A social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: Activation-decision-construction-action theory

The effects of deception on memory: a comparative study of actors and eyewitnesses accounts

Deception is a common occurrence in daily life and has been shown to impair memory. This study investigated the memory-undermining effects of deception in a simulated daily life scenario, focusing on the potential moderating effect of the liars' role (i.e., actor vs. eyewitness). In a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, 128 participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: actors who told the truth, actors who lied, eyewitnesses who told the truth, and eyewitnesses who lied. Participants engaged in a simulated shopping task, followed by an interview where they either provided truthful or deceptive responses about the items they bought (actors) or observed (eyewitnesses). Two days later, participants completed a series of memory tests assessing item memory, source memory, destination memory, and non-believed memories. Results showed that deception impaired source memory, with a greater impairment observed for actors than eyewitnesses. Deception also led to more non-believed memories and impaired item and destination memory, regardless of the liars' role. These findings suggest that the role of liars moderates the effects of deception on memory, with self-related deception (actors) leading to greater memory impairments than other-related deception (eyewitnesses).

Different neural correlates of deception: Crafting high and low creative scams

Deception is a complex social behavior that manifests in various forms, including scams. To successfully deceive victims, liars have to continually devise novel scams. This ability to create novel scams represents one kind of malevolent creativity, referred to as lying. This study aimed to explore different neural substrates involved in the generation of high and low creative scams. A total of 40 participants were required to design several creative scams, and their cortical activity was recorded by functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The results revealed that the right frontopolar cortex (FPC) was significantly active in scam generation. This region associated with theory of mind may be a key region for creating novel and complex scams. Moreover, creativity-related regions were positively involved in creative scams, while morality-related areas showed negative involvement. This suggests that individuals might attempt to use malevolent creativity while simultaneously minimizing the influence of moral considerations. The right FPC exhibited increased coupling with the right precentral gyrus during the design of high-harmfulness scams, suggesting a diminished control over immoral thoughts in the generation of harmful scams. Additionally, the perception of the victim's emotions (related to right pre-motor cortex) might diminish the quality of highly original scams. Furthermore, an efficient and cohesive neural coupling state appears to be a key factor in generating high-creativity scams. These findings suggest that the right FPC was crucial in scam creation, highlighting a neural basis for balancing malevolent creativity against moral considerations in high-creativity deception.

Mixed in a World of Truth and Lies: List Composition Moderates the Effects of a Lie Fabrication Manipulation on Memory and Metamemory

Research has shown that list composition moderates the effects of encoding manipulations on memory performance; differential memory performance is observed at distinct levels of the independent variable in mixed lists, but not in pure lists. The current study aims to investigate the effect of list composition on predicted and actual memory performance using a semantic lie fabrication manipulation. In Experiment 1, participants either told the truth or fabricated a lie in response to a set of general knowledge questions in a mixed-list design, made memory predictions for each response, and received a free recall test. Experiments 2A and 2B compared the effect of list composition by employing mixed and pure lists, respectively. The results showed that the lie fabrication led to a metacognitive illusion in mixed lists by inducing a crossed double dissociation between memory and metamemory. Participants produced higher memory performance and lower memory predictions for lies than the truth. In contrast, predicted and actual memory performance were similar for truth and lies in pure lists. These findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge on list composition and have implications for situations where individuals need to maintain and remember their fabricated lies.

Detecting deception with artificial intelligence: promises and perils

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have driven interest in its potential application for lie detection. Unfortunately, the current approaches have primarily focused on technical aspects at the expense of a solid methodological and theoretical foundation. We discuss the implications thereof and offer recommendations for the development and regulation of AI-based deception detection.

The effect of lying on memory in daily life: Does motivation matter?

Recently, there has been renewed interest in the effect of lying on memory. A growing body of studies has documented that lying can impair memories and cause memory disruptions, such as forgetting and false memories, to a greater degree than telling the truth. This study aimed to investigate whether motivation plays a role in the effect of lying on memory. The present study utilized a daily life paradigm and manipulated three conditions: truth telling, internally motivated lying, and externally motivated lying. We asked participants to engage in a shopping task and to tell lies (externally motivated lying group) or to choose between telling the truth (truth-telling group) and telling lies (internally motivated lying group) in the interview. Forty-eight hours later, the participants were instructed to truthfully carry out multiple memory assessments. The principal findings of this research are that lying can result in memory impairments, and internally motivated lying can lead to greater impairment in source memory than externally motivated lying. Moreover, no significant differences between the two lying groups were found in the memory tests. The empirical findings of this study provide new insights into the effect of lying on memory.

Autistic adults' inclination to lie in everyday situations

LAY ABSTRACT

Differences in social communication and understanding others' mental states may mean that autistic adults are less likely to deceive others than non-autistic individuals. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their inclination to lie and which psychological factors are involved in the inclination to lie. We found that autistic and non-autistic groups reported a similar inclination to lie, and the extent to which participants viewed lying as acceptable helped to explain their inclination to deceive others. However, the other underlying psychological factors associated with deception inclination differed between autistic and non-autistic groups. Autistic adults' belief about their ability to lie and also how quickly they could lie helped to explain whether they were more or less inclined to lie. For non-autistic adults, their memory and ability to understand others' mental states helped to explain their lie inclination. We discuss these findings and recommend areas for future research.

Nonverbal cues to deception: insights from a mock crime scenario in a Chinese sample

Nonverbal behaviors could play a crucial role in detecting deception, yet existing studies on deception cues have largely centered on Western populations, predominantly university students, thus neglecting the influence of cultural and sample diversity. To address this gap, our study explored deception cues within an Asian cultural setting, utilizing a mock crime paradigm. Our sample comprised Chinese participants, including both men and women with various socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds. Our findings revealed that compared to truth tellers, liars exhibited heightened emotions and an increased cognitive load. Furthermore, liars showed a higher frequency of self-adaptors and a longer duration of gaze aversion. Our findings contribute to a more profound understanding of deception cues within Asian culture and have implications for practical fields such as criminal interrogation.

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children's elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children's second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children's ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.

Verbal lie detection using Large Language Models

Human accuracy in detecting deception with intuitive judgments has been proven to not go above the chance level. Therefore, several automatized verbal lie detection techniques employing Machine Learning and Transformer models have been developed to reach higher levels of accuracy. This study is the first to explore the performance of a Large Language Model, FLAN-T5 (small and base sizes), in a lie-detection classification task in three English-language datasets encompassing personal opinions, autobiographical memories, and future intentions. After performing stylometric analysis to describe linguistic differences in the three datasets, we tested the small- and base-sized FLAN-T5 in three Scenarios using 10-fold cross-validation: one with train and test set coming from the same single dataset, one with train set coming from two datasets and the test set coming from the third remaining dataset, one with train and test set coming from all the three datasets. We reached state-of-the-art results in Scenarios 1 and 3, outperforming previous benchmarks. The results revealed also that model performance depended on model size, with larger models exhibiting higher performance. Furthermore, stylometric analysis was performed to carry out explainability analysis, finding that linguistic features associated with the Cognitive Load framework may influence the model's predictions.

Revisiting Deception in Breonna Taylor's Case: A Cognitive-Acoustic Approach

The present paper proposes an eclectic model for examining the cognitive load involved in detecting deception that benefits from the acoustic dimension as an exercise in cognitive forensic linguistics. The corpus used is composed of the legal confession transcripts of the Breonna Taylor's Case, a 26-year-old African-American woman worker who was shot dead by police officers in Louisville, Ky., in March 2020 during a crackdown on her apartment. The dataset comprises transcripts and recordings of the persons involved in the shooting event but have given unclear charges, and those accused of contributory negligence due to wanton misfiring. The data is analyzed based on the video interviews and reaction times (RT) as an application of the model proposed. The findings reveal that the episodes chosen and how they are analyzed exhibit that the modified ADCM along with the acoustic dimension provide a clear picture of cognitive load management in the course of constructing and producing lies.

Does deception involve more cognitive control than truth-telling? Meta-analyses of N2 and MFN ERP studies

A number of psychological theories propose that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Over the last decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to unravel this question, but the findings are mixed. To address this controversy, two meta-analyses were conducted to quantify the results of existing studies reporting N2 or medial frontal negativity (MFN) associated with deception. In total, 32 papers consisting of 1091 participants were included, which yielded 32 effect sizes for N2 and 7 effect sizes for MFN. We found that deception was associated with a more negative N2 and MFN than truth-telling with medium and large effect sizes (r = .25 and .51, respectively). We also found that the deception paradigm modulated the results (p = .043), but found no evidence for publication bias. Our findings indicate that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Our review also identifies gaps in this literature, including a need for more ERP studies using spontaneous deception.

Socio-cognitive correlates of primary school children's deceptive behavior toward peers in competitive settings

Competing for limited resources with peers is common among children from an early age, illustrating their propensity to use deceptive strategies to win. We focused on how primary school-age (6-8 years old) children's strategic deception toward peers is associated with their socio-cognitive development (theory of mind and executive functions). In a novel computerized competitive hide-and-seek game, we manipulated the peer opponents' familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and actions (following vs. not following children's indications), as well as the stimuli likability (liked vs. disliked cards). Our findings demonstrated that children deceived the familiar opponent less than the unfamiliar one, indicating their determination to preserve positive peer interactions. We showed that theory of mind and executive functions significantly predicted children's willingness to deceive. Notably, second-order false belief understanding and visuospatial working memory positively predicted children's use of truths to deceive, whereas inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility efficacy scores were negatively related to their deceptive performance when using the same strategy. Implications for children's competitive behavior toward peers involving lie-telling are discussed.

Millennia of legal content criteria of lies and truths: wisdom or common-sense folly?

Long before experimental psychology, religious writers, orators, and playwrights described examples of lie detection based on the verbal content of statements. Legal scholars collected evidence from individual cases and systematized them as "rules of evidence". Some of these resemble content cues used in contemporary research, while others point to working hypotheses worth exploring. To examine their potential validity, we re-analyzed data from a quasi-experimental study of 95 perjury cases. The outcomes support the fruitfulness of this approach. Travelling back in time searching for testable ideas about content cues to truth and deception may be worthwhile.

Similarities and Distinctions between Cortical Neural Substrates That Underlie Generation of Malevolent Creative Ideas

Creativity can be driven by negative intentions, and this is called malevolent creativity (MC). It is a type of creativity that serves antisocial purposes and deliberately leads to harmful or immoral results. A possible classification indicates that there are three kinds of MC in daily life: hurting people, lying, and playing tricks. This study aimed to explore similar and distinct neural substrates underlying these different kinds of MC idea generation. The participants were asked to perform different MC tasks, and their neural responses were recorded using a functional near-infrared spectroscopy device. The findings revealed that most regions within the prefrontal and temporal lobes [e.g., the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC), and right angular gyrus] were involved in the three MC tasks. However, the right frontopolar cortex (rFPC) was more activated and less coupled with the rDLPFC and right precuneus during the lying task than during the other tasks. Thus, rFPC may play an important role in constructing novel lies. In the lying task, individuals were more selfish and less compassionate. In the playing tricks and hurting people tasks, there was less neural coupling between the rDLPFC and the left inferior frontal gyrus/right inferior parietal lobule than that in the lying task. This may imply that selfish motivation is released when individuals try to ignore victims' distress or generate aggressive tricks in hurting people or playing tricks tasks. These findings indicate that the three kinds of MC idea generation involve common cortical regions related to creative idea generation and moral judgment, whereas differences in cortical responses exist because of their unique features.

Are Intelligent People Better Liars? Relationships between Cognitive Abilities and Credible Lying

Lying is essential to social communication. Despite years of research, its detection still poses many challenges. This is partly because some individuals are perceived as truthful and reliable, even when lying. However, relatively little is known about these effective liars. In our study, we focused on the cognitive functioning of effective liars. We tested 400 participants who completed tasks measuring executive functions, verbal fluency, and fluid intelligence, and also made four statements (two true and two false, half of them written and half oral). The reliability of the statements was then assessed. Only fluid intelligence was found to be relevant for reliable lying. This relationship was only evident for oral statements, suggesting that the importance of intelligence is highlighted when statements are made spontaneously without prior preparation.

Post-execution monitoring in dishonesty

When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response-stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response-stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.

Personalized persuasion: Quantifying susceptibility to information exploitation in spear-phishing attacks

Many cyberattacks begin with a malicious email message, known as spear phishing, targeted at unsuspecting victims. Although security technologies have improved significantly in recent years, spear phishing continues to be successful due to the bespoke nature of such attacks. Crafting such emails requires attackers to conduct careful research about their victims and collect personal information about them and their acquaintances. Despite the widespread nature of spear-phishing attacks, little is understood about the human factors behind them. This is particularly the case when considering the role of attack personalization on end-user vulnerability. To study spear-phishing attacks in the laboratory, we developed a simulation environment called SpearSim that simulates the tasks involved in the generation and reception of spear-phishing messages. Using SpearSim, we conducted a laboratory experiment with human subjects to study the effect of information availability and information exploitation end-user vulnerability. The results of the experiment show that end-users in the high information-availability condition were 2.97 times more vulnerable to spear-phishing attacks than those in the low information-availability condition. We found that access to more personal information about targets can result in attacks involving contextually meaningful impersonation and narratives. We discuss the implications of this research for the design of anti-phishing training solutions.

