1
|
Granato G, Baldassarre G. Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory. Neural Netw 2024; 176:106292. [PMID: 38657422 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106292] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2023] [Revised: 03/27/2024] [Accepted: 04/05/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Granato
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
| | - Gianluca Baldassarre
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Storm JF, Klink PC, Aru J, Senn W, Goebel R, Pigorini A, Avanzini P, Vanduffel W, Roelfsema PR, Massimini M, Larkum ME, Pennartz CMA. An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1531-1552. [PMID: 38447578 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/05/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Johan F Storm
- The Brain Signaling Group, Division of Physiology, IMB, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Domus Medica, Sognsvannsveien 9, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
| | - P Christiaan Klink
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Experimental Psychology, Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, 3584 CS Utrecht, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France
| | - Jaan Aru
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
| | - Walter Senn
- Department of Physiology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Rainer Goebel
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Oxfordlaan 55, 6229 EV Maastricht, The Netherlands
| | - Andrea Pigorini
- Department of Biomedical, Surgical and Dental Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20122, Italy
| | - Pietro Avanzini
- Istituto di Neuroscienze, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 43125 Parma, Italy
| | - Wim Vanduffel
- Department of Neurosciences, Laboratory of Neuro and Psychophysiology, KU Leuven Medical School, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA; Department of Radiology, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02144, USA
| | - Pieter R Roelfsema
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France; Department of Integrative Neurophysiology, VU University, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Neurosurgery, Academisch Medisch Centrum, Postbus 22660, 1100 DD Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Marcello Massimini
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences "L. Sacco", Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20157, Italy; Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi, Milan 20122, Italy; Azrieli Program in Brain, Mind and Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Matthew E Larkum
- Institute of Biology, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Neurocure Center for Excellence, Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Center for Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Sciencepark 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Bellet ME, Gay M, Bellet J, Jarraya B, Dehaene S, van Kerkoerle T, Panagiotaropoulos TI. Spontaneously emerging internal models of visual sequences combine abstract and event-specific information in the prefrontal cortex. Cell Rep 2024; 43:113952. [PMID: 38483904 DOI: 10.1016/j.celrep.2024.113952] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2022] [Revised: 06/06/2023] [Accepted: 02/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/02/2024] Open
Abstract
When exposed to sensory sequences, do macaque monkeys spontaneously form abstract internal models that generalize to novel experiences? Here, we show that neuronal populations in macaque ventrolateral prefrontal cortex jointly encode visual sequences by separate codes for the specific pictures presented and for their abstract sequential structure. We recorded prefrontal neurons while macaque monkeys passively viewed visual sequences and sequence mismatches in the local-global paradigm. Even without any overt task or response requirements, prefrontal populations spontaneously form representations of sequence structure, serial order, and image identity within distinct but superimposed neuronal subspaces. Representations of sequence structure rapidly update following single exposure to a mismatch sequence, while distinct populations represent mismatches for sequences of different complexity. Finally, those representations generalize across sequences following the same repetition structure but comprising different images. These results suggest that prefrontal populations spontaneously encode rich internal models of visual sequences reflecting both content-specific and abstract information.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Marie E Bellet
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
| | - Marion Gay
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
| | - Joachim Bellet
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
| | - Bechir Jarraya
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, Versailles, France; Neuromodulation Pole, Foch Hospital, Suresnes, France
| | - Stanislas Dehaene
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Collège de France, Université Paris-Sciences-Lettres (PSL), Paris, France
| | - Timo van Kerkoerle
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Department of Neurophysics, Donders Center for Neuroscience, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands; Department of Neurobiology and Aging, Biomedical Primate Research Center, Rijswijk, the Netherlands
| | | |
Collapse
|
4
|
Evers K, Farisco M, Pennartz CMA. Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103668. [PMID: 38417198 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2023] [Revised: 02/07/2024] [Accepted: 02/12/2024] [Indexed: 03/01/2024]
Abstract
How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- K Evers
