense of future self. He complained of a decreased sense of being human, because he could not imagine doing things in the future that he had done in the past. Suicidal thinking and inability to place himself in future tasks persisted despite resolution of depression. Clinical assessment revealed a crossmodal loss of semantic knowledge, and neuroimaging showed bilateral anterior temporal atrophy and hypometabolism. On specific tests of autobiographical memory, identity, attribute knowledge, and future projection, the patient could return to the past and visualize himself in familiar scenarios, but he could not visualize himself even passively in these scenarios in the future. His future self was impaired not from seeing himself disabled; it was from an absence of semantic details of potential experiences, associated with impaired semantic autobiographical memory. His self-representations were concrete and specific rather than abstract and generalizable. This patient and recent publications indicate that semantic dementia impairs the ability to imagine oneself as capable in the future, leading some patients to suicidal behavior. We discuss possible mechanisms for these findings, including the potential role of abstract construals for future thinking.

Adaptive constructive processes and the future of memory

Memory serves critical functions in everyday life but is also prone to error. This article examines adaptive constructive processes, which play a functional role in memory and cognition but can also produce distortions, errors, and illusions. The article describes several types of memory errors that are produced by adaptive constructive processes and focuses in particular on the process of imagining or simulating events that might occur in one's personal future. Simulating future events relies on many of the same cognitive and neural processes as remembering past events, which may help to explain why imagination and memory can be easily confused. The article considers both pitfalls and adaptive aspects of future event simulation in the context of research on planning, prediction, problem solving, mind-wandering, prospective and retrospective memory, coping and positivity bias, and the interconnected set of brain regions known as the default network.

Scene construction in developmental amnesia: an fMRI study

Amnesic patients with bilateral hippocampal damage sustained in adulthood are generally unable to construct scenes in their imagination. By contrast, patients with developmental amnesia (DA), where hippocampal damage was acquired early in life, have preserved performance on this task, although the reason for this sparing is unclear. One possibility is that residual function in remnant hippocampal tissue is sufficient to support basic scene construction in DA. Such a situation was found in the one amnesic patient with adult-acquired hippocampal damage (P01) who could also construct scenes. Alternatively, DA patients’ scene construction might not depend on the hippocampus, perhaps being instead reliant on non-hippocampal regions and mediated by semantic knowledge. To adjudicate between these two possibilities, we examined scene construction during functional MRI (fMRI) in Jon, a well-characterised patient with DA who has previously been shown to have preserved scene construction. We found that when Jon constructed scenes he activated many of the regions known to be associated with imagining scenes in control participants including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices. Critically, however, activity was not increased in Jon's remnant hippocampal tissue. Direct comparisons with a group of control participants and patient P01, confirmed that they activated their right hippocampus more than Jon. Our results show that a type of non-hippocampal dependent scene construction is possible and occurs in DA, perhaps mediated by semantic memory, which does not appear to involve the vivid visualisation of imagined scenes.

•

Scene construction is associated with intact hippocampal function.

•

Patients with developmental amnesia (DA) and hippocampal lesions can construct scenes.

•

DA patient Jon did not activate his hippocampi during fMRI while constructing scenes.

•

Patients with DA may not truly visualise scenes but use semantic knowledge instead.

Sparing of spatial mental imagery in patients with hippocampal lesions

In four experiments, we explored the capacity for spatial mental imagery in patients with hippocampal lesions, using tasks that minimized the role of learning and memory. On all four tasks, patients with hippocampal lesions performed as well as controls. Nonetheless, in separate tests, the patients were impaired at remembering the materials that had been used to assess mental imagery. The findings suggest that the hippocampus is not needed for constructing many forms of spatial imagery but is needed for the formation of long-term memory. In future studies of the neural organization of spatial mental imagery, it will be important to separate the contribution of spatial processing from the contribution of learning and memory.

Episodic memory and episodic future thinking impairments in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder: an underlying difficulty with scene construction or self-projection?

