Neural correlates of outcome processing post dishonest choice: An fMRI and ERP study

To lie or to tell the truth? The influence of processing the opponent's feedback on the forthcoming choice

Introduction

The brain mechanisms of deceptive behavior are relatively well studied, and the key brain regions involved in its processing were established. At the same time, the brain mechanisms underlying the processes of preparation for deception are less known.

Methods

We studied BOLD-signal changes during the presentation of the opponent's feedback to a previous deceptive or honest action during the computer game. The goal of the game was to mislead the opponent either by means of deception or by means of telling the truth.

Results

As a result, it was shown that several brain regions that were previously demonstrated as involved in deception execution, such as the left anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, also underlie processes related to deception preparation.

Discussion

The results obtained also allowed us to suggest that brain regions responsible for performance monitoring, intention assessment, suppression of non-selected solutions, and reward processing could be involved in shaping future action selection and preparation for deception. By shedding light on the brain mechanisms underlying deception, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of this complex cognitive process. Furthermore, it emphasizes the significance of exploring brain mechanisms governing the choice between deception and truth at various stages of decision-making.

The Neuroscience of Human and Artificial Intelligence Presence

Two decades of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics research illustrate the brain mechanisms that are engaged when people consider human beings, often in comparison to considering artificial intelligence (AI) as a nonhuman control. AI as an experimental control preserves agency and facilitates social interactions but lacks a human presence, providing insight into brain mechanisms that are engaged by human presence and the presence of AI. Here, I review this literature to determine how the brain instantiates human and AI presence across social perception and decision-making paradigms commonly used to realize a social context. People behave toward humans differently than they do toward AI. Moreover, brain regions more engaged by humans compared to AI extend beyond the social cognition brain network to all parts of the brain, and the brain sometimes is engaged more by AI than by humans. Finally, I discuss gaps in the literature, limitations in current neuroscience approaches, and how an understanding of the brain correlates of human and AI presence can inform social science in the wild.

Altered neural mechanisms of deception in individuals with autistic traits

A successful deception involves making a decision, acting on it, and evaluating results. Here, we investigated deception in a non-clinical sample (n = 36) with varying autism traits using a coin-toss paradigm of active deception. The subjects were asked to react to the instructions by clicking one of the two boxes that could mislead their opponents, followed by feedback on their success or failure. During this reaction, their EEG activity was recorded, and the results suggested that people with high autistic traits exhibited longer reaction times and lower amplitude of P3 in the decision-making stage compared to individuals with low autistic traits. The feedback evaluation stage in the high autistic trait group elicited lower amplitude of FRN and P3. Overall, these results indicated that people with high autistic traits experienced difficulties in deceiving, which could be related to atypical neural mechanisms.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

Resting-state functional connectivity of social brain regions predicts motivated dishonesty

Motivated dishonesty is a typical social behavior varying from person to person. Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) is capable of identifying unique patterns from functional connectivity (FC) between brain regions. Recent work has built a link between brain networks in resting state to dishonesty in Western participants. To determine and reproduce the relevant neural patterns and build an interpretable model to predict dishonesty, we analyzed two conceptually similar datasets containing rsfMRI data with different dishonesty tasks. Both tasks implemented the information-passing paradigm, in which monetary rewards were employed to induce dishonesty. We applied connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) to build a model among FC within and between four social brain networks (reward, self-referential, moral, and cognitive control). The CPM analysis indicated that FCs of social brain networks are predictive of dishonesty rate, especially FCs within reward network, and between self-referential and cognitive control networks. Our study offers an conceptual replication with integrated model to predict dishonesty with rsfMRI, and the results suggest that frequent motivated dishonest decisions may require the higher engagement of social brain regions.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal scenario: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study

This study aims to examine neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal situation, and the difference in neural correlates between spontaneous deception and instructed deception using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). We used a modified poker game in which participants freely decided whether sending a piece of truthful/deceptive information to other participants. In the instructed session, participants sent truthful/deceptive information per the instructions. In this non-competitive interpersonal situation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), deception produced higher neural activities than truth-telling. In addition, spontaneous deception exhibited higher neural activities than instructed deception in the frontopolar area, DLPFC, and frontal eye fields. Spontaneous truth-telling produced higher neural activities than instructed truth-telling in frontal eye fields and frontopolar area. This study provides evidence about neural correlates of spontaneous deception during non-competitive interpersonal scenarios and the difference between spontaneous deception and instructed deception.

Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image Concerns in Appearing Fair

Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The present research explored how individual difference measured by social value orientations, and situations, affect deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments, participants made allocations between themselves and recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1 demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair, especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2 showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.

