Meta-Reasoning: Monitoring and Control of Thinking and Reasoning

Metacognition for hearing in noise: a comparison between younger and older adults

Metacognition entails knowledge of one's own cognitive skills, perceived self-efficacy and locus of control when performing a task, and performance monitoring. Age-related changes in metacognition have been observed in metamemory, whereas their occurrence for hearing remained unknown. We tested 30 older and 30 younger adults with typical hearing, to assess if age reduces metacognition for hearing sentences in noise. Metacognitive monitoring for older and younger adults was overall comparable. In fact, the older group achieved better monitoring for words in the second part of the phrase. Additionally, only older adults showed a correlation between performance and perceived confidence. No age differentiation was found for locus of control, knowledge or self-efficacy. This suggests intact metacognitive skills for hearing in noise in older adults, alongside a somewhat paradoxical overconfidence in younger adults. These findings support exploiting metacognition for older adults dealing with noisy environments, since metacognition is central for implementing self-regulation strategies.

Grounding Cognition in Perceptual Experience

The aim of this Special Issue was to put forward a multifaceted reflection on the relevance of perceptual experience in affecting and modeling various aspects of cognitive performance [...].

Examining interpersonal metacognitive monitoring in artificial grammar learning

This study investigates the observers' ability to monitor the ongoing cognitive processes of a partner who is implicitly learning an artificial grammar. Our hypothesis posits that learners experience metacognitive feelings as they attempt to apply their implicit knowledge, and that observers are capable of detecting and interpreting these feelings as cues of the learner's cognitive state. For instance, learners might encounter affective signals linked to cognitive conflicts and errors at different processing stages, which observers can construe as manifestations of the learner's cognitive dissonance. The research involved 126 participants organized into dyads, with one participant acting as a learner, and the other as an observer. The observer's task was to judge whether the learner agrees with the information presented (consonance judgment) and was limited to reading the learner's nonverbal signals to avoid explicit mindreading. The findings suggest that observers possess mindreading abilities, enabling them to detect both learners' confidence and accuracy in stimuli classification. This extends our understanding of non-verbal mindreading capabilities and indicates that observers can effectively interpret early implicit metacognitive information, even in the absence of explicit self-evaluation from the learners. This research offers significant insights into how individuals interpret others' mental states during implicit learning tasks, particularly in the context of utilizing early affective cues within the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm.

A low-dimensional approximation of optimal confidence

Human decision making is accompanied by a sense of confidence. According to Bayesian decision theory, confidence reflects the learned probability of making a correct response, given available data (e.g., accumulated stimulus evidence and response time). Although optimal, independently learning these probabilities for all possible data combinations is computationally intractable. Here, we describe a novel model of confidence implementing a low-dimensional approximation of this optimal yet intractable solution. This model allows efficient estimation of confidence, while at the same time accounting for idiosyncrasies, different kinds of biases and deviation from the optimal probability correct. Our model dissociates confidence biases resulting from the estimate of the reliability of evidence by individuals (captured by parameter α), from confidence biases resulting from general stimulus independent under and overconfidence (captured by parameter β). We provide empirical evidence that this model accurately fits both choice data (accuracy, response time) and trial-by-trial confidence ratings simultaneously. Finally, we test and empirically validate two novel predictions of the model, namely that 1) changes in confidence can be independent of performance and 2) selectively manipulating each parameter of our model leads to distinct patterns of confidence judgments. As a tractable and flexible account of the computation of confidence, our model offers a clear framework to interpret and further resolve different forms of confidence biases.

No strong support for a Dunning-Kruger effect in creativity: analyses of self-assessment in absolute and relative terms

Competencies related to the evaluation of own cognitive processes, called metacognitive monitoring, are crucial as they help decide whether to persist in or desist from cognitive efforts. One of the most well-known phenomena in this context-the Dunning-Kruger effect-is that less skilled people tend to overestimate their performance. This effect has been reported for various kinds of performance including creativity. More recently, however, it has been suggested that this phenomenon could be a statistical artifact caused by the better-than-average effect and by regression toward the mean. Therefore, we examined the Dunning-Kruger effect in the context of creative thinking performance (i.e., divergent thinking ability) across two studies (Study 1: N = 425; Study 2: N = 317) and applied the classical quartile-based analysis as well as newly recommended, advanced statistical approaches: the Glejser test of heteroscedasticity and nonlinear quadratic regression. We found that the results indeed depended on the employed statistical method: While classical analyses supported the Dunning-Kruger effect across all conditions, it was not consistently supported by the more advanced statistical methods. These findings are in line with recent work challenging certain assumptions of the Dunning-Kruger effect and we discuss factors that undermine accurate self-assessments, especially in the context of creative performance.

