Dimensions in data: testing psychological models using state-trace analysis

The late positive event-related potential component is time locked to the decision in recognition memory tasks

Two event-related potential (ERP) components are commonly observed in recognition memory tasks: the Frontal Negativity (FN400) and the Late Positive Component (LPC). These components are widely interpreted as neural correlates of familiarity and recollection, respectively. However, the interpretation of LPC effects is complicated by inconsistent results regarding the timing of ERP amplitude differences. There are also mixed findings regarding how LPC amplitudes covary with decision confidence. Critically, LPC effects have almost always been measured using fixed time windows relative to memory probe stimulus onset, yet it has not been determined whether LPC effects are time locked to the stimulus or the recognition memory decision. To investigate this, we analysed a large (n = 132) existing dataset recorded during recognition memory tasks with old/new decisions followed by post-decisional confidence ratings. We used ERP deconvolution to disentangle contributions to LPC effects (defined as differences between hits and correct rejections) that were time locked to either the stimulus or the vocal old/new response. We identified a left-lateralised parietal LPC effect that was time locked to the vocal response rather than probe stimulus onset. We also isolated a response-locked, midline parietal ERP correlate of confidence that influenced measures of LPC amplitudes at left parietal electrodes. Our findings demonstrate that, contrary to widespread assumptions, the LPC effect is time locked to the recognition memory decision and is best measured using response-locked ERPs. By extension, differences in response time distributions across conditions of interest may lead to substantial measurement biases when analysing stimulus-locked ERPs. Our findings highlight important confounding factors that further complicate the interpretation of existing stimulus-locked LPC effects as neural correlates of recollection. We recommend that future studies adopt our analytic approach to better isolate LPC effects and their sensitivity to manipulations in recognition memory tasks.

Evidence for a multidimensional account of cognitive and affective theory of mind: A state-trace analysis

Theory of mind (ToM) has been argued to be a multidimensional construct, with ToM inferences depending on distinct processes across affective and cognitive ToM tasks and across first-order cognitive and second-order cognitive ToM tasks. Behavioural evidence for a multidimensional account has primarily depended on dissociations identified via analysis of variance, a statistical approach insufficient for assessing dimensionality. Instead, state-trace analysis (STA) is a more appropriate statistical technique to uncover dimensionality. The current study first applied STA to two summary datasets that had previously identified key dissociations between cognitive and affective ToM; these reanalyses did not support a multidimensional account of ToM. Next, STA was applied to a more detailed dataset to reveal whether ToM is based on multiple processes in a sample of 115 older adults aged 60-85 years (M = 68.5, SD = 5.92, 61.7% female) with higher or lower emotion perception ability. Participants made ToM judgements about different social exchanges (e.g., sarcasm or lying). STA results supported a multidimensional account of ToM across first-order cognitive, second-order cognitive, and affective ToM subdomains. These results lay a more rigorous foundation for subsequent studies to further examine the dimensionality of ToM and to apply formal modelling, progressing the field's understanding and measurement of the cognitive processes driving ToM judgements.

Conscious and unconscious memory and eye movements in context-guided visual search: A computational and experimental reassessment of Ramey, Yonelinas, and Henderson (2019)

Are eye movements unconsciously guided towards target locations in familiar scenes? In a recent eyetracking study, Ramey, Yonelinas, and Henderson (2019) measured eye-movement efficiency (scanpath ratio) and memory judgments when participants searched for targets in repeated and novel scenes. When trials judged new with high confidence were selected, scanpath ratio was lower for old scenes (misses) than for new scenes (correct rejections). In addition, familiarity as measured by recognition confidence did not significantly predict scanpath ratio. Ramey et al. attributed these results to unconscious learning guiding eye movements. In a re-assessment of Ramey et al.'s data, we show that their findings can be accounted for by a single-system computational model in which eye movements and memory judgments are driven by a common latent memory representation. In particular, (a) the scanpath ratio difference between high-confidence misses and correct rejections is a consequence of regression to the mean, while (b) the null correlation between familiarity and scanpath ratio, partly a natural consequence of the low reliability of the scanpath ratio measure, is also reproduced by the model. Two pre-registered experiments confirm a novel prediction of the alternative single-system model. This work offers a parsimonious account of Ramey et al.'s findings without recourse to unconscious guidance of eye movements.

