The strength of weak integrated information theory

Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness

A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

High-order brain interactions in ketamine during rest and task: a double-blinded cross-over design using portable EEG on male participants

Ketamine is a dissociative anesthetic that induces a shift in global consciousness states and related brain dynamics. Portable low-density EEG systems could be used to monitor these effects. However, previous evidence is almost null and lacks adequate methods to address global dynamics with a small number of electrodes. This study delves into brain high-order interactions (HOI) to explore the effects of ketamine using portable EEG. In a double-blinded cross-over design, 30 male adults (mean age = 25.57, SD = 3.74) were administered racemic ketamine and compared against saline infusion as a control. Both task-driven (auditory oddball paradigm) and resting-state EEG were recorded. HOI were computed using advanced multivariate information theory tools, allowing us to quantify nonlinear statistical dependencies between all possible electrode combinations. Ketamine induced an increase in redundancy in brain dynamics (copies of the same information that can be retrieved from 3 or more electrodes), most significantly in the alpha frequency band. Redundancy was more evident during resting state, associated with a shift in conscious states towards more dissociative tendencies. Furthermore, in the task-driven context (auditory oddball), the impact of ketamine on redundancy was more significant for predictable (standard stimuli) compared to deviant ones. Finally, associations were observed between ketamine's HOI and experiences of derealization. Ketamine appears to increase redundancy and HOI across psychometric measures, suggesting these effects are correlated with alterations in consciousness towards dissociation. In comparisons with event-related potential (ERP) or standard functional connectivity metrics, HOI represent an innovative method to combine all signal spatial interactions obtained from low-density dry EEG in drug interventions, as it is the only approach that exploits all possible combinations between electrodes. This research emphasizes the potential of complexity measures coupled with portable EEG devices in monitoring shifts in consciousness, especially when paired with low-density configurations, paving the way for better understanding and monitoring of pharmacological-induced changes.

Unravelling consciousness and brain function through the lens of time, space, and information

Disentangling how cognitive functions emerge from the interplay of brain dynamics and network architecture is among the major challenges that neuroscientists face. Pharmacological and pathological perturbations of consciousness provide a lens to investigate these complex challenges. Here, we review how recent advances about consciousness and the brain's functional organisation have been driven by a common denominator: decomposing brain function into fundamental constituents of time, space, and information. Whereas unconsciousness increases structure-function coupling across scales, psychedelics may decouple brain function from structure. Convergent effects also emerge: anaesthetics, psychedelics, and disorders of consciousness can exhibit similar reconfigurations of the brain's unimodal-transmodal functional axis. Decomposition approaches reveal the potential to translate discoveries across species, with computational modelling providing a path towards mechanistic integration.

What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review

A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.

Psychedelics and disorders of consciousness: the current landscape and the path forward

Modern medicine has been shaken by the surge of psychedelic science that proposes a new approach to mitigate mental disorders, such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Clinical trials to investigate whether psychedelic substances can treat psychiatric conditions are now underway, yet less discussion gravitates around their use in neurological disorders due to brain injury. One suggested implementation of brain-complexity enhancing psychedelics is to treat people with post-comatose disorders of consciousness (DoC). In this article, we discuss the rationale of this endeavour, examining possible outcomes of such experiments by postulating the existence of an optimal level of complexity. We consider the possible counterintuitive effects of both psychedelics and DoC on the functional connectivity of the default mode network and its possible impact on selfhood. We also elaborate on the role of computational modelling in providing complementary information to experimental studies, both contributing to our understanding of the treatment mechanisms and providing a path towards personalized medicine. Finally, we update the discourse surrounding the ethical considerations, encompassing clinical and scientific values.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

High-order brain interactions in ketamine during rest and task: A double-blinded cross-over design using portable EEG

In a double-blinded cross-over design, 30 adults (mean age = 25.57, SD = 3.74; all male) were administered racemic ketamine and compared against saline infusion as a control. Both task-driven (auditory oddball paradigm) and resting-state EEG were recorded. HOI were computed using advanced multivariate information theory tools, allowing us to quantify nonlinear statistical dependencies between all possible electrode combinations. Results: Ketamine increased redundancy in brain dynamics, most significantly in the alpha frequency band. Redundancy was more evident during the resting state, associated with a shift in conscious states towards more dissociative tendencies. Furthermore, in the task-driven context (auditory oddball), the impact of ketamine on redundancy was more significant for predictable (standard stimuli) compared to deviant ones. Finally, associations were observed between ketamine's HOI and experiences of derealization. Conclusions: Ketamine appears to increase redundancy and genuine HOI across metrics, suggesting these effects correlate with consciousness alterations towards dissociation. HOI represents an innovative method to combine all signal spatial interactions obtained from low-density dry EEG in drug interventions, as it is the only approach that exploits all possible combinations from different electrodes. This research emphasizes the potential of complexity measures coupled with portable EEG devices in monitoring shifts in consciousness, especially when paired with low-density configurations, paving the way for better understanding and monitoring of pharmacological-induced changes.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Covert cortical processing: a diagnosis in search of a definition

