The human Turing machine: a neural framework for mental programs

Decomposing Neural Circuit Function into Information Processing Primitives

It is challenging to measure how specific aspects of coordinated neural dynamics translate into operations of information processing and, ultimately, cognitive functions. An obstacle is that simple circuit mechanisms-such as self-sustained or propagating activity and nonlinear summation of inputs-do not directly give rise to high-level functions. Nevertheless, they already implement simple the information carried by neural activity. Here, we propose that distinct functions, such as stimulus representation, working memory, or selective attention, stem from different combinations and types of low-level manipulations of information or information processing primitives. To test this hypothesis, we combine approaches from information theory with simulations of multi-scale neural circuits involving interacting brain regions that emulate well-defined cognitive functions. Specifically, we track the information dynamics emergent from patterns of neural dynamics, using quantitative metrics to detect where and when information is actively buffered, transferred or nonlinearly merged, as possible modes of low-level processing (storage, transfer and modification). We find that neuronal subsets maintaining representations in working memory or performing attentional gain modulation are signaled by their boosted involvement in operations of information storage or modification, respectively. Thus, information dynamic metrics, beyond detecting which network units participate in cognitive processing, also promise to specify how and when they do it, that is, through which type of primitive computation, a capability that may be exploited for the analysis of experimental recordings.

Prophylactic relationship between mental health disorder symptoms and physical activity of Royal Canadian Mounted Police Cadets during the cadet training program

Objective

Royal Canadian Mounted Police report experiencing extremely frequent potentially psychologically traumatic events (PPTE). In a recent study, approximately half of participating RCMP screened positive for one or more mental disorders, which is approximately five times the diagnostic proportion for the general Canadian population. Increased reporting of mental health symptoms been linked to PPTE exposures. Programs promoting physical activity may be useful interventions to supplement or pair with mental health interventions, providing anxiolytic, antidepressant, and stress-buffering effects. The current study was designed to assess the relationship between physical activity behaviors and reported mental health disorder symptoms of cadets during the Royal Mounted Canadian Police (RCMP) Cadet Training Program (CTP). The current study also examined the relationship between exercise and mental health disorder symptoms of cadets during the CTP.

Methods

The study included data from 394 cadets (76.1% male). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a series of t-tests were used to assess several differences across sociodemographic groups. Bivariate Spearman's Rank correlations were performed between the average number of active calories burned per day, as recorded by Apple Watches, and changes in self-reported mental health disorder symptoms (i.e., Generalized Anxiety Disorder [GAD], Major Depressive Disorder [MDD], Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD], Social Anxiety Disorder [SAD]. Alcohol Use Disorders [AUD], Panic Disorder [PD]) from pre-training (starting the CTP) to pre-deployment (completing the CTP) 26 weeks later.

Results

There were statistically significant correlations between physical activity and self-reported mental health disorder symptom scores during CTP. Cadets who performed more physical activity from pre-training to pre-deployment had statistically significantly greater decreases in symptoms of GAD (ρ = -0.472, p < 0.001), MDD (ρ = -0.307, p < 0.001), PTSD (ρ = -0.343, p < 0.001), and AUD (ρ = -0.085, p < 0.05). There was no statistically significant relationship between physical activity and changes in PD symptoms (ρ = -0.037, p > 0.05). There were also no statistically significant relationships between pre-CTP mental health disorder symptom scores and the volume of physical activity performed during CTP.

Conclusion

There was evidence of a significant relationship between reductions in mental health disorder symptom scores and physical activity during the 26-week CTP. The results highlight the role that exercise can play as an important tool for reducing mental health disorder symptoms, considering there was no relationship between pre-CTP baseline mental health scores and physical activity performed during CTP. Further research is needed to understand differences in physical activity behaviours among cadets and serving RCMP.

