Altercentric Cognition: How Others Influence Our Cognitive Processing

Three key questions to move towards a theoretical framework of visuospatial perspective taking

What would a theory of visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) look like? Here, ten researchers in the field, many with different theoretical viewpoints and empirical approaches, present their consensus on the three big questions we need to answer in order to bring this theory (or these theories) closer.

Co-perceiving: Bringing the social into perception

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Measuring mindreading in preschoolers: The perspective battery (PERBAT)

OBJECTIVE

The capacity to take another person's visual perspective is pivotal for solving mindreading tests, such as Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks, but most of them heavily rely on domain-general abilities (e.g., language, executive functions). Here we present a novel battery of visual perspective-taking tests for child neuropsychological assessment, the Perspective Battery (PERBAT), which poses a limited load on domain-general abilities.

METHODS

The battery includes four tests: i) Block Building; ii) Hide and Seek; iii) Deceptive Figures; iv) Double-Sided Shelf. We administered the PERBAT to 126 typically developing preschoolers (65 males; 3-6-year-old); the participants also performed classical tests of social cognition, language, and nonverbal abstract reasoning.

RESULTS

The scores of all the PERBAT tests were significantly and positively related with age and scores of the classical social cognition tests, but not with scores of the language and nonverbal abstract reasoning tests.

CONCLUSIONS

The PERBAT could represent a useful neuropsychological tool providing a comprehensive assessment of visual perspective-taking skills in preschool children. Future investigation is needed to examine the validity of the PERBAT with neurotypical samples across countries, race, ethnicity, and language as well as with clinical populations. Longitudinal studies are also encouraged to examine whether early visual perspective-taking weaknesses are associated with later development of mindreading skills.

Neural correlates involved in perspective-taking in early childhood

Learning to consider another person's perspective is pivotal in early social development. Still, little is known about the neural underpinnings involved in perspective-taking in early childhood. In this EEG study, we examined 4-year-old children's brain activity during a live, social interaction that involved perspective-taking. Children were asked to pass one of two toys to another person. To decide which toy to pass, they had to consider either their partner's perspective (perspective-taking) or visual features unrelated to their partner's perspective (control). We analyzed power changes in midfrontal and temporal-parietal EEG channels. The results indicated that children showed higher power around 7 Hz at right temporal-parietal channels for perspective-taking compared to control trials. This power difference was positively correlated with children's perspective-taking performance, specifically for trials in which they needed to pass the toy their partner could not see. A similar power difference at right temporal-parietal channels was seen when comparing perspective-taking trials where children's visual access mismatched rather than matched that of their partner. No differences were detected for midfrontal channels. In sum, we identified distinct neural activity as 4-year-olds considered another person's perspective in a live interaction; this activity converges with neural findings of adults' social processing network.

Embodied Cross-Modal Interactions Based on an Altercentric Reference Frame

Accurate comprehension of others' thoughts and intentions is crucial for smooth social interactions, wherein understanding their perceptual experiences serves as a fundamental basis for this high-level social cognition. However, previous research has predominantly focused on the visual modality when investigating perceptual processing from others' perspectives, leaving the exploration of multisensory inputs during this process largely unexplored. By incorporating auditory stimuli into visual perspective-taking (VPT) tasks, we have designed a novel experimental paradigm in which the spatial correspondence between visual and auditory stimuli was limited to the altercentric rather than the egocentric reference frame. Overall, we found that when individuals engaged in explicit or implicit VPT to process visual stimuli from an avatar's viewpoint, the concomitantly presented auditory stimuli were also processed within this avatar-centered reference frame, revealing altercentric cross-modal interactions.