Historically, clinical evaluation of unresponsive patients following brain injury has relied principally on serial behavioral examination to search for emerging signs of consciousness and track recovery. Advances in neuroimaging and electrophysiologic techniques now enable clinicians to peer into residual brain functions even in the absence of overt behavioral signs. These advances have expanded clinicians' ability to sub-stratify behaviorally unresponsive and seemingly unaware patients following brain injury by querying and classifying covert brain activity made evident through active or passive neuroimaging or electrophysiologic techniques, including functional MRI, electroencephalography (EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation-EEG, and positron emission tomography. Clinical research has thus reciprocally influenced clinical practice, giving rise to new diagnostic categories including cognitive-motor dissociation (i.e. 'covert consciousness') and covert cortical processing (CCP). While covert consciousness has received extensive attention and study, CCP is relatively less understood. We describe that CCP is an emerging and clinically relevant state of consciousness marked by the presence of intact association cortex responses to environmental stimuli in the absence of behavioral evidence of stimulus processing. CCP is not a monotonic state but rather encapsulates a spectrum of possible association cortex responses from rudimentary to complex and to a range of possible stimuli. In constructing a roadmap for this evolving field, we emphasize that efforts to inform clinicians, philosophers, and researchers of this condition are crucial. Along with strategies to sensitize diagnostic criteria and disorders of consciousness nosology to these vital discoveries, democratizing access to the resources necessary for clinical identification of CCP is an emerging clinical and ethical imperative.

Carving Nature at Its Joints: A Comparison of CEMI Field Theory with Integrated Information Theory and Global Workspace Theory

The quest to comprehend the nature of consciousness has spurred the development of many theories that seek to explain its underlying mechanisms and account for its neural correlates. In this paper, I compare my own conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory with integrated information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT) for their ability to 'carve nature at its joints' in the sense of predicting the entities, structures, states and dynamics that are conventionally recognized as being conscious or nonconscious. I go on to argue that, though the cemi field theory shares features of both integrated information theory and global workspace theory, it is more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, and is thereby a more successful theory of consciousness.

The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia

Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.

Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem

The problem of explaining the relationship between subjective experience and physical reality remains difficult and unresolved. In most explanations, consciousness is epiphenomenal, without causal power. The most notable exception is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides a causal explanation for consciousness. However, IIT relies on an identity between subjectivity and a particular type of physical structure, namely with an information structure that has intrinsic causal power greater than the sum of its parts. Any theory that relies on a psycho-phyiscal identity must eventually appeal to panpsychism, which undermines that theory's claim to be fundamental. IIT has recently pivoted towards a strong version of causal emergence, but macroscopic structures cannot be stronger causally than their microphysical parts without some new physical law or governing principle. The approach taken here is designed to uncover such a principle. The decisive argument is entirely deductive from initial premises that are phenomenologically certain. If correct, the arguments prove that conscious experience is sufficient to create additional degrees of causal freedom independently of the content of experience, and in a manner that is unpredictable and unobservable by any temporally sequential means. This provides a fundamental principle about consciousness, and a conceptual bridge between it and the physics describing what is experienced. The principle makes testable predictions about brain function, with notable differences from IIT, some of which are also empirically testable.

Paradoxical pharmacological dissociations result from drugs that enhance delta oscillations but preserve consciousness

Low-frequency (<4 Hz) neural activity, particularly in the delta band, is generally indicative of loss of consciousness and cortical down states, particularly when it is diffuse and high amplitude. Remarkably, however, drug challenge studies of several diverse classes of pharmacological agents-including drugs which treat epilepsy, activate GABA_B receptors, block acetylcholine receptors, or produce psychedelic effects-demonstrate neural activity resembling cortical down states even as the participants remain conscious. Of those substances that are safe to use in healthy volunteers, some may be highly valuable research tools for investigating which neural activity patterns are sufficient for consciousness or its absence.

About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness

This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.

When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.

Measuring Consciousness in the Intensive Care Unit

Early reemergence of consciousness predicts long-term functional recovery for patients with severe brain injury. However, tools to reliably detect consciousness in the intensive care unit are lacking. Transcranial magnetic stimulation electroencephalography has the potential to detect consciousness in the intensive care unit, predict recovery, and prevent premature withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy.

Not with a “zap” but with a “beep”: measuring the origins of perinatal experience

When does the mind begin? Infant psychology is mysterious in part because we cannot remember our first months of life, nor can we directly communicate with infants. Even more speculative is the possibility of mental life prior to birth. The question of when consciousness, or subjective experience, begins in human development thus remains incompletely answered, though boundaries can be set using current knowledge from developmental neurobiology and recent investigations of the perinatal brain. Here, we offer our perspective on how the development of a sensory perturbational complexity index (sPCI) based on auditory ("beep-and-zip"), visual ("flash-and-zip"), or even olfactory ("sniff-and-zip") cortical perturbations in place of electromagnetic perturbations ("zap-and-zip") might be used to address this question. First, we discuss recent studies of perinatal cognition and consciousness using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and, in particular, magnetoencephalography (MEG). While newborn infants are the archetypal subjects for studying early human development, researchers may also benefit from fetal studies, as the womb is, in many respects, a more controlled environment than the cradle. The earliest possible timepoint when subjective experience might begin is likely the establishment of thalamocortical connectivity at 26 weeks gestation, as the thalamocortical system is necessary for consciousness according to most theoretical frameworks. To infer at what age and in which behavioral states consciousness might emerge following the initiation of thalamocortical pathways, we advocate for the development of the sPCI and similar techniques, based on EEG, MEG, and fMRI, to estimate the perinatal brain's state of consciousness.

Sensory modality defines the relation between EEG Lempel-Ziv diversity and meaningfulness of a stimulus

Diversity of brain activity is a robust neural correlate of global states of consciousness. It has been proposed that diversity measures specifically reflect the temporal variability of conscious experience. