Ontogenetic Origins of Human Integer Representations

Children's representation of coincidence

People relish thinking about coincidences-we puzzle over their meanings and delight in conveying our experiences of them to others. But whereas some research has begun to explore how coincidences are represented by adults, little is known about the early development of these representations. Here we explored factors influencing coincidence representations in both adults and children. Across two experiments, participants read stories describing co-occurring events and then judged whether these constituted coincidences. In Experiment 1 we found that adults' coincidence judgments were highly sensitive to the presence or absence of plausible explanations: as expected, adults were more likely to judge co-occurrences as a coincidence when no explanation was available. Importantly, their coincidence judgments were also modulated by the number of events that co-occurred. Adults tended to reject scenarios involving too many co-occurring events as coincidences regardless of whether an explanation was present, suggesting that observing suspiciously many co-occurrences triggered them to infer their own underlying explanation (and thus blocking the events' interpretation as a coincidence). In Experiment 2 we found that 4- to 10-year-old children also represent coincidences, and identify them via the absence of plausible explanations. Older children, like adults, rejected suspiciously large numbers of co-occurring events as coincidental, whereas younger children did not exhibit this sensitivity. Overall, these results suggest that representation of coincidence is available from early in life, but undergoes developmental change during the early school-age years.

Symbolic metaprogram search improves learning efficiency and explains rule learning in humans

Throughout their lives, humans seem to learn a variety of rules for things like applying category labels, following procedures, and explaining causal relationships. These rules are often algorithmically rich but are nonetheless acquired with minimal data and computation. Symbolic models based on program learning successfully explain rule-learning in many domains, but performance degrades quickly as program complexity increases. It remains unclear how to scale symbolic rule-learning methods to model human performance in challenging domains. Here we show that symbolic search over the space of metaprograms-programs that revise programs-dramatically improves learning efficiency. On a behavioral benchmark of 100 algorithmically rich rules, this approach fits human learning more accurately than alternative models while also using orders of magnitude less search. The computation required to match median human performance is consistent with conservative estimates of human thinking time. Our results suggest that metaprogram-like representations may help human learners to efficiently acquire rules.

(Dis)similarities between non-symbolic and symbolic number representations: Insights from vector space models

Empirical evidence in support of a shared system for non-symbolic and symbolic number processing has been inconclusive. The current study aims to address this question in a novel way, specifically by testing whether the efficient coding principle based on co-occurrence of number symbols in natural language holds for both non-symbolic and symbolic number processing. The efficient coding principle postulates that perception is optimized when stimuli frequently co-occur in a natural environment. We hypothesized that both numerical ratios and co-occurrence frequencies of symbolic numbers would significantly influence participants' performance on a non-symbolic and symbolic number comparison task. To test this hypothesis, we employed latent semantic analysis on a TASA corpus to quantify number co-occurrence in natural language and calculate language similarity estimates. We engaged 73 native English speakers (mean age = 19.36, standard deviation = 1.83) with normal or corrected vision and no learning disorders in a number comparison task involving non-symbolic (dot arrays) and symbolic stimuli (Arabic numerals and English number words). Results showed that numerical ratios significantly predicted participants' performances across all number formats (ps < 0.001). Language similarity estimates derived from everyday language also predicted performance on the non-symbolic task and the symbolic task involving number words (ps < 0.007). Our results highlight the complex nature of numerical processing, pointing to the co-occurrence of number symbols in natural language as an auxiliary factor in understanding the shared characteristics between non-symbolic and symbolic number representations. Given that our study focused on a limited number range (5 to 16) and a specific task type, future studies should explore a wider range of tasks and numbers to further test the role of the efficient coding principle in number processing.

Thinking about numbers in different tongues: An overview of the influences of multilingualism on numerical and mathematical competencies

In an increasingly multilingual and multicultural world, understanding the interactions between language and mathematics is critical, especially when individuals must acquire and exercise their mathematical competencies in multiple languages. Indeed, research shows that, overall, L2 language learners are at an academic disadvantage compared to their L1 peers. The current article briefly overviews how multilingualism influences basic and advanced mathematical skills and interacts with mathematical learning difficulties. We first outline the traditional cognitive models of number learning and language processing. We then discuss the particularities of multilingualism and how it impacts numerical skills such as counting and building lexical-semantic associations, transcoding and arithmetic, mathematical word problems and mathematical performance tests, and dyscalculia diagnosis. We end this review by outlining challenges, recommendations, and solutions for multilingual educational settings. The article is intended as a guide for numerical cognition researchers who work with diverse populations and for mathematics educators and educational policy-makers facing the challenges of a multilingual classroom.