Inhibiting responses under the watch of a recently synchronized peer increases self-monitoring: evidence from functional near-infrared spectroscopy

Developing motor synchrony with a peer (through interventions such as the mirror game) can yield collaborative, cognitive and social benefits. However, it is also well established that observation by an audience can improve cognition. The combined and relative advantages offered by motor synchronization and audience effects are not yet understood. It is important to address this gap to determine the extent to which synchronizing activities might interact with the positive effects of an audience. In this preregistered study, we investigate the extent to which response inhibition may be improved when observed by a peer after motor synchronization with this peer. We compare behavioural and cortical (functional near-infrared spectroscopy; fNIRS) measures of inhibition between synchronized and non-synchronized dyads and find that the presence of a synchronized peer-audience introduces a speed-accuracy trade-off, consisting of slower reaction times and improved accuracy. This co-occurs with cortical activation in bilateral inferior frontal and middle prefrontal cortices, which are implicated in monitoring and maintenance of social alignment. Our findings have implications for carers and support people, who may benefit from synchronizing activities for rehabilitating inhibition and social skills in clinical settings.

Flexible Cultural Learning Through Action Coordination

The cultural transmission of technical know-how has proven vital to the success of our species. The broad diversity of learning contexts and social configurations, as well as the various kinds of coordinated interactions they involve, speaks to our capacity to flexibly adapt to and succeed in transmitting vital knowledge in various learning contexts. Although often recognized by ethnographers, the flexibility of cultural learning has so far received little attention in terms of cognitive mechanisms. We argue that a key feature of the flexibility of cultural learning is that both the models and learners recruit cognitive mechanisms of action coordination to modulate their behavior contingently on the behavior of their partner, generating a process of mutual adaptation supporting the successful transmission of technical skills in diverse and fluctuating learning environments. We propose that the study of cultural learning would benefit from the experimental methods, results, and insights of joint-action research and, complementarily, that the field of joint-action research could expand its scope by integrating a learning and cultural dimension. Bringing these two fields of research together promises to enrich our understanding of cultural learning, its contextual flexibility, and joint action coordination.

Evidence against implicit belief processing in a blindfold task

Understanding what other people think is crucial to our everyday interactions. We seem to be affected by the perspective of others even in situations where it is irrelevant to us. This intrusion from others' perspectives has been referred to as altercentric bias and has been suggested to reflect implicit belief processing. There is an ongoing debate about how robust such altercentric effects are and whether they indeed reflect true mentalizing or result from simpler, domain-general processes. As a critical test for true mentalizing, the blindfold manipulation has been proposed. That is, participants are familiarized with a blindfold that is either transparent or opaque. When they then observe a person wearing this blindfold, they can only infer what this person can or cannot see based on their knowledge of the blindfold's transparency. Here, we used this blindfold manipulation to test whether participants' reaction times in detecting an object depended on the agent's belief about the object's location, itself manipulated with a blindfold. As a second task, we asked participants to detect where the agent was going to look for the object. Across two experiments with a large participant pool (N = 234) and different settings (online/lab), we found evidence against altercentric biases in participants' response times in detecting the object. We did, however, replicate a well-documented reality congruency effect. When asked to detect the agent's action, in turn, participants were biased by their own knowledge of where the object should be, in line with egocentric biases previously found in false belief reasoning. These findings suggests that altercentric biases do not reflect belief processing but lower-level processes, or alternatively, that implicit belief processing does not occur when the belief needs to be inferred from one's own experience.

Collective interactions, collaborative inhibition, and shared spatial knowledge

Research on spatial mental representations focuses on individual mental maps and spatial knowledge. This exploratory study investigates instead collective interactions, collaborative memory, and the sharing of spatial knowledge. Based on the principle of collaborative inhibition (i.e., people recall information less effectively in groups), we posed the following research question: How do collective interactions, occurring during environmental exploration and group drawing sessions, affect collaborative inhibition, and the quality of sketch maps designed collectively? We conducted in situ explorations in Plaine St-Denis (France) with real-time tracking, followed by individual and group drawing sessions. This experiment involved 118 participants divided into three groups: (1) solo explorations without devices; (2) solo explorations with a mobile mapping application; (3) collective explorations using the same application enhanced with interaction features (viewing collective routes and photos of visited places). The comparison of the total number of entities found on individual mental maps with those included in collective sketch maps reveals that collaborative inhibition applies to spatial memory. Additional findings indicate that the use of a map, combined with collective interactions, mitigates collaborative inhibition and increases the accuracy of the sketch maps. However, the effect of such interactions on group dynamics remains unclear as of now.