Parental rights or parental wrongs: Parents' metacognitive knowledge of the factors that influence their school choice decisions

School choice initiatives-which empower parents to choose which schools their children attend-are built on the assumptions that parents know what features of a school are most important to their family and that they are capable of focusing on the most important features when they make their decisions. However, decades of psychological research suggest that decision makers lack metacognitive knowledge of the factors that influence their decisions. We sought to reconcile this discrepancy between the policy assumptions and the psychological research. To do so, we asked participants to complete Choice-Based Conjoint surveys in which they made series of choices between different hypothetical schools. We then asked participants to self-report the weight they placed on each attribute when making their choices. Across four studies, we found that participants did not know how much weight they had placed on various school attributes. Average correlations between stated and revealed weights ranged from r = .34-.54. Stated weights predicted different choices than revealed weights in 16.41-20.63% of decisions. These metacognitive limitations persisted regardless of whether the participants were parents or non-parents (Study 1a/1b), the nature of the attributes that participants used to evaluate alternatives (Study 2), and whether or not decision makers had access to school ratings that could be used as metacognitive aids (Study 3). In line with prior psychological research-and in contract to policy assumptions-these findings demonstrate that decision makers do not have particularly strong metacognitive knowledge of the factors that influence their school choice decisions. As a result, parents making school choice decisions are likely to seek out and use the wrong information, thus leading to suboptimal school choices. Future research should replicate these results in more ecologically valid samples and test new approaches to school choice that account for these metacognitive limitations.

Probabilistic causal reasoning under time pressure

While causal reasoning is a core facet of our cognitive abilities, its time-course has not received proper attention. As the duration of reasoning might prove crucial in understanding the underlying cognitive processes, we asked participants in two experiments to make probabilistic causal inferences while manipulating time pressure. We found that participants are less accurate under time pressure, a speed-accuracy-tradeoff, and that they respond more conservatively. Surprisingly, two other persistent reasoning errors-Markov violations and failures to explain away-appeared insensitive to time pressure. These observations seem related to confidence: Conservative inferences were associated with low confidence, whereas Markov violations and failures to explain were not. These findings challenge existing theories that predict an association between time pressure and all causal reasoning errors including conservatism. Our findings suggest that these errors should not be attributed to a single cognitive mechanism and emphasize that causal judgements are the result of multiple processes.

Stimulus Complexity Can Enhance Art Appreciation: Phenomenological and Psychophysiological Evidence for the Pleasure-Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking

We tested predictions deriving from the "Pleasure-Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking" (PIA Model), whereby aesthetic preferences arise from two fluency-based processes: an initial automatic, percept-driven default process and a subsequent perceiver-driven reflective process. One key trigger for reflective processing is stimulus complexity. Moreover, if meaning can be derived from such complexity, then this can engender increased interest and elevated liking. Experiment 1 involved graffiti street-art images, pre-normed to elicit low, moderate and high levels of interest. Subjective reports indicated a predicted enhancement in liking across increasing interest levels. Electroencephalography (EEG) recordings during image viewing revealed different patterns of alpha power in temporal brain regions across interest levels. Experiment 2 enforced a brief initial image-viewing stage and a subsequent reflective image-viewing stage. Differences in alpha power arose in most EEG channels between the initial and deliberative viewing stages. A linear increase in aesthetic liking was again seen across interest levels, with different patterns of alpha activity in temporal and occipital regions across these levels. Overall, the phenomenological data support the PIA Model, while the physiological data suggest that enhanced aesthetic liking might be associated with "flow-feelings" indexed by alpha activity in brain regions linked to visual attention and reducing distraction.

Examining the relationship between metacognitive trust in thinking styles and supernatural beliefs

Conflicting findings have emerged from research on the relationship between thinking styles and supernatural beliefs. In two studies, we examined this relationship through meta-cognitive trust and developed a new: (1) experimental manipulation, a short scientific article describing the benefits of thinking styles: (2) trust in thinking styles measure, the Ambiguous Decisions task; and (3) supernatural belief measure, the Belief in Psychic Ability scale. In Study 1 (N = 415) we found differences in metacognitive trust in thinking styles between the analytical and intuitive condition, and overall greater trust in analytical thinking. We also found stronger correlations between thinking style measures (in particular intuitive thinking) and psychic ability and paranormal beliefs than with religious beliefs, but a mixed-effect linear regression showed little to no variation in how measures of thinking style related to types of supernatural beliefs. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 with participants from the United States, Canada, and Brazil (N = 802), and found similar results, with the Brazilian participants showing a reduced emphasis on analytical thinking. We conclude that our new design, task, and scale may be particularly useful for dual-processing research on supernatural belief.

Understanding Collective Intelligence: Investigating the Role of Collective Memory, Attention, and Reasoning Processes

As society has come to rely on groups and technology to address many of its most challenging problems, there is a growing need to understand how technology-enabled, distributed, and dynamic collectives can be designed to solve a wide range of problems over time in the face of complex and changing environmental conditions-an ability we define as "collective intelligence." We describe recent research on the Transaction Systems Model of Collective Intelligence (TSM-CI) that integrates literature from diverse areas of psychology to conceptualize the underpinnings of collective intelligence. The TSM-CI articulates the development and mutual adaptation of transactive memory, transactive attention, and transactive reasoning systems that together support the emergence and maintenance of collective intelligence. We also review related research on computational indicators of transactive-system functioning based on collaborative process behaviors that enable agent-based teammates to diagnose and potentially intervene to address developing issues. We conclude by discussing future directions in developing the TSM-CI to support research on developing collective human-machine intelligence and to identify ways to design technology to enhance it.

