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Bradford NA, Shen A, Odegaard B, Peters MAK. Aligning consciousness science and U.S. funding agency priorities. Commun Biol 2024; 7:1315. [PMID: 39397101 PMCID: PMC11471858 DOI: 10.1038/s42003-024-07011-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2024] [Accepted: 10/03/2024] [Indexed: 10/15/2024] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Nora A Bradford
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA.
| | - Angela Shen
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
| | - Brian Odegaard
- Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
| | - Megan A K Peters
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA.
- Center for the Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA.
- Program in Brain, Mind, & Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, ON, Canada.
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2
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Lambert AJ. The maturing science of consciousness. J R Soc N Z 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/03036758.2022.2090391] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Anthony J. Lambert
- School of Psychology and Centre for Brain Research, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
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3
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Maier A, Tsuchiya N. Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness. Atten Percept Psychophys 2021; 83:558-576. [PMID: 33034851 PMCID: PMC7886945 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-020-02146-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 09/08/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Our conscious experience of the world seems to go in lockstep with our attentional focus: We tend to see, hear, taste, and feel what we attend to, and vice versa. This tight coupling between attention and consciousness has given rise to the idea that these two phenomena are indivisible. In the late 1950s, the honoree of this special issue, Charles Eriksen, was among a small group of early pioneers that sought to investigate whether a transient increase in overall level of attention (alertness) in response to a noxious stimulus can be decoupled from conscious perception using experimental techniques. Recent years saw a similar debate regarding whether attention and consciousness are two dissociable processes. Initial evidence that attention and consciousness are two separate processes primarily rested on behavioral data. However, the past couple of years witnessed an explosion of studies aimed at testing this conjecture using neuroscientific techniques. Here we provide an overview of these and related empirical studies on the distinction between the neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness, and detail how advancements in theory and technology can bring about a more detailed understanding of the two. We argue that the most promising approach will combine ever-evolving neurophysiological and interventionist tools with quantitative, empirically testable theories of consciousness that are grounded in a mathematically formalized understanding of phenomenology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexander Maier
- Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA.
| | - Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health & School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing, and Health Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Suita, Osaka, 565-0871, Japan
- Advanced Telecommunications Research Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, 2-2-2 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, 619-0288, Japan
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4
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Bareham CA, Oxner M, Gastrell T, Carmel D. Beyond the neural correlates of consciousness: using brain stimulation to elucidate causal mechanisms underlying conscious states and contents. J R Soc N Z 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/03036758.2020.1840405] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Corinne A. Bareham
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - Matt Oxner
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - Tim Gastrell
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - David Carmel
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
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5
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Lack of awareness despite complex visual processing: Evidence from event-related potentials in a case of selective metamorphopsia. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2020; 117:16055-16064. [PMID: 32571942 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2000424117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Visual awareness is thought to result from integration of low- and high-level processing; instances of integration failure provide a crucial window into the cognitive and neural bases of awareness. We present neurophysiological evidence of complex cognitive processing in the absence of awareness, raising questions about the conditions necessary for visual awareness. We describe an individual with a neurodegenerative disease who exhibits impaired visual awareness for the digits 2 to 9, and stimuli presented in close proximity to these digits, due to perceptual distortion. We identified robust event-related potential responses indicating 1) face detection with the N170 component and 2) task-dependent target-word detection with the P3b component, despite no awareness of the presence of faces or target words. These data force us to reconsider the relationship between neural processing and visual awareness; even stimuli processed by a workspace-like cognitive system can remain inaccessible to awareness. We discuss how this finding challenges and constrains theories of visual awareness.
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6
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Pecere P. Reconsidering the ignorabimus: du Bois-Reymond and the hard problem of consciousness. SCIENCE IN CONTEXT 2020; 33:1-18. [PMID: 33004094 DOI: 10.1017/s0269889720000095] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
In this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond's speech "On the limits of natural science" (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the "hard problem of consciousness." Du Bois-Reymond's position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.
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7
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Noel JP, Ishizawa Y, Patel SR, Eskandar EN, Wallace MT. Leveraging Nonhuman Primate Multisensory Neurons and Circuits in Assessing Consciousness Theory. J Neurosci 2019; 39:7485-7500. [PMID: 31358654 PMCID: PMC6750944 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.0934-19.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2019] [Revised: 06/27/2019] [Accepted: 07/19/2019] [Indexed: 01/03/2023] Open
Abstract
Both the global neuronal workspace (GNW) and integrated information theory (IIT) posit that highly complex and interconnected networks engender perceptual awareness. GNW specifies that activity recruiting frontoparietal networks will elicit a subjective experience, whereas IIT is more concerned with the functional architecture of networks than with activity within it. Here, we argue that according to IIT mathematics, circuits converging on integrative versus convergent yet non-integrative neurons should support a greater degree of consciousness. We test this hypothesis by analyzing a dataset of neuronal responses collected simultaneously from primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and ventral premotor cortex (vPM) in nonhuman primates presented with auditory, tactile, and audio-tactile stimuli as they are progressively anesthetized with propofol. We first describe the multisensory (audio-tactile) characteristics of S1 and vPM neurons (mean and dispersion tendencies, as well as noise-correlations), and functionally label these neurons as convergent or integrative according to their spiking responses. Then, we characterize how these different pools of neurons behave as a function of consciousness. At odds with the IIT mathematics, results suggest that convergent neurons more readily exhibit properties of consciousness (neural complexity and noise correlation) and are more impacted during the loss of consciousness than integrative neurons. Last, we provide support for the GNW by showing that neural ignition (i.e., same trial coactivation of S1 and vPM) was more frequent in conscious than unconscious states. Overall, we contrast GNW and IIT within the same single-unit activity dataset, and support the GNW.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A number of prominent theories of consciousness exist, and a number of these share strong commonalities, such as the central role they ascribe to integration. Despite the important and far reaching consequences developing a better understanding of consciousness promises to bring, for instance in diagnosing disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative-state, locked-in syndrome), these theories are seldom tested via invasive techniques (with high signal-to-noise ratios), and never directly confronted within a single dataset. Here, we first derive concrete and testable predictions from the global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory of consciousness. Then, we put these to the test by functionally labeling specific neurons as either convergent or integrative nodes, and examining the response of these neurons during anesthetic-induced loss of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jean-Paul Noel
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York 10003,
| | | | - Shaun R Patel
- Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02114
| | - Emad N Eskandar
- Leo M. Davidoff Department of Neurological Surgery, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York 10461
| | - Mark T Wallace
- Department of Hearing and Speech, Vanderbilt University Medical School, Nashville, Tennessee 37235
- Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37235, and
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Vanderbilt Medical School, Nashville, Tennessee 37235
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8
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Harms IM, van Dijken JH, Brookhuis KA, de Waard D. Walking Without Awareness. Front Psychol 2019; 10:1846. [PMID: 31456719 PMCID: PMC6700670 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01846] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2019] [Accepted: 07/26/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Pedestrians are commonly engaged in other activities while walking. The current study assesses (1) whether pedestrians are sufficiently aware of their surroundings to successfully negotiate obstacles in a city, and (2) whether various common walking practices affect awareness of obstacles and, or, avoidance behavior. To this end, an obstacle, i.e., a signboard was placed on a pavement in the city centre of Utrecht, the Netherlands. The behavioral measure consisted of the distance to the signboard before pedestrians moved to avoid it. After passing, participants were interviewed to obtain thought samples, self-reported route familiarity, a confirmation of secondary task engagement, and to assess awareness through recall and recognition of the signboard and its text. In this study 234 pedestrians participated. More than half of the participants (53.8%) was unaware of the signboard, still none of them had bumped into it. Mind wandering, being engaged in secondary tasks such as talking with a companion or using a mobile phone, and being familiar with a route, did not affect awareness nor avoidance behavior. In conclusion, despite being very common there was no evidence that walking without awareness necessarily results in risk. The absence of awareness does not imply any absence of cognitive and perceptual processing. Pedestrians are still capable of successfully avoiding obstacles in their path, even in visually more challenging environments such as a city centre. It is argued that this is because walking consists of highly automated, skilled behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ilse M Harms
- Department Smart Mobility, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, The Hague, Netherlands.,Department Clinical & Developmental Neuropsychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