OBJECTIVE

There appears to be a common network of brain regions that underlie the ability to recall past personal experiences (episodic memory) and the ability to imagine possible future personal experiences (episodic future thinking). At the cognitive level, these abilities are thought to rely on "scene construction" (the ability to bind together multimodal elements of a scene in mind--dependent on hippocampal functioning) and temporal "self-projection" (the ability to mentally project oneself through time--dependent on prefrontal cortex functioning). Although autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by diminished episodic memory, it is unclear whether episodic future thinking is correspondingly impaired. Moreover, the underlying basis of such impairments (difficulties with scene construction, self-projection, or both) is yet to be established. The current study therefore aimed to elucidate these issues.

METHOD

Twenty-seven intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD and 29 age- and IQ-matched neurotypical comparison adults were asked to describe (a) imagined atemporal, non-self-relevant fictitious scenes (assessing scene construction), (b) imagined plausible self-relevant future episodes (assessing episodic future thinking), and (c) recalled personally experienced past episodes (assessing episodic memory). Tests of narrative ability and theory of mind were also completed.

RESULTS

Performances of participants with ASD were significantly and equally diminished in each condition and, crucially, this diminution was independent of general narrative ability.

CONCLUSIONS

Given that participants with ASD were impaired in the fictitious scene condition, which does not involve self-projection, we suggest the underlying difficulty with episodic memory/future thinking is one of scene construction.

Memory, Imagination, and Predicting the Future: A Common Brain Mechanism?

On the face of it, memory, imagination, and prediction seem to be distinct cognitive functions. However, metacognitive, cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence is emerging that they are not, suggesting intimate links in their underlying processes. Here, we explore these empirical findings and the evolving theoretical frameworks that seek to explain how a common neural system supports our recollection of times past, imagination, and our attempts to predict the future.

Imagining the future: evidence for a hippocampal contribution to constructive processing

Imagining future events and remembering past events rely on a common core network, but several regions within this network--including the hippocampus--show increased activity for imagining future events compared to remembering past events. It remains unclear whether this hippocampal activity reflects processes related to the demands of constructing details retrieved across disparate episodic memories into coherent imaginary events, encoding these events into memory, novelty detection, or some combination of these processes. We manipulated the degree of constructive processing by comparing activity associated with the initial construction of an imagined scenario with the re-construction of an imagined scenario (imagine vs. re-imagine). After accounting for effects of novelty and subsequent memory, we found that a region in the hippocampus was preferentially activated for newly constructed imagined events compared with re-imagined events. Our results suggest that the hippocampus may support several distinct but related processes that are critical for imagining future events, and they also indicate that a particular region within posterior hippocampus may uniquely contribute to the construction of imagined future events.

Social cognition in a case of amnesia with neurodevelopmental mechanisms

Episodic-autobiographical memory (EAM) is considered to emerge gradually in concert with the development of other cognitive abilities (such as executive functions, personal semantic knowledge, emotional knowledge, theory of mind (ToM) functions, language, and working memory). On the brain level its emergence is accompanied by structural and functional reorganization of different components of the so-called EAM network. This network includes the hippocampal formation, which is viewed as being vital for the acquisition of memories of personal events for long-term storage. Developmental studies have emphasized socio-cultural-linguistic mechanisms that may be unique to the development of EAM. Furthermore it was hypothesized that one of the main functions of EAM is the social one. In the research field, the link between EAM and social cognition remains however debated. Herein we aim to bring new insights into the relation between EAM and social information processing (including social cognition) by describing a young adult patient with amnesia with neurodevelopmental mechanisms due to perinatal complications accompanied by hypoxia. The patient was investigated medically, psychiatrically, and with neuropsychological and neuroimaging methods. Structural high resolution magnetic resonance imaging revealed significant bilateral hippocampal atrophy as well as indices for degeneration in the amygdalae, basal ganglia, and thalamus, when a less conservative threshold was applied. In addition to extensive memory investigations and testing other (non-social) cognitive functions, we employed a broad range of tests that assessed social information processing (social perception, social cognition, social regulation). Our results point to both preserved (empathy, core ToM functions, visual affect selection, and discrimination, affective prosody discrimination) and impaired domains of social information processing (incongruent affective prosody processing, complex social judgments). They support proposals for a role of the hippocampal formation in processing more complex social information that likely requires multimodal relational handling.

