Group Cooperation, Carrying-Capacity Stress, and Intergroup Conflict

Using artificial agents to nudge outgroup altruism and reduce ingroup favoritism in human-agent interaction

Ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination can be mutually reinforcing during social interaction, threatening intergroup cooperation and the sustainability of societies. In two studies (N = 880), we investigated whether promoting prosocial outgroup altruism would weaken the ingroup favoritism cycle of influence. Using novel methods of human-agent interaction via a computer-mediated experimental platform, we introduced outgroup altruism by (i) nonadaptive artificial agents with preprogrammed outgroup altruistic behavior (Study 1; N = 400) and (ii) adaptive artificial agents whose altruistic behavior was informed by the prediction of a machine learning algorithm (Study 2; N = 480). A rating task ensured that the observed behavior did not result from the participant's awareness of the artificial agents. In Study 1, nonadaptive agents prompted ingroup members to withhold cooperation from ingroup agents and reinforced ingroup favoritism among humans. In Study 2, adaptive agents were able to weaken ingroup favoritism over time by maintaining a good reputation with both the ingroup and outgroup members, who perceived agents as being fairer than humans and rated agents as more human than humans. We conclude that a good reputation of the individual exhibiting outgroup altruism is necessary to weaken ingroup favoritism and improve intergroup cooperation. Thus, reputation is important for designing nudge agents.

The nasty neighbor effect in humans

Like other group-living species, humans often cooperate more with an in-group member than with out-group members and strangers. Greater in-group favoritism should imply that people also compete less with in-group members than with out-group members and strangers. However, in situations where people could invest to take other's resources and invest to protect against exploitation, we observed the opposite. Akin to what in other species is known as the "nasty neighbor effect," people invested more when facing an in-group rather than out-group member or stranger across 51 nations, in different communities in Kenya, and in representative samples from the United Kingdom. This "nasty neighbor" behavior is independent of in-group favoritism in trust and emerges when people perceive within-group resource scarcity. We discuss how to reconcile that humans exhibit nastiness and favoritism toward in-group members with existing theory on in-group favoritism.

Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation

Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practises or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup 'friends' and outgroup 'foes', facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes-albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

Identity Fusion and Aggressive Behavior Among Chinese Freshmen: The Chain Mediating Role of Depressive Mood and Sleep Quality

Aggressive behavior is considered one of the indicators of maladjustment and increases during the transition to college. Previous studies have demonstrated that having identity fusion with particular social groups significantly predicts college adjustment among freshmen. However, the relationship between identity fusion and aggressive behavior in college freshmen has rarely been studied. Thus, guided by the frustration-aggression theory, this study aimed to explore the association between identity fusion with class and aggressive behavior among Chinese college freshmen and examine the potential mediating roles of depressive mood and sleep quality. A cross-sectional survey study was carried out among 1,037 Chinese college freshmen (Mage = 19.56, SD = 1.068, 29.12% males). Class identity fusion, depressive mood, sleep quality, and aggressive behavior were measured via four self-reported questionnaires. Structural equation modeling was used to test the mediation model. Analyses showed that identity fusion was negatively related to depressive mood and aggressive behavior and positively correlated with sleep quality. The results also revealed that the direct effect of identity fusion on aggressive behavior was significant, and identity fusion can indirectly affect aggressive behavior not only through the mediation effect of depressive mood but also through the chain mediation effect of depressive mood and sleep quality. Moreover, the mediating effect of depressive mood varied by gender. These findings suggest that strategies that help freshmen promote identity fusion and those that alleviate depressive mood and sleep problem may help reduce aggressive behavior.

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission-fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.