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
| | - M Farisco
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; Bioethics Unit, Biogem, Molecular Biology and Molecular Genetics Research Institute, Ariano Irpino (AV), Italy
| | - C M A Pennartz
- Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherland; Research Priority Area, Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Pennartz CMA, Oude Lohuis MN, Olcese U. How 'visual' is the visual cortex? The interactions between the visual cortex and other sensory, motivational and motor systems as enabling factors for visual perception. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20220336. [PMID: 37545313 PMCID: PMC10404929 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0336] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2023] [Accepted: 06/13/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The definition of the visual cortex is primarily based on the evidence that lesions of this area impair visual perception. However, this does not exclude that the visual cortex may process more information than of retinal origin alone, or that other brain structures contribute to vision. Indeed, research across the past decades has shown that non-visual information, such as neural activity related to reward expectation and value, locomotion, working memory and other sensory modalities, can modulate primary visual cortical responses to retinal inputs. Nevertheless, the function of this non-visual information is poorly understood. Here we review recent evidence, coming primarily from studies in rodents, arguing that non-visual and motor effects in visual cortex play a role in visual processing itself, for instance disentangling direct auditory effects on visual cortex from effects of sound-evoked orofacial movement. These findings are placed in a broader framework casting vision in terms of predictive processing under control of frontal, reward- and motor-related systems. In contrast to the prevalent notion that vision is exclusively constructed by the visual cortical system, we propose that visual percepts are generated by a larger network-the extended visual system-spanning other sensory cortices, supramodal areas and frontal systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Matthijs N. Oude Lohuis
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Champalimaud Research, Champalimaud Foundation, 1400-038 Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Umberto Olcese
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Nieder A. In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104865. [PMID: 36096205 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104865] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2022] [Revised: 08/17/2022] [Accepted: 09/05/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
Abstract
Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Andreas Nieder
- Animal Physiology Unit, Institute of Neurobiology, University of Tübingen, Auf der Morgenstelle 28, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Pennartz CMA. What is neurorepresentationalism? From neural activity and predictive processing to multi-level representations and consciousness. Behav Brain Res 2022; 432:113969. [PMID: 35718232 DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113969] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/29/2021] [Revised: 05/18/2022] [Accepted: 05/20/2022] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
Abstract
This review provides an update on Neurorepresentationalism, a theoretical framework that defines conscious experience as multimodal, situational survey and explains its neural basis from brain systems constructing best-guess representations of sensations originating in our environment and body [1]. It posits that conscious experience is characterized by five essential hallmarks: (i) multimodal richness, (ii) situatedness and immersion, (iii) unity and integration, (iv) dynamics and stability, and (v) intentionality. Consciousness is furthermore proposed to have a biological function, framed by the contrast between reflexes and habits (not requiring consciousness) versus goal-directed, planned behavior (requiring multimodal, situational survey). Conscious experience is therefore understood as a sensorily rich, spatially encompassing representation of body and environment, while we nevertheless have the impression of experiencing external reality directly. Contributions to understanding neural mechanisms underlying consciousness are derived from models for predictive processing, which are trained in an unsupervised manner, do not necessarily require overt action, and have been extended to deep neural networks. Even with predictive processing in place, however, the question remains why this type of neural network activity would give rise to phenomenal experience. Here, I propose to tackle the Hard Problem with the concept of multi-level representations which emergently give rise to multimodal, spatially wide superinferences corresponding to phenomenal experiences. Finally, Neurorepresentationalism is compared to other neural theories of consciousness, and its implications for defining indicators of consciousness in animals, artificial intelligence devices and immobile or unresponsive patients with disorders of consciousness are discussed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Center for Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Abstract
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
Collapse
|
10
|
Farisco M, Pennartz C, Annen J, Cecconi B, Evers K. Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients. BMC Med Ethics 2022; 23:30. [PMID: 35313885 PMCID: PMC8935680 DOI: 10.1186/s12910-022-00770-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2020] [Accepted: 03/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches.