| | - Joke H van Dijken
- Department Clinical & Developmental Neuropsychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
| | - Karel A Brookhuis
- Department Clinical & Developmental Neuropsychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
| | - Dick de Waard
- Department Clinical & Developmental Neuropsychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
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9
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Mobbs D, Adolphs R, Fanselow MS, Barrett LF, LeDoux JE, Ressler K, Tye KM. Viewpoints: Approaches to defining and investigating fear. Nat Neurosci 2019; 22:1205-1216. [PMID: 31332374 PMCID: PMC6943931 DOI: 10.1038/s41593-019-0456-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 91] [Impact Index Per Article: 18.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
There is disagreement on how best to define and investigate fear. Nature Neuroscience asked Dean Mobbs to lead experts from the fields of human and animal affective neuroscience to discuss their viewpoints on how to define fear and how to move forward with the study of fear.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dean Mobbs
- Department of Humanities and Social Sciences and Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, USA.
| | - Ralph Adolphs
- Department of Humanities and Social Sciences and Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, USA
| | - Michael S Fanselow
- Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, USA
| | - Lisa Feldman Barrett
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
- Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging and Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Joseph E LeDoux
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York, USA
- Nathan Kline Institute, New York State Office of Mental Health, New York, New York, USA
- Departments of Psychiatry and Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, NYU Langone Medical School, New York, New York, USA
| | - Kerry Ressler
- Division of Depression & Anxiety Disorders, McLean Hospital, Belmont, Massachusetts, USA
- Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Kay M Tye
- Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla, California, USA
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10
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Michel M, Beck D, Block N, Blumenfeld H, Brown R, Carmel D, Carrasco M, Chirimuuta M, Chun M, Cleeremans A, Dehaene S, Fleming SM, Frith C, Haggard P, He BJ, Heyes C, Goodale MA, Irvine L, Kawato M, Kentridge R, King JR, Knight RT, Kouider S, Lamme V, Lamy D, Lau H, Laureys S, LeDoux J, Lin YT, Liu K, Macknik SL, Martinez-Conde S, Mashour GA, Melloni L, Miracchi L, Mylopoulos M, Naccache L, Owen AM, Passingham RE, Pessoa L, Peters MAK, Rahnev D, Ro T, Rosenthal D, Sasaki Y, Sergent C, Solovey G, Schiff ND, Seth A, Tallon-Baudry C, Tamietto M, Tong F, van Gaal S, Vlassova A, Watanabe T, Weisberg J, Yan K, Yoshida M. Opportunities and challenges for a maturing science of consciousness. Nat Hum Behav 2019; 3:104-107. [PMID: 30944453 PMCID: PMC6568255 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-019-0531-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 39] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne Université, Paris, France.
| | - Diane Beck
- Department of Psychology and Beckman Institute, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
| | - Ned Block
- Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, New York, USA
| | - Hal Blumenfeld
- Department of Neurology, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
| | - Richard Brown
- Philosophy Program, LaGuardia Community College, The City University of New York, Long Island City, New York, USA
| | - David Carmel
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - Marisa Carrasco
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York, USA
| | - Mazviita Chirimuuta
- Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
| | - Marvin Chun
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Cognition & Neurosciences, Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Chair of Experimental Cognitive Psychology, College de France, Paris, France.,Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA), INSERM, Université Paris-Sud, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center, Gif/Yvette, France
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Chris Frith
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
| | - Patrick Haggard
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
| | - Biyu J He
- Neuroscience Institute, New York University Langone Medical Center, New York, New York, USA
| | - Cecilia Heyes
- All Souls College and Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Melvyn A Goodale
- The Brain and Mind Institute, The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada
| | - Liz Irvine
- School of Philosophy, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
| | - Mitsuo Kawato
- Department of Decoded Neurofeedback, Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, Kyoto, Japan
| | | | - Jean-Remi King
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York, United States.,Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, Frankfurt, Germany
| | - Robert T Knight
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, USA
| | - Sid Kouider
- Brain and Consciousness group (ENS, EHESS, CNRS), Département d'Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure - PSL Research University, Paris, France
| | - Victor Lamme
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Dominique Lamy
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Hakwan Lau
- Department of Psychology and Brain Research Institute, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA. .,Department of Psychology, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China. .,State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, HKU, Hong Kong, China.