Memory and self-neuroscientific landscapes

Relations between memory and the self are framed from a number of perspectives-developmental aspects, forms of memory, interrelations between memory and the brain, and interactions between the environment and memory. The self is seen as dividable into more rudimentary and more advanced aspects. Special emphasis is laid on memory systems and within them on episodic autobiographical memory which is seen as a pure human form of memory that is dependent on a proper ontogenetic development and shaped by the social environment, including culture. Self and episodic autobiographical memory are seen as interlocked in their development and later manifestation. Aside from content-based aspects of memory, time-based aspects are seen along two lines-the division between short-term and long-term memory and anterograde-future-oriented-and retrograde-past-oriented memory. The state dependency of episodic autobiographical is stressed and implications of it-for example, with respect to the occurrence of false memories and forensic aspects-are outlined. For the brain level, structural networks for encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval are discussed both by referring to patient data and to data obtained in normal participants with functional brain imaging methods. It is elaborated why descriptions from patients with functional or dissociative amnesia are particularly apt to demonstrate the facets in which memory, self, and personal temporality are interwoven.

The CRISP theory of hippocampal function in episodic memory

Over the past four decades, a "standard framework" has emerged to explain the neural mechanisms of episodic memory storage. This framework has been instrumental in driving hippocampal research forward and now dominates the design and interpretation of experimental and theoretical studies. It postulates that cortical inputs drive plasticity in the recurrent cornu ammonis 3 (CA3) synapses to rapidly imprint memories as attractor states in CA3. Here we review a range of experimental studies and argue that the evidence against the standard framework is mounting, notwithstanding the considerable evidence in its support. We propose CRISP as an alternative theory to the standard framework. CRISP is based on Context Reset by dentate gyrus (DG), Intrinsic Sequences in CA3, and Pattern completion in cornu ammonis 1 (CA1). Compared to previous models, CRISP uses a radically different mechanism for storing episodic memories in the hippocampus. Neural sequences are intrinsic to CA3, and inputs are mapped onto these intrinsic sequences through synaptic plasticity in the feedforward projections of the hippocampus. Hence, CRISP does not require plasticity in the recurrent CA3 synapses during the storage process. Like in other theories DG and CA1 play supporting roles, however, their function in CRISP have distinct implications. For instance, CA1 performs pattern completion in the absence of CA3 and DG contributes to episodic memory retrieval, increasing the speed, precision, and robustness of retrieval. We propose the conceptual theory, discuss its implications for experimental results and suggest testable predictions. It appears that CRISP not only accounts for those experimental results that are consistent with the standard framework, but also for results that are at odds with the standard framework. We therefore suggest that CRISP is a viable, and perhaps superior, theory for the hippocampal function in episodic memory.

The pivotal role of semantic memory in remembering the past and imagining the future

Episodic memory refers to a complex and multifaceted process which enables the retrieval of richly detailed evocative memories from the past. In contrast, semantic memory is conceptualized as the retrieval of general conceptual knowledge divested of a specific spatiotemporal context. The neural substrates of the episodic and semantic memory systems have been dissociated in healthy individuals during functional imaging studies, and in clinical cohorts, leading to the prevailing view that episodic and semantic memory represent functionally distinct systems subtended by discrete neurobiological substrates. Importantly, however, converging evidence focusing on widespread neural networks now points to significant overlap between those regions essential for retrieval of autobiographical memories, episodic learning, and semantic processing. Here we review recent advances in episodic memory research focusing on neurodegenerative populations which has proved revelatory for our understanding of the complex interplay between episodic and semantic memory. Whereas episodic memory research has traditionally focused on retrieval of autobiographical events from the past, we also include evidence from the recent paradigm shift in which episodic memory is viewed as an adaptive and constructive process which facilitates the imagining of possible events in the future. We examine the available evidence which converges to highlight the pivotal role of semantic memory in providing schemas and meaning whether one is engaged in autobiographical retrieval for the past, or indeed, is endeavoring to construct a plausible scenario of an event in the future. It therefore seems plausible to contend that semantic processing may underlie most, if not all, forms of episodic memory, irrespective of temporal condition.