Main body We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity. Conclusions Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michele Farisco
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden. .,Science and Society Unit, Biogem, Biology and Molecular Genetics Research Institute, Ariano Irpino, AV, Italy.
| | - Cyriel Pennartz
- Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.,Research Priority Area, Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Jitka Annen
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium.,Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Benedetta Cecconi
- Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium.,Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Kathinka Evers
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Slater M, Sanchez-Vives MV. Is Consciousness First in Virtual Reality? Front Psychol 2022; 13:787523. [PMID: 35222187 PMCID: PMC8873142 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.787523] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2021] [Accepted: 01/10/2022] [Indexed: 01/30/2023] Open
Abstract
The prevailing scientific paradigm is that matter is primary and everything, including consciousness can be derived from the laws governing matter. Although the scientific explanation of consciousness on these lines has not been realized, in this view it is only a matter of time before consciousness will be explained through neurobiological activity in the brain, and nothing else. There is an alternative view that holds that it is fundamentally impossible to explain how subjectivity can arise solely out of material processes-"the hard problem of consciousness"-and instead consciousness should be regarded in itself as a primary force in nature. This view attempts to derive, for example, the laws of physics from models of consciousness, instead of the other way around. While as scientists we can understand and have an intuition for the first paradigm, it is very difficult to understand what "consciousness is primary" might mean since it has no intuitive scientific grounding. Here we show that worlds experienced through virtual reality (VR) are such that consciousness is a first order phenomenon. We discuss the Interface Theory of Perception which claims that in physical reality perceptions are not veridical and that we do not see the "truth" but that perception is based on evolutionary payoffs. We show that this theory may provide an accurate description of perception and consciousness within VR, and we put forward an experimental study that could throw light on this. We conclude that VR does offer an experimental frame that provides intuition with respect to the idea that "consciousness is first" and what this might mean regarding the perceived world. However, we do not draw any conclusions about the veracity of this notion with respect to physical reality or question the emergence of consciousness from brain function.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mel Slater
- Event Lab, Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychobiology, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- Institute of Neurosciences of the University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Institut d’Investigacions Biomédiques August Pi i Sunyer (IDIBAPS), Barcelona, Spain
- ICREA, Barcelona, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Chang AYC, Biehl M, Yu Y, Kanai R. Information Closure Theory of Consciousness. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1504. [PMID: 32760320 PMCID: PMC7374725 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01504] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2019] [Accepted: 06/05/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Information processing in neural systems can be described and analyzed at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Generally, information at lower levels is more fine-grained but can be coarse-grained at higher levels. However, only information processed at specific scales of coarse-graining appears to be available for conscious awareness. We do not have direct experience of information available at the scale of individual neurons, which is noisy and highly stochastic. Neither do we have experience of more macro-scale interactions, such as interpersonal communications. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that conscious experiences co-vary with information encoded in coarse-grained neural states such as the firing pattern of a population of neurons. In this article, we introduce a new informational theory of consciousness: Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We hypothesize that conscious processes are processes which form non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) with respect to the environment at certain coarse-grained scales. This hypothesis implies that conscious experience is confined due to informational closure from conscious processing to other coarse-grained scales. Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT) proposes new quantitative definitions of both conscious content and conscious level. With the parsimonious definitions and a hypothesize, ICT provides explanations and predictions of various phenomena associated with consciousness. The implications of ICT naturally reconcile issues in many existing theories of consciousness and provides explanations for many of our intuitions about consciousness. Most importantly, ICT demonstrates that information can be the common language between consciousness and physical reality.
Collapse
|
13
|
Wiese W. The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model. Neurosci Conscious 2020; 2020:niaa013. [PMID: 32676200 PMCID: PMC7352491 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2020] [Revised: 04/24/2020] [Accepted: 04/29/2020] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Wanja Wiese
- Department of Philosophy, Johannes Gutenberg University, Jakob-Welder-Weg 18, 55128 Mainz, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Abstract
The QBIT theory is an attempt toward solving the problem of consciousness based on empirical evidence provided by various scientific disciplines including quantum mechanics, biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. This theory formulates the problem of consciousness in the following four questions, and provides preliminary answers for each question: Question 1: What is the nature of qualia? ANSWER A quale is a superdense pack of quantum information encoded in maximally entangled pure states. Question 2: How are qualia generated? ANSWER When a pack of quantum information is compressed beyond a certain threshold, a quale is generated. Question 3: Why are qualia subjective? ANSWER A quale is subjective because a pack of information encoded in maximally entangled pure states are essentially private and unshareable. Question 4: Why does a quale have a particular meaning? ANSWER A pack of information within a cognitive system gradually obtains a particular meaning as it undergoes a progressive process of interpretation performed by an internal model installed in the system. This paper introduces the QBIT theory of consciousness, and explains its basic assumptions and conjectures.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Majid Beshkar
- Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran.