Resting-state Functional Connectivity and Deception: Exploring Individualized Deceptive Propensity by Machine Learning

Individuals show marked variability in determining to be honest or deceptive in daily life. A large number of studies have investigated the neural substrates of deception; however, the brain networks contributing to the individual differences in deception remain unclear. In this study, we sought to address this issue by employing a machine-learning approach to predict individuals' deceptive propensity based on the topological properties of whole-brain resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC). Participants finished the resting-state functional MRI (fMRI) data acquisition, and then, one week later, participated as proposers in a modified ultimatum game in which they spontaneously chose to be honest or deceptive. A linear relevance vector regression (RVR) model was trained and validated to examine the relationship between topological properties of networks of RSFC and actual deceptive behaviors. The machine-learning model sufficiently decoded individual differences in deception using three brain networks based on RSFC, including the executive controlling network (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, middle frontal cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex), the social and mentalizing network (the temporal lobe, temporo-parietal junction, and inferior parietal lobule), and the reward network (putamen and thalamus). These networks have been found to form a signaling cognitive framework of deception by coding the mental states of others and the reward or values of deception or honesty, and integrating this information to make a final decision about being deceptive or honest. These findings suggest the potential of using RSFC as a task-independent neural trait for predicting deceptive propensity, and shed light on using machine-learning approaches in deception detection.

I lie, why don't you: Neural mechanisms of individual differences in self-serving lying

People tend to lie in varying degrees. To advance our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms of this heterogeneity, we investigated individual differences in self-serving lying. We performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in 37 participants and introduced a color-reporting game where lying about the color would in general lead to higher monetary payoffs but would also be punished if get caught. At the behavioral level, individuals lied to different extents. Besides, individuals who are more dishonest showed shorter lying response time, whereas no significant correlation was found between truth-telling response time and the degree of dishonesty. At the neural level, the left caudate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) were key regions reflecting individual differences in making dishonest decisions. The dishonesty associated activity in these regions decreased with increased dishonesty. Subsequent generalized psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that individual differences in self-serving lying were associated with the functional connectivity among the caudate, vmPFC, IFG, and dlPFC. More importantly, regardless of the decision types, the neural patterns of the left caudate and vmPFC during the decision-making phase could be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty. The present study demonstrated that lying decisions differ substantially from person to person in the functional connectivity and neural activation patterns which can be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty.

Telling a truth to deceive: Examining executive control and reward-related processes underlying interpersonal deception

Does deception necessarily involve false statements that are incompatible with the truth? In some cases, people choose truthful statements in order to mislead others. This type of deception has been investigated less. The current study employed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neurocognitive processes when both truthful and false statements were used to deceive others. We focused our ERP analysis on two stages: a decision making stage during which participants decided whether to tell a false or a truthful statement, and an outcome evaluation stage during which participants evaluated whether their deception had succeeded or not. Results showed that in the decision making stage, intentions to deceive elicited larger N200s and smaller P300s than an honest control condition. During the outcome evaluation stage, success/failure feedback in the deception condition elicited larger Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P300 than feedback after honest responses. Importantly, whether participants chose to tell false or true statements, did not further modulate executive control or reward-related processes. Taken together, these results suggest that during interpersonal deception, having deceptive intentions engages executive control and reward-related processes regardless of the veracity of statements.

Event-Related Potentials in Relation to Risk-Taking: A Systematic Review

Event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to investigate neural mechanisms underlying risk-related decisions over the last 16 years. We aimed to systematically evaluate associations between risk-taking and ERP components elicited during decisions and following feedback. A total of 79 articles identified from PsychINFO and PubMed databases met the inclusion criteria. Selected articles assessed early ERP components (feedback-related negativity/FRN, error-related negativity/ERN, and medial frontal negativity/MFN) and the mid-latency P3 component, all using gambling paradigms that involved selecting between choices of varying risk (e.g., Iowa Gambling Task, Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and two-choice gambling tasks). The P3 component was consistently enhanced to the selection of risky options and when positive feedback (as compared to negative feedback) was provided. Also consistently, the early negative components were found to be larger following feedback indicating monetary losses as compared to gains. In the majority of studies reviewed here, risk was conceptualized in the context of simple economical decisions in gambling tasks. As such, this narrow concept of risk might not capture the diversity of risky decisions made in other areas of everyday experience, for example, social, health, and recreational risk-related decisions. It therefore remains to be seen whether the risk-sensitivity of the ERP components reviewed here generalizes to other domains of life.