The Aha! experience is associated with a drop in the perceived difficulty of the problem

The study investigated the correlation between the intensity of the Aha! experience and participants' subjective difficulty ratings of problems before and after finding their solutions. We assumed that the Aha! experience arises from a shift in processing fluency triggered by changing from an initially incoherent problem representation to a coherent one, which ultimately leads to the retrieval of a solution with unexpected ease and speed. First, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would indicate more sudden solutions, manifesting in a reduced correlation between the initial difficulty ratings and solution times. Second, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would correspond to a greater shift in the subjective difficulty ratings between the initial and retrospective assessments. To test our hypotheses, we developed a novel set of rebus puzzles. A total of 160 participants solved rebuses and provided initial (within 5 s of problem presentation) and retrospective difficulty ratings (following the generation or presentation of a correct solution). They also rated their Aha! experience (after solution generation or presentation), confidence in solutions, and the likability of each rebus. Our findings revealed that the initial ratings of the problem's subjective difficulty were positively correlated with the solution time and that this correlation decreased in the case of a stronger Aha! experience. Aha! experience ratings were positively correlated with the differences between initial and retrospective difficulty ratings, confidence, solution accuracy, and rebus likability. We interpreted our results to be in line with the processing fluency and metacognitive prediction error accounts.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Effect of cognitive load and working memory capacity on the efficiency of discovering better alternatives: A survival analysis

Why do humans attempt to discover better alternatives to solve a problem even when they know the way to solve it? This question is related to the flexibility of thinking and is the subject of studies on the Einstellung effect. This study focuses on cognitive load for familiar trained procedure as a factor that influences the discovery of alternatives in Einstellung situations, where the problem can be solved using a trained procedure. Many studies on creative problem solving and strategy selection demonstrate that cognitive load for facilitates the discovery of alternatives. However, findings are inconsistent regarding Einstellung situations. We argue that the reason for such inconsistent results were the use of manipulations such as the double task, which both load on the trained and alternative procedure and the lack of perspective on efficiency in analysis. Therefore, we examine the relationship between cognitive load manipulated by the complexity of the trained procedure and time-based performance measured by the number of trials prior to finding alternatives. The results illustrate that higher cognitive load increased the efficiency of discovery of alternatives and that this effect was significant for participants with high working memory capacity. This study provides empirical evidence that high cognitive load for trained procedure facilitates the discovery of alternatives and suggests the importance of considering temporal properties, such as efficiency, when examining the effects of working memory on problem solving, which requires cognitive flexibility.

Retrieval fluency inflates perceived preparation for difficult problems

When faced with a difficult problem, people often rely on past experiences. While remembering clearly helps us reach solutions, can retrieval also lead to misperceptions of our abilities? In three experiments, participants encountered "worst case scenarios" they likely had never experienced and that would be difficult to navigate without extensive training (e.g., bitten by snake). Learning brief tips improved problem-solving performance later, but retrieval increased feelings of preparation by an even larger margin. This gap occurred regardless of whether people thought that tips came from an expert or another participant in the study, and it did not reflect mere familiarity with the problems themselves. Instead, our results suggest that the ease experienced while remembering, or retrieval fluency, inflated feelings of preparation.

Dual-Process Theory and Two Types of Metacognitive Monitoring and Control Processes

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes are important parts of our cognitive system. In this article, they are considered in the light of the dual-process theory and interpreted as occurring at the level of Type 1 and Type 2 information processing. Associative connection is the main factor that allows us to divide these processes into two types. Accordingly, metacognitive monitoring of the first type occurs when feelings of rightness/error automatically appear along with a certain judgment. The second type occurs when a controlled inference is made about whether a judgment is true or false. Metacognitive control of the first type occurs when the decision to reject, revise or accept the received judgment is associated with the feelings of rightness/error and automatically appears when one of these feelings appears. The second type takes place when a person rejects (or they are unclear) the results of the first type of metacognitive control and deliberately decides what to do with the received judgment - reject, revise or accept.

A multi-study examination of the relevance of the metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability in emotion regulation and clinical symptoms

Transdiagnostic approaches to psychopathology have postulated that factors related to perceived control are particularly relevant to mental health. Here we focused on a specific perceived control-related construct: metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability. Evidence suggests that dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs play a role in the activation and maintenance of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and emotional distress. Metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of worry are the most strongly associated with psychopathology. In this multi-study research, we hypothesized that metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability make a specific contribution to emotion regulation strategies and clinical symptoms. We tested our hypotheses in four different studies, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally (N = 2224). Participants completed measures of metacognitive beliefs, maladaptive strategies (e.g., worry, thought suppression), and clinical symptoms (e.g., generalized anxiety, emotional distress, depressive and anxiety symptoms). Our results showed that uncontrollability beliefs were the strongest variable associated with maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and clinical symptoms (cross-sectionally), and the only ones that predicted them in the long term. We discuss the theoretical and clinical implications of these results in the light of the metacognitive model and control-related theories.

A systematic framework of creative metacognition

Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.