The Role of Cognition in Dishonest Behavior

Dishonesty has received increased attention from many professionals in recent years for its relevance in many social areas such as finance and psychology, among others. Understanding the mechanisms underlying dishonesty and the channels in which dishonesty operates could enable the detection and even prevention of dishonest behavior. However, the study of dishonesty is a challenging endeavor; dishonesty is a complex behavior because it imposes a psychological and cognitive burden. The study of this burden has fostered a new research trend that focuses on cognition’s role in dishonesty. This paper reviews the theoretical aspects of how such cognitive processes modulate dishonest behavior. We will pay special attention to executive functions such as inhibitory processes, working memory, or set-shifting that may modulate the decision to be (dis)honest. We also account for some frameworks in cognitive and social psychology that may help understand dishonesty, such as the Theory of Mind, the role of creative processes, and discourse analyses within language studies. Finally, we will discuss some specific cognitive-based models that integrate cognitive mechanisms to explain dishonesty. We show that cognition and dishonest behavior are firmly related and that there are several important milestones to reach in the future to advance the understanding of dishonesty in our society.

The path of dishonesty: identification of mental processes with electrical neuroimaging

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach-the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.

Default settings affect children's decisions about whether to be honest

Behavioral economics research has revealed that our decision-making can be biased by default settings. That is, all other things being equal, adults tend to choose default options even when the effort involved in choosing other options is minimal. Extensive evidence shows that default settings can systematically influence adult decisions in a wide variety of domains (e.g., pension choices, organ donation), but little is known about their developmental origin. Of interest in the present research is whether default settings can influence young children's decisions about whether to be honest. We investigated this question in two studies of 5- and 6-year-old Chinese children (total N = 120; 60 girls; M_age = 5.81, SD_age = 0.14). Each study used a specially designed device that allowed children to play a guessing game in either a Cheating Default condition in which they would cheat by doing nothing or in an Honesty Default condition in which they would be honest by doing nothing. In each condition, they had the option of taking a trivially easy action to override the default (pushing a button in Study 1 or moving a screen in Study 2). In both studies, children decided to cheat significantly more often in the Cheating Default condition than in the Honesty Default condition. Additionally, overall cheating rates were significantly higher in Study 2 than in Study 1 (55% vs. 25%), which suggests that even though the default setting effect generalized across different actions, the specific action in question can also affect the cheating rate. Taken together, these results indicate that default setting effects that have been observed in adults have origins in childhood, and they point toward new ways to use nudges to promote positive social development and moral decision-making.

Contextual considerations for deception production and detection in forensic interviews

Most deception scholars agree that deception production and deception detection effects often display mixed results across settings. For example, some liars use more emotion than truth-tellers when discussing fake opinions on abortion, but not when communicating fake distress. Similarly, verbal and nonverbal cues are often inconsistent predictors to assist in deception detection, leading to mixed accuracies and detection rates. Why are lie production and detection effects typically inconsistent? In this piece, we argue that aspects of the context are often unconsidered in how lies are produced and detected. Greater theory-building related to contextual constraints of deception are therefore required. We reintroduce and extend the Contextual Organization of Language and Deception (COLD) model, a framework that outlines how psychological dynamics, pragmatic goals, and genre conventions are aspects of the context that moderate the relationship between deception and communication behavior such as language. We extend this foundation by proposing three additional aspects of the context - individual differences, situational opportunities for deception, and interpersonal characteristics - for the COLD model that can specifically inform and potentially improve forensic interviewing. We conclude with a forward-looking perspective for deception researchers and practitioners related to the need for more theoretical explication of deception and its detection related to the context.

Maltreated and non-maltreated children's truthful and dishonest reports: Linguistic and syntactic differences

Introduction

Adults are typically poor judges of the veracity of statements, requiring the need for alternative methods for detecting lies. One alternative method to human lie-detectors is using computer-based linguistic analysis which may present a more reliable method for detecting dishonesty. Moreover, while previous research has examined linguistic differences between typically developing children's and adults' truthful and dishonest reports, no study to date has examined whether maltreated children exhibit different linguistic cues to dishonesty. Thus, the current study examined maltreated and nonmaltreated children's linguistic and syntactic cues to children's truthful and dishonest reports.