Cognitive Neural Mechanism of Backward Inhibition and Deinhibition: A Review

Task switching is one of the typical paradigms to study cognitive control. When switching back to a recently inhibited task (e.g., “A” in an ABA sequence), the performance is often worse compared to a task without N-2 task repetitions (e.g., CBA). This difference is called the backward inhibitory effect (BI effect), which reflects the process of overcoming residual inhibition from a recently performed task (i.e., deinhibition). The neural mechanism of backward inhibition and deinhibition has received a lot of attention in the past decade. Multiple brain regions, including the frontal lobe, parietal, basal ganglia, and cerebellum, are activated during deinhibition. The event-related potentials (ERP) studies have shown that deinhibition process is reflected in the P1/N1 and P3 components, which might be related to early attention control, context updating, and response selection, respectively. Future research can use a variety of new paradigms to separate the neural mechanisms of BI and deinhibition.

Machine learning for flow batteries: opportunities and challenges

With increased computational ability of modern computers, the rapid development of mathematical algorithms and the continuous establishment of material databases, artificial intelligence (AI) has shown tremendous potential in chemistry. Machine learning (ML), as one of the most important branches of AI, plays an important role in accelerating the discovery and design of key materials for flow batteries (FBs), and the optimization of FB systems. In this perspective, we first provide a fundamental understanding of the workflow of ML in FBs. Moreover, recent progress on applications of the state-of-art ML in both organic FBs and vanadium FBs are discussed. Finally, the challenges and future directions of ML research in FBs are proposed.

Perceptual decisions and oculomotor responses rely on temporally distinct streams of evidence

Perceptual decisions often require the integration of noisy sensory evidence over time. This process is formalized with sequential sampling models, where evidence is accumulated up to a decision threshold before a choice is made. Although intuition suggests that decision formation must precede the preparation of a motor response (i.e., the action used to communicate the choice), neurophysiological findings have suggested that these two processes might be one and the same. To test this idea, we developed a reverse-correlation protocol in which the visual stimuli that influence decisions can be distinguished from those guiding motor responses. In three experiments, we found that the temporal weighting function of oculomotor responses did not overlap with the relatively early weighting function of stimulus properties having an impact on decision formation. These results support a timeline in which perceptual decisions are formed, at least in part, prior to the preparation of a motor response.

A paradigm in which visual stimuli that influence decisions can be distinguished from those guiding motor responses demonstrates that in humans, perceptual decisions are formed, at least in part, prior to the preparation of a motor response.

Why Can the Brain (and Not a Computer) Make Sense of the Liar Paradox?

Ordinary computing machines prohibit self-reference because it leads to logical inconsistencies and undecidability. In contrast, the human mind can understand self-referential statements without necessitating physically impossible brain states. Why can the brain make sense of self-reference? Here, we address this question by defining the Strange Loop Model, which features causal feedback between two brain modules, and circumvents the paradoxes of self-reference and negation by unfolding the inconsistency in time. We also argue that the metastable dynamics of the brain inhibit and terminate unhalting inferences. Finally, we show that the representation of logical inconsistencies in the Strange Loop Model leads to causal incongruence between brain subsystems in Integrated Information Theory.

Decision prioritization and causal reasoning in decision hierarchies

From cooking a meal to finding a route to a destination, many real life decisions can be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-decisions. In a hierarchy, choosing which decision to think about requires planning over a potentially vast space of possible decision sequences. To gain insight into how people decide what to decide on, we studied a novel task that combines perceptual decision making, active sensing and hierarchical and counterfactual reasoning. Human participants had to find a target hidden at the lowest level of a decision tree. They could solicit information from the different nodes of the decision tree to gather noisy evidence about the target's location. Feedback was given only after errors at the leaf nodes and provided ambiguous evidence about the cause of the error. Despite the complexity of task (with 107 latent states) participants were able to plan efficiently in the task. A computational model of this process identified a small number of heuristics of low computational complexity that accounted for human behavior. These heuristics include making categorical decisions at the branching points of the decision tree rather than carrying forward entire probability distributions, discarding sensory evidence deemed unreliable to make a choice, and using choice confidence to infer the cause of the error after an initial plan failed. Plans based on probabilistic inference or myopic sampling norms could not capture participants' behavior. Our results show that it is possible to identify hallmarks of heuristic planning with sensing in human behavior and that the use of tasks of intermediate complexity helps identify the rules underlying human ability to reason over decision hierarchies.