"Catastrophic" set size limits on infants' capacity to represent objects: A systematic review and Bayesian meta-analysis

Decades of research has revealed that humans can concurrently represent small quantities of three-dimensional objects as those objects move through space or into occlusion. For infants (but not older children or adults), this ability apparently comes with a significant limitation: when the number of occluded objects exceeds three, infants experience what has been characterized as a "catastrophic" set size limit, failing to represent even the approximate quantity of the hidden array. Infants' apparent catastrophic representational failures suggest a significant information processing limitation in the first years of life, and the evidence has been used as support for prominent theories of the development of object and numerical cognition. However, the evidence for catastrophic failure consists of individual small-n experiments that use null hypothesis significance testing to obtain null results (i.e., p > 0.05). Whether catastrophic representational failures are robust or reliable across studies, methods, and labs is not known. Here we report a systematic review and Bayesian meta-analysis to examine the strength of the evidence in favor of catastrophic representational failures in infancy. Our analysis of 22 experiments across 12 reports, with a combined total of n = 367 infants aged 10-20 months, revealed strong support for the evidence for catastrophic set size limits. A complementary analysis found moderate support for infants' success when representing fewer than four objects. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of object and numerical cognitive development. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Previous work has suggested that infants are unable to concurrently represent four or more objects-a "catastrophic" set size limit. We reviewed this work and conducted a Bayesian meta-analysis to examine the robustness of this limit across individual small-n experiments. We found strong support for the evidence for catastrophic set size limits, and moderate support for infants' success when representing fewer than four objects.

The relational bottleneck as an inductive bias for efficient abstraction

A central challenge for cognitive science is to explain how abstract concepts are acquired from limited experience. This has often been framed in terms of a dichotomy between connectionist and symbolic cognitive models. Here, we highlight a recently emerging line of work that suggests a novel reconciliation of these approaches, by exploiting an inductive bias that we term the relational bottleneck. In that approach, neural networks are constrained via their architecture to focus on relations between perceptual inputs, rather than the attributes of individual inputs. We review a family of models that employ this approach to induce abstractions in a data-efficient manner, emphasizing their potential as candidate models for the acquisition of abstract concepts in the human mind and brain.

Children dynamically update and extend the interface between number words and perceptual magnitudes

As adults, we represent and think about number, space, and time in at least two ways: our intuitive-but imprecise-perceptual representations, and the slowly learned-but precise-number words. With development, these representational formats interface, allowing us to use precise number words to estimate imprecise perceptual experiences. We test two accounts of this developmental milestone. Either slowly learned associations are required for the interface to form, predicting that deviations from typical experiences (e.g., presentation of a novel unit or unpracticed dimension) will disrupt children's ability to map number words to their perceptual experiences or children's understanding of the logical similarity between number words and perceptual representations allows them to flexibly extend this interface to novel experiences (e.g., units and dimensions they have not yet learned how to formally measure). 5-11-year-olds completed verbal estimation and perceptual sensitivity tasks across three dimensions: Number, Length, and Area. For verbal estimation, they were given novel units (i.e., a three-dot unit called one "toma" for Number, a 44 px long line called one "blicket" for Length, a 111 px2 blob called one "modi" for Area) and asked to estimate how many tomas/blickets/modies they saw when shown a larger set of dots, lines, and blobs. Children could flexibly link number words to novel units across dimensions, demonstrating positive estimation slopes, even for Length and Area, which younger children had limited experience with. This suggests that the logic of structure mapping can be dynamically utilized across perceptual dimensions, even without extensive experience.

Creating ad hoc graphical representations of number

The ability to communicate about exact number is critical to many modern human practices spanning science, industry, and politics. Although some early numeral systems used 1-to-1 correspondence (e.g., 'IIII' to represent 4), most systems provide compact representations via more arbitrary conventions (e.g., '7' and 'VII'). When people are unable to rely on conventional numerals, however, what strategies do they initially use to communicate number? Across three experiments, participants used pictures to communicate about visual arrays of objects containing 1-16 items, either by producing freehand drawings or combining sets of visual tokens. We analyzed how the pictures they produced varied as a function of communicative need (Experiment 1), spatial regularities in the arrays (Experiment 2), and visual properties of tokens (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1, we found that participants often expressed number in the form of 1-to-1 representations, but sometimes also exploited the configuration of sets. In Experiment 2, this strategy of using configural cues was exaggerated when sets were especially large, and when the cues were predictably correlated with number. Finally, in Experiment 3, participants readily adopted salient numerical features of objects (e.g., four-leaf clover) and generally combined them in a cumulative-additive manner. Taken together, these findings corroborate historical evidence that humans exploit correlates of number in the external environment - such as shape, configural cues, or 1-to-1 correspondence - as the basis for innovating more abstract number representations.