Concealed semantic and episodic autobiographical memory electrified

Electrophysiology-based concealed information tests (CIT) try to determine whether somebody possesses concealed information about a crime-related item (probe) by comparing event-related potentials (ERPs) between this item and comparison items (irrelevants). Although the broader field is sometimes referred to as “memory detection,” little attention has been paid to the precise type of underlying memory involved. This study begins addressing this issue by examining the key distinction between semantic and episodic memory in the autobiographical domain within a CIT paradigm. This study also addresses the issue of whether multiple repetitions of the items over the course of the session habituate the brain responses. Participants were tested in a 3-stimulus CIT with semantic autobiographical probes (their own date of birth) and episodic autobiographical probes (a secret date learned just before the study). Results dissociated these two memory conditions on several ERP components. Semantic probes elicited a smaller frontal N2 than episodic probes, consistent with the idea that the frontal N2 decreases with greater pre-existing knowledge about the item. Likewise, semantic probes elicited a smaller central N400 than episodic probes. Semantic probes also elicited a larger P3b than episodic probes because of their richer meaning. In contrast, episodic probes elicited a larger late positive complex (LPC) than semantic probes, because of the recent episodic memory associated with them. All these ERPs showed a difference between probes and irrelevants in both memory conditions, except for the N400, which showed a difference only in the semantic condition. Finally, although repetition affected the ERPs, it did not reduce the difference between probes and irrelevants. These findings show that the type of memory associated with a probe has both theoretical and practical importance for CIT research.

Losing sight of the future: Impaired semantic prospection following medial temporal lobe lesions

The ability to imagine the future (prospection) relies on many of the same brain regions that support memory for the past. To date, scientific research has primarily focused on the neural substrates of episodic forms of prospection (mental simulation of spatiotemporally specific future events); however, little is known about the neural substrates of semantic prospection (mental simulation of future nonpersonal facts). Of particular interest is the role of the medial temporal lobes (MTLs), and specifically the hippocampus. Although the hippocampus has been proposed to play a key role in episodic prospection, recent evidence suggests that it may not play a similar role in semantic prospection. To examine this possibility, amnesic patients with MTL lesions were asked to imagine future issues occurring in the public domain. The results showed that patients could list general semantic facts about the future, but when probed to elaborate, patients produced impoverished descriptions that lacked semantic detail. This impairment occurred despite intact performance on standard neuropsychological tests of semantic processing and did not simply reflect deficits in narrative construction. The performance of a patient with damage limited to the hippocampus was similar to that of the remaining patients with MTL lesions and amnesic patients' impaired elaboration of the semantic future correlated with their impaired elaboration of the semantic past. Together, these results provide novel evidence from MTL amnesia that memory and prospection are linked in the semantic domain and reveal that the MTLs play a critical role in the construction of detailed, multi-element semantic simulations.

The future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain

During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of memory in imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both memory and imagination. Here, we discuss a number of key points that have emerged during recent years, focusing in particular on the importance of distinguishing between temporal and nontemporal factors in analyses of memory and imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the future, the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory-based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our conception of memory by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning.

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future

Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then examine the nature of both the types of self-knowledge assumed to be projected into the future and the types of temporalities that constitute projective temporal experience. Finally, I argue that a person lacking episodic memory should nonetheless be able to imagine a personal future by virtue of (1) the fact that semantic, as well as episodic, memory can be self-referential, (2) autonoetic awareness is not a prerequisite for FMTT, and (3) semantic memory does, in fact, enable certain forms of personally oriented FMTT. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:63-79. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1210 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.