Metacognitive Effort Regulation across Cultures

Success in cognitive tasks is associated with effort regulation and motivation. We employed the meta-reasoning approach to investigate metacognitive monitoring accuracy and effort regulation in problem solving across cultures. Adults from China, from Israel, and from Europe and North America (for simplicity: "Western countries") solved nonverbal problems and rated their confidence in their answers. The task involved identifying geometric shapes within silhouettes and, thus, required overcoming interference from holistic processing. The Western group displayed the worst monitoring accuracy, with both the highest overconfidence and poorest resolution (discrimination in confidence between the correct and wrong solutions). The Israeli group resembled the Western group in many respects but exhibited better monitoring accuracy. The Chinese group invested the most time and achieved the best success rates, demonstrating exceptional motivation and determination to succeed. However, their efficiency suffered as they correctly solved the fewest problems per minute of work. Effort regulation analysis based on the Diminishing Criterion Model revealed distinct patterns: the Western participants invested the least amount of time regardless of item difficulty and the Israelis invested more time only when addressing the hardest items. The Chinese group allocated more time throughout but particularly in moderate to difficult items, hinting at their strategic determination to overcome the challenge. Understanding cultural differences in metacognitive processes carries implications for theory (e.g., motivational factors) and practice (e.g., international teams, education). The present findings can serve as a foundation for future research in these and other domains.

Not feeling right about uncertainty monitoring

De Neys proposed a "switch" model to address what he argued to be lacuna in dual-process theory, in which he theorized about the processes that initiate and terminate analytic thinking. We will argue that the author neglected to acknowledge the abundant literature on metacognitive functions, specifically, the meta-reasoning framework developed by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), that addresses just those questions.

We know what stops you from thinking forever: A metacognitive perspective

This commentary addresses omissions in De Neys's model of fast-and-slow thinking from a metacognitive perspective. We review well-established meta-reasoning monitoring (e.g., confidence) and control processes (e.g., rethinking) that explain mental effort regulation. Moreover, we point to individual, developmental, and task design considerations that affect this regulation. These core issues are completely ignored or mentioned in passing in the target article.

Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing

The 34 commentaries on the target article span a broad range of interesting issues. I have organized my reply around five major themes that seemed to emerge: Remarks about the generalizability of the empirical findings, links with other models, necessary extensions, the utility of dual-process models, and more specific points. This allows me to clarify possible misconceptions and identify avenues for further advancement.

Individual differences and multi-step thinking

Deliberative thinking often consists of several steps, each involving a switch decision. These decisions may be influenced by confidence in the thinking done so far. Individuals may differ in their tolerance of low confidence and thus may arrive at unjustified high confidence too soon, either from trusting their intuition or by bolstering an initially favored conclusion.

Fostering Collective Intelligence in Human-AI Collaboration: Laying the Groundwork for COHUMAIN

Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered machines are increasingly mediating our work and many of our managerial, economic, and cultural interactions. While technology enhances individual capability in many ways, how do we know that the sociotechnical system as a whole, consisting of a complex web of hundreds of human-machine interactions, is exhibiting collective intelligence? Research on human-machine interactions has been conducted within different disciplinary silos, resulting in social science models that underestimate technology and vice versa. Bringing together these different perspectives and methods at this juncture is critical. To truly advance our understanding of this important and quickly evolving area, we need vehicles to help research connect across disciplinary boundaries. This paper advocates for establishing an interdisciplinary research domain-Collective Human-Machine Intelligence (COHUMAIN). It outlines a research agenda for a holistic approach to designing and developing the dynamics of sociotechnical systems. In illustrating the kind of approach, we envision in this domain, we describe recent work on a sociocognitive architecture, the transactive systems model of collective intelligence, that articulates the critical processes underlying the emergence and maintenance of collective intelligence and extend it to human-AI systems. We connect this with synergistic work on a compatible cognitive architecture, instance-based learning theory and apply it to the design of AI agents that collaborate with humans. We present this work as a call to researchers working on related questions to not only engage with our proposal but also develop their own sociocognitive architectures and unlock the real potential of human-machine intelligence.

The Development of Intuitive and Analytic Thinking in Autism: The Case of Cognitive Reflection

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a short measure of a person's ability to resist intuitive response tendencies, and to produce normatively correct responses that are assumed to be based on effortful, analytic thinking. A remarkable characteristic of the CRT is that although the questions are open-ended, for each item, the vast majority of people either produce a correct, analytic response or a typical incorrect (i.e., intuitive) response. This unique feature of the CRT makes it possible to investigate the question of whether autistic and neurotypical people share the same intuitions. We report a study that included adolescents and young adults. In both age groups, autistic and neurotypical participants were matched on age, gender, cognitive ability, and educational background. In line with previous findings, the results showed an age-related increase in analytic responding on the CRT, and a decrease in intuitive responding. Crucially, the proportion of both intuitive and analytic responses across autistic and neurotypical participants was identical in both age groups. The current results are in contrast with claims that autistic individuals have an increased tendency toward an analytic/rational type of processing, which is commonly attributed to an impairment within their intuitive reasoning mechanisms.

Shaped-Charge Learning Architecture for the Human-Machine Teams

In spite of great progress in recent years, deep learning (DNN) and transformers have strong limitations for supporting human-machine teams due to a lack of explainability, information on what exactly was generalized, and machinery to be integrated with various reasoning techniques, and weak defense against possible adversarial attacks of opponent team members. Due to these shortcomings, stand-alone DNNs have limited support for human-machine teams. We propose a Meta-learning/DNN → kNN architecture that overcomes these limitations by integrating deep learning with explainable nearest neighbor learning (kNN) to form the object level, having a deductive reasoning-based meta-level control learning process, and performing validation and correction of predictions in a way that is more interpretable by peer team members. We address our proposal from structural and maximum entropy production perspectives.