Common and distinct neural correlates of self-serving and prosocial dishonesty

People often anticipate certain benefits when making dishonest decisions. In this article, we aim to dissociate the neural-cognitive processes of (1) dishonest decisions that focus on overall benefits of being dishonest (regardless of whether the benefits are self-serving or prosocial) from (2) those that distinguish between self-serving and prosocial benefits. Thirty-one participants had the opportunity to maximize their monetary benefits by voluntarily making dishonest decisions while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In each trial, the monetary benefit of being dishonest was either self-serving or prosocial. Behaviorally, we found dissociable patterns of dishonest decisions: some participants were dishonest for overall benefits, while others were primarily dishonest for self-serving (compared with prosocial) benefits. When provided an opportunity to be dishonest for either self-serving or prosocial benefits, participants with a stronger overall tendency to be dishonest had stronger vmPFC activity, as well as stronger functional connectivity between the vmPFC and dlPFC. Furthermore, vmPFC activity was associated with decisions to be dishonest both when the benefits of being dishonest were self-serving and prosocial. Conversely, high self-serving-biased participants had stronger striatum activity and stronger functional connectivity between the striatum and middle-mPFC when they had a chance to be dishonest for self-serving (compared with prosocial) benefits. Altogether, we showed that activity in (and functional connectivity between) regions in the valuation (e.g., vmPFC and Str) and executive control (e.g., dlPFC and mmPFC) systems play a key role in registering the social-related goal of dishonest decisions.

Perceived Gaze Direction Modulates Neural Processing of Prosocial Decision Making

Gaze direction is a common social cue implying potential interpersonal interaction. However, little is known about the neural processing of social decision making influenced by perceived gaze direction. Here, we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) method to investigate 27 females when they were engaging in an economic exchange game task during which photos of direct or averted eye gaze were shown. We found that, when averted but not direct gaze was presented, prosocial vs. selfish choices were associated with stronger activations in the right superior temporal gyrus (STG) as well as larger functional couplings between right STG and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Moreover, stronger activations in right STG was associated with quicker actions for making prosocial choice accompanied with averted gaze. The findings suggest that, when the cue implying social contact is absent, the processing of understanding others’ intention and the relationship between self and others is more involved for making prosocial than selfish decisions. These findings could advance our understanding of the roles of subtle cues in influencing prosocial decision making, as well as shedding lights on deficient social cue processing and functioning among individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).

The good lies: Altruistic goals modulate processing of deception in the anterior insula

When it comes to lies, the beneficiaries of one's dishonesty play an important role in the decision-making process. Altruistic lies that are made with the intention of benefiting others are a specific type of lies and very common in real life. While it has been shown that altruistic goals influence (dis)honest behaviors, the neural substrates of this effect is still unknown. To reveal how the brain integrates altruistic goals into (dis)honest decisions, this study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural activity of participants in a real incentivized context while they were making (dis)honest decisions. We manipulated the beneficiaries of individuals' decisions (self vs. a charity) and whether the choices of higher payoffs involved deception or not. While finding that participants lied more often to benefit charities than for themselves, we observed that the altruistic goal of benefiting a charity, compared with the self-serving goal, reduced the activity in the anterior insula (AI) when lying to achieve higher payoffs. Furthermore, the degree of altruistic goal-induced reduction of AI activity was positively correlated with the degree of altruistic goal-induced reduction of honesty concerns. These results suggest that the AI serves as a neural hub in modulating the effect of altruistic goals on deception, which shed light on the underlying neural mechanism of altruistic lies. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3675-3690, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: A signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.

Unfolding the Spatial and Temporal Neural Processing of Making Dishonest Choices

To understand the neural processing that underpins dishonest behavior in an economic exchange game task, this study employed both functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) methodologies to examine the neural conditions of 25 participants while they were making either dishonest or honest choices. It was discovered that dishonest choices, contrary to honest choices, elicited stronger fMRI activations in bilateral striatum and anterior insula. It also induced fluctuations in ERP amplitudes within two time windows, which are 270–30 milliseconds before and 110–290 milliseconds after the response, respectively. Importantly, when making either dishonest or honest choices, human and computer counterparts were associated with distinct fMRI activations in the left insula and different ERP amplitudes at medial and right central sites from 80 milliseconds before to 250 milliseconds after the response. These results support the hypothesis that there would be distinct neural processing during making dishonest decisions, especially when the subject considers the interests of the counterpart. Furthermore, the fMRI and ERP findings, together with ERP source reconstruction, clearly delineate the temporal sequence of the neural processes of a dishonest decision: the striatum is activated before response, then the left insula is involved around the time of response, and finally the thalamus is activated after response.

Can beneficial ends justify lying? Neural responses to the passive reception of lies and truth-telling with beneficial and harmful monetary outcomes

Can beneficial ends justify morally questionable means? To investigate how monetary outcomes influence the neural responses to lying, we used a modified, cheap talk sender-receiver game in which participants were the direct recipients of lies and truthful statements resulting in either beneficial or harmful monetary outcomes. Both truth-telling (vs lying) as well as beneficial (vs harmful) outcomes elicited higher activity in the nucleus accumbens. Lying (vs truth-telling) elicited higher activity in the supplementary motor area, right inferior frontal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus and left anterior insula. Moreover, the significant interaction effect was found in the left amygdala, which showed that the monetary outcomes modulated the neural activity in the left amygdala only when truth-telling rather than lying. Our study identified a neural network associated with the reception of lies and truth, including the regions linked to the reward process, recognition and emotional experiences of being treated (dis)honestly.