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Osman M. Overstepping the boundaries of free choice: Folk beliefs on free will and determinism in real world contexts. Conscious Cogn 2019; 77:102860. [PMID: 31862499 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102860] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/11/2019] [Revised: 12/04/2019] [Accepted: 12/04/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
We know little about the commonality of folk beliefs around applications of psychological research on the unconscious control of behaviours. To address this, in Experiment 1 (N = 399) participants volunteered examples of where research on the unconscious has been applied to influence their behaviours. A subset of these were presented in Experiment 2 (N = 198) and Experiment 3 (N = 100). Participants rated the extent to which the behaviour being influenced in these contexts was: (1) via the unconscious, (2) free, (3) the result of prior conscious intentions, (4) under conscious control. Relative to judgements about the extent to which behaviour was influenced via the unconscious, the remaining judgements regarding conscious control of behaviours were either higher (e.g., political contexts) or lower (e.g., therapy). This study is the first to show, using ecologically valid examples, the folk beliefs people share on psychological constructs concerning free will and determinism.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Magda Osman
- Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Rd, London E14NS, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Kanai R, Chang A, Yu Y, Magrans de Abril I, Biehl M, Guttenberg N. Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2019; 2019:niz016. [PMID: 31798969 PMCID: PMC6884095 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/02/2019] [Revised: 10/14/2019] [Accepted: 10/22/2019] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
What is the biological advantage of having consciousness? Functions of consciousness have been elusive due to the subjective nature of consciousness and ample empirical evidence showing the presence of many nonconscious cognitive performances in the human brain. Drawing upon empirical literature, here, we propose that a core function of consciousness be the ability to internally generate representations of events possibly detached from the current sensory input. Such representations are constructed by generative models learned through sensory-motor interactions with the environment. We argue that the ability to generate information underlies a variety of cognitive functions associated with consciousness such as intention, imagination, planning, short-term memory, attention, curiosity, and creativity, all of which contribute to non-reflexive behavior. According to this view, consciousness emerged in evolution when organisms gained the ability to perform internal simulations using internal models, which endowed them with flexible intelligent behavior. To illustrate the notion of information generation, we take variational autoencoders (VAEs) as an analogy and show that information generation corresponds the decoding (or decompression) part of VAEs. In biological brains, we propose that information generation corresponds to top-down predictions in the predictive coding framework. This is compatible with empirical observations that recurrent feedback activations are linked with consciousness whereas feedforward processing alone seems to occur without evoking conscious experience. Taken together, the information generation hypothesis captures many aspects of existing ideas about potential functions of consciousness and provides new perspectives on the functional roles of consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ryota Kanai
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| | - Acer Chang
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| | - Yen Yu
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| | - Ildefons Magrans de Abril
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| | - Martin Biehl
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| | - Nicholas Guttenberg
- Basic Research Group, Araya, Inc., P.O. Box 577 ARK Mori Building 24 F, 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-6024, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
17
|
Rusu SI, Pennartz CMA. Learning, memory and consolidation mechanisms for behavioral control in hierarchically organized cortico-basal ganglia systems. Hippocampus 2019; 30:73-98. [PMID: 31617622 PMCID: PMC6972576 DOI: 10.1002/hipo.23167] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2018] [Revised: 09/09/2019] [Accepted: 09/11/2019] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
This article aims to provide a synthesis on the question how brain structures cooperate to accomplish hierarchically organized behaviors, characterized by low‐level, habitual routines nested in larger sequences of planned, goal‐directed behavior. The functioning of a connected set of brain structures—prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, striatum, and dopaminergic mesencephalon—is reviewed in relation to two important distinctions: (a) goal‐directed as opposed to habitual behavior and (b) model‐based and model‐free learning. Recent evidence indicates that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortices not only subserve goal‐directed behavior and model‐based learning, but also code the “landscape” (task space) of behaviorally relevant variables. While the hippocampus stands out for its role in coding and memorizing world state representations, it is argued