Partner choice and cooperation in social dilemmas can increase resource inequality

Cooperation is more likely when individuals can choose their interaction partner. However, partner choice may be detrimental in unequal societies, in which individuals differ in available resources and productivity, and thus in their attractiveness as interaction partners. Here we experimentally examine this conjecture in a repeated public goods game. Individuals (n = 336), participating in groups of eight participants, are assigned a high or low endowment and a high or low productivity factor (the value that their cooperation generates), creating four unique participant types. On each round, individuals are either assigned a partner (assigned partner condition) or paired based on their self-indicated preference for a partner type (partner choice condition). Results show that under partner choice, individuals who were assigned a high endowment and high productivity almost exclusively interact with each other, forcing other individuals into less valuable pairs. Consequently, pre-existing resource differences between individuals increase. These findings show how partner choice in social dilemmas can amplify resource inequality.

The evolution of intergroup cooperation

Sociality is widespread among animals, and involves complex relationships within and between social groups. While intragroup interactions are often cooperative, intergroup interactions typically involve conflict, or at best tolerance. Active cooperation between members of distinct, separate groups occurs very rarely, predominantly in some primate and ant species. Here, we ask why intergroup cooperation is so rare, and what conditions favour its evolution. We present a model incorporating intra- and intergroup relationships and local and long-distance dispersal. We show that dispersal modes play a pivotal role in the evolution of intergroup interactions. Both long-distance and local dispersal processes drive population social structure, and the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, tolerance and cooperation. Overall, the evolution of multi-group interaction patterns, including both intergroup aggression and intergroup tolerance, or even altruism, is more likely with mostly localized dispersal. However, the evolution of these intergroup relationships may have significant ecological impacts, and this feedback may alter the ecological conditions that favour its own evolution. These results show that the evolution of intergroup cooperation is favoured by a specific set of conditions, and may not be evolutionarily stable. We discuss how our results relate to empirical evidence of intergroup cooperation in ants and primates. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Collective behaviour through time'.

Evolutionary and neuroendocrine foundations of human aggression

Humans present a behavioural paradox: they are peaceful in many circumstances, but they are also violent and kill conspecifics at high rates. We describe a social evolutionary theory to resolve this paradox. The theory interprets human aggression as a combination of low propensities for reactive aggression and coercive behaviour and high propensities for some forms of proactive aggression (especially coalitionary proactive aggression). These tendencies are associated with the evolution of groupishness, self-domestication, and social norms. This human aggression profile is expected to demand substantial plasticity in the evolved biological mechanisms responsible for aggression. We discuss the contributions of various social signalling molecules (testosterone, cortisol, oxytocin, vasopressin, serotonin, and dopamine) as the neuroendocrine foundation conferring such plasticity.

Oxytocin attenuates racial categorization in 14-month-old infants

Intergroup bias - the preferential attitudes one holds towards one's social group - is a ubiquitous socio-cognitive phenomenon. In fact, studies show that already in the first months of life, infants manifest a preference for members of their own social group. This points to the possibility of inborn mechanisms involved in social group cognition. Here we assess the effect of a biological activation of infants' affiliative motivation on their social categorization capacity. In a first visit to the lab, mothers self-administered either Oxytocin (OT) or placebo (PL) via a nasal spray and then engaged in a face-to-face interaction with their 14-month-old infants, a procedure previously shown to increase OT levels in infants. Infants then performed a racial categorization task presented on an eye-tracker. Mothers and infants returned a week later and repeated the procedure while self-administering the complementary substance (i.e., PL or OT, respectively). In total, 24 infants completed the two visits. We found that whereas infants in the PL condition on the first visit exhibited racial categorization, infants in the OT condition in their first visit did not. Moreover, these patterns remained a week later despite the change in substance. Thus, OT inhibited racial categorization when infants first encountered the to-be-categorized faces. These findings highlight the role of affiliative motivation in social categorization, and suggest that the neurobiology of affiliation may provide insights on mechanisms that may be involved in the downstream prejudicial consequences of intergroup bias.