Testing formal cognitive models of classification and old-new recognition in a real-world high-dimensional category domain

Categorization and old-new recognition memory are closely linked topics in the cognitive-psychology literature and there have been extensive past efforts at developing unified formal modeling accounts of these fundamental psychological processes. However, the existing formal-modeling literature has almost exclusively used small sets of simplified stimuli and artificial category structures. The present work extends this literature by collecting both categorization and old-new recognition judgments on a large set of high-dimensional stimuli that form real-world category structures: namely, a set of 540 images of rocks belonging to the geologically-defined categories igneous, metamorphic and sedimentary. Participants first engaged in a learning phase in which they classified large sets of training instances into these real-world categories. This was followed by a test phase in which they classified both training and novel transfer items into the learned categories and also judged whether each item was old or new. We attempted to model both the classification and recognition test data at the level of individual items. Ultimately, the categorization data were well fit by both an exemplar and clustering model, but not by a prototype model. Only the exemplar model was able to provide a reasonable first-order account of the old-new recognition data; however, the standard version of the model failed to capture the variability in hit rates within the class of old-training items themselves. An extended hybrid-similarity version of the exemplar model that made allowance for boosts in self-similarity due to matching distinctive features yielded much improved accounts of the old-new recognition data. The study is among the first to test cognitive-process models on their ability to account quantitatively for old-new recognition of real-world, high-dimensional stimuli at the level of individual items.

The contribution of episodic long-term memory to working memory for bindings

The present experiments support two conclusions about the capacity limit of working memory (WM). First, they provide evidence for the Binding Hypothesis, WM capacity is limited by interference between bindings but not items. Second, they show that episodic LTM contributes substantially to binding memory when the capacity of WM is stretched to the limit by larger set sizes. We tested immediate memory for sets of word-picture pairs. With increasing set size, memory for bindings declined more precipitously than memory for items, as predicted from the binding hypothesis. Yet, at higher set sizes performance was more stable than expected from a capacity limited memory, suggesting a contribution of episodic long-term memory (LTM) to circumvent the WM capacity limit. In support of that hypothesis, we show a double dissociation of contributions of WM and episodic LTM to binding memory: Performance at set sizes larger than 3 was specifically affected by proactive interference - but were immune to influences from a distractor-filled delay. In contrast, performance at set size 2 was unaffected by proactive interference but harmed by a distractor-filled delay.

Multiple latent variables but functionally dependent output mappings underlying the recognition of own- and other-race faces for Chinese individuals: Evidence from state-trace analysis

To explore the number of latent variables underlying recognition of own- and other-race faces for Chinese observers, we conducted a study-recognition task where orientation, stimuli type, and duration were manipulated in the study phase and applied state trace analysis as a statistic method. Results showed that each state trace plot on each pair of stimuli types matched a single monotonic curve when stimuli type was set to state factor, but separate curves between face and non-face showed up when the state factor was orientation. The results implied that at least two latent variables affected recognition performance in the inversion paradigm. Besides, the unidimensional structure between own- and other-race faces regardless of the state factor suggested that Chinese participants used the same recognition mechanism for unfamiliar own- and other-race faces in the inversion paradigm.

Assessing the Evidence for Asymmetrical Switch Costs and Reversed Language Dominance Effects - A Meta-Analysis

Two seemingly counterintuitive phenomena - asymmetrical language switch costs and the reversed language dominance effect - prove to be particularly controversial in the literature on language control. Asymmetrical language switch costs refer to the larger costs for switching into the dominant language compared to switching into the less dominant language, both relative to staying in either one language. The reversed language dominance effect refers to longer reaction times when in the more dominant of the two languages in situations that require frequent language switching (i.e., mixed-language blocks). The asymmetrical language switch costs are commonly taken as an index for processes of transient, reactive inhibitory language control, whereas the reversed language dominance effect is taken as an index for sustained, proactive inhibitory language control. In the present meta-analysis, we set out to establish the empirical evidence for these two phenomena using a Bayesian linear mixed effects modelling approach. Despite the observation of both phenomena in some studies, our results suggest that overall, there is little evidence for the generality and robustness of these two effects, and this holds true even when conditions - such as language proficiency and preparation time manipulations - were included as moderators of these phenomena. We conclude that asymmetrical switch costs and the reversed language dominance effect are important for theory development, but their utility for theory testing is limited due to their lack of robustness and the absence of confirmed moderatory variables.

The Challenge of Inferring Unconscious Mental Processes

Studies of unconscious mental processes often compare a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with a measure of awareness (e.g., a verbal report or forced-choice response) of the critical cue or contingency taken either concurrently or separately. The resulting patterns of bivariate data across participants lend themselves to several analytic approaches for inferring the existence of unconscious mental processes, but it is rare for researchers to consider the underlying generative processes that might cause these patterns. We show that bivariate data are generally insufficient to discriminate single-process models, with a unitary latent process determining both performance and awareness, from dual-process models, comprising distinct latent processes for performance and awareness. Future research attempting to isolate and investigate unconscious processes will need to employ richer types of data and analyses.

Fleeting Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Recalling Without Seeing

We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the "phenomenological consciousness" of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the "access consciousness" of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink - the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate.

A test of two processes: The effect of training on deductive and inductive reasoning

Dual-process theories posit that separate kinds of intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) processes contribute to reasoning. Under this view, inductive judgments are more heavily influenced by Type 1 processing, and deductive judgments are more strongly influenced by Type 2 processing. Alternatively, single-process theories propose that both types of judgments are based on a common form of assessment. The competing accounts were respectively instantiated as two-dimensional and one-dimensional signal detection models, and their predictions were tested against specifically targeted novel data using signed difference analysis. In two experiments, participants evaluated valid and invalid arguments, under induction or deduction instructions. Arguments varied in believability and type of conditional argument structure. Additionally, we used logic training to strengthen Type 2 processing in deduction (Experiments 1 & 2) and belief training to strengthen Type 1 processing in induction (Experiment 2). The logic training successfully improved validity-discrimination, and differential effects on induction and deduction judgments were evident in Experiment 2. While such effects are consistent with popular dual-process accounts, crucially, a one-dimensional model successfully accounted for the results. We also demonstrate that the one-dimensional model is psychologically interpretable, with the model parameters varying sensibly across conditions. We argue that single-process accounts have been prematurely discounted, and formal modeling approaches are important for theoretical progress in the reasoning field.

In Search of the Factors Behind Naive Sentence Judgments: A State Trace Analysis of Grammaticality and Acceptability Ratings

We present a state-trace analysis of sentence ratings elicited by asking participants to evaluate the overall acceptability of a sentence and those elicited by asking participants to focus on structural well-formedness only. Appealing to literature on “grammatical illusion” sentences, we anticipated that a simple instruction manipulation might prompt people to apply qualitatively different kinds of judgment in the two conditions. Although differences consistent with the subjective experience of grammatical illusion dissociations were observed, the state trace analysis of the rating data indicates that responses were still consistent with both judgment types accessing a single underlying factor. These results add to the existing comparisons between analytic and probabilistic modeling approaches to predicting rating judgments.

Connecting the dots without top-down knowledge: Evidence for rapidly-learned low-level associations that are independent of object identity

Knowing the identity of an object can powerfully alter perception. Visual demonstrations of this-such as Gregory's (1970) hidden Dalmatian-affirm the existence of both top-down and bottom-up processing. We consider a third processing pathway: lateral connections between the parts of an object. Lateral associations are assumed by theories of object processing and hierarchical theories of memory, but little evidence attests to them. If they exist, their effects should be observable even in the absence of object identity knowledge. We employed Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) while participants studied object images, such that visual details were learned without explicit object identification. At test, lateral associations were probed using a part-to-part matching task. We also tested whether part-whole links were facilitated by prior study using a part-naming task, and included another study condition (Word), in which participants saw only an object's written name. The key question was whether CFS study (which provided visual information without identity) would better support part-to-part matching (via lateral associations) whereas Word study (which provided identity without the correct visual form) would better support part-naming (via top-down processing). The predicted dissociation was found and confirmed by state-trace analyses. Thus, lateral part-to-part associations were learned and retrieved independently of object identity representations. This establishes novel links between perception and memory, demonstrating that (a) lateral associations at lower levels of the object identification hierarchy exist and contribute to object processing and (b) these associations are learned via rapid, episodic-like mechanisms previously observed for the high-level, arbitrary relations comprising episodic memories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Do modals identify better models? A comparison of signal detection and probabilistic models of inductive reasoning

The nature of the relationship between deductive and inductive reasoning is a hotly debated topic. A key question is whether there is a single dimension of evidence underlying both deductive and inductive judgments. Following Rips (2001), Rotello and Heit (2009) and Heit and Rotello (2010) implemented one- and two-dimensional models grounded in signal detection theory to assess predictions for receiver operating characteristic data (ROCs), and concluded in favor of the two-dimensional model. Recently, Lassiter and Goodman (2015) proposed a different type of one-dimensional model, the Probability Threshold Model (PTM), that they concluded offered a good account of data collected over a range of decision modals (e.g., How likely, possible, or necessary is the argument conclusion?). Here, we apply the PTM and the signal detection models to ROCs from 3 large experiments in which participants made judgments about arguments varying in terms of modals introduced by Lassiter and Goodman (2015). Two independent variables that are theoretically important for the study of inductive reasoning, namely premise-conclusion similarity (as utilized in Heit & Rotello, 2010) and number of premises (as utilized in Rotello & Heit, 2009), are also varied in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In all cases, the PTM provides the poorest fit both quantitatively and qualitatively; the two-dimensional signal detection model is preferred.

Two processes are not necessary to understand memory deficits

Bastin et al. propose a dual-process model to understand memory deficits. However, results from state-trace analysis have suggested a single underlying variable in behavioral and neural data. We advocate the usage of unidimensional models that are supported by data and have been successful in understanding memory deficits and in linking to neural data.

Inductive reasoning 2.0

Inductive reasoning entails using existing knowledge to make predictions about novel cases. The first part of this review summarizes key inductive phenomena and critically evaluates theories of induction. We highlight recent theoretical advances, with a special emphasis on the structured statistical approach, the importance of sampling assumptions in Bayesian models, and connectionist modeling. A number of new research directions in this field are identified including comparisons of inductive and deductive reasoning, the identification of common core processes in induction and memory tasks and induction involving category uncertainty. The implications of induction research for areas as diverse as complex decision-making and fear generalization are discussed. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Learning.

The Electrophysiological Signature of Remember-Know Is Confounded with Memory Strength and Cannot Be Interpreted as Evidence for Dual-process Theory of Recognition

The quantity and nature of the processes underlying recognition memory remains an open question. A majority of behavioral, neuropsychological, and brain studies have suggested that recognition memory is supported by two dissociable processes: recollection and familiarity. It has been conversely argued, however, that recollection and familiarity map onto a single continuum of mnemonic strength and hence that recognition memory is mediated by a single process. Previous electrophysiological studies found marked dissociations between recollection and familiarity, which have been widely held as corroborating the dual-process account. However, it remains unknown whether a strength interpretation can likewise apply for these findings. Here we describe an ERP study, using a modified remember-know (RK) procedure, which allowed us to control for mnemonic strength. We find that ERPs of high and low mnemonic strength mimicked the electrophysiological distinction between R and K responses, in a lateral positive component (LPC), 500-1000 msec poststimulus onset. Critically, when contrasting strength with RK experience, by comparing weak R to strong K responses, the electrophysiological signal mapped onto strength, not onto subjective RK experience. Invoking the LPC as support for dual-process accounts may, therefore, be amiss.

Is state-trace analysis an appropriate tool for assessing the number of cognitive systems?

There is now much evidence that humans have multiple memory systems, and evidence is also building that other cognitive processes are mediated by multiple systems. Even so, several recent articles have questioned the existence of multiple cognitive systems, and a number of these have based their arguments on results from state-trace analysis. State-trace analysis was not developed for this purpose but, rather, to identify data sets that are consistent with variation in a single parameter. All previous applications have assumed that state-trace plots in which the data fall on separate curves rule out any model in which only a single parameter varies across the two tasks under study. Unfortunately, this assumption is incorrect. Models in which only one parameter varies can generate any type of state-trace plot, as can models in which two or more parameters vary. In addition, it is straightforward to show that both single-system and multiple-systems models can generate state-trace plots that are considered in the literature to be consistent with either one or multiple cognitive systems. Thus, without additional information, there is no empirical state-trace plot that supports any inferences about the number of underlying parameters or systems.

“Wait! Just Let Me Not Think About That for a Minute”

The belief that in certain situations we are better off not thinking has anecdotal resonance and appeals to our tendency to follow a “law of least effort.” But is it good advice? In this review, I examine recent work from two domains of higher-level cognition—perceptual category learning and decision making—in which similar claims have been made about the benefits of disengaging explicit thought to allow for the operation of superior implicit processes. A reevaluation of this literature suggests a less appealing but perhaps also less surprising conclusion: Complex tasks appear to require explicit thought, and there is little reason to think that not thinking is optimal in these situations. Far from offering a negative conclusion, this perspective emphasizes not only the powers of human cognition but also our ability to explain our behavior without recourse to the “black box” of the unconscious.

Easily perceived, easily remembered? Perceptual interference produces a double dissociation between metamemory and memory performance

A recent candidate for explaining metamemory judgments is the perceptual fluency hypothesis, which proposes that easily perceived items are predicted to be remembered better, regardless of actual memory performance (Rhodes & Castel Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615-625, 2008). In two experiments, we used the perceptual interference manipulation to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with intact and backward-masked words during encoding, followed by a metamemory prediction (a list-wide judgment of learning, JOL) and then a free recall test. Participants predicted that intact words would be better recalled, despite better actual memory for words in the perceptual interference condition, yielding a crossed double dissociation between predicted and actual memory performance. In Experiment 2, JOLs were made after each study word. Item-by-item JOLs were likewise higher for intact than for backward-masked words, despite similar actual memory performance for both types of words. The results are consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based metamemory judgments.

Prior experience with negative spectral correlations promotes information integration during auditory category learning

Complex sounds vary along a number of acoustic dimensions. These dimensions may exhibit correlations that are familiar to listeners due to their frequent occurrence in natural sounds-namely, speech. However, the precise mechanisms that enable the integration of these dimensions are not well understood. In this study, we examined the categorization of novel auditory stimuli that differed in the correlations of their acoustic dimensions, using decision bound theory. Decision bound theory assumes that stimuli are categorized on the basis of either a single dimension (rule based) or the combination of more than one dimension (information integration) and provides tools for assessing successful integration across multiple acoustic dimensions. In two experiments, we manipulated the stimulus distributions such that in Experiment 1, optimal categorization could be accomplished by either a rule-based or an information integration strategy, while in Experiment 2, optimal categorization was possible only by using an information integration strategy. In both experiments, the pattern of results demonstrated that unidimensional strategies were strongly preferred. Listeners focused on the acoustic dimension most closely related to pitch, suggesting that pitch-based categorization was given preference over timbre-based categorization. Importantly, in Experiment 2, listeners also relied on a two-dimensional information integration strategy, if there was immediate feedback. Furthermore, this strategy was used more often for distributions defined by a negative spectral correlation between stimulus dimensions, as compared with distributions with a positive correlation. These results suggest that prior experience with such correlations might shape short-term auditory category learning.

Authors' response: the primacy of conscious decision making

The target article sought to question the common belief that our decisions are often biased by unconscious influences. While many commentators offer additional support for this perspective, others question our theoretical assumptions, empirical evaluations, and methodological criteria. We rebut in particular the starting assumption that all decision making is unconscious, and that the onus should be on researchers to prove conscious influences. Further evidence is evaluated in relation to the core topics we reviewed (multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty), as well as priming effects. We reiterate a key conclusion from the target article, namely, that it now seems to be generally accepted that awareness should be operationally defined as reportable knowledge, and that such knowledge can only be evaluated by careful and thorough probing. We call for future research to pay heed to the different ways in which awareness can intervene in decision making (as identified in our lens model analysis) and to employ suitable methodology in the assessment of awareness, including the requirements that awareness assessment must be reliable, relevant, immediate, and sensitive.

Associative learning beyond the medial temporal lobe: many actors on the memory stage

Decades of research have established a model that includes the medial temporal lobe, and particularly the hippocampus, as a critical node for episodic memory. Neuroimaging and clinical studies have shown the involvement of additional cortical and subcortical regions. Among these areas, the thalamus, the retrosplenial cortex, and the prefrontal cortices have been consistently related to episodic memory performance. This article provides evidences that these areas are in different forms and degrees critical for human memory function rather than playing only an ancillary role. First we briefly summarize the functional architecture of the medial temporal lobe with respect to recognition memory and recall. We then focus on the clinical and neuroimaging evidence available on thalamo-prefrontal and thalamo-retrosplenial networks. The role of these networks in episodic memory has been considered secondary, partly because disruption of these areas does not always lead to severe impairments; to account for this evidence, we discuss methodological issues related to the investigation of these regions. We propose that these networks contribute differently to recognition memory and recall, and also that the memory stage of their contribution shows specificity to encoding or retrieval in recall tasks. We note that the same mechanisms may be in force when humans perform non-episodic tasks, e.g., semantic retrieval and mental time travel. Functional disturbance of these networks is related to cognitive impairments not only in neurological disorders, but also in psychiatric medical conditions, such as schizophrenia. Finally we discuss possible mechanisms for the contribution of these areas to memory, including regulation of oscillatory rhythms and long-term potentiation. We conclude that integrity of the thalamo-frontal and the thalamo-retrosplenial networks is necessary for the manifold features of episodic memory.

Age effects on explicit and implicit memory

It is well-documented that explicit memory (e.g., recognition) declines with age. In contrast, many argue that implicit memory (e.g., priming) is preserved in healthy aging. For example, priming on tasks such as perceptual identification is often not statistically different in groups of young and older adults. Such observations are commonly taken as evidence for distinct explicit and implicit learning/memory systems. In this article we discuss several lines of evidence that challenge this view. We describe how patterns of differential age-related decline may arise from differences in the ways in which the two forms of memory are commonly measured, and review recent research suggesting that under improved measurement methods, implicit memory is not age-invariant. Formal computational models are of considerable utility in revealing the nature of underlying systems. We report the results of applying single and multiple-systems models to data on age effects in implicit and explicit memory. Model comparison clearly favors the single-system view. Implications for the memory systems debate are discussed.

Using state-trace analysis to dissociate the functions of the human hippocampus and perirhinal cortex in recognition memory

A recurring issue in neuroscience concerns evidence as to whether two or more brain regions implement qualitatively different functions. Here we introduce the application of state-trace analysis to measures of neural activity, illustrating how this analysis can furnish compelling evidence for qualitatively different functions, even when the precise "neurometric" mapping between function and brain measure is unknown. In doing so, we address a long-standing debate about the brain systems supporting human memory: whether the hippocampus and the perirhinal cortex, two key components of the medial temporal lobe memory system, provide qualitatively different contributions to recognition memory. An alternative account has been that both regions support a single shared function, such as memory strength, with the apparent dissociations obtained by previous neuroimaging studies merely reflecting different, nonlinear neurometric mappings across regions. To adjudicate between these scenarios, we analyze intracranial electroencephalographic data obtained directly from human hippocampus and perirhinal cortex during a recognition paradigm and apply state-trace analysis to responses evoked by the retrieval cue as a function of different types of memory judgment. Assuming only that the neurometric mapping in each region is monotonic, any unidimensional theory (such as the memory-strength account) will produce a monotonic state trace. Critically, results showed a nonmonotonic state trace; that is, activity levels in the two regions did not show the same relative ordering across memory conditions. This nonmonotonic state trace demonstrates that there are at least two different functions implemented across the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, allowing formal rejection of a single-process account of medial temporal lobe contributions to recognition memory.

An R package for state-trace analysis

State-trace analysis (Bamber, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 19, 137-181, 1979) is a graphical analysis that can determine whether one or more than one latent variable mediates an apparent dissociation between the effects of two experimental manipulations. State-trace analysis makes only ordinal assumptions and so, is not confounded by range effects that plague alternative methods, especially when performance is measured on a bounded scale (such as accuracy). We describe and illustrate the application of a freely available GUI driven package, StateTrace, for the R language. StateTrace automates many aspects of a state-trace analysis of accuracy and other binary response data, including customizable graphics and the efficient management of computationally intensive Bayesian methods for quantifying evidence about the outcomes of a state-trace experiment, developed by Prince, Brown, and Heathcote (Psychological Methods, 17, 78-99, 2012).

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.

How to discover modules in mind and brain: the curse of nonlinearity, and blessing of neuroimaging. A comment on Sternberg (2011)

Sternberg (2011) elegantly formalizes how certain sets of hypotheses, specifically modularity and pure or composite measures, imply certain patterns of behavioural and neuroimaging data. Experimentalists are often interested in the converse, however: whether certain patterns of data distinguish certain hypotheses, specifically whether more than one module is involved. In this case, there is a striking reversal of the relative value of the data patterns that Sternberg considers. Foremost, the example of additive effects of two factors on one composite measure becomes noninformative for this converse question. Indeed, as soon as one allows for nonlinear measurement functions and nonlinear module processes, even a cross-over interaction between two factors is noninformative in this respect. Rather, one requires more than one measure, from which certain data patterns do provide strong evidence for multiple modules, assuming only that the measurement functions are monotonic. If two measures are not monotonically related to each other across the levels of one or more experimental factors, then one has evidence for more than one module (i.e., more than one nonmonotonic transform). Two special cases of this are illustrated here: a “reversed association” between two measures across three levels of a single factor, and Sternberg's example of selective effects of two factors on two measures. Fortunately, functional neuroimaging methods normally do provide multiple measures over space (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) and/or time (e.g., electroencephalography, EEG). Thus to the extent that brain modules imply mind modules (i.e., separate processors imply separate processes), the performance data offered by functional neuroimaging are likely to be more powerful in revealing modules than are the single behavioural measures (such as accuracy or reaction time, RT) traditionally considered in psychology.

Aging and Executive Control: Reports of a Demise Greatly Exaggerated

I report a series of meta-analyses on aging and executive control. A first set of analyses failed to find evidence for specific age-related deficits in tasks of selective attention (inhibition of return, negative priming, flanker, and Stroop) or tasks tapping local task-shifting costs (reading with distractors is an exception) but found evidence for specific age-related deficits in tasks of divided attention (dual tasking and global task-shifting costs). The second set examined whether executive control explained any age-related variance in complex cognition (episodic memory, reasoning, spatial abilities) over and beyond the effects of speed and working memory; it did not. Thus, the purported decline in executive control with advancing age is clearly not general, and it may ultimately play only a small role in explaining age-related deficits in complex cognition.

The dimensionality of perceptual category learning: a state-trace analysis

State-trace analysis was used to investigate the effect of concurrent working memory load on perceptual category learning. Initial reanalysis of Zeithamova and Maddox (2006, Experiment 1) revealed an apparently two-dimensional state-trace plot consistent with a dual-system interpretation of category learning. However, three modified replications of the original experiment found evidence of a single resource underlying the learning of both rule-based and information integration category structures. Follow-up analyses of the Zeithamova and Maddox data, restricted to only those participants who had learned the category task and performed the concurrent working memory task adequately, revealed a one-dimensional plot consistent with a single-resource interpretation and the results of the three new experiments. The results highlight the potential of state-trace analysis in furthering our understanding of the mechanisms underlying category learning.

Friends and Foes of Theory Construction in Psychological Science

Newell (1973) criticized the use of vague theoretical dichotomies to account for narrowly defined empirical phenomena. Many of the problems raised by Newell persist today. We argue that these problems derive not from any peculiarity of psychological science but from the hindrances inherent to empirical theory testing. To show the contemporary relevance of these problems, we present two modern illustrations of the encumbrances faced by dichotomy-based research, we review some attempts to rely on nonempirical criteria to overcome the empirical impediments in theory testing, and we bring the question of theoretical mimicry to bear on these problems. Next, we discuss an alternative to theoretical dichotomies: the Unified Theories of Cognition (Newell, 1990). Finally, we introduce the “new experimentalism” approach in philosophy of science (Mayo, 1996), which provides a new perspective on theory construction in psychological science. We conclude with suggestions on how this new perspective can be implemented.

Defending the concept of “concepts”

We critically review key lines of evidence and theoretical argument relevant to Machery's “heterogeneity hypothesis.” These include interactions between different kinds of concept representations, unified approaches to explaining contextual effects on concept retrieval, and a critique of empirical dissociations as evidence for concept heterogeneity. We suggest there are good grounds for retaining the concept construct in human cognition.

What is the link between propositions and memories?

Mitchell et al. present a lucid and provocative challenge to the claim that links between mental representations are formed automatically. However, the propositional approach they offer requires clearer specification, especially with regard to how propositions and memories interact. A definition of a system would also clarify the debate, as might an alternative technique for assessing task “dissociations.”