to function in model‐based learning but is not required for coding of action–outcome contingencies, illustrating that goal‐directed behavior is not congruent with model‐based learning. While the dorsolateral and dorsomedial striatum largely conform to the dichotomy between habitual versus goal‐directed behavior, ventral striatal functions go beyond this distinction. Next, we contextualize findings on coding of reward‐prediction errors by ventral tegmental dopamine neurons to suggest a broader role of mesencephalic dopamine cells, viz. in behavioral reactivity and signaling unexpected sensory changes. We hypothesize that goal‐directed behavior is hierarchically organized in interconnected cortico‐basal ganglia loops, where a limbic‐affective prefrontal‐ventral striatal loop controls action selection in a dorsomedial prefrontal–striatal loop, which in turn regulates activity in sensorimotor‐dorsolateral striatal circuits. This structure for behavioral organization requires alignment with mechanisms for memory formation and consolidation. We propose that frontal corticothalamic circuits form a high‐level loop for memory processing that initiates and temporally organizes nested activities in lower‐level loops, including the hippocampus and the ripple‐associated replay it generates. The evidence on hierarchically organized behavior converges with that on consolidation mechanisms in suggesting a frontal‐to‐caudal directionality in processing control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Silviu I Rusu
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.,Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.,Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Towards a Unified View on Pathways and Functions of Neural Recurrent Processing. Trends Neurosci 2019; 42:589-603. [PMID: 31399289 DOI: 10.1016/j.tins.2019.07.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2019] [Revised: 06/21/2019] [Accepted: 07/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
There are three neural feedback pathways to the primary visual cortex (V1): corticocortical, pulvinocortical, and cholinergic. What are the respective functions of these three projections? Possible functions range from contextual modulation of stimulus processing and feedback of high-level information to predictive processing (PP). How are these functions subserved by different pathways and can they be integrated into an overarching theoretical framework? We propose that corticocortical and pulvinocortical connections are involved in all three functions, whereas the role of cholinergic projections is limited by their slow response to stimuli. PP provides a broad explanatory framework under which stimulus-context modulation and high-level processing are subsumed, involving multiple feedback pathways that provide mechanisms for inferring and interpreting what sensory inputs are about.
Collapse
|
19
|
Pennartz CMA, Farisco M, Evers K. Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach. Front Syst Neurosci 2019; 13:25. [PMID: 31379521 PMCID: PMC6660257 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2019.00025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2019] [Accepted: 06/24/2019] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Research Priority Area, Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Michele Farisco
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
- Biogem, Biology and Molecular Genetics Institute, Ariano Irpino, Italy
| | - Kathinka Evers
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Ju U, Wallraven C. Manipulating and decoding subjective gaming experience during active gameplay: a multivariate, whole-brain analysis. Neuroimage 2019; 188:1-13. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.11.061] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2018] [Revised: 11/09/2018] [Accepted: 11/30/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
|
21
|
Meijer GT, Mertens PEC, Pennartz CMA, Olcese U, Lansink CS. The circuit architecture of cortical multisensory processing: Distinct functions jointly operating within a common anatomical network. Prog Neurobiol 2019; 174:1-15. [PMID: 30677428 DOI: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2019.01.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/21/2017] [Revised: 12/21/2018] [Accepted: 01/21/2019] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
Our perceptual systems continuously process sensory inputs from different modalities and organize these streams of information such that our subjective representation of the outside world is a unified experience. By doing so, they also enable further cognitive processing and behavioral action. While cortical multisensory processing has been extensively investigated in terms of psychophysics and mesoscale neural correlates, an in depth understanding of the underlying circuit-level mechanisms is lacking. Previous studies on circuit-level mechanisms of multisensory processing have predominantly focused on cue integration, i.e. the mechanism by which sensory features from different modalities are combined to yield more reliable stimulus estimates than those obtained by using single sensory modalities. In this review, we expand the framework on the circuit-level mechanisms of cortical multisensory processing by highlighting that multisensory processing is a family of functions - rather than a single operation - which involves not only the integration but also the segregation of modalities. In addition, multisensory processing not only depends on stimulus features, but also on cognitive resources, such as attention and memory, as well as behavioral context, to determine the behavioral outcome. We focus on rodent models as a powerful instrument to study the circuit-level bases of multisensory processes, because they enable combining cell-type-specific recording and interventional techniques with complex behavioral paradigms. We conclude that distinct multisensory processes share overlapping anatomical substrates, are implemented by diverse neuronal micro-circuitries that operate in parallel, and are flexibly recruited based on factors such as stimulus features and behavioral constraints.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Guido T Meijer