Metacognitive Cues, Working Memory, and Math Anxiety: The Regulated Attention in Mathematical Problem Solving (RAMPS) Framework

Mathematical problem solving is a process involving metacognitive (e.g., judging progress), cognitive (e.g., working memory), and affective (e.g., math anxiety) factors. Recent research encourages researchers who study math cognition to consider the role that the interaction between metacognition and math anxiety plays in mathematical problem solving. Problem solvers can make many metacognitive judgments during a math problem, ranging from global judgments such as, "Do I care to solve this problem?" to minor cue-based judgments such as, "Is my current strategy successful in making progress toward the correct solution?" Metacognitive monitoring can hinder accurate mathematical problem solving when the monitoring is task-irrelevant; however, task-relevant metacognitive experiences can lead to helpful control decisions in mathematical problem solving such as checking work, considering plausibility of an answer, and considering alternate strategies. Worry and negative thoughts (i.e., math anxiety) can both interfere with the accuracy of metacognitive experiences as cues in mathematical problem solving and lead to avoidance of metacognitive control decisions that could otherwise improve performance. The current paper briefly reviews and incorporates prior literature with current qualitative reports (n = 673) to establish a novel framework of regulated attention in mathematical problem solving (RAMPS).

A computational process-tracing method for measuring people's planning strategies and how they change over time

One of the most unique and impressive feats of the human mind is its ability to discover and continuously refine its own cognitive strategies. Elucidating the underlying learning and adaptation mechanisms is very difficult because changes in cognitive strategies are not directly observable. One important domain in which strategies and mechanisms are studied is planning. To enable researchers to uncover how people learn how to plan, we offer a tutorial introduction to a recently developed process-tracing paradigm along with a new computational method for measuring the nature and development of a person's planning strategies from the resulting process-tracing data. Our method allows researchers to reveal experience-driven changes in people's choice of individual planning operations, planning strategies, strategy types, and the relative contributions of different decision systems. We validate our method on simulated and empirical data. On simulated data, its inferences about the strategies and the relative influence of different decision systems are accurate. When evaluated on human data generated using our process-tracing paradigm, our computational method correctly detects the plasticity-enhancing effect of feedback and the effect of the structure of the environment on people's planning strategies. Together, these methods can be used to investigate the mechanisms of cognitive plasticity and to elucidate how people acquire complex cognitive skills such as planning and problem-solving. Importantly, our methods can also be used to measure individual differences in cognitive plasticity and examine how different types (pedagogical) interventions affect the acquisition of cognitive skills.

Why Should We Study the Foreign Language Effect: Debiasing through Affecting Metacognition?

Debiasing is a method of improving people's decisions by reducing their reliance on salient intuitions causing them to behave suboptimally or biasedly. However, many of the known debiasing techniques have limited effectiveness or can only remedy a one-shot decision, rather than having a lasting impact. In this work, I focus on the role of metacognition in debiasing decision-making and discuss how it can be better understood through the lens of the foreign language effect. The foreign language effect suggests that using a foreign language can sometimes benefit people's decision-making without providing them with additional information or instructions regarding the task. However, we do not fully understand how the foreign language effect works and its limitations. I conclude by urging scientists to research this effect with the hope of having a lasting positive impact on society.

The Role of Semantic Associations as a Metacognitive Cue in Creative Idea Generation

Is my idea creative? This question directs investing in companies and choosing a research agenda. Following previous research, we focus on the originality of ideas and consider their association with self-assessments of idea generators regarding their own originality. We operationalize the originality score as the frequency (%) of each idea within a sample of participants and originality judgment as the self-assessment of this frequency. Initial evidence suggests that originality scores and originality judgments are produced by separate processes. As a result, originality judgments are prone to biases. So far, heuristic cues that lead to such biases are hardly known. We used methods from computational linguistics to examine the semantic distance as a potential heuristic cue underlying originality judgments. We examined the extent to which the semantic distance would contribute additional explanatory value in predicting originality scores and originality judgments, above and beyond cues known from previous research. In Experiment 1, we re-analyzed previous data that compared originality scores and originality judgments after adding the semantic distance of the generated ideas from the stimuli. We found that the semantic distance contributed to the gap between originality scores and originality judgments. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the examples given in task instructions to prime participants with two levels of idea originality and two levels of semantic distance. We replicated Experiment 1 in finding the semantic distance as a biasing factor for originality judgments. In addition, we found differences among the conditions in the extent of the bias. This study highlights the semantic distance as an unacknowledged metacognitive cue and demonstrates its biasing power for originality judgments.

The screen inferiority depends on test format in reasoning and meta-reasoning tasks

Influential work has confirmed screen inferiority in reading tasks that reading on screen is less productive than reading on paper. Recent researches suggest that poor cognitive performance in screen environments may be primarily due to cognitive defects rather than technological flaws. Although some studies have explored screen inferiority in reasoning tasks from cognitive and metacognitive perspectives, related theories have yet to be enriched. Here, we found that screen inferiority exists in reasoning performance regardless of the test format (multiple-choice VS. open-ended), which may result from shallow processing consistent with the previous findings. However, meta-reasoning monitoring showed screen inferiority only in the multiple-choice test format. Our results indicate that the screens exhibit robust inferiority in reasoning scores, while the influence of the media on meta-reasoning may vary with external triggers. Our research may shed light on how to conduct efficient reasoning in the screen age.

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions

The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conflict arguments, arguably because logic is intuitive and automatic enough to interfere with belief judgments. However, recent studies have challenged this interpretation by finding the same conflict effects when a matching heuristic cues the same response as logic, even on arguments with no logically valid structures. In this study, we test the matching heuristic hypothesis across 4 experiments (total N = 409) by manipulating the arguments propositions so that matching cues a response that is either (1) aligned or (2) misaligned with logic, or (3) cues no response at all. Consistent with the predictions of the matching heuristic, standard, reversed, and no conflict effects were found in those conditions, respectively. These results indicate that intuitively correct inferences which are assumed as evidence of logical intuitions are actually driven by a matching heuristic that cues responses aligned with logic. Alleged intuitive logic effects are reversed when the matching heuristic cues an opposing logical response or disappears when there are no matching cues. Therefore, it appears as though the operation of a matching heuristic, rather than an intuitive access to logic, drives logical intuitions.

Metacognitive Feelings as a Source of Information for the Creative Process: A Conceptual Exploration

Philosophers and psychologists have debated the wisdom of using feelings as a source of information when making decisions. While not trying to solve this debate, a complementary approach is to examine how metacognitive feelings are used when generating, evaluating, and selecting ideas to solve creative problems and whether their use leads to accurate idea evaluation and selection. Hence, this conceptual article aims to explore how metacognitive feelings are used to evaluate and select creative ideas. Interestingly, while metacognitive feelings come from the perceived ease or difficulty of generating solutions to creative problems, these feelings also inform the decision to continue generating ideas or stop. Metacognitive feelings are then an integral part of the creative process of generating, evaluating, and selecting ideas. The present article briefly reviews the history of metacognitive feelings as examined in metamemory, meta-reasoning, and judgment formation in social psychology, before discussing their implications and potential for understanding the creative process. The article ends by positing directions for future research.

Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process?

Traditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed to explore reasoning and metacognition when only one type of heuristic process is exploited to cue multiple responses. In two experiments, a novel modification of the Base Rate neglect task was used to create versions in which one belief-based heuristic competes, or works in concert, with another of the same type to provide a response. Experiment 1 results reveal that the presence of conflict between cued responses does not affect meta-reasoning, which indicates that reasoning defaulted to a single process. An alternative explanation was that the effect of conflict was masked due to an imbalance in the strength of the dominant response between conflicting and congruent versions. Experiment 2 was designed to test hypotheses based on these competing explanations. Findings show that when the strength of a response was no longer masking the effect, the conflict did result in longer reasoning times and lower confidence. The study provides more robust evidence in favor of the dual-process account of reasoning, introduces a new methodological approach, and discusses how conflict may be modulated during reasoning.

Metacognitive Myopia: A Major Obstacle on the Way to Rationality

The notion of metacognitive myopia refers to a conspicuous weakness of the quality control of memory and reasoning processes. Although people are often remarkably sensitive even to complex samples of information when making evaluative judgments and decisions, their uncritical and naive tendency to take the validity of sampled information for granted constitutes a major obstacle to rational behavior. After illustrating this phenomenon with reference to prominent biases (base-rate neglect, misattribution, perseverance), we decompose metacognitive myopia into two distinct but intertwined functions, monitoring and control. We offer explanations for why effectively monitoring the biases resulting from information sampling in an uncertain world is so difficult and why the control function is severely restricted by the lack of volitional control over mental actions. Because of these and other difficulties, metacognitive myopia constitutes a major obstacle to rational judgment and decision making.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.

On the role of exploitation and exploration strategies in the maintenance of cognitive biases: Beyond the pursuit of instrumental rewards

Why can initial biases persist in repeated choice tasks? Previous research has shown that frequent rewards can lure the decision maker into premature exploitation of a supposedly best option, which can result in the persistence of initial biases. Here, we demonstrate that even in the absence of rewards, initial biases can be perpetuated through a positive testing strategy. After eliciting a biased preference for one of two equally rewarding options, participants (N = 203) could sample freely from both options without the lure of any financial rewards. When participants were told to rule out alternatives in this phase, they explored the supposedly worse option and thereby managed to overcome their initial bias. When told to optimize their strategy, however, they exhibited a positive testing strategy resulting in the continued exploitation of the supposedly better option, a bias they maintained in an incentivized choice phase and later judgments. Across all participants, individual tendencies to exploit one option in earlier phases predicted biased behavior in subsequent phases. The findings highlight that not only the pursuit of instrumental rewards can lead to exploitation and the maintenance of initial biases. We discuss potential consequences for interventions.

To kill or not to kill: A systematic literature review of high-stakes moral decision-making measures and their psychometric properties

Introduction

The present systematic review investigates the psychological tools available for capturing high-stakes decisions involving life-death content and their psychometric properties. Valid measurement of these individual differences will provide crucial information in the personnel selection and training in fields where high-stakes moral issues exist (e.g., military, medicine). To our knowledge, this is the first systematic examination of such instruments.

Methods

Systematic searches of 6 electronic databases were conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines. An appraisal tool evaluated the quality of identified measures. Twenty studies met pre-determined inclusion criteria. Moral decision-making was assessed with either a self-report scale (n = 3) or moral dilemmas (n = 17).

Results

The findings identified two measures, the Defining Issues Test and the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale as psychometrically sound measures of moral decision-making. However, they are unlikely to be considered "gold standard" measures due to their theoretically specific, but limited, scope. Overall, the findings suggest that research in the area has been scattered. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of moral decision-making, and a lack of cross-validation on how different measures of moral decision-making relate to each other. This presents a gap between theory and empirical measurement in moral decision-making. Further work is needed for a unified conceptualization of moral decision-making to pave the way to both theory development and the development of well-validated measurement tools, and this review provides a critical foundation for both.

Metacognition and learning transfer under uncertainty

OBJECTIVES

This study examined the possible correlation between metacognition and learning experience transfer of nursing students after engaging in an urgent and cognitively demanding clinical situation.

METHODS

This is a one-group post-test- only study design in which participants engaged in an emergency care scenario simulation and completed the Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale - Domain Specific (MCAS-DS).

RESULTS

Study results revealed that participants' metacognitive awareness is significantly correlated to the learning transfer (p=0.0001) and GPA (p=0.006). There is also a positive correlation between learning transfer and GPA (p=0.04), clinical settings-based training experience (p=0.021) and metacognitive confidence (p=0.0001).

CONCLUSIONS

This study may imply that academic achievement can be used as a potential screening tool to identify students requiring metacognitive training. It may also imply that metacognitive abilities can be enhanced indirectly through considering factors that may influence the transfer of learning such as increasing the hours of clinical training.

Functional brain activation patterns of creative metacognitive monitoring

Creative metacognitive monitoring represents the ability to accurately evaluate the quality of own ideas during idea generation. To the best of our knowledge, this study presents the first EEG investigation of creative metacognitive monitoring in the brain, using data, of 100 participants, who generated single, original uses of common objects (alternate uses task). After each response, participants subjectively rated the creative quality of their idea. Additionally, five independent external judges rated the creative quality of all ideas. The correspondence between the subjective and the external performance ratings served as a measure of monitoring accuracy. We applied a generalized linear mixed effects model to investigate effects of creative metacognitive monitoring and creative potential on EEG activity in the alpha band at idea and person level. Participants with both higher monitoring skills and higher creative potential showed stronger alpha power decreases at parietal/occipital sites during creative idea generation and evaluation. Interestingly, only more creative people with lower metacognitive monitoring skills showed the expected alpha power increases at parietal/occipital sites during both phases. Furthermore, metacognitive monitoring skills were associated with lower frontal and temporal/central alpha power during idea evaluation (compared to generation) at the person level. This pattern of findings seems to suggest that less internal attention, less memory load, and increased sensory processing are associated with more effective and accurate monitoring of the creative process. This study sheds first light on the brain mechanisms underlying the interplay of creative metacognitive monitoring skills and creative potential.

Alpha Suppression Is Associated with the Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT) State Whereas Alpha Expression Is Associated with Knowing That One Does Not Know

The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state is a spontaneously occurring metacognitive state that indicates that the answer to a query is almost, but not quite, at hand, i.e., that resolution is imminent. Since the time of William James, a distinctive feeling of nagging frustration has been observed to be associated with TOT states. On a more positive note, TOT states are also associated with intense goal-directed curiosity and with a strong desire to know that translates into successful mental action. The present study showed that prior to the presentation of resolving feedback to verbal queries-if the individual was in a TOT state-alpha suppression was in evidence in the EEG. This alpha suppression appears to be a marker of a spontaneously occurring, conscious, and highly motivating goal-directed internal metacognitive state. At the same time, alpha expression in the same time period was associated with the feeling of not knowing, indicating a more discursive state. Both alpha and alpha suppression were observed broadly across centro-parietal scalp electrodes and disappeared immediately upon presentation of the resolving feedback. Analyses indicated that the occurrence of alpha suppression was associated with participants' verbal affirmations of being in a TOT state, which is also related to subsequent expression of a late positivity when feedback is provided, and to enhanced memory.

A Validated Ontology for Metareasoning in Intelligent Systems

Metareasoning suffers from the heterogeneity problem, in which different researchers build diverse metareasoning models for intelligent systems with comparable functionality but differing contexts, ambiguous terminology, and occasionally contradicting features and descriptions. This article presents an ontology-driven knowledge representation for metareasoning in intelligent systems. The proposed ontology, called IM-Onto, provides a visual means of sharing a common understanding of the structure and relationships between terms and concepts. A rigorous research method was followed to ensure that the two main requirements of the ontology (integrity based on relevant knowledge and acceptance by researchers and practitioners) were met. The high accuracy rate indicates that most of the knowledge elements in the ontology are useful information for the integration of multiple types of metareasoning problems in intelligent systems.