| | - Steven Laureys
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Joseph LeDoux
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, New York, USA
| | - Ying-Tung Lin
- Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan
| | - Kayuet Liu
- Department of Sociology, UCLA, Los Angeles, California, USA
| | - Stephen L Macknik
- State University of New York, Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, New York, USA
| | | | - George A Mashour
- Center for Consciousness Science, Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
| | - Lucia Melloni
- Department of Neurology, NYU School of Medicine, New York, New York, USA
| | - Lisa Miracchi
- Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
| | - Myrto Mylopoulos
- Department of Philosophy and Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
| | | | - Adrian M Owen
- The Brain & Mind Institute, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada
| | | | - Luiz Pessoa
- Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA
| | - Megan A K Peters
- Department of Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside, California, USA
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Tony Ro
- Psychology and Biology, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA
| | - David Rosenthal
- Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, New York, USA
| | - Yuka Sasaki
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
| | - Claire Sergent
- Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Université Paris Descartes, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Guillermo Solovey
- Instituto de Cálculo, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Nicholas D Schiff
- Department of Neurology, Weill Cornell Medicine, New York, New York, USA
| | - Anil Seth
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Catherine Tallon-Baudry
- Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, INSERM, École Normale Supérieure - PSL Research University, Paris, France
| | - Marco Tamietto
- Department of Medical and Clinical Psychology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.,Department of Psychology, University of Torino, Torino, Italy
| | - Frank Tong
- Psychology Department, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Alexandra Vlassova
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Takeo Watanabe
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
| | - Josh Weisberg
- Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, Texas, USA
| | - Karen Yan
- Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan
| | - Masatoshi Yoshida
- Department of System Neuroscience, National Institute for Physiological Sciences, Okazaki, Japan
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11
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Michel M, Fleming SM, Lau H, Lee ALF, Martinez-Conde S, Passingham RE, Peters MAK, Rahnev D, Sergent C, Liu K. An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science. Front Psychol 2018; 9:2134. [PMID: 30455661 PMCID: PMC6230957 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2018] [Accepted: 10/16/2018] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment for the field to grow and develop sustainably. We conducted an online survey on people’s views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of research. 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne Université, Paris, France
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Hakwan Lau
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States.,Brain Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States.,Department of Psychology, Hong State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
| | - Alan L F Lee
- Department of Applied Psychology, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
| | - Susana Martinez-Conde
- SUNY Downstate Medical Center, State University of New York, New York, NY, United States
| | - Richard E Passingham
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Megan A K Peters
- Department of Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, United States
| | - Dobromir Rahnev
- School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Claire Sergent
- Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Université Paris Descartes, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Kayuet Liu
- Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
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12
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Hauger SL, Schanke AK, Andersson S, Chatelle C, Schnakers C, Løvstad M. The Clinical Diagnostic Utility of Electrophysiological Techniques in Assessment of Patients With Disorders of Consciousness Following Acquired Brain Injury: A Systematic Review. J Head Trauma Rehabil 2018; 32:185-196. [PMID: 27831962 DOI: 10.1097/htr.0000000000000267] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To investigate the diagnostic utility of electrophysiological recordings during active cognitive tasks in detecting residual cognitive capacities in patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) after severe acquired brain injury. DESIGN Systematic review of empirical research in MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, and Cochrane from January 2002 to March 2016. MAIN MEASURES Data extracted included sample size, type of electrophysiological technique and task design, rate of cognitive responders, false negatives and positives, and excluded subjects from the study analysis. The Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies-2 (QUADAS-2) was used for quality appraisal of the retrieved literature. RESULTS Twenty-four studies examining electrophysiological signs of command-following in patients with DoC were identified. Sensitivity rates in healthy controls demonstrated variable accuracy across the studies, ranging from 71% to 100%. In patients with DoC, specificity and sensitivity rates varied in the included studies, ranging from 0% to 100%. Pronounced heterogeneity was found between studies regarding methodological approaches, task design, and procedures of analysis, rendering comparison between studies challenging. CONCLUSION We are still far from establishing precise recommendations for standardized electrophysiological diagnostic procedures in DoC, but electrophysiological methods may add supplemental diagnostic information of covert cognition in some patients with DoC.