Association neurons in the crow telencephalon link visual signs to numerical values

Many animals can associate signs with numerical values and use these signs in a goal-directed way during task performance. However, the neuronal basis of this semantic association has only rarely been investigated, and so far only in primates. How mechanisms of number associations are implemented in the distinctly evolved brains of other animal taxa such as birds is currently unknown. Here, we explored this semantic number-sign mapping by recording single-neuron activity in the crows' nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL), a brain structure critically involved in avian numerical cognition. Crows were trained to associate visual shapes with varying numbers of items in a number production task. The responses of many NCL neurons during stimulus presentation reflected the numerical values associated with visual shapes in a behaviorally relevant way. Consistent with the crow's better behavioral performance with signs, neuronal representations of numerical values extracted from shapes were more selective compared to those from dot arrays. The existence of number association neurons in crows points to a phylogenetic preadaptation of the brains of cognitively advanced vertebrates to link visual shapes with numerical meaning.

The algorithmic origins of counting

The study of how children learn numbers has yielded one of the most productive research programs in cognitive development, spanning empirical and computational methods, as well as nativist and empiricist philosophies. This paper provides a tutorial on how to think computationally about learning models in a domain like number, where learners take finite data and go far beyond what they directly observe or perceive. To illustrate, this paper then outlines a model which acquires a counting procedure using observations of sets and words, extending the proposal of Piantadosi et al. (2012). This new version of the model responds to several critiques of the original work and outlines an approach which is likely appropriate for acquiring further aspects of mathematics.

Questions About Quantifiers: Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Quantity Processing by the Brain

One approach to understanding how the human cognitive system stores and operates with quantifiers such as "some," "many," and "all" is to investigate their interaction with the cognitive mechanisms for estimating and comparing quantities from perceptual input (i.e., nonsymbolic quantities). While a potential link between quantifier processing and nonsymbolic quantity processing has been considered in the past, it has never been discussed extensively. Simultaneously, there is a long line of research within the field of numerical cognition on the relationship between processing exact number symbols (such as "3" or "three") and nonsymbolic quantity. This accumulated knowledge can potentially be harvested for research on quantifiers since quantifiers and number symbols are two different ways of referring to quantity information symbolically. The goal of the present review is to survey the research on the relationship between quantifiers and nonsymbolic quantity processing mechanisms and provide a set of research directions and specific questions for the investigation of quantifier processing.

Characterizing exact arithmetic abilities before formal schooling

Children appear to have some arithmetic abilities before formal instruction in school, but the extent of these abilities as well as the mechanisms underlying them are poorly understood. Over two studies, an initial exploratory study of preschool children in the U.S. (N = 207; Age = 2.89-4.30 years) and a pre-registered replication of preschool children in Italy (N = 130; Age = 3-6.33 years), we documented some basic behavioral signatures of exact arithmetic using a non-symbolic subtraction task. Furthermore, we investigated the underlying mechanisms by analyzing the relationship between individual differences in exact subtraction and assessments of other numerical and non-numerical abilities. Across both studies, children performed above chance on the exact non-symbolic arithmetic task, generally showing better performance on problems involving smaller quantities compared to those involving larger quantities. Furthermore, individual differences in non-verbal approximate numerical abilities and exact cardinal number knowledge were related to different aspects of subtraction performance. Specifically, non-verbal approximate numerical abilities were related to subtraction performance in older but not younger children. Across both studies we found evidence that cardinal number knowledge was related to performance on subtraction problems where the answer was zero (i.e., subtractive negation problems). Moreover, subtractive negation problems were only solved above chance by children who had a basic understanding of cardinality. Together these finding suggest that core non-verbal numerical abilities, as well as emerging knowledge of symbolic numbers provide a basis for some, albeit limited, exact arithmetic abilities before formal schooling.

Conflict paradigms cannot reveal competence

De Neys is right to criticize the exclusivity assumption in dual-process theories, but he misses the original sin underlying this assumption, which his working model continues to share. Conflict paradigms, in which experimenters measure how one cognitive process interferes (or does not interfere) with another, license few inferences about how the interfered-with process works on its own.

Learning-induced reorganization of number neurons and emergence of numerical representations in a biologically inspired neural network

Number sense, the ability to decipher quantity, forms the foundation for mathematical cognition. How number sense emerges with learning is, however, not known. Here we use a biologically-inspired neural architecture comprising cortical layers V1, V2, V3, and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) to investigate how neural representations change with numerosity training. Learning dramatically reorganized neuronal tuning properties at both the single unit and population levels, resulting in the emergence of sharply-tuned representations of numerosity in the IPS layer. Ablation analysis revealed that spontaneous number neurons observed prior to learning were not critical to formation of number representations post-learning. Crucially, multidimensional scaling of population responses revealed the emergence of absolute and relative magnitude representations of quantity, including mid-point anchoring. These learnt representations may underlie changes from logarithmic to cyclic and linear mental number lines that are characteristic of number sense development in humans. Our findings elucidate mechanisms by which learning builds novel representations supporting number sense.

Is Conviction Narrative Theory a theory of everything or nothing?

We connect Conviction Narrative Theory to an account that views people as intuitive scientists who can flexibly create, evaluate, and modify representations of decision problems. We argue that without understanding how the relevant complex narratives (or indeed any representation, simple to complex) are themselves constructed, we also cannot know when and why people would rely on them to make choices.