The evolution of universal cooperation

Humans work together in groups to tackle shared problems and contribute to local club goods that benefit other group members. Whereas benefits from club goods remain group bound, groups are often nested in overarching collectives that face shared problems like pandemics or climate change. Such challenges require individuals to cooperate across group boundaries, raising the question how cooperation can transcend beyond confined groups. Here, we show how frequent intergroup interactions allow groups to transition from group-bound to universal cooperation. With frequent intergroup interactions, reciprocity of cooperative acts permeates group boundaries and enables the evolution of universal cooperation. As soon as intergroup interactions take place frequently, people start to selectively reward cooperation aimed at benefitting everyone, irrespective of their group membership. Simulations further show that it becomes more difficult to overcome group-bound cooperation when populations are fragmented into many small groups. Our findings reveal important prerequisites for the evolution of universal cooperation.

Group identities can undermine social tipping after intervention

Social tipping can accelerate behaviour change consistent with policy objectives in diverse domains from social justice to climate change. Hypothetically, however, group identities might undermine tipping in ways that policymakers do not anticipate. To examine this, we implemented an experiment around the 2020 US federal elections. The participants faced consistent incentives to coordinate their choices. Once the participants had established a coordination norm, an intervention created pressure to tip to a new norm. Our control treatment used neutral labels for choices. Our identity treatment used partisan political images. This simple pay-off-irrelevant relabelling generated extreme differences. The control groups developed norms slowly before intervention but transitioned to new norms rapidly after intervention. The identity groups developed norms rapidly before intervention but persisted in a state of costly disagreement after intervention. Tipping was powerful but unreliable. It supported striking cultural changes when choice and identity were unlinked, but even a trivial link destroyed tipping entirely.

Cooperating with the outgroup rather than the ingroup: The effects of status, individual mobility, and group mobility on resource allocation and trust in an interactional game

We describe a team game that implements a social dilemma between ingroup cooperation and defection by self-enriching outgroup exchange. We test hypotheses derived from social identity theory about how group status and belief about individual mobility and group mobility affect exchange behavior. We ran 60 experimental team games between rich and poor groups under one of four experiment conditions in a fully crossed design, manipulating the presence or absence of individual mobility and group mobility beliefs. Each game was played over 10 rounds in which participants generated wealth for self or group by allocating tokens to either the ingroup or outgroup bank or to outgroup individuals. We identify 10 exchange strategies via latent class analysis and show how class membership and resulting perceptions of group trust are predicted by the experimental conditions. The results show that rich status and individual mobility promote defecting exchanges with outgroup individuals, and that behavior under individual mobility beliefs weakens ingroup trust. In contrast, intergroup competition of the group mobility condition did not affect ingroup cooperation versus defection or trust.

Learning whom to cooperate with: neurocomputational mechanisms for choosing cooperative partners

Cooperation is fundamental for survival and a functioning society. With substantial individual variability in cooperativeness, we must learn whom to cooperate with, and often make these decisions on behalf of others. Understanding how people learn about the cooperativeness of others, and the neurocomputational mechanisms supporting this learning, is therefore essential. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants completed a novel cooperation-partner-choice task where they learned to choose between cooperative and uncooperative partners through trial-and-error both for themselves and vicariously for another person. Interestingly, when choosing for themselves, participants made faster and more exploitative choices than when choosing for another person. Activity in the ventral striatum preferentially responded to prediction errors (PEs) during self-learning, whereas activity in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) signaled both personal and vicarious PEs. Multivariate pattern analyses showed distinct coding of personal and vicarious choice-making and outcome processing in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), dorsal ACC, and striatum. Moreover, in right TPJ the activity pattern that differentiated self and other outcomes was associated with individual differences in exploitation tendency. We reveal neurocomputational mechanisms supporting cooperative learning and show that this learning is reflected in trial-by-trial univariate signals and multivariate patterns that can distinguish personal and vicarious choices.

Oxytocin has 'tend-and-defend' functionality in group conflict across social vertebrates

Across vertebrate species, intergroup conflict confronts individuals with a tension between group interests best served by participation in conflict and personal interest best served by not participating. Here, we identify the neurohormone oxytocin as pivotal to the neurobiological regulation of this tension in distinctly different group-living vertebrates, including fishes, birds, rodents, non-human primates and humans. In the context of intergroup conflict, a review of emerging work on pro-sociality suggests that oxytocin and its fish and birds homologues, isotocin and mesotocin, respectively, can elicit participation in group conflict and aggression. This is because it amplifies (i) concern for the interests of genetically related or culturally similar ‘in-group’ others and (ii) willingness to defend against outside intruders and enemy conspecifics. Across a range of social vertebrates, oxytocin can induce aggressive behaviour to ‘tend-and-defend’ the in-group during intergroup contests.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Intergroup conflict across taxa’.

Environmental stress increases out-group aggression and intergroup conflict in humans

Peaceful coexistence and trade among human groups can be fragile and intergroup relations frequently transition to violent exchange and conflict. Here we specify how exogenous changes in groups' environment and ensuing carrying-capacity stress can increase individual participation in intergroup conflict, and out-group aggression in particular. In two intergroup contest experiments, individuals could contribute private resources to out-group aggression (versus in-group defense). Environmental unpredictability, induced by making non-invested resources subject to risk of destruction (versus not), created psychological stress and increased participation in and coordination of out-group attacks. Archival analyses of interstate conflicts showed, likewise, that sovereign states engage in revisionist warfare more when their pre-conflict economic and climatic environment were more volatile and unpredictable. Given that participation in conflict is wasteful, environmental unpredictability not only made groups more often victorious but also less wealthy. Macro-level changes in the natural and economic environment can be a root cause of out-group aggression and turn benign intergroup relations violent.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Intergroup conflict across taxa’.

From inter-group conflict to inter-group cooperation: insights from social insects

The conflict between social groups is widespread, often imposing significant costs across multiple groups. The social insects make an ideal system for investigating inter-group relationships, because their interaction types span the full harming-helping continuum, from aggressive conflict, to mutual tolerance, to cooperation between spatially separate groups. Here we review inter-group conflict in the social insects and the various means by which they reduce the costs of conflict, including individual or colony-level avoidance, ritualistic behaviours and even group fusion. At the opposite extreme of the harming-helping continuum, social insect groups may peacefully exchange resources and thus cooperate between groups in a manner rare outside human societies. We discuss the role of population viscosity in favouring inter-group cooperation. We present a model encompassing intra- and inter-group interactions, and local and long-distance dispersal. We show that in this multi-level population structure, the increased likelihood of cooperative partners being kin is balanced by increased kin competition, such that neither cooperation (helping) nor conflict (harming) is favoured. This model provides a baseline context in which other intra- and inter-group processes act, tipping the balance toward or away from conflict. We discuss future directions for research into the ecological factors shaping the evolution of inter-group interactions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Intergroup conflict across taxa'.

Intergroup conflict: origins, dynamics and consequences across taxa

Although uniquely destructive and wasteful, intergroup conflict and warfare are not confined to humans. They are seen across a range of group-living species, from social insects, fishes and birds to mammals, including nonhuman primates. With its unique collection of theory, research and review contributions from biology, anthropology and economics, this theme issue provides novel insights into intergroup conflict across taxa. Here, we introduce and organize this theme issue on the origins and consequences of intergroup conflict. We provide a coherent framework by modelling intergroup conflicts as multi-level games of strategy in which individuals within groups cooperate to compete with (individuals in) other groups for scarce resources, such as territory, food, mating opportunities, power and influence. Within this framework, we identify cross-species mechanisms and consequences of (participating in) intergroup conflict. We conclude by highlighting crosscutting innovations in the study of intergroup conflict set forth by individual contributions. These include, among others, insights on how within-group heterogeneities and leadership relate to group conflict, how intergroup conflict shapes social organization and how climate change and environmental degradation transition intergroup relations from peaceful coexistence to violent conflict.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Intergroup conflict across taxa’.

Intergroup bias in punishing behaviors of adults with autism spectrum disorder

Groups are essential elements of society, and humans, by nature, commonly manifest intergroup bias (i.e., behave more positively toward an ingroup member than toward an outgroup member). Despite the growing evidence of various types of altered decision-making in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), their behavior under the situation involving group membership remains largely unexplored. By modifying a third-party punishment paradigm, we investigated intergroup bias in individuals with ASD and typical development (TD). In our experiment, participants who were considered as the third party observed a dictator game wherein proposers could decide how to distribute a provided amount of money while receivers could only accept unconditionally. Participants were confronted with two different group situations: the proposer was an ingroup member and the recipient was an outgroup member (IN/OUT condition) or the proposer was an outgroup member and the recipient was an ingroup member (OUT/IN condition). Participants with TD punished proposers more severely when violating social norms in the OUT/IN condition than in IN/OUT condition, indicating that their decisions were influenced by the intergroup context. This intergroup bias was attenuated in individuals with ASD. Our findings deepen the understanding of altered decision-making and socioeconomic behaviors in individuals with ASD.

Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms

Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is a friend and who is a foe. The need to overcome this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Prosociality as a foundation for intergroup conflict

Intergroup conflict can be modeled as a two-level game of strategy in which prosociality can take the form of trust and cooperation within groups or between groups. We review recent work, from our own laboratory and that of others, that shows how biological and sociocultural mechanisms that promote prosocial preferences and beliefs create in-group bounded, parochial cooperation, and, sometimes, parochial competition. We show when and how parochial cooperation and competition intensify rather than mitigate intergroup conflict.

Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals and groups

Direct and indirect reciprocity are two fundamental mechanisms that promote prosocial behavior within groups and across societies. Here, we review recent work that illustrates how a (direct and indirect) reciprocity framework can illuminate our understanding of several factors related to prosocial behavior - namely group membership, gossip, and third-party punishment. We propose that each of these factors can promote prosocial behavior via proximate psychological mechanisms related to direct and indirect reciprocity: reputational concern, expectations, and anticipation of future interaction. Finally, we discuss the implications of adopting such a framework and highlight a number of avenues for future research.

Social Preferences Correlate with Cortical Thickness of the Orbito-Frontal Cortex

Humans differ in their preferences for personal rewards, fairness and others’ welfare. Such social preferences predict trust, public goods provision and mutual gains bargaining and have been linked to neural activity in regions involved in reward computation, cognitive control and perspective-taking. Although shaped by culture, social preferences are relatively stable across time, raising the question whether differences in brain anatomy predict social preferences and their key components—concern for personal outcomes and concern for others’ outcomes. Here, we examine this possibility by linking social preferences measured with incentivized economic games to 74 cortical parcels in 194 healthy humans. Neither concerns for personal outcomes nor concerns for the outcomes of others in isolation were related to anatomical differences. However, fitting earlier findings, social preferences positively scaled with cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus, a structure in the orbital frontal cortex previously shown to be involved in value-based decision-making. Consistent with work showing that heavier usage corresponds to larger brain volume, findings suggest that pro-social preferences relate to cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus because of heavier reliance on the orbital frontal cortex during social decision-making.

Political games of attack and defence

Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo, the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

Experimental Games and Social Decision Making

Experimental games model situations in which the future outcomes of individuals and groups depend on their own choices and on those of other (groups of) individuals. Games are a powerful tool to identify the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal and group cooperation and coordination. Here we discuss recent developments in how experimental games are used and adapted, with an increased focus on repeated interactions, partner control through sanctioning, and partner (de)selection for future interactions. Important advances have been made in uncovering the neurobiological underpinnings of key factors involved in cooperation and coordination, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputations and (in)direct reciprocity. Emerging trends at the cross-sections of psychology, economics, and the neurosciences include an increased focus on group heterogeneities, intergroup polarization and conflict, cross-cultural differences in cooperation and norm enforcement, and neurocomputational modeling of the formation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.