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Paul E C Mertens
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Umberto Olcese
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Carien S Lansink
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
Olcese U, Oude Lohuis MN, Pennartz CMA. Sensory Processing Across Conscious and Nonconscious Brain States: From Single Neurons to Distributed Networks for Inferential Representation. Front Syst Neurosci 2018; 12:49. [PMID: 30364373 PMCID: PMC6193318 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2018.00049] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2018] [Accepted: 09/25/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Neuronal activity is markedly different across brain states: it varies from desynchronized activity during wakefulness to the synchronous alternation between active and silent states characteristic of deep sleep. Surprisingly, limited attention has been paid to investigating how brain states affect sensory processing. While it was long assumed that the brain was mostly disconnected from external stimuli during sleep, an increasing number of studies indicates that sensory stimuli continue to be processed across all brain states-albeit differently. In this review article, we first discuss what constitutes a brain state. We argue that-next to global, behavioral states such as wakefulness and sleep-there is a concomitant need to distinguish bouts of oscillatory dynamics with specific global/local activity patterns and lasting for a few hundreds of milliseconds, as these can lead to the same sensory stimulus being either perceived or not. We define these short-lasting bouts as micro-states. We proceed to characterize how sensory-evoked neural responses vary between conscious and nonconscious states. We focus on two complementary aspects: neuronal ensembles and inter-areal communication. First, we review which features of ensemble activity are conducive to perception, and how these features vary across brain states. Properties such as heterogeneity, sparsity and synchronicity in neuronal ensembles will especially be considered as essential correlates of conscious processing. Second, we discuss how inter-areal communication varies across brain states and how this may affect brain operations and sensory processing. Finally, we discuss predictive coding (PC) and the concept of multi-level representations as a key framework for understanding conscious sensory processing. In this framework the brain implements conscious representations as inferences about world states across multiple representational levels. In this representational hierarchy, low-level inference may be carried out nonconsciously, whereas high levels integrate across different sensory modalities and larger spatial scales, correlating with conscious processing. This inferential framework is used to interpret several cellular and population-level findings in the context of brain states, and we briefly compare its implications to two other theories of consciousness. In conclusion, this review article, provides foundations to guide future studies aiming to uncover the mechanisms of sensory processing and perception across brain states.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Umberto Olcese
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Matthijs N. Oude Lohuis
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience Group, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
23
|
Placebo Effect: Theory, Mechanisms and Teleological Roots. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF NEUROBIOLOGY 2018; 139:233-253. [PMID: 30146049 DOI: 10.1016/bs.irn.2018.07.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
Why pain can be relieved with placebos is heavily debated. The term "placebo effect," implies that the placebo treatment induces pain relief which is imprecise because it is the mental cueing to the context of treatment and not the placebo itself that can reduce pain. This essay reverts to fundamentals of perception that have been used to explain how context generates predictions that can in turn effect the process of processing, organizing and interpreting of sensory inputs received from the periphery. We reinterpret placebo effect as a neurobiological phenomenon that occurs through the process of reward and aversive learning. The brain uses learnt information to generate predictions. The perceptual processes adjust the experience of pain to fit with the predictions generated from prior information. Placebo effect is thus understandably a result of the expectations and mental states that result from engaging in the process of treatment. These processes have teleological roots in ancient medicine and are the context that produces these responses is transforming with the evolution of modern medicine. Thus, when placebo effect is observed, the potent agent that induces pain reduction is not the placebo itself, but the mental cueing to the context of taking treatment.
Collapse
|