Methods

Nine- to 12-year-olds, half of whom were maltreated, played a computer game with a confederate: half of the children experienced a transgression (i.e., playing a forbidden game and crashing the computer) and were coached to conceal it, and half of the children experienced no transgression (i.e., simply played a computer game). All children were then interviewed about the event. The current study utilized automated linguistic and syntactic analysis software to compare children's truthful reports (no transgression occurred) with dishonest reports.

Results and Discussion

Results indicated that maltreated and non-maltreated children did not differ in their indicators of dishonesty. Dishonest reporters used more first-person plural pronouns and cognitive mechanism terms and had less syntactically complex reports compared to truthful reporters. Finally, first-personal plural pronouns, cognitive mechanism terms, and syntactic complexity accurately classified (74.2%) the veracity of children's reports. The current findings present a new indicator of dishonesty (syntactic complexity) and suggest that indicators from typically developing populations may apply to maltreated children when coaching occurred.

Research on the Effects of Lying on Memory: A Scientometric Analysis and a Call for New Studies

Research on the effects of lying and memory is increasingly attracting empirical attention. In the current manuscript, a scientometric analysis was carried out on the mnemonic consequences of lying. This analysis took into account 70 published articles extracted from Scopus and Web of Science databases from 1998 to 2021. A scientometric analysis was conducted in order to visualize the state of the art on this line of research (i.e., authors, countries, institutions, journals, and co-citations). Additionally, a keywords’ cluster analysis was executed to investigate the main keywords used in the published papers. Based on the keywords’ cluster analysis, we identified the main aims and critical issues of the reviewed papers. The United States and the Netherlands are the two most productive countries into the effects of lying on memory. The top five authors are mainly from European countries and wrote from 6 to 15 articles. The cluster analysis detected three clusters of keywords. The critical issues of this line of research are mainly related to the generalizability of the achieved findings for real situations, a lack of a direct control of the manipulation adopted, and a need of additional measures. The current analysis provides a comprehensive overview and understanding of existing research on the effects of lying on memory and provides possible future directions of this research domain.

Challenging response latencies in faking detection: The case of few items and no warnings

AbstractFaking detection is an ongoing challenge in psychological assessment. A notable approach for detecting fakers involves the inspection of response latencies and is based on the congruence model of faking. According to this model, respondents who fake good will provide favorable responses (i.e., congruent answers) faster than they provide unfavorable (i.e., incongruent) responses. Although the model has been validated in various experimental faking studies, to date, research supporting the congruence model has focused on scales with large numbers of items. Furthermore, in this previous research, fakers have usually been warned that faking could be detected. In view of the trend to use increasingly shorter scales in assessment, it becomes important to investigate whether the congruence model also applies to self-report measures with small numbers of items. In addition, it is unclear whether warning participants about faking detection is necessary for a successful application of the congruence model. To address these issues, we reanalyzed data sets of two studies that investigated faking good and faking bad on extraversion (n = 255) and need for cognition (n = 146) scales. Reanalyses demonstrated that having only a few items per scale and not warning participants represent a challenge for the congruence model. The congruence model of faking was only partly confirmed under such conditions. Although faking good on extraversion was associated with the expected longer latencies for incongruent answers, all other conditions remained nonsignificant. Thus, properties of the measurement and properties of the procedure affect the successful application of the congruence model.

The evil within: The AMORAL model of dark creativity

The dark side of creativity entails using original thought to meet a selfish, negative, or evil goal, with or without the deliberate intent to harm others. Recent empirical advances have studied the behavioral correlates of such creativity, including associations with aggression, deception, and subclinical psychopathy. The time, therefore, seems apt to propose a theoretical framework for dark creativity’s development and manifestation. This article outlines the AMORAL model of dark creativity, which traces a creative action from its Antecedents to Mechanisms and Operants to its Realization, and to the subsequent Aftereffects and Legacy of the act. We use both real-life and simulated examples to illustrate the application of the theory across multiple domains, from law enforcement to interpersonal relationships. Our goal is to help guide future scholarship and measurement.

Who did I lie to that day? Deception impairs memory in daily life

Research has demonstrated that deceptive responses can undermine item and source memories. However, previous studies have often randomly assigned participants to an honest or deception group and asked them to respond in specific ways in an interview, rather than providing them a choice of what response to give. Moreover, little attention has been given to destination memory in previous research. Using a daily life paradigm, we investigated the effects of deception on memory. After completing a mock shopping task, participants were told that someone would ask them questions about their shopping lists. The participants voluntarily chose to tell the truth or lie in the interview and were encouraged to respond as they would in their daily lives. An item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given 48 h after the interview. Source and destination memories but not item memories were impaired for participants who chose to lie. Specifically, liars forgot the things about which they lied and mistakenly believed that they lied about many things that they did not, and they also did not remember to whom they lied. We conclude that deception can disrupt memory in daily life.