Preserved sensory processing but hampered conflict detection when stimulus input is task-irrelevant

Conflict detection in sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, past research has shown that conflict may even be detected in the absence of conflict awareness, suggesting that conflict detection is an automatic process that does not require attention. To test the possibility of conflict processing in the absence of attention, we manipulated task relevance and response overlap of potentially conflicting stimulus features across six behavioral tasks. Multivariate analyses on human electroencephalographic data revealed neural signatures of conflict only when at least one feature of a conflicting stimulus was attended, regardless of whether that feature was part of the conflict, or overlaps with the response. In contrast, neural signatures of basic sensory processes were present even when a stimulus was completely unattended. These data reveal an attentional bottleneck at the level of objects, suggesting that object-based attention is a prerequisite for cognitive control operations involved in conflict detection.

Focusing your attention on one thing can leave you surprisingly unaware of what goes on around you. A classic experiment known as ‘the invisible gorilla’ highlights this phenomenon. Volunteers were asked to watch a clip featuring basketball players, and count how often those wearing white shirts passed the ball: around half of participants failed to spot that someone wearing a gorilla costume wandered into the game and spent nine seconds on screen.

Yet, things that you are not focusing on can sometimes grab your attention anyway. Take for example, the ‘cocktail party effect’, the ability to hear your name among the murmur of a crowded room. So why can we react to our own names, but fail to spot the gorilla? To help answer this question, Nuiten et al. examined how paying attention affects the way the brain processes input.

Healthy volunteers were asked to perform various tasks while the words ‘left’ or ‘right’ played through speakers. The content of the word was sometimes consistent with its location (‘left’ being played on the left speaker), and sometimes opposite (‘left’ being played on the right speaker). Processing either the content or the location of the word is relatively simple for the brain; however detecting a discrepancy between these two properties is challenging, requiring the information to be processed in a brain region that monitors conflict in sensory input.

To manipulate whether the volunteers needed to pay attention to the words, Nuiten et al. made their content or location either relevant or irrelevant for a task. By analyzing brain activity and task performance, they were able to study the effects of attention on how the word properties were processed.

The results showed that the volunteers’ brains were capable of dealing with basic information, such as location or content, even when their attention was directed elsewhere. But discrepancies between content and location could only be detected when the volunteers were focusing on the words, or when their content or location was directly relevant to the task.

The findings by Nuiten et al. suggest that while performing a difficult task, our brains continue to react to basic input but often fail to process more complex information. This, in turn, has implications for a range of human activities such as driving. New technology could potentially help to counteract this phenomenon, aiming to direct attention towards complex information that might otherwise be missed.

The computational origin of representation

Each of our theories of mental representation provides some insight into how the mind works. However, these insights often seem incompatible, as the debates between symbolic, dynamical, emergentist, sub-symbolic, and grounded approaches to cognition attest. Mental representations-whatever they are-must share many features with each of our theories of representation, and yet there are few hypotheses about how a synthesis could be possible. Here, I develop a theory of the underpinnings of symbolic cognition that shows how sub-symbolic dynamics may give rise to higher-level cognitive representations of structures, systems of knowledge, and algorithmic processes. This theory implements a version of conceptual role semantics by positing an internal universal representation language in which learners may create mental models to capture dynamics they observe in the world. The theory formalizes one account of how truly novel conceptual content may arise, allowing us to explain how even elementary logical and computational operations may be learned from a more primitive basis. I provide an implementation that learns to represent a variety of structures, including logic, number, kinship trees, regular languages, context-free languages, domains of theories like magnetism, dominance hierarchies, list structures, quantification, and computational primitives like repetition, reversal, and recursion. This account is based on simple discrete dynamical processes that could be implemented in a variety of different physical or biological systems. In particular, I describe how the required dynamics can be directly implemented in a connectionist framework. The resulting theory provides an "assembly language" for cognition, where high-level theories of symbolic computation can be implemented in simple dynamics that themselves could be encoded in biologically plausible systems.

Hierarchical Representation of Multistep Tasks in Multiple-Demand and Default Mode Networks

Task episodes consist of sequences of steps that are performed to achieve a goal. We used fMRI to examine neural representation of task identity, component items, and sequential position, focusing on two major cortical systems—the multiple-demand (MD) and default mode networks (DMN). Human participants (20 males, 22 females) learned six tasks each consisting of four steps. Inside the scanner, participants were cued which task to perform and then sequentially identified the target item of each step in the correct order. Univariate time course analyses indicated that intra-episode progress was tracked by a tonically increasing global response, plus an increasing phasic step response specific to MD regions. Inter-episode boundaries evoked a widespread response at episode onset, plus a marked offset response specific to DMN regions. Representational similarity analysis (RSA) was used to examine representation of task identity and component steps. Both networks represented the content and position of individual steps, however the DMN preferentially represented task identity while the MD network preferentially represented step-level information. Thus, although both MD and DMN networks are sensitive to step-level and episode-level information in the context of hierarchical task performance, they exhibit dissociable profiles in terms of both temporal dynamics and representational content. The results suggest collaboration of multiple brain regions in control of multistep behavior, with MD regions particularly involved in processing the detail of individual steps, and DMN adding representation of broad task context.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Achieving one's goals requires knowing what to do and when. Tasks are typically hierarchical, with smaller steps nested within overarching goals. For effective, flexible behavior, the brain must represent both levels. We contrast response time courses and information content of two major cortical systems—the multiple-demand (MD) and default mode networks (DMN)—during multistep task episodes. Both networks are sensitive to step-level and episode-level information, but with dissociable profiles. Intra-episode progress is tracked by tonically increasing global responses, plus MD-specific increasing phasic step responses. Inter-episode boundaries evoke widespread responses at episode onset, plus DMN-specific offset responses. Both networks represent content and position of individual steps; however, the DMN and MD networks favor task identity and step-level information, respectively.

Heart Rate Variability as an Index of Differential Brain Dynamics at Rest and After Acute Stress Induction

The brain continuously receives input from the internal and external environment. Using this information, the brain exerts its influence on both itself and the body to facilitate an appropriate response. The dynamic interplay between the brain and the heart and how external conditions modulate this relationship deserves attention. In high-stress situations, synchrony between various brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex and the heart may alter. This flexibility is believed to facilitate transitions between functional states related to cognitive, emotional, and especially autonomic activity. This study examined the dynamic temporal functional association of heart rate variability (HRV) with the interaction between three main canonical brain networks in 38 healthy male subjects at rest and directly after a psychosocial stress task. A sliding window approach was used to estimate the functional connectivity (FC) among the salience network (SN), central executive network (CEN), and default mode network (DMN) in 60-s windows on time series of blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal. FC between brain networks was calculated by Pearson correlation. A multilevel linear mixed model was conducted to examine the window-by-window association between the root mean square of successive differences between normal heartbeats (RMSSD) and FC of network-pairs across sessions. Our findings showed that the minute-by-minute correlation between the FC and RMSSD was significantly stronger between DMN and CEN than for SN and CEN in the baseline session [b = 4.36, t(5025) = 3.20, p = 0.006]. Additionally, this differential relationship between network pairs and RMSSD disappeared after the stress task; FC between DMN and CEN showed a weaker correlation with RMSSD in comparison to baseline [b = −3.35, t(5025) = −3.47, p = 0.006]. These results suggest a dynamic functional interplay between HRV and the functional association between brain networks that varies depending on the needs created by changing conditions.