Aspects of self-regulated learning and their influence on the mathematics achievement of fifth graders in the context of four different proclaimed curricula

Metacognition is a part of the models of self-regulated learning. The consideration of a broader context resonates with a social cognitive perspective approach to learning which dominates the educational academic field with the theory of self-regulated learning. Metacognition is considered a crucial factor influencing mathematics achievement. Furthermore, the affective field including pupils' self-efficacy, interest and motivation are the phenomena involved in mathematical problem-solving. On the other hand, metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulations are not a regular part of mathematics education in the Czech Republic. The main aim of this study was to investigate the relation between pupils' attitude toward mathematics; metacognitive knowledge; self-efficacy and motivation; metacognitive monitoring; and their achievement in solving mathematical problems. All together 1,133 students of Grade 5 from four types of Czech schools participated in the study. There were traditional schools; schools teaching mathematics by genetic constructivism, i.e., Hejný's method; Montessori schools; and Dalton schools were involved. The assessed variables, namely relation to mathematics; metacognitive knowledge; self-efficacy and motivation; metacognitive monitoring; and mathematical achievement were used as an input to regression analysis. Item-response theory was used for assessing the performance of the students and demands of the tasks. The metacognitive monitoring was detected as the most significant predictor of mathematics achievement for higher- and lower-performing students as well as for the item with high and low demands. The study reveals how the different mathematics curricula (un)support the metacognitive processes involved in mathematical problem-solving. The information allows teachers to spend sufficient time with particular types of mathematics problems whose solutions is determined by activation of metacognitive processes. This demonstrates the importance of including the activities for development of metacognitive monitoring in mathematics education.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Differences in the distribution of attention to trained procedure between finders and non-finders of the alternative better procedure

The human ability to flexibly discover alternatives without fixating on a known solution supports a variety of human creative activities. Previous research has shown that people who discover an alternative procedure relax their attentional bias to information regarding the known solutions just prior to the discovery. This study examined whether the difference in the distribution of attention between the finders and non-finders of the alternative procedure is observed from the phase of solving the problem using the trained procedure. We evaluated the characteristics of the finders' distribution of attention in situations where problem solving using a trained procedure was successful. This aspect has been little examined in previous research. Our study obtained empirical evidence for the fact that, compared to non-finders, finders pay more attention to information unrelated to the trained procedure acquired through knowledge and experience, even time when using a trained procedure. We also confirmed that this difference does not exist from the beginning of the task, but emerges during repeated use of familiar procedures. These findings indicate that in order to find an alternative procedure, one should not only divert attention from a familiar procedure just before the discovery but also pay a certain amount of attention to information unrelated to the familiar procedure even when the familiar procedure is functioning well.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions of MetaTutor: Leveraging Multichannel Data to Scaffold Self-Regulated Learning With an Intelligent Tutoring System

Self-regulated learning (SRL) is critical for learning across tasks, domains, and contexts. Despite its importance, research shows that not all learners are equally skilled at accurately and dynamically monitoring and regulating their self-regulatory processes. Therefore, learning technologies, such as intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs), have been designed to measure and foster SRL. This paper presents an overview of over 10 years of research on SRL with MetaTutor, a hypermedia-based ITS designed to scaffold college students' SRL while they learn about the human circulatory system. MetaTutor's architecture and instructional features are designed based on models of SRL, empirical evidence on human and computerized tutoring principles of multimedia learning, Artificial Intelligence (AI) in educational systems for metacognition and SRL, and research on SRL from our team and that of other researchers. We present MetaTutor followed by a synthesis of key research findings on the effectiveness of various versions of the system (e.g., adaptive scaffolding vs. no scaffolding of self-regulatory behavior) on learning outcomes. First, we focus on findings from self-reports, learning outcomes, and multimodal data (e.g., log files, eye tracking, facial expressions of emotion, screen recordings) and their contributions to our understanding of SRL with an ITS. Second, we elaborate on the role of embedded pedagogical agents (PAs) as external regulators designed to scaffold learners' cognitive and metacognitive SRL strategy use. Third, we highlight and elaborate on the contributions of multimodal data in measuring and understanding the role of cognitive, affective, metacognitive, and motivational (CAMM) processes. Additionally, we unpack some of the challenges these data pose for designing real-time instructional interventions that scaffold SRL. Fourth, we present existing theoretical, methodological, and analytical challenges and briefly discuss lessons learned and open challenges.

Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences

This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.

Confidence in COVID problem solving: What factors predict adults' item-level metacognitive judgments on health-related math problems before and after an educational intervention?

The advent of COVID-19 highlighted widespread misconceptions regarding people's accuracy in interpreting quantitative health information. How do people judge whether they accurately answered health-related math problems? Which individual differences predict these item-by-item metacognitive monitoring judgments? How does a brief intervention targeting math skills-which increased problem-solving accuracy-affect people's monitoring judgments? We investigated these pre-registered questions in a secondary analysis of data from a large Qualtrics panel of adults (N = 1,297). Pretest performance accuracy, math self-efficacy, gender, and math anxiety were associated with pretest item-level monitoring judgments. Participants randomly assigned to the intervention condition, relative to the control condition, made higher monitoring judgments post intervention. That is, these participants believed they were more accurate when answering problems. Regardless of experimental condition, those who actually were correct on health-related math problems made higher monitoring judgments than those who answered incorrectly. Finally, consistent with prior research, math anxiety explained additional variance in monitoring judgments beyond trait anxiety. Together, findings indicated the importance of considering both objective (e.g., problem accuracy) and subjective factors (e.g., math self-efficacy, math anxiety) to better understand adults' metacognitive monitoring.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11409-022-09300-3.