Dimensions of integration in interdisciplinary explanations of the origin of evolutionary novelty

Phenotype-first hypotheses, spandrels and early metazoan evolution

Against the neo-Darwinian assumption that genetic factors are the principal source of variation upon which natural selection operates, a phenotype-first hypothesis strikes us as revolutionary because development would seem to constitute an independent source of variability. Richard Watson and his co-authors have argued that developmental memory constitutes one such variety of phenotypic variability. While this version of the phenotype-first hypothesis is especially well-suited for the late metazoan context, where animals have a sufficient history of selection from which to draw, appeals to developmental memory seem less plausible in the evolutionary context of the early metazoans. I provide an interpretation of Stuart Newman's account of deep metazoan phylogenesis that suggests that spandrels are, in addition to developmental memory, an important reservoir of phenotypic variability. I conclude by arguing that Gerd Müller's "side-effect hypothesis" is an illuminating generalization of the proposed non-Watsonian version of the phenotype-first hypothesis.

Evolvability and Macroevolution: Overview and Synthesis

Evolvability is best addressed from a multi-level, macroevolutionary perspective through a comparative approach that tests for among-clade differences in phenotypic diversification in response to an opportunity, such as encountered after a mass extinction, entering a new adaptive zone, or entering a new geographic area. Analyzing the dynamics of clades under similar environmental conditions can (partially) factor out shared external drivers to recognize intrinsic differences in evolvability, aiming for a macroevolutionary analog of a common-garden experiment. Analyses will be most powerful when integrating neontological and paleontological data: determining differences among extant populations that can be hypothesized to generate large-scale, long-term contrasts in evolvability among clades; or observing large-scale differences among clade histories that can by hypothesized to reflect contrasts in genetics and development observed directly in extant populations. However, many comparative analyses can be informative on their own, as explored in this overview. Differences in clade-level evolvability can be visualized in diversity-disparity plots, which can quantify positive and negative departures of phenotypic productivity from stochastic expectations scaled to taxonomic diversification. Factors that evidently can promote evolvability include modularity—when selection aligns with modular structure or with morphological integration patterns; pronounced ontogenetic changes in morphology, as in allometry or multiphase life cycles; genome size; and a variety of evolutionary novelties, which can also be evaluated using macroevolutionary lags between the acquisition of a trait and phenotypic diversification, and dead-clade-walking patterns that may signal a loss of evolvability when extrinsic factors can be excluded. High speciation rates may indirectly foster phenotypic evolvability, and vice versa. Mechanisms are controversial, but clade evolvability may be higher in the Cambrian, and possibly early in the history of clades at other times; in the tropics; and, for marine organisms, in shallow-water disturbed habitats.

Animal culture: But of which kind?

Is animal culture a real entity or is it rather just in the eye of the beholder? The concept of culture began to be increasingly used in the context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. Despite its success, it is not clear that it represents what philosophers have traditionally thought to be a natural kind. In this article I will show, however, how conceiving of animal culture in this fashion has played a role in the "culture wars", and what lessons we can draw from this. First, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented, thus vindicating the centrality of the concept in describing a broad range of findings. A minimal definition that encompasses the multiple strands of research incorporating the notion of culture is proposed. I then systematically enumerate the ways in which culture thus conceived cannot be considered a natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. This is accomplished by reviewing the efforts and possibilities of anchoring the elusive idea in specific mechanisms, homologies, selection pressures, homeostatic property clusters, or alternatively, its reduction or elimination. Finally, a plausible interpretation of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is compatible with both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its inferential limitations. Culture plays the role of a well-established epistemic kind, a node that connects different areas of research on common themes.

Evolution evolving? Reflections on big questions

John Bonner managed a long and productive career that balanced specialized inquiry into cellular slime molds with general investigations of big questions in evolutionary biology, such as the origins of multicellular development and the evolution of complexity. This commentary engages with his final paper ("The evolution of evolution"), which argues that the evolutionary process has changed through the history of life. In particular, Bonner emphasizes the possibility that natural selection plays different roles at different size scales. I identify some underlying assumptions in his argument and evaluate its cogency to both foster future discussion and emulate the intellectual example set by Bonner over a lifetime. This endeavor is important beyond Bonner's own theoretical disposition because similar issues are visible in controversies about the possibility of an extended evolutionary synthesis.

Disciplinary capture and epistemological obstacles to interdisciplinary research: Lessons from central African conservation disputes

Complex environmental problems require well-researched policies that integrate knowledge from both the natural and social sciences. Epistemic differences can impede interdisciplinary collaboration, as shown by debates between conservation biologists and anthropologists who are working to preserve biological diversity and support economic development in central Africa. Disciplinary differences with regard to 1) facts, 2) rigor, 3) causal explanation, and 4) research goals reinforce each other, such that early decisions about how to define concepts or which methods to adopt may tilt research design and data interpretation toward one discipline's epistemological framework. If one of the contributing fields imposes a solution to an epistemic problem, this sets the stage for what I call disciplinary capture. Avoiding disciplinary capture requires clear communication between collaborators, but beyond this it also requires that collaborators craft research questions and innovate research designs which are different from the inherited epistemological frameworks of contributing disciplines.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy's organismic view on the theory of evolution

Ludwig von Bertalanffy was a key figure in the advancement of theoretical biology. His early considerations already led him to recognize the necessity of considering the organism as a system, as an organization of parts and processes. He termed the resulting research program organismic biology, which he extended to all basic questions of biology and almost all areas of biology, hence also to the theory of evolution. This article begins by outlining the rather unknown (because often written in German) research of Bertalanffy in the field of theoretical biology. The basics of the organismic approach are then described. This is followed by Bertalanffy's considerations on the theory of evolution, in which he used methods from theoretical biology and then introduced his own, organismic, view on evolution, leading to the demand for finding laws of evolution. Finally, his view on the concept of homology is presented.

Integration in biology: Philosophical perspectives on the dynamics of interdisciplinarity

This introduction to the special section on integration in biology provides an overview of the different contributions. In addition to motivating the philosophical significance of analyzing integration and interdisciplinary research, I lay out common themes and novel insights found among the special section contributions, and indicate how they exhibit current trends in the philosophical study of integration. One upshot of the contributed papers is that there are different aspects to and kinds of integration, so that rather than attempting to offer a universal construal of what integrations is, philosophers have to analyze in concrete cases in what respects particular aspects of scientific theorizing and/or practice are 'integrative' and how this instance of integration works and was achieved.

Articulating Babel: An approach to cultural evolution

After an initial discussion of the character of interdisciplinary linkages between complex disciplines, I consider an area with confluences of many diverse disciplines-the study of cultural evolution. This must embrace not only the traditional biological sciences, but also the multiple often warring disciplines of the human sciences. This interdisciplinary articulation is in its early stages compared, e.g., to that of evolutionary biology or evolutionary developmental biology, and I try to lay out major axes along which its articulation should plausibly occur, given the relevant causal processes acting at different levels. One cannot have an adequate account of cultural evolution without recognizing a central role for cognitive and social development (since culture is cumulatively acquired by individuals through the life-cycle) and the social and cultural organizations and institutions and artifactual tools and infrastructure that support and structure these developmental processes. These induce a population structure that mediates the transmission, expression, and elaboration of culture, and in particular the different ways in which they scaffold learning and the development and articulation of complex skills. I consider how these elements should articulate the disciplines that tend to focus separately on them. Intentions and the market are not explicitly included in this account, and I consider ways in which these perspectives might enter.