Beyond imitation: Zero-shot task transfer on robots by learning concepts as cognitive programs

Humans can infer concepts from image pairs and apply those in the physical world in a completely different setting, enabling tasks like IKEA assembly from diagrams. If robots could represent and infer high-level concepts, then it would notably improve their ability to understand our intent and to transfer tasks between different environments. To that end, we introduce a computational framework that replicates aspects of human concept learning. Concepts are represented as programs on a computer architecture consisting of a visual perception system, working memory, and action controller. The instruction set of this cognitive computer has commands for parsing a visual scene, directing gaze and attention, imagining new objects, manipulating the contents of a visual working memory, and controlling arm movement. Inferring a concept corresponds to inducing a program that can transform the input to the output. Some concepts require the use of imagination and recursion. Previously learned concepts simplify the learning of subsequent, more elaborate concepts and create a hierarchy of abstractions. We demonstrate how a robot can use these abstractions to interpret novel concepts presented to it as schematic images and then apply those concepts in very different situations. By bringing cognitive science ideas on mental imagery, perceptual symbols, embodied cognition, and deictic mechanisms into the realm of machine learning, our work brings us closer to the goal of building robots that have interpretable representations and common sense.

How the Level of Reward Awareness Changes the Computational and Electrophysiological Signatures of Reinforcement Learning

The extent to which subjective awareness influences reward processing, and thereby affects future decisions, is currently largely unknown. In the present report, we investigated this question in a reinforcement learning framework, combining perceptual masking, computational modeling, and electroencephalographic recordings (human male and female participants). Our results indicate that degrading the visibility of the reward decreased, without completely obliterating, the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increased their tendency to repeat previous choices. We dissociated electrophysiological signatures evoked by the reward-based learning processes from those elicited by the reward-independent repetition of previous choices and showed that these neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, this report sheds new light on the neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making and highlights that awareness is beneficial for the trial-by-trial adjustment of decision-making strategies.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The notion of reward is strongly associated with subjective evaluation, related to conscious processes such as "pleasure," "liking," and "wanting." Here we show that degrading reward visibility in a reinforcement learning task decreases, without completely obliterating, the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increases subjects' tendency to repeat previous choices. Electrophysiological recordings, in combination with computational modeling, show that neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, we dissociate different neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making, which highlights a beneficial role of reward awareness in adjusting decision-making strategies.

Counterfactual Reasoning Underlies the Learning of Priors in Decision Making

Accurate decisions require knowledge of prior probabilities (e.g., prevalence or base rate), but it is unclear how prior probabilities are learned in the absence of a teacher. We hypothesized that humans could learn base rates from experience making decisions, even without feedback. Participants made difficult decisions about the direction of dynamic random dot motion. Across blocks of 15–42 trials, the base rate favoring left or right varied. Participants were not informed of the base rate or choice accuracy, yet they gradually biased their choices and thereby increased accuracy and confidence in their decisions. They achieved this by updating knowledge of base rate after each decision, using a counterfactual representation of confidence that simulates a neutral prior. The strategy is consistent with Bayesian updating of belief and suggests that humans represent both true confidence, which incorporates the evolving belief of the prior, and counterfactual confidence, which discounts the prior.

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People can learn base rates without feedback and apply them to make better decisions

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The estimate of base rate is updated based on the confidence in each decision

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The form of confidence used is counterfactual, as if the base rate were uninformative

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The study extends the Bayesian framework from choice to prior probability estimation

Decision Making and Sequential Sampling from Memory

Decisions take time, and as a rule more difficult decisions take more time. But this only raises the question of what consumes the time. For decisions informed by a sequence of samples of evidence, the answer is straightforward: more samples are available with more time. Indeed, the speed and accuracy of such decisions are explained by the accumulation of evidence to a threshold or bound. However, the same framework seems to apply to decisions that are not obviously informed by sequences of evidence samples. Here, we proffer the hypothesis that the sequential character of such tasks involves retrieval of evidence from memory. We explore this hypothesis by focusing on value-based decisions and argue that mnemonic processes can account for regularities in choice and decision time. We speculate on the neural mechanisms that link sampling of evidence from memory to circuits that represent the accumulated evidence bearing on a choice. We propose that memory processes may contribute to a wider class of decisions that conform to the regularities of choice-reaction time predicted by the sequential sampling framework.