Increased interference from conflicting perspectives and gender differences: A longitudinal study during adolescence

Adolescents need to develop adequate perspective-taking skills to successfully navigate their increasingly complex social environments. This study investigated adolescents' development of the cognitive processes of egocentric and altercentric interference that influence perspective-taking abilities. Using the Dot Perspective Task, participants' (N = 803; 50.9% female) egocentric and altercentric interference was measured during 3 consecutive years from 12 to 14 years of age. Linear mixed model analyses showed that whereas overall task performance improved over time, egocentric and altercentric interference increased over time. These results suggest that perspective taking develops at slower rates when there are conflicting perspectives than in situations with no conflict. Moreover, we found that girls showed less egocentric interference than boys. This result provides task-based evidence that supports previous findings of higher self-reported perspective taking in adolescent girls than in adolescent boys.

Visual memory of a co-actor's target during joint search

Studies on joint action show that when two actors turn-takingly attend to each other's target that appears one at a time, a partner's target is accumulated in memory. However, in the real world, actors may not be certain that they attend to the same object because multiple objects often appear simultaneously. In this study, we asked participant pairs to search for different targets in parallel from multiple objects and investigated the memory of a partner's target. We employed the contextual cueing paradigm, in which repetitive search forms associative memory between a target and a configuration of distractors that facilitates search. During the learning phase, exemplars of three target categories (i.e., bird, shoe, and tricycle) were presented among unique objects, and participant pairs searched for them. In Experiment 1, it was followed by a memory test about target exemplars. Consequently, the partner's target was better recognized than the target that nobody searched for. In Experiments 2a and 2b, the memory test was replaced with the transfer phase, where one individual from the pair searched for the category that nobody had searched for while the other individual searched for the category the partner had searched for in the learning phase. The transfer phase did not show search facilitation underpinned by associative memory between the partner's target and distractors. These results suggest that when participant pairs search for different targets in parallel, they accumulate the partner's target in memory but may not form its associative memory with the distractors that facilitates its search.

Differences in self-other control as cognitive mechanism to characterize theory of mind reasoning in autistic and non-autistic adults

In cognitive science, altered Theory of Mind is a central pillar of etiological models of autism. Yet, recent evidence, showing comparable Theory of Mind abilities in autistic and non-autistic people, draws a more complex picture and renders previous descriptions of Theory of Mind abilities in autism and their role in autistic symptomatology insufficient. Here, we addressed self-other control as a potential candidate cognitive mechanism to explain subtle Theory of Mind reasoning differences between autistic and non-autistic adults. We investigated flexible shifting between another's and one's own congruent or incongruent points of view, an ability that is important for reciprocal social interaction. Measuring response accuracy and reaction time in a multiple-trial unexpected location false belief task, we found evidence for altered self-other control in Theory of Mind reasoning in autistic adults, with a relative difficulty in flexibly considering the other's perspective and less interference of the other's incongruent viewpoint when their own perspective is considered. Our results add to previous findings that social cognitive differences are there but subtle and constitute one step further in characterizing Theory of Mind reasoning in autism and explaining communication and interaction difficulties with non-autistic people in everyday life.

How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task

It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding with implicit, non-verbal measures suggest that some form of ToM may be present even in infancy. But these studies now face replication issues, and it remains unclear whether they can provide robust evidence for implicit ToM. One line of research on implicit ToM, however, may remain promising: Studies that tap so-called altercentric biases. Such biases occur when agents in their judgments about the world are influenced (perform slower, more error-prone) in light of another agent's deviating perspective even if that perspective is completely irrelevant to the task; they thus can be seen as indicators of spontaneous and implicit ToM. Altercentric biases are the mirror images of egocentric biases (agents are influenced by their own perspective when evaluating another agent's deviating perspective). In three studies with adults, we aimed to tap both egocentric and altercentric interference effects within the same task format. We used the so-called Sandbox task, a false belief task with continuous locations. In Study 1, we tested an online adaptation of the Sandbox task, which we also used to explore potential cross-cultural differences in these biases. Studies 2 and 3 combined the Sandbox task with mouse-tracking measures. These studies revealed neither egocentric nor altercentric biases. These null results are discussed with regard to the question whether absence of evidence here may present evidence of absence of such spontaneous perspective-taking biases or merely false negatives.