Deceptive behaviour in autism: A scoping review

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to deceive others is an important skill that usually develops in early childhood. In this review, we give an overview of studies that have examined deceptive behaviour in autistic children, adolescents and adults. We separated the study findings into three main categories and seven sub-categories: (1) Deception ability and prevalence (1a) gameplay deception; (1b) naturalistic deception; (2) Psychological processes in deception (2a) verbal, intellectual and social ability; (2b) ability to understand others' thoughts and beliefs; (2c) cognitive ability; and (3) Social learning (3a) training; (3b) social contexts. Contrary to some stereotypes, we found that autistic people can and do deceive but often find this more difficult than non-autistic people. We also found that autistic people may use different psychological processes than non-autistic people when deceiving and may get better at deception in adulthood.

Involvement Modulates the Effects of Deception on Memory in Daily Life

Previous studies have demonstrated that liars who adopt a false denial strategy often forget what they lied about, which has been labeled the denial-induced forgetting (DIF) effect. However, several investigations have not found such an effect. It has been suggested that involvement might play a role in the inconsistency. The present study was designed to directly determine whether involvement modulates the effects of deception on memory. Participants were assigned randomly to either high- or low-involvement conditions and were required to complete a mock shopping task. They were then asked to participate in an interview in which they were asked to respond honestly or deceptively. Two days later, final memory tests were given, and the participants were asked to give honest responses. We found a DIF effect in the high-involvement condition but not in the low-involvement condition. Moreover, the liars in the high-involvement condition created more non-believed memories in the source memory test and the destination memory test than the honest participants. In addition, liars in both the high- and low-involvement conditions forgot who they lied to. We conclude that the effects of deception on memory could be influenced by the degree of involvement.

Concealing Untrustworthiness: The Role of Conflict Monitoring in a Social Deception Task

Deception studies emphasize the important role of event-related potentials (ERPs) to uncover deceptive behavior based on underlying neuro-cognitive processes. The role of conflict monitoring as indicated by the frontal N2 component during truthful and deceptive responses was investigated in an adapted Concealed Information Test (CIT). Previously memorized pictures of faces should either be indicated as truthfully trustworthy, truthfully untrustworthy or trustworthy while concealing the actual untrustworthiness (untrustworthy-probe). Mean, baseline-to-peak and peak-to-peak amplitudes were calculated to examine the robustness of ERP findings across varying quantification techniques. Data of 30 participants (15 female; age: M = 23.73 years, SD = 4.09) revealed longer response times and lower correct rates for deceptive compared to truthful trustworthy responses. The frontal N2 amplitude was more negative for untrustworthy-probe and truthful untrustworthy compared to truthful trustworthy stimuli when measured as mean or baseline-to-peak amplitude. Results suggest that deception evokes conflict monitoring and ERP quantifications are differentially sensitive to a-priori hypotheses.

False Rape Allegation and Regret: A Theoretical Model Based on Cognitive Dissonance

The aim of this paper is to provide a model illustrating how regretful consensual intercourse may lead to false rape allegations (FRA). An intrapersonal perspective of regret based on cognitive dissonance is added to the interpersonal factors already mentioned in the literature. The intrapersonal perspective is discussed in terms of the reduction of a state of cognitive dissonance induced by the gap between social norms and the shamefully perceived behavior. First, we start with the review of the different motives that may lead to a FRA, insisting on regret caused by cognitive dissonance. We then develop the emergence of regret from a state of cognitive dissonance. Second, we describe the means used to build the model: a literature review, an extraction of the factors at play in regret-based FRA, a chronological structure of the various factors, as some are necessarily the source of others. We then build the model. Third, we illustrate how the model could encompass many possible and usual scenarios. Thirteen plausible scenarios were developed to show the relevance of the model. Finally, we comment and discuss the model for future research and prevention.