Iterative free-energy optimization for recurrent neural networks (INFERNO)

The intra-parietal lobe coupled with the Basal Ganglia forms a working memory that demonstrates strong planning capabilities for generating robust yet flexible neuronal sequences. Neurocomputational models however, often fails to control long range neural synchrony in recurrent spiking networks due to spontaneous activity. As a novel framework based on the free-energy principle, we propose to see the problem of spikes' synchrony as an optimization problem of the neurons sub-threshold activity for the generation of long neuronal chains. Using a stochastic gradient descent, a reinforcement signal (presumably dopaminergic) evaluates the quality of one input vector to move the recurrent neural network to a desired activity; depending on the error made, this input vector is strengthened to hill-climb the gradient or elicited to search for another solution. This vector can be learned then by one associative memory as a model of the basal-ganglia to control the recurrent neural network. Experiments on habit learning and on sequence retrieving demonstrate the capabilities of the dual system to generate very long and precise spatio-temporal sequences, above two hundred iterations. Its features are applied then to the sequential planning of arm movements. In line with neurobiological theories, we discuss its relevance for modeling the cortico-basal working memory to initiate flexible goal-directed neuronal chains of causation and its relation to novel architectures such as Deep Networks, Neural Turing Machines and the Free-Energy Principle.

Atoms of recognition in human and computer vision

Discovering the visual features and representations used by the brain to recognize objects is a central problem in the study of vision. Recently, neural network models of visual object recognition, including biological and deep network models, have shown remarkable progress and have begun to rival human performance in some challenging tasks. These models are trained on image examples and learn to extract features and representations and to use them for categorization. It remains unclear, however, whether the representations and learning processes discovered by current models are similar to those used by the human visual system. Here we show, by introducing and using minimal recognizable images, that the human visual system uses features and processes that are not used by current models and that are critical for recognition. We found by psychophysical studies that at the level of minimal recognizable images a minute change in the image can have a drastic effect on recognition, thus identifying features that are critical for the task. Simulations then showed that current models cannot explain this sensitivity to precise feature configurations and, more generally, do not learn to recognize minimal images at a human level. The role of the features shown here is revealed uniquely at the minimal level, where the contribution of each feature is essential. A full understanding of the learning and use of such features will extend our understanding of visual recognition and its cortical mechanisms and will enhance the capacity of computational models to learn from visual experience and to deal with recognition and detailed image interpretation.

Goal-directed, habitual and Pavlovian prosocial behavior

Although prosocial behaviors have been widely studied across disciplines, the mechanisms underlying them are not fully understood. Evidence from psychology, biology and economics suggests that prosocial behaviors can be driven by a variety of seemingly opposing factors: altruism or egoism, intuition or deliberation, inborn instincts or learned dispositions, and utility derived from actions or their outcomes. Here we propose a framework inspired by research on reinforcement learning and decision making that links these processes and explains characteristics of prosocial behaviors in different contexts. More specifically, we suggest that prosocial behaviors inherit features of up to three decision-making systems employed to choose between self- and other- regarding acts: a goal-directed system that selects actions based on their predicted consequences, a habitual system that selects actions based on their reinforcement history, and a Pavlovian system that emits reflexive responses based on evolutionarily prescribed priors. This framework, initially described in the field of cognitive neuroscience and machine learning, provides insight into the potential neural circuits and computations shaping prosocial behaviors. Furthermore, it identifies specific conditions in which each of these three systems should dominate and promote other- or self- regarding behavior.

Perceptual awareness and its neural basis: bridging experimental and theoretical paradigms

Understanding consciousness is a major scientific challenge of our times, and perceptual awareness is an integral part of that challenge. This Theme Issue aims to provide a timely focus on crucial insights from leading scientists on perceptual awareness and its neural basis. The issue refers to key research questions and findings in perceptual awareness research and aims to be a catalyst for further research, by bringing together the state-of-the-art. It shows how bridges are being built between empirical and theoretical research and proposes new directions for the study of multisensory awareness and the role of the states of the body therein. In this introduction, we highlight crucial problems that have characterized the development of the study of perceptual awareness. We then provide an overview of major experimental and theoretical paradigms related to perceptual awareness and its neural basis. Finally, we present an overview of the Theme Issue, with reference to the contributed articles and their relationships.