The Multiple Perspectives Theory of Mental States in Communication

Inspired by early proposals in philosophy, dominant accounts of language posit a central role for mutual knowledge, either encoded directly in common ground, or approximated through other cognitive mechanisms. Using existing empirical evidence from language and memory, we challenge this tradition, arguing that mutual knowledge captures only a subset of the mental states needed to support communication. In a novel theoretical proposal, we argue for a cognitive architecture that includes separate, distinct representations of the self and other, and a cognitive process that compares these representations continuously during conversation, outputting both similarities and differences in perspective. Our theory accounts for existing data, interfaces with findings from other cognitive domains, and makes novel predictions about the role of perspective in language use. We term this new account the Multiple Perspectives Theory of mental states in communication.

Objects in a social world: Infants' object representational capacity limits are shaped by objects' social relevance

Several decades of research have revealed consistent signature limits on infants' ability to represent objects. However, these signature representational limits were established with methods that often removed objects from their most common context. In infants' everyday lives, objects are very often social artifacts: they are the targets of agents' goal-directed actions, communications, and beliefs, and may have social content or relevance themselves. In this chapter, we explore the relationship between infants' object representational capacity limits and their processing of the social world. We review evidence that the social content and context of objects can shift infants' object representational limits. We discuss how taking the social world into account can yield more robust and ecologically valid estimates of infants' early representational capacities.

Growing out of your own mind: Reexamining the development of the self-other difference in the unexpected contents task

The unexpected contents task is a well-established measure for studying young children's developing theory of mind. The task measures whether children understand that others have a false belief about a deceptive container and whether children can track the representational change in their own beliefs about the container's contents. Performance on both questions improves between the ages of 3 and 4. A previous meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) found little evidence for a difference in children's responses on these questions, but did not investigate the weak effect size that was reported for the interaction between age and question type. The two meta-analyses reported here update the literature review, and find a more robust interaction between question type and age. Three-year-olds showed better performance on questions about their own representational change than others' false belief, while older children showed the reverse pattern. A mega-analysis of a sample of over 1200 children between the ages of 36-60 months then showed the same result. This response pattern requires novel theoretical interpretations, which include reframing the development of children's understanding of false belief.

Biasing the neurocognitive processing of videos with the presence of a real cultural other

In the digital age, while short videos present vital events with powerful information, the presence of cultural cues may bias our processing of videos of foreign cultures. However, the underlying neurocognitive processes remain unclear. In this study, we hypothesized that cultural cues might bias video processing by either enhancing cultural perspective-taking or shifting cultural self-schema. To test these hypotheses, we used a novel paradigm in which the cultural cue was a real cultural other (the priming participants) who watched American/Chinese videos together with the primed participants. The results showed that when the cue was present, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response to videos with other cultural content was shifted, showing a priming effect. Moreover, the activity pattern in the rTPJ was more congruent with the primed culture than with the original culture, reflecting a neural biasing effect. Finally, intersubject representational similarity analysis indicated that the neural biasing effect in the rTPJ was more closely associated with cultural perspective-taking than with cultural self-schema. In summary, these findings support the perspective-taking hypothesis, suggesting that cultural cues can significantly bias our cultural mindset by altering cultural perspective-taking when we are exposed to culture-relevant naturalistic stimuli.

Mask-wearing selectivity alters observers’ face perception

Face masks became prevalent across the globe as an efficient tool to stop the spread of COVID-19. A host of studies already demonstrated that masks lead to changes in facial identification and emotional expression processing. These changes were documented across ages and were consistent even with the increased exposure to masked faces. Notably, mask-wearing also changes the state of the observers in regard to their own bodies and other agents. Previous research has already demonstrated a plausible association between observers’ states and their perceptual behaviors. Thus, an outstanding question is whether mask-wearing would alter face recognition abilities. To address this question, we conducted a set of experiments in which participants were asked to recognize non-masked faces (Experiment 1), masked faces (Experiment 2) and novel objects (Experiment 3) while they were either masked or unmasked. Mask wearing hindered face perception abilities but did not modulate object recognition ability. Finally, we demonstrated that the decrement in face perception ability relied on wearing the mask on distinctive facial features (Experiment 4). Together, these findings reveal a novel effect of mask-wearing on face recognition. We discuss these results considering the plausible effect of somatosensory stimulation on visual processing as well as the effect of involuntary perspective taking.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments (N = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.g. a sandbox. In Experiment 1, a between-subjects design was used, with children being randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one in which child and other jointly attended to the object in L1 (joint attention condition); one in which the other was present but unengaged with the child when the object was placed in L1 (other present condition) and a baseline condition in which only the child was present (no other condition). Automatic perspective-taking should manifest in biased searches toward L1 in the other present and joint attention conditions, but not in the no other condition. No automatic perspective-taking was observed in either experiment, regardless of whether the other person left and remained absent (Experiment 1) or returned after the object was relocated (Experiment 2). The findings contribute to a growing body of empirical data that questions the existence of automatic perspective-taking.

EEG alpha and theta signatures of socially and non-socially cued working memory in virtual reality

In this preregistered study (https://osf.io/s4rm9) we investigated the behavioural and neurological [electroencephalography; alpha (attention) and theta (effort)] effects of dynamic non-predictive social and non-social cues on working memory. In a virtual environment realistic human-avatars dynamically looked to the left or right side of a table. A moving stick served as a non-social control cue. Kitchen items were presented in the valid cued or invalid un-cued location for encoding. Behavioural findings showed a similar influence of the cues on working memory performance. Alpha power changes were equivalent for the cues during cueing and encoding, reflecting similar attentional processing. However, theta power changes revealed different patterns for the cues. Theta power increased more strongly for the non-social cue compared to the social cue during initial cueing. Furthermore, while for the non-social cue there was a significantly larger increase in theta power for valid compared to invalid conditions during encoding, this was reversed for the social cue, with a significantly larger increase in theta power for the invalid compared to valid conditions, indicating differences in the cues' effects on cognitive effort. Therefore, while social and non-social attention cues impact working memory performance in a similar fashion, the underlying neural mechanisms appear to differ.

Adversity, attachment and emotion recognition in BPD adolescents: the distinct roles of disengaged and controlling environment

Background

Literature data about emotion perception in patients with borderline personality disorders (BPD) revealed some discrepancies between some patients that are vigilant and accurate to detect their emotional environment and others that are impaired at identifying emotions of others. Even if some links between childhood adversity and facial affect recognition have been established, there is a need to understand the heterogeneous psychobiological mechanisms underlying this association. The aim is to distinguish in a BPD sample, the links between facial emotion recognition (FER) and adversity types (maltreatment and parental bonding), by evaluating two dimensions of disengaged and controlling environment.

Method

The study includes BPD adolescents (n = 45) and healthy controls (HC, n = 44): two scores of disengaged environment (parental low care; emotional and physical neglect) and controlling environment (high level of parenting control; emotional, physical and sexual abuse) were established and correlated to FER, as well as to attachment dimensions. Multiple linear regression analyzes were conducted to evaluate the effect of disengaged and controlling dimensions, on FER scores of sensitivity and accuracy, including anxious and avoidant attachment as covariables.

Results

Analyzes revealed that a disengaged environment was positively correlated to sensitivity in BPD patients, and the correlation was negative in the HC group. Controlling environment was negatively associated to accuracy of emotion in BPD. Avoidant and anxious attachment did not influence these associations.

Conclusions

These results suggest that distinct adverse experiences account for the heterogeneity observed in emotion regulation in BPD patients.

