Building trust by tearing others down: When accusing others of unethical behavior engenders trust

When do gossip receivers assess negative gossip as justifiable? A goal framing approach

Negative gossip is a double-edged sword, which can harm group members but also protect them from harmful others. Current theory proposes that gossip receivers assess gossipers' selfish and prosocial intentions based on different social cues, to determine whether the negative gossip behavior is morally justifiable. However, assessing gossipers' moral intentions does not fully clarify when and how justifiability of negative gossip is assessed by receivers. Using goal framing theory, I propose a parsimonious way of understanding when gossip receivers will be interested in determining whether sharing the negative gossip was justifiable, and how they assess justifiability. In line with predictions, results of two scenario experiments showed that in a hedonic and gain goal frame gossip justifiability was similar to a baseline level, suggesting that receivers had no particular concerns regarding gossip justifiability. However, in a normative frame receivers assessed negative gossip to be less justifiable when social cues indicated that the gossiper was motivated to harm others for self-interest compared to when such cues were absent (Study 1). In Study 2, gossip was more justified when social cues indicated that that the target broke the salient social norm and signaled that the gossiper has low motivation to harm. Moreover, in a normative frame, participants were more interested in further establishing gossip truthfulness compared to participants in a gain, hedonic, or control condition in Study 1, and in a hedonic condition in Study 2. These results show that individuals' goal frame determine their interest in gossip justifiability and how they assess it. This may help solve the paradox of negative gossip by drawing from goal framing theory to understand individuals can be avid gossip consumers, while holding widely disapproving attitudes towards this behavior.

Visual analysis of trustworthiness studies: based on the Web of Science database

Trustworthiness is the most significant predictor of trust and has a significant impact on people's levels of trust. Most trustworthiness-related research is empirical, and while it has a long history, it is challenging for academics to get insights that are applicable to their fields of study and to successfully transfer fragmented results into practice. In order to grasp their dynamic development processes through the mapping of network knowledge graphs, this paper is based on the Web of Science database and uses CiteSpace (6.2.R4) software to compile and visualize the 1,463 publications on trustworthy studies over the past 10 years. This paper aims to provide valuable references to theoretical research and the practice of Trustworthiness. The findings demonstrate that: over the past 10 years, trustworthiness-related research has generally increased in volume; trustworthiness research is concentrated in industrialized Europe and America, with American research findings having a bigger global impact; The University of California System, Harvard University, and Yale University are among the high-production institutions; the leading figures are represented by Alexander Todorov, Marco Brambilla, Bastian Jaeger, and others; the core authors are distinguished university scholars; however, the level of cooperation of the core author needs to be improved. The primary journal for publishing research on trustworthiness is the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and Biology Letters. In addition, the study focuses on three distinct domains, involving social perception, facial clues, and artificial intelligence.

A pull versus push framework for reputation

Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation framework that centers the perspective of evaluators by suggesting that reputation systems can create two fundamentally different incentives for evaluators to reward positive reputations. Evaluators may be pulled towards 'good' actors to benefit directly from their reciprocal cooperation, or pushed to cooperate with such actors by normative pressure. I discuss how psychology and behavior might diverge under pull versus push mechanisms, and use this framework to deepen our understanding of the empirical reputation literature and suggest ways that we may better leverage reputation for social good.

When Do Observers Deprioritize Due Process for the Perpetrator and Prioritize Safety for the Victim in Response to Information-Poor Allegations of Harm?

We examined how observers assess information-poor allegations of harm (e.g., "my word against yours" cases), in which the outcomes of procedurally fair investigations may favor the alleged perpetrator because the evidentiary standards are unmet. Yet this lack of evidence does not mean no harm occurred, and some observers may be charged with deciding whether the allegation is actionable within a collective. On the basis of theories of moral typecasting, procedural justice, and uncertainty management, we hypothesized that observers would be more likely to prioritize the victim's safety (vs. to prioritize due process for the perpetrator) and view the allegation as actionable when the victim-alleged perpetrator dyad members exhibit features that align with stereotypes of victims and perpetrators. We supported our hypothesis with four studies using various contexts, sources of perceived prototypicality, due-process prioritization, and samples (students from New Zealand, Ns = 137 and 114; Mechanical Turk workers from the United States; Ns = 260 and 336).