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation.

Temporal windows in visual processing: "prestimulus brain state" and "poststimulus phase reset" segregate visual transients on different temporal scales

Dynamic vision requires both stability of the current perceptual representation and sensitivity to the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. Here we study the electrophysiological signatures of this intricate balance between temporal segregation and integration in vision. Within a forward masking paradigm with short and long stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA), we manipulated the temporal overlap of the visual persistence of two successive transients. Human observers enumerated the items presented in the second target display as a measure of the informational capacity read-out from this partly temporally integrated visual percept. We observed higher β-power immediately before mask display onset in incorrect trials, in which enumeration failed due to stronger integration of mask and target visual information. This effect was timescale specific, distinguishing between segregation and integration of visual transients that were distant in time (long SOA). Conversely, for short SOA trials, mask onset evoked a stronger visual response when mask and targets were correctly segregated in time. Examination of the target-related response profile revealed the importance of an evoked α-phase reset for the segregation of those rapid visual transients. Investigating this precise mapping of the temporal relationships of visual signals onto electrophysiological responses highlights how the stream of visual information is carved up into discrete temporal windows that mediate between segregated and integrated percepts. Fragmenting the stream of visual information provides a means to stabilize perceptual events within one instant in time.

The structure of cognition: attentional episodes in mind and brain

Cognition is organized in a structured series of attentional episodes, allowing complex problems to be addressed through solution of simpler subproblems. A "multiple-demand" (MD) system of frontal and parietal cortex is active in many different kinds of tasks, and using data from neuroimaging, electrophysiology, neuropsychology, and cognitive studies of intelligence, I propose a core role for MD regions in assembly of the attentional episode. Monkey and human data show dynamic neural coding of attended information across multiple MD regions, with rapid communication within and between regions. Neuropsychological and imaging data link MD function to fluid intelligence, explaining some but not all "executive" deficits after frontal lobe lesions. Cognitive studies link fluid intelligence to goal neglect, and the problem of dividing complex task requirements into focused parts. Like the innate releasing mechanism of ethology, I suggest that construction of the attentional episode provides a core organizational principle for complex, adaptive cognition.

Rapid instructed task learning: a new window into the human brain's unique capacity for flexible cognitive control

The human ability to flexibly adapt to novel circumstances is extraordinary. Perhaps the most illustrative, yet underappreciated, form of this cognitive flexibility is rapid instructed task learning (RITL)--the ability to rapidly reconfigure our minds to perform new tasks from instructions. This ability is important for everyday life (e.g., learning to use new technologies) and is used to instruct participants in nearly every study of human cognition. We review the development of RITL as a circumscribed domain of cognitive neuroscience investigation, culminating in recent demonstrations that RITL is implemented via brain circuits centered on lateral prefrontal cortex. We then build on this and the recent discovery of compositional representations within lateral prefrontal cortex to develop an integrative theory of cognitive flexibility and cognitive control that identifies mechanisms that may enable RITL within the human brain. The insights gained from this new theoretical account have important implications for further developments and applications of RITL research.

How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and - via internal simulation - of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.

The brain's connective core and its role in animal cognition

This paper addresses the question of how the brain of an animal achieves cognitive integration--that is to say how it manages to bring its fullest resources to bear on an ongoing situation. To fully exploit its cognitive resources, whether inherited or acquired through experience, it must be possible for unanticipated coalitions of brain processes to form. This facilitates the novel recombination of the elements of an existing behavioural repertoire, and thereby enables innovation. But in a system comprising massively many anatomically distributed assemblies of neurons, it is far from clear how such open-ended coalition formation is possible. The present paper draws on contemporary findings in brain connectivity and neurodynamics, as well as the literature of artificial intelligence, to outline a possible answer in terms of the brain's most richly connected and topologically central structures, its so-called connective core.