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Affiliation(s)
- S L Hauger
- Department of Research, Sunnaas Rehabilitation Hospital, Norway (Mrs Hauger and Drs Løvstad and Schanke); Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway (Drs Andersson, Løvstad, and Schanke); Laboratory for NeuroImaging of Coma and Consciousness, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, and Acute Neurorehabilitation Unit, Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University Hospital of Lausanne, Switzerland (Dr Chatelle); and Department of Neurosurgery, University of California, Los Angeles (Dr Schnakers)
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13
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LeDoux J, Brown R, Pine D, Hofmann S. Know Thyself: Well-Being and Subjective Experience. CEREBRUM : THE DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE 2018; 2018. [PMID: 30746034 DOI: pmid/30746034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/03/2022]
Abstract
The study of subjective experience represents a significant challenge to cognitive scientists, but one that is beginning to be increasingly addressed. Subjectivity renders experience less amenable to traditional objective scientific measurements than other subject matter. Our authors believe that when seeking to understand the mind, subjectivity must ultimately be investigated and understood.
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14
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Tooley MD, Carmel D, Chapman A, Grimshaw GM. Dissociating the physiological components of unconscious emotional responses. Neurosci Conscious 2017; 2017:nix021. [PMID: 30042852 PMCID: PMC6007137 DOI: 10.1093/nc/nix021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/29/2017] [Revised: 09/03/2017] [Accepted: 09/12/2017] [Indexed: 01/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Conscious emotional processing is characterized by a coordinated set of responses across multiple physiological systems. Although emotional stimuli can evoke certain physiological responses even when they are suppressed from awareness, it is not known whether unconscious emotional responses comprise a similar constellation or are confined to specific systems. To compare physiological responses to emotional stimuli with and without awareness, we measured a range of responses while participants viewed positive, negative and neutral images that were accompanied by noise bursts to elicit startle reflexes. We measured four responses simultaneously - skin conductance and heart rate changes in response to the images themselves; and startle eye-blink and post-auricular reflexes in response to the noise bursts that occurred during image presentation. For half of the participants, the images were masked from awareness using continuous flash suppression. The aware group showed the expected pattern of response across physiological systems: emotional images (regardless of valence) evoked larger skin conductance responses (SCRs) and greater heart rate deceleration than neutral images, negative images enhanced eye-blink reflexes and positive images enhanced post-auricular reflexes. In contrast, we found a striking dissociation between measures for the unaware group: typical modulation of SCRs and post-auricular reflexes, but no modulation of heart rate deceleration or eye-blink reflexes. Our findings suggest that although some physiological systems respond to emotional stimuli presented outside of awareness, conscious emotional processing may be characterized by a broad and coordinated set of responses across systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael D Tooley
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington 6012, New Zealand
| | - David Carmel
- Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, UK; Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0109, USA
| | - Angus Chapman
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington 6012, New Zealand
| | - Gina M Grimshaw
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington 6012, New Zealand
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15
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Michel M. A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2017; 49:333-346. [PMID: 28246058 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2016] [Revised: 01/23/2017] [Accepted: 02/06/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Laboratoire Sciences, Normes et Décision, Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1, rue Victor Cousin, 75005 Paris, France.
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16
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Climbing Brain Levels of Organisation from Genes to Consciousness. Trends Cogn Sci 2017; 21:168-181. [PMID: 28161289 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2016] [Revised: 12/24/2016] [Accepted: 01/04/2017] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Given the tremendous complexity of brain organisation, here I propose a strategy that dynamically links stages of brain organisation from genes to consciousness, at four privileged structural levels: genes; transcription factors (TFs)-gene networks; synaptic epigenesis; and long-range connectivity. These structures are viewed as nested and reciprocally inter-regulated, with a hierarchical organisation that proceeds on different timescales during the course of evolution and development. Interlevel bridging mechanisms include intrinsic variation-selection mechanisms, which offer a community of bottom-up and top-down models linking genes to consciousness in a stepwise manner.
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17
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Fields C, Glazebrook JF. Disrupted development and imbalanced function in the global neuronal workspace: a positive-feedback mechanism for the emergence of ASD in early infancy. Cogn Neurodyn 2016; 11:1-21. [PMID: 28174609 DOI: 10.1007/s11571-016-9419-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2016] [Revised: 10/06/2016] [Accepted: 11/09/2016] [Indexed: 01/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is increasingly being conceptualized as a spectrum disorder of connectome development. We review evidence suggesting that ASD is characterized by a positive feedback loop that amplifies small functional variations in early-developing sensory-processing pathways into structural and functional imbalances in the global neuronal workspace. Using vision as an example, we discuss how early functional variants in visual processing may be feedback-amplified to produce variant object categories and disrupted top-down expectations, atypically large expectation-to-perception mismatches, problems re-identifying individual people and objects, socially inappropriate, generally aversive emotional responses and disrupted sensory-motor coordination. Viewing ASD in terms of feedback amplification of small functional variants allows a number of recent models of ASD to be integrated with neuroanatomical, neurofunctional and genetic data.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - James F Glazebrook
- Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920 USA
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18
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Kemmerer D. Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2015; 2015:niv006. [PMID: 30135741 PMCID: PMC6089087 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niv006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2015] [Revised: 08/24/2015] [Accepted: 09/02/2015] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
To locate consciousness in the flow of synaptic activity in the brain, we must first locate it in the flow of information processing in the mind. Two different positions have been debated for centuries. The liberal view maintains that the contents of experience include not only sensory, motor, and affective states, but also concepts and the thoughts they enter into. In contrast, the conservative view maintains that concepts have no intrinsic qualia of their own, and that the contents of experience are therefore restricted to sensory, motor, and affective states. Here I discuss how this long-standing controversy is relevant to several contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness. I do so, however, in a manner that is admittedly biased toward the conservative view, since I am among those who believe that it is more consistent than the liberal view with a number of key findings. I focus first on two of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness—namely, Stanislas Dehaene's Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. I argue that because both of these approaches assume the liberal view, they are challenged in significant ways by data favoring the competing conservative view. I then turn to a third framework—namely, Jesse Prinz's Attended Intermediate-Level Representation Theory. I contend that because it explicitly endorses the conservative view, it has a unique advantage over the other two approaches. I also point out, however, that it has independent shortcomings that prevent it from achieving adequate explanatory coherence. I conclude by emphasizing that, if the conservative view is in fact correct, a central goal of future research should be to distinguish, at both psychological and neurobiological levels of analysis, between the following two kinds of information processing that often occur simultaneously: first, activation of the modality-specific sensory, motor, and affective representations that constitute the sole ingredients of conscious experiences; and second, activation of the conceptual representations that give those experiences meaning and that may even influence them in a top-down manner, but that never themselves reach awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Kemmerer
- Department of Speech, Language, and Hearing Sciences, Purdue University and Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University
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19
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20
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Affiliation(s)
- Anil K Seth
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex
| | - Biyu J He
- National Institutes of Health, National Institutes of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health
| | - Jakob Hohwy
- Cognition & Philosophy Lab, Monash University
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21
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Response to Block et al.: first-person perspectives are both necessary and troublesome for consciousness science. Trends Cogn Sci 2014; 18:557-8. [PMID: 25278369 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.09.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2014] [Accepted: 09/18/2014] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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