When do supervisors punish subordinates' unethical pro-organizational behavior: Roles of moral identity and goal congruence with the group

Given that unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) violates moral standards but benefits the organization at the same time, supervisors' responses to this behavior could be equivocal although it is supposed to be punished. Previous research, however, has centered on antecedents of UPB, less is known about its consequences, especially how supervisors respond to subordinates' UPB. Integrating social identity theory with social information processing theory, this paper aims to explain when supervisors perceive subordinate UPB in a negative way, and further engage in negative leading behaviors as punishments for UPB. Results of a multi-wave, multiple-source survey suggest that subordinates' UPB is most negatively related to supervisors' trust when supervisors' moral identity is prominent and goal congruence with the group is low. Furthermore, results show that reduced trust ultimately elicits abusive supervisor behavior. These findings extend understanding of when and why supervisors punish rather than indulge subordinates who act in ethically questionable ways and provide important insights into supervisors' leading behavior from a bottom-up perspective.

Who Do I (Dis)Trust and Monitor for Ethical Misconduct? Status, Power, and the Structural Paradox

A wealth of research documents the critical role of trust for social exchange and cooperative behavior. The ability to inspire trust in others can often be elusive, and distrust can have adverse interpersonal and ethical consequences. Drawing from the literature on social hierarchy and interpersonal judgments, the current research explores the predictive role of a structural paradox between high power and low status in identifying the actors most likely to be distrusted and monitored for ethical misconduct. Across four studies and an internal meta-analysis, we found that the structural paradox was associated with distrust-related judgments and behaviors. In Study 1, high power-low status actors were judged as less trustworthy. In Studies 2 and 3, high power-low status actors were sent less money in a trust game, an effect fully mediated by feelings of dislike. Study 4 revealed that high power-low status actors were more likely to be monitored for cheating, an effect partially mediated by trust judgments. These findings contribute to business ethics research by identifying the structural paradox of high power-low status as a salient contextual influence impacting observers' distrust and monitoring dynamics. Implications for reducing observers' level of distrust of high power-low status actors are discussed.

Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?

Whistleblowing is a powerful and rather inexpensive instrument to deter tax evasion. Despite the deterrent effects on tax evasion, whistleblowing can reduce trust and undermine agents’ attitude to cooperate with group members. Yet, no study has investigated the potential spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation. This paper reports results of a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in two consecutive phases in unchanging groups: a tax evasion game, followed by a generalized gift exchange game. Two dimensions are manipulated in our experiment: the inclusion of a whistleblowing stage in which, after observing others’ declared incomes, subjects can signal other group members to the tax authority, and the provision of information about the content of the second phase before the tax evasion game is played. Our results show that whistleblowing is effective in both curbing tax evasion and improving the precision of tax auditing. Moreover, we detect no statistically significant spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation in the subsequent generalized gift exchange game, with this result being unaffected by the provision of information about the experimental task in the second phase. Finally, the provision of information does not significantly alter subjects’ (tax and whistleblowing) choices in the tax evasion game: thus, knowledge about perspective ingroup cooperation did not alter attitude toward whistleblowing.

The Effects of Investigative Sanctioning Systems on Wrongdoing, Reporting, and Helping: A Multiparty Perspective

Over the past two decades, organizations have established sanctioning systems as an important component of their ethical infrastructures to detect and punish wrongdoing. However, empirical knowledge about the overall effectiveness of such systems remains limited. Existing studies have mostly adopted a single-party perspective even though many wrongdoing situations involve dynamic multiparty interactions between actors, recipients, and observers of wrongdoing. Moreover, most existing research has emphasized an economic perspective—that sanctioning systems only affect behavior because of economic considerations while crowding out ethical ones. In this research, we develop a moral and normative perspective of sanctioning systems. Using a novel experimental game design, our study focuses on the investigative dimension of sanctioning systems to examine their psychological and behavioral effects in actor–recipient–observer wrongdoing interactions. Findings reveal that investigative sanctioning systems influence wrongdoing, reporting, and helping behaviors as well as alter ethical and normative considerations, such that as systems become stronger, wrongdoing behaviors are judged as more unethical and perceived as less typical than when weaker systems are in place. These moral judgments and norm perceptions mediate the effect of investigative sanctioning system strength on wrongdoing behavior. Our research extends previous empirical and theoretical work on sanctioning systems by applying a more holistic perspective and by demonstrating that highly effective systems can serve as important behavioral guides because they activate and alter moral and normative considerations about wrongdoing.