The tell-tale heart: heart rate fluctuations index objective and subjective events during a game of chess

During a decision-making process, the body changes. These somatic changes have been related to specific cognitive events and also have been postulated to assist decision-making indexing possible outcomes of different options. We used chess to analyze heart rate (HR) modulations on specific cognitive events. In a chess game, players have a limited time-budget to make about 40 moves (decisions) that can be objectively evaluated and retrospectively assigned to specific subjectively perceived events, such as setting a goal and the process to reach a known goal. We show that HR signals events: it predicts the conception of a plan, the concrete analysis of variations or the likelihood to blunder by fluctuations before to the move, and it reflects reactions, such as a blunder made by the opponent, by fluctuations subsequent to the move. Our data demonstrate that even if HR constitutes a relatively broad marker integrating a myriad of physiological variables, its dynamic is rich enough to reveal relevant episodes of inner thought.

A small world of weak ties provides optimal global integration of self-similar modules in functional brain networks

The human brain is organized in functional modules. Such an organization presents a basic conundrum: Modules ought to be sufficiently independent to guarantee functional specialization and sufficiently connected to bind multiple processors for efficient information transfer. It is commonly accepted that small-world architecture of short paths and large local clustering may solve this problem. However, there is intrinsic tension between shortcuts generating small worlds and the persistence of modularity, a global property unrelated to local clustering. Here, we present a possible solution to this puzzle. We first show that a modified percolation theory can define a set of hierarchically organized modules made of strong links in functional brain networks. These modules are "large-world" self-similar structures and, therefore, are far from being small-world. However, incorporating weaker ties to the network converts it into a small world preserving an underlying backbone of well-defined modules. Remarkably, weak ties are precisely organized as predicted by theory maximizing information transfer with minimal wiring cost. This trade-off architecture is reminiscent of the "strength of weak ties" crucial concept of social networks. Such a design suggests a natural solution to the paradox of efficient information flow in the highly modular structure of the brain.

Sea slugs, subliminal pictures, and vegetative state patients: boundaries of consciousness in classical conditioning

Classical (trace) conditioning is a specific variant of associative learning in which a neutral stimulus leads to the subsequent prediction of an emotionally charged or noxious stimulus after a temporal gap. When conditioning is concurrent with a distraction task, only participants who can report the relationship (the contingency) between stimuli explicitly show associative learning. This suggests that consciousness is a prerequisite for trace conditioning. We review and question three main controversies concerning this view. Firstly, virtually all animals, even invertebrate sea slugs, show this type of learning; secondly, unconsciously perceived stimuli may elicit trace conditioning; and thirdly, some vegetative state patients show trace learning. We discuss and analyze these seemingly contradictory arguments to find the theoretical boundaries of consciousness in classical conditioning. We conclude that trace conditioning remains one of the best measures to test conscious processing in the absence of explicit reports.

Parsing a perceptual decision into a sequence of moments of thought

Theoretical, computational, and experimental studies have converged to a model of decision-making in which sensory evidence is stochastically integrated to a threshold, implementing a shift from an analog to a discrete form of computation. Understanding how this process can be chained and sequenced – as virtually all real-life tasks involve a sequence of decisions – remains an open question in neuroscience. We reasoned that incorporating a virtual continuum of possible behavioral outcomes in a simple decision task – a fundamental ingredient of real-life decision-making – should result in a progressive sequential approximation to the correct response. We used real-time tracking of motor action in a decision task, as a measure of cognitive states reflecting an internal decision process. We found that response trajectories were spontaneously segmented into a discrete sequence of explorations separated by brief stops (about 200 ms) – which remained unconscious to the participants. The characteristics of these stops were indicative of a decision process – a “moment of thought”: their duration correlated with the difficulty of the decision and with the efficiency of the subsequent exploration. Our findings suggest that simple navigation in an abstract space involves a discrete sequence of explorations and stops and, moreover, that these stops reveal a fingerprint of moments of thought.