What aspects of counting help infants attend to numerosity?

Recent work shows that 18-month old infants understand that counting is numerically relevant-infants who see objects counted are more likely to represent the approximate number of objects in the array than infants who see the objects labeled but not counted. Which aspects of counting signal infants to attend to numerosity in this way? Here we asked whether infants rely on familiarity with the count words in their native language, or on procedures instantiated by the counting routine, independent of specific tokens. In three experiments (N = 48), we found that 18-month old infants from English-speaking households successfully distinguished four hidden objects from two when the objects were counted correctly, regardless of their familiarity with the count words (i.e., when objects were counted in familiar English and in unfamiliar German). However, when the objects were counted using familiar English count words in ways that violated basic counting principles, infants no longer represented the arrays, failing to distinguish four hidden objects from two. Together with previous findings, these results suggest that children may link the procedure of counting with numerosity years before they learn the meanings of the count words.

Cortical representations of numbers and nonsymbolic quantities expand and segregate in children from 5 to 8 years of age

Number symbols, such as Arabic numerals, are cultural inventions that have transformed human mathematical skills. Although their acquisition is at the core of early elementary education in children, it remains unknown how the neural representations of numerals emerge during that period. It is also unclear whether these relate to an ontogenetically earlier sense of approximate quantity. Here, we used multivariate fMRI adaptation coupled with within- and between-format machine learning to probe the cortical representations of Arabic numerals and approximate nonsymbolic quantity in 89 children either at the beginning (age 5) or four years into formal education (age 8). Although the cortical representations of both numerals and nonsymbolic quantities expanded from age 5 to age 8, these representations also segregated with learning and development. Specifically, a format-independent neural representation of quantity was found in the right parietal cortex, but only for 5-year-olds. These results are consistent with the so-called symbolic estrangement hypothesis, which argues that the relation between symbolic and nonsymbolic quantity weakens with exposure to formal mathematics in children.

A million is more than a thousand: Children's acquisition of very large number words

Very large numbers words such as "hundred," "thousand," "million," "billion," and "trillion" pose a learning problem for children because they are sparse in everyday speech and children's experience with extremely large quantities is scarce. In this study, we examine when children acquire the relative ordering of very large number words as a first step toward understanding their acquisition. In Study 1, a hundred and twenty-five 5-8-year-olds participated in a verbal number comparison task involving very large number words. We found that children can judge which of two very large numbers is more as early as age 6, prior to entering first grade. In Study 2, we provided a descriptive analysis on the usage of very large number words using the CHILDES database. We found that the relative frequency of large number words does not change across the years, with "hundred" uttered more frequently than others by an order of magnitude. We also found that adults were more likely to use large number words to reference units of quantification for money, weight, and time, than for discrete, physical entities. Together, these results show that children construct a numerical scale for large number words prior to learning their precise cardinal meanings, and highlight how frequency and context may support their acquisition. Our results have pedagogical implications and highlight a need to investigate how children acquire meanings for number words that reference quantities beyond our everyday experience.

Recursive sequence generation in crows

Recursion, the process of embedding structures within similar structures, is often considered a foundation of symbolic competence and a uniquely human capability. To understand its evolution, we can study the recursive aptitudes of nonhuman animals. We adopted the behavioral protocol of a recent study demonstrating that humans and nonhuman primates grasp recursion. We presented sequences of bracket pair stimuli (e.g., [ ] and { }) to crows who were instructed to peck at training lists. They were then tested on their ability to transfer center-embedded structure to never-before-seen pairings of brackets. We reveal that crows have recursive capacities; they perform on par with children and even outperform macaques. The crows continued to produce recursive sequences after extending to longer and thus deeper embeddings. These results demonstrate that recursive capabilities are not limited to the primate genealogy and may have occurred separately from or before human symbolic competence in different animal taxa.

Environmental influences on mathematics performance in early childhood

Math skills relate to lifelong career, health, and financial outcomes. Individuals' own cognitive abilities predict math performance and there is growing recognition that environmental influences including differences in culture and variability in math engagement also impact math skills. In this Review, we summarize evidence indicating that differences between languages, exposure to math-focused language, socioeconomic status, attitudes and beliefs about math, and engagement with math activities influence young children's math performance. These influences play out at the community and individual level. However, research on the role of these environmental influences for foundational number skills, including understanding of number words, is limited. Future research is needed to understand individual differences in the development of early emerging math skills such as number word skills, examining to what extent different types of environmental input are necessary and how children's cognitive abilities shape the impact of environmental input.

Acquisition of the counting principles during the subset-knower stages: Insights from children's errors

Studies on children's understanding of counting examine when and how children acquire the cardinal principle: the idea that the last word in a counted set reflects the cardinal value of the set. Using Wynn's (1990) Give-N Task, researchers classify children who can count to generate large sets as having acquired the cardinal principle (cardinal-principle-knowers) and those who cannot as lacking knowledge of it (subset-knowers). However, recent studies have provided a more nuanced view of number word acquisition. Here, we explore this view by examining the developmental progression of the counting principles with an aim to elucidate the gradual elements that lead to children successfully generating sets and being classified as CP-knowers on the Give-N Task. Specifically, we test the claim that subset-knowers lack cardinal principle knowledge by separating children's understanding of the cardinal principle from their ability to apply and implement counting procedures. We also ask when knowledge of Gelman & Gallistel's (1978) other how-to-count principles emerge in development. We analyzed how often children violated the three how-to-count principles in a secondary analysis of Give-N data (N = 86). We found that children already have knowledge of the cardinal principle prior to becoming CP-knowers, and that understanding of the stable-order and word-object correspondence principles likely emerged earlier. These results suggest that gradual development may best characterize children's acquisition of the counting principles and that learning to coordinate all three principles represents an additional step beyond learning them individually.

The development of early numeracy in deaf and hard of hearing children acquiring spoken language

Most deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) children are born to hearing parents and steered toward spoken rather than signed language, introducing a delay in language access. This study investigated the effects of this delay on number acquisition. DHH children (N = 44, mean_age  = 58 months, 21F, >50% White) and typically-hearing (TH) children (N = 79, mean_age  = 49 months, 51F, >50% White) were assessed on number and language in 2011-13. DHH children showed similar trajectories to TH children but delayed timing; a binary logistic regression showed that the odds of being a cardinal-principle (CP) knower were 17 times higher for TH children than DHH children, controlling for age (d = .69). Language fully mediated the association between deaf/hearing group and number knowledge, suggesting that language access sets the pace for number acquisition.

A number-line task with a Bayesian active learning algorithm provides insights into the development of non-symbolic number estimation

To characterize numerical representations, the number-line task asks participants to estimate the location of a given number on a line flanked with zero and an upper-bound number. An open question is whether estimates for symbolic numbers (e.g., Arabic numerals) and non-symbolic numbers (e.g., number of dots) rely on common processes with a common developmental pathway. To address this question, we explored whether well-established findings in symbolic number-line estimation generalize to non-symbolic number-line estimation. For exhaustive investigations without sacrificing data quality, we applied a novel Bayesian active learning algorithm, dubbed Gaussian process active learning (GPAL), that adaptively optimizes experimental designs. The results showed that the non-symbolic number estimation in participants of diverse ages (5-73 years old, n = 238) exhibited three characteristic features of symbolic number estimation.

When eleven does not equal 11: Investigating exactness at a number's upper bound

The approximate number system (a) views number as an imprecise signal that (b) functions equivalently regardless of a number's initial presentation. These features do not readily account for exact readings when a task calls for them. While profiting from insights in areas neighboring the number cognition literature, we propose that linguistic-pragmatic and cultural pressures operate on a number's upper bound in order to provide exact readings. With respect to (a), Experimental Pragmatic findings indicate that numbers appear to be semantically lower-bounded (Eleven candidates are coming means at least eleven) but fluid at its upper-bound; exactly readings emerge as a consequence of an additional pragmatic process that solidifies the upper bound. With respect to (b), studies from cognitive anthropology underline how symbolic representations of number are distinct from written codes. Here, we investigate a novel hypothesis proposing that symbolic expressions of number (such as "11") explicitly provide exactly readings unlike verbal (oral and written) ones, which engender at least readings. We then employ a Numerical Magnitude Task (NMT), in which French-speaking participants determine whether a presented number is lesser or greater than a benchmark (12) in one of three presentation conditions: i) Symbolic/Hindu-Arabic (e.g. "11" via screen), ii) Oral (e.g. "/'on.zə/" via headphones), or; iii) spelled-out-in-Letters (e.g. "onze" via screen). Participants also carry out a Number Identification Task (NIT) so that each participant's recognition speed per number can be removed from their NMT times. We report that decision reaction times to "onze" take longer to process (and prompt more errors) than "treize" whereas "11" and "13" are comparable. One prediction was not supported: Decision times to the critical oral forms ("/'on.zə/" and "[tʁ̥ɛːzə̆]") were comparable, making these outcomes resonate with those in the Symbolic condition.

Exact Number Concepts Are Limited to the Verbal Count Range

Previous findings suggest that mentally representing exact numbers larger than four depends on a verbal count routine (e.g., "one, two, three . . ."). However, these findings are controversial because they rely on comparisons across radically different languages and cultures. We tested the role of language in number concepts within a single population-the Tsimane' of Bolivia-in which knowledge of number words varies across individual adults. We used a novel data-analysis model to quantify the point at which participants (N = 30) switched from exact to approximate number representations during a simple numerical matching task. The results show that these behavioral switch points were bounded by participants' verbal count ranges; their representations of exact cardinalities were limited to the number words they knew. Beyond that range, they resorted to numerical approximation. These results resolve competing accounts of previous findings and provide unambiguous evidence that large exact number concepts are enabled by language.

Assessing the knower-level framework: How reliable is the Give-a-Number task?

The Give-a-Number task has become a gold standard of children's number word comprehension in developmental psychology. Recently, researchers have begun to use the task as a predictor of other developmental milestones. This raises the question of how reliable the task is, since test-retest reliability of any measure places an upper bound on the size of reliable correlations that can be found between it and other measures. In Experiment 1, we presented 81 2- to 5-year-old children with Wynn (1992) titrated version of the Give-a-Number task twice within a single session. We found that the reliability of this version of the task was high overall, but varied importantly across different assigned knower levels, and was very low for some knower levels. In Experiment 2, we assessed the test-retest reliability of the non-titrated version of the Give-a-Number task with another group of 81 children and found a similar pattern of results. Finally, in Experiment 3, we asked whether the two versions of Give-a-Number generated different knower levels within-subjects, by testing 75 children with both tasks. Also, we asked how both tasks relate to another commonly used test of number knowledge, the "What's-On-This-Card" task. We found that overall, the titrated and non-titrated versions of Give-a-Number yielded similar knower levels, though the non-titrated version was slightly more conservative than the titrated version, which produced modestly higher knower levels. Neither was more closely related to "What's-On-This-Card" than the other. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these results.

The approximate number system represents magnitude and precision

Numbers are symbols manipulated in accord with the axioms of arithmetic. They sometimes represent discrete and continuous quantities (e.g., numerosities, durations, rates, distances, directions, and probabilities), but they are often simply names. Brains, including insect brains, represent the rational numbers with a fixed-point data type, consisting of a significand and an exponent, thereby conveying both magnitude and precision.

Numbers, numerosities, and new directions

In our target article, we argued that the number sense represents natural and rational numbers. Here, we respond to the 26 commentaries we received, highlighting new directions for empirical and theoretical research. We discuss two background assumptions, arguments against the number sense, whether the approximate number system (ANS) represents numbers or numerosities, and why the ANS represents rational (but not irrational) numbers.

Numerical cognition needs more and better distinctions, not fewer

We agree that the approximate number system (ANS) truly represents number. We endorse the authors' conclusions on the arguments from confounds, congruency, and imprecision, although we disagree with many claims along the way. Here, we discuss some complications with the meanings that undergird theories in numerical cognition, and with the language we use to communicate those theories.

Constructing rationals through conjoint measurement of numerator and denominator as approximate integer magnitudes in tradeoff relations

To investigate mechanisms of rational representation, I consider (1) construction of an ordered continuum of psychophysical scale of magnitude of sensation; (2) counting mechanism leading to an approximate numerosity scale for integers; and (3) conjoint measurement structure pitting the denominator against the numerator in tradeoff positions. Number sense of resulting rationals is neither intuitive nor expedient in their manipulation.

Children's attention to numerical quantities relates to verbal number knowledge: An introduction to the Build-A-Train task

Which dimension of a set of objects is more salient to young children: number or size? The 'Build-A-Train' task was developed and used to examine whether children spontaneously use a number or physical size approach on an un-cued matching task. In the Build-A-Train task, an experimenter assembles a train using one to five blocks of a particular length and asks the child to build the same train. The child's blocks differ in length from the experimenter's blocks, causing the child to build a train that matches based on either the number of blocks or length of the train, as it is not possible to match on both. One hundred and nineteen children between 2 years 2 months and 6 years 0 months of age (M = 4.05, SD = 0.84) completed the Build-A-Train task, and the Give-a-Number task, a classic task used to assess children's conceptual knowledge of verbal number words. Across train lengths and verbal number knowledge levels, children used a number approach more than a size approach on the Build-A-Train task. However, children were especially likely to use a number approach over a size approach when they knew the verbal number word that corresponded to the quantity of blocks in the train, particularly for quantities smaller than four. Therefore, children's attention to number relates to their knowledge of verbal number words. The Build-A-Train task and findings from the current study set a foundation for future longitudinal research to investigate the causal relationship between children's acquisition of symbolic mathematical concepts and attention to number.

Counting and the ontogenetic origins of exact equality

Humans are unique in their capacity to both represent number exactly and to express these representations symbolically. This correlation has prompted debate regarding whether symbolic number systems are necessary to represent large exact number. Previous work addressing this question in innumerate adults and semi-numerate children has been limited by conflicting results and differing methodologies, and has not yielded a clear answer. We address this debate by adapting methods used with innumerate populations (a "set-matching" task) for 3- to 5-year-old US children at varying stages of symbolic number acquisition. In five studies we find that children's ability to match sets exactly is related not simply to knowing the meanings of a few number words, but also to understanding how counting is used to generate sets (i.e., the cardinal principle). However, while children were more likely to match sets after acquiring the cardinal principle, they nevertheless demonstrated failures, compatible with the hypothesis that the ability to reason about exact equality emerges sometime later. These findings provide important data on the origin of exact number concepts, and point to knowledge of a counting system, rather than number language in general, as a key ingredient in the ability to reason about large exact number.

Automatic integration of numerical formats examined with frequency-tagged EEG

How humans integrate and abstract numerical information across different formats is one of the most debated questions in human cognition. We addressed the neuronal signatures of the numerical integration using an EEG technique tagged at the frequency of visual stimulation. In an oddball design, participants were stimulated with standard sequences of numbers (< 5) depicted in single (digits, dots, number words) or mixed notation (dots-digits, number words-dots, digits-number words), presented at 10 Hz. Periodically, a deviant stimulus (> 5) was inserted at 1.25 Hz. We observed significant oddball amplitudes for all single notations, showing for the first time using this EEG technique, that the magnitude information is spontaneously and unintentionally abstracted, irrespectively of the numerical format. Significant amplitudes were also observed for digits-number words and number words-dots, but not for digits-dots, suggesting an automatic integration across some numerical formats. These results imply that direct and indirect neuro-cognitive links exist across the different numerical formats.

Common and distinct predictors of non-symbolic and symbolic ordinal number processing across the early primary school years

What are the cognitive mechanisms supporting non-symbolic and symbolic order processing? Preliminary evidence suggests that non-symbolic and symbolic order processing are partly distinct constructs. The precise mechanisms supporting these skills, however, are still unclear. Moreover, predictive patterns may undergo dynamic developmental changes during the first years of formal schooling. This study investigates the contribution of theoretically relevant constructs (non-symbolic and symbolic magnitude comparison, counting and storage and manipulation components of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory) to performance and developmental change in non-symbolic and symbolic numerical order processing. We followed 157 children longitudinally from Grade 1 to 3. In the order judgement tasks, children decided whether or not triplets of dots or digits were arranged in numerically ascending order. Non-symbolic magnitude comparison and visuo-spatial manipulation were significant predictors of initial performance in both non-symbolic and symbolic ordering. In line with our expectations, counting skills contributed additional variance to the prediction of symbolic, but not of non-symbolic ordering. Developmental change in ordering performance from Grade 1 to 2 was predicted by symbolic comparison skills and visuo-spatial manipulation. None of the predictors explained variance in developmental change from Grade 2 to 3. Taken together, the present results provide robust evidence for a general involvement of pair-wise magnitude comparison and visuo-spatial manipulation in numerical ordering, irrespective of the number format. Importantly, counting-based mechanisms appear to be a unique predictor of symbolic ordering. We thus conclude that there is only a partial overlap of the cognitive mechanisms underlying non-symbolic and symbolic order processing.

Dual coding of knowledge in the human brain

How does the human brain code knowledge about the world? While disciplines such as artificial intelligence represent world knowledge based on human language, neurocognitive models of knowledge have been dominated by sensory embodiment, in which knowledge is derived from sensory/motor experience and supported by high-level sensory/motor and association cortices. The neural correlates of an alternative disembodied symbolic system had previously been difficult to establish. A recent line of studies exploring knowledge about visual properties, such as color, in visually deprived individuals converge to provide positive, compelling evidence for non-sensory, language-derived, knowledge representation in dorsal anterior temporal lobe and extended language network, in addition to the sensory-derived representations, leading to a sketch of a dual-coding knowledge neural framework.

Development of Preschoolers' Understanding of Zero

While knowledge on the development of understanding positive integers is rapidly growing, the development of understanding zero remains not well-understood. Here, we test several components of preschoolers’ understanding of zero: Whether they can use empty sets in numerical tasks (as measured with comparison, addition, and subtraction tasks); whether they can use empty sets soon after they understand the cardinality principle (cardinality-principle knowledge is measured with the give-N task); whether they know what the word “zero” refers to (tested in all tasks in this study); and whether they categorize zero as a number (as measured with the smallest-number and is-it-a-number tasks). The results show that preschoolers can handle empty sets in numerical tasks as soon as they can handle positive numbers and as soon as, or even earlier than, they understand the cardinality principle. Some also know that these sets are labeled as “zero.” However, preschoolers are unsure whether zero is a number. These results identify three components of knowledge about zero: operational knowledge, linguistic knowledge, and meta-knowledge. To account for these results, we propose that preschoolers may understand numbers as the properties of items or objects in a set. In this view, zero is not regarded as a number because an empty set does not include any items, and missing items cannot have any properties, therefore, they cannot have the number property either. This model can explain why zero is handled correctly in numerical tasks even though it is not regarded as a number.

Developmental brain dynamics of numerical and arithmetic abilities

The development of numerical and arithmetic abilities constitutes a crucial cornerstone in our modern and educated societies. Difficulties to acquire these central skills can lead to severe consequences for an individual's well-being and nation's economy. In the present review, we describe our current broad understanding of the functional and structural brain organization that supports the development of numbers and arithmetic. The existing evidence points towards a complex interaction among multiple domain-specific (e.g., representation of quantities and number symbols) and domain-general (e.g., working memory, visual-spatial abilities) cognitive processes, as well as a dynamic integration of several brain regions into functional networks that support these processes. These networks are mainly, but not exclusively, located in regions of the frontal and parietal cortex, and the functional and structural dynamics of these networks differ as a function of age and performance level. Distinctive brain activation patterns have also been shown for children with dyscalculia, a specific learning disability in the domain of mathematics. Although our knowledge about the developmental brain dynamics of number and arithmetic has greatly improved over the past years, many questions about the interaction and the causal involvement of the abovementioned functional brain networks remain. This review provides a broad and critical overview of the known developmental processes and what is yet to be discovered.

Perception of geometric sequences and numerosity both predict formal geometric competence in primary school children

While most animals have a sense of number, only humans have developed symbolic systems to describe and organize mathematical knowledge. Some studies suggest that human arithmetical knowledge may be rooted in an ancient mechanism dedicated to perceiving numerosity, but it is not known if formal geometry also relies on basic, non-symbolic mechanisms. Here we show that primary-school children who spontaneously detect and predict geometrical sequences (non-symbolic geometry) perform better in school-based geometry tests indexing formal geometric knowledge. Interestingly, numerosity discrimination thresholds also predicted and explained a specific portion of variance of formal geometrical scores. The relation between these two non-symbolic systems and formal geometry was not explained by age or verbal reasoning skills. Overall, the results are in line with the hypothesis that some human-specific, symbolic systems are rooted in non-symbolic mechanisms.

Electrophysiological evidence for internalized representations of canonical finger-number gestures and their facilitating effects on adults' math verification performance

Fingers facilitate number learning and arithmetic processing in early childhood. The current study investigated whether images of early-learned, culturally-typical (canonical), finger montring patterns presenting smaller (2,3,4) or larger (7,8,9) quantities still facilitate adults' performance and neural processing in a math verification task. Twenty-eight adults verified solutions to simple addition problems that were shown in the form of canonical or non-canonical finger-number montring patterns while measuring Event Related Potentials (ERPs). Results showed more accurate and faster sum verification when sum solutions were shown by canonical (versus non-canonical) finger patterns. Canonical finger montring patterns 2-4 led to faster responses independent of whether they presented correct or incorrect sum solutions and elicited an enhanced early right-parietal P2p response, whereas canonical configurations 7-9 only facilitated performance in correct sum solution trials without evoking P2p effects. The later central-parietal P3 was enhanced to all canonical finger patterns irrespective of numerical range. These combined results provide behavioral and brain evidence for canonical cardinal finger patterns still having facilitating effects on adults' number processing. They further suggest that finger montring configurations of numbers 2-4 have stronger internalized associations with other magnitude representations, possibly established through their mediating role in the developmental phase in which children acquire the numerical meaning of the first four number symbols.

The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers

On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals possess a "number sense," or approximate number system (ANS), that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques that question whether the ANS genuinely represents number. We distinguish three lines of critique-the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision-and show that none succeed. We then provide positive reasons to think that the ANS genuinely represents numbers, and not just non-numerical confounds or exotic substitutes for number, such as "numerosities" or "quanticals," as critics propose. In so doing, we raise a neglected question: numbers of what kind? Proponents of the orthodox view have been remarkably coy on this issue. But this is unsatisfactory since the predictions of the orthodox view, including the situations in which the ANS is expected to succeed or fail, turn on the kind(s) of number being represented. In response, we propose that the ANS represents not only natural numbers (e.g. 7), but also non-natural rational numbers (e.g. 3.5). It does not represent irrational numbers (e.g. √2), however, and thereby fails to represent the real numbers more generally. This distances our proposal from existing conjectures, refines our understanding of the ANS, and paves the way for future research.

Impaired large numerosity estimation and intact subitizing in developmental dyscalculia

It is believed that the approximate estimation of large sets and the exact quantification of small sets (subitizing) are supported by two different systems, the Approximate Number System (ANS) and Object Tracking System (OTS), respectively. It is a current matter of debate whether they are both impaired in developmental dyscalculia (DD), a specific learning disability in symbolic number processing and calculation. Here we tackled this question by asking 32 DD children and 32 controls to perform a series of tasks on visually presented sets, including exact enumeration of small sets as well as comparison of large, uncountable sets. In children with DD, we found poor sensitivity in processing large numerosities, but we failed to find impairments in the exact enumeration of sets within the subitizing range. We also observed deficits in visual short-term memory skills in children with dyscalculia that, however, did not account for their low ANS acuity. Taken together, these results point to a dissociation between quantification skills in dyscalculia, they highlight a link between DD and low ANS acuity and provide support for the notion that DD is a multifaceted disability that covers multiple cognitive skills.