Utilizing the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory to predict children's hypothetical decisions to deceive

The Decision component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action-Theory (ADCAT) utilizes a cost-benefit formula to explain the cognitive, motivational and social processes involved in deception. Three prior studies suggest that ADCAT can be used to predict adults' future deceptive behavior; however, no study has assessed the potential relevance of ADCAT with children. The present study is the first to date to examine whether this cost-benefit formula can predict children's hypothetical decisions to tell three types of lies, and whether there are specific developmental factors that need to be considered. The results indicate that the cost-benefit formula was only effective for predicting children's hypothetical lies for self-gain at no cost to another (Self-No Cost lies) and lies for others when there was a personal cost (Other-Cost to Self). More specifically, expected value of telling the truth was related to lower willingness to tell hypothetical Self-No Cost and Other-Cost to Self lies. On the other hand, the expected value of lying was not related to children's hypothetical decisions to tell Self-No Cost, Self-Cost to Other or Other-Cost to Self lies. Children's inhibitory control and theory of mind were significant covariates for some of the ADCAT predictor variables and children's hypothetical truth and lying behaviors. Altogether, these findings indicate that the effectiveness of the ADCAT cost-benefit formula for predicting children's lying behavior is affected by developmental factors and the type of lie being analyzed.

To err is human but not deceptive

This study addresses a poorly understood but important question concerning the cognition of deception: How much more is there to lying than to responding incorrectly, the latter capturing how researchers have occasionally operationalized deception? A recent social-cognitive account of lying - Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT) - asserts a qualitative difference between the two - for instance, that deception involves Theory of Mind inferences and more proactive interference. To test these notions within-subjects, participants answered closed-ended and open-ended questions probing general truths honestly, deceptively, or with intentional errors. Response time and noncompliance with instructions were the dependent measures. Deceptive responding generally elicited the longest response times and the lowest instruction compliance, followed by intentional erring, supporting the theory. Although not the primary focus, response inhibition due to implausible deception was demonstrated for the first time.

The role of executive functions in the effects of lying on memory

Recent studies have demonstrated that lying can affect memory and that such memory effects are based on the cognitive load required in performing the lie. The present study aimed to verify whether the impact of two deceptive strategies (i.e., false denials and fabrication) depends on individuals' cognitive resources in terms of Executive Functions (i.e., EF: Shifting, Inhibition, and Updating). A sample of 147 participants watched a video of a robbery and then were instructed to either fabricate (i.e., fabrication condition), deny (i.e. false denial condition), or tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling condition) to some questions about the crime. Two days later, all participants had to provide an honest account on a final memory test where they indicated their memory for having discussed details (i.e., fabricated, denied, or told the truth) and their memory for the video. Finally, their EF resources were also assessed. Our findings demonstrated that individual differences in EFs played a role in how the event was recalled and on the effects of lying on memory. That is, memory for the event after having lied depended especially on individuals' Shifting resources. We also found that the two deceptive strategies differentially affected individuals' memory for the interview and for the event: Denying affected memory for the interview while fabricating affected memory for the event. Our findings can inform legal professionals on the possibility to assess individuals' EF as an indicator of witnesses' credibility.

How deception and believability feedback affect recall

While research suggests that telling lies can distort memory for the truth, the effects of receiving feedback about the believability about one's lies are not known. We hypothesised that participants who exaggerated the number of stolen items (vs. told the truth) in a mock insurance claim and then received feedback that their statement was believable (vs. not believable) would incorporate this lie into memory. In a two-phase between-subjects design, participants saw images of an office pre- and post-theft and were randomly assigned to report the number of stolen items accurately (truth-tellers) or exaggerate (liars). They were then randomly assigned to receive feedback that their statement was believable or not. Approximately two weeks later, participants' recall of the theft was measured. Liars and truth-tellers recalled a similar number of stolen items, but liars had less accurate recall for exactly which items were stolen. Liars (vs. truth-tellers) also made more omission errors. The majority of participants who fabricated additional stolen items (65.7%) incorporated one or more of these (false) items into their memory. Results suggest that source monitoring errors may lead fabricated details to be incorporated into memory. Although no effects of believability feedback were observed, recommendations for future researchers are discussed.

Evaluating heart rate variability as a predictor of the influence of lying on memory

Previous research suggests self-provided misinformation (lying) impairs memory for the truth, whereby more incorrect details are remembered compared to being truthful. The cognitive control processes evoked by inhibiting retrieval of truthful information may come at the expense of retaining that information in memory. Because lying requires quick adaptability to the situation, heart rate variability (HRV), reflecting cognitive control processes, is a useful metric of these cognitive demands. The present experiment extends previous research (Paige et al., 2019) and had participants complete a questionnaire orally in front of a panel while electrocardiography (ECG) data was collected. Participants were instructed to tell the truth for half of the questions and lie for the other half. For a subset of the questions, participants were instructed to elaborate on their response. After a delay, participants completed the same questionnaire on the computer, responding truthfully to all items. Results revealed that correct memory was lower for items participants previously lied about compared to truthful items. Although prior work suggests increased HRV is associated with increased cognitive control, HRV did not predict memory for truth or lie items. These findings are consistent with past literature showing that lying impairs memory for veridical information compared to truth-telling.

Eye spy a liar: assessing the utility of eye fixations and confidence judgments for detecting concealed recognition of faces, scenes and objects

BACKGROUND

In criminal investigations, uncooperative witnesses might deny knowing a perpetrator, the location of a murder scene or knowledge of a weapon. We sought to identify markers of recognition in eye fixations and confidence judgments whilst participants told the truth and lied about recognising faces (Experiment 1) and scenes and objects (Experiment 2) that varied in familiarity. To detect recognition we calculated effect size differences in markers of recognition between familiar and unfamiliar items that varied in familiarity (personally familiar, newly learned).

RESULTS

In Experiment 1, recognition of personally familiar faces was reliably detected across multiple fixation markers (e.g. fewer fixations, fewer interest areas viewed, fewer return fixations) during honest and concealed recognition. In Experiment 2, recognition of personally familiar non-face items (scenes and objects) was detected solely by fewer fixations during honest and concealed recognition; differences in other fixation measures were not consistent. In both experiments, fewer fixations exposed concealed recognition of newly learned faces, scenes and objects, but the same pattern was not observed during honest recognition. Confidence ratings were higher for recognition of personally familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces.

CONCLUSIONS

Robust memories of personally familiar faces were detected in patterns of fixations and confidence ratings, irrespective of task demands required to conceal recognition. Crucially, we demonstrate that newly learned faces should not be used as a proxy for real-world familiarity, and that conclusions should not be generalised across different types of familiarity or stimulus class.

How Information on a Motive to Lie Influences CBCA-Based Ratings and Veracity Judgments

We investigated how information on a motive to lie impacts on the perceived content quality of a statement and its subsequent veracity rating. In an online study, 300 participants rated a statement about an alleged sexual harassment on a scale based on Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA) and judged its veracity. In a 3 × 3 between-subjects design, we varied prior information (motive to lie, no motive to lie, and no information on a motive), and presented three different statement versions of varying content quality (high, medium, and low). In addition to anticipating main effects of both independent variables (motive information and statement version), we predicted that the impact of motive information on both ratings would be highest for medium quality statements, because their assessment is especially ambiguous (interaction effect). Contrary to our hypotheses, results showed that participants were unaffected by motive information and accurately reproduced the manipulated quality differences between statement versions in their CBCA-based judgments. In line with the expected interaction effect, veracity ratings decreased in the motive-to-lie group compared to controls, but only when the medium- and the low-quality statements were rated (truth ratings dropped from approximately 80 to 50%). Veracity ratings in both the no-motive-to-lie group and controls did not differ across statement versions (≥82% truth ratings). In sum, information on a motive to lie thus encouraged participants to consider content quality in their veracity judgments by being critical only of statements of medium and low quality. Otherwise, participants judged statements to be true irrespective of content quality.

Both High Cognitive Load and Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Over the Right Inferior Frontal Cortex Make Truth and Lie Responses More Similar

Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed, the truth tellers’ performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the IFC on performance. During stimulation, participants truthfully or deceptively indicated whether each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load and tDCS than lying.

The effects of the putative confession and evidence presentation on maltreated and non-maltreated 9- to 12-year-olds' disclosures of a minor transgression

The current study examined the influence of the putative confession (in which children are told that the suspect told them "everything that happened" and "wants [the child] to tell the truth") and evidence presentation on 9- to 12-year-old maltreated and non-maltreated children's disclosure (N = 321). Half of the children played a forbidden game with an adult confederate that resulted in a laptop computer breaking (no transgression occurred for the other half of the children), followed by coaching to conceal the forbidden game and to falsely disclose the sanctioned game. Children were then interviewed about the interaction with the confederate. Among the 9- and 10-year-olds, the putative confession led to a higher rate of breakage disclosure (62%) than the control condition (13%) and to a higher rate of leakage of incriminating details during recall (47% vs. 9%). Older children were more likely to disclose than younger children and to be uninfluenced by the putative confession. Among all ages, evidence presentation elicited disclosures from 63% of children who had not previously disclosed without eliciting any false disclosures.