Seeing the World From Others' Perspective: 14-Month-Olds Show Altercentric Modulation Effects by Others' Beliefs

Humans have a propensity to readily adopt others' perspective, which often influences their behavior even when it seemingly should not. This altercentric influence has been widely studied in adults, yet we lack an understanding of its ontogenetic origins. The current studies investigated whether 14-month-olds' search in a box for potential objects is modulated by another person's belief about the box's content. We varied the person's potential belief such that in her presence/absence an object was removed, added, or exchanged for another, leading to her true/false belief about the object's presence (Experiment 1, n = 96); or transformed into another object, leading to her true/false belief about the object's identity (i.e., the objects represented under a specific aspect, Experiment 2, n = 32). Infants searched longer if the other person believed that an object remained in the box, showing an altercentric influence early in development. These results suggest that infants spontaneously represent others' beliefs involving multiple objects and raise the possibility that infants can appreciate that others encode the world under a unique aspect.

Investigating facilitatory versus inhibitory effects of dynamic social and non-social cues on attention in a realistic space

This study aimed to investigate the facilitatory versus inhibitory effects of dynamic non-predictive central cues presented in a realistic environment. Realistic human-avatars initiated eye contact and then dynamically looked to the left, right or centre of a table. A moving stick served as a non-social control cue and participants localised (Experiment 1) or discriminated (Experiment 2) a contextually relevant target (teapot/teacup). The cues movement took 500 ms and stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA, 150 ms/300 ms/500 ms/1000 ms) were measured from movement initiation. Similar cuing effects were seen for the social avatar and non-social stick cue across tasks. Results showed facilitatory processes without inhibition, though there was some variation by SOA and task. This is the first time facilitatory versus inhibitory processes have been directly investigated where eye contact is initiated prior to gaze shift. These dynamic stimuli allow a better understanding of how attention might be cued in more realistic environments.

Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind

Recent evidence suggests that young infants, as well as nonhuman apes, can anticipate others' behavior based on their false beliefs. While such behaviors have been proposed to be accounted by simple associations between agents, objects, and locations, human adults are undoubtedly endowed with sophisticated theory of mind abilities. For example, they can attribute mental contents about abstract or non-existing entities, or beliefs whose content is poorly specified. While such endeavors may be human specific, it is unclear whether the representational apparatus that allows for encoding such beliefs is present early in development. In four experiments we asked whether 15-month-old infants are able to attribute beliefs with underspecified content, update their content later, and maintain attributed beliefs that are unknown to be true or false. In Experiment 1, infants observed as an agent hid an object to an unspecified location. This location was later revealed in the absence or presence of the agent, and the object was then hidden again to an unspecified location. Then the infants could search for the object while the agent was away. Their search was biased to the revealed location (that could be represented as the potential content of the agent's belief when she had not witnessed the re-hiding), suggesting that they (1) first attributed an underspecified belief to the agent, (2) later updated the content of this belief, and (3) were primed by this content in their own action even though its validity was unknown. This priming effect was absent when the agent witnessed the re-hiding of the object, and thus her belief about the earlier location of the object did not have to be sustained. The same effect was observed when infants searched for a different toy (Experiment 2) or when an additional spatial transformation was introduced (Experiment 4), but not when the spatial transformation disrupted belief updating (Experiment 3). These data suggest that infants' representational apparatus is prepared to efficiently track other agents' beliefs online, encode underspecified beliefs and define their content later, possibly reflecting a crucial characteristic of mature theory of mind: using a metarepresentational format for ascribed beliefs.

Human Representation Learning

The central theme of this review is the dynamic interaction between information selection and learning. We pose a fundamental question about this interaction: How do we learn what features of our experiences are worth learning about? In humans, this process depends on attention and memory, two cognitive functions that together constrain representations of the world to features that are relevant for goal attainment. Recent evidence suggests that the representations shaped by attention and memory are themselves inferred from experience with each task. We review this evidence and place it in the context of work that has explicitly characterized representation learning as statistical inference. We discuss how inference can be scaled to real-world decisions by approximating beliefs based on a small number of experiences. Finally, we highlight some implications of this inference process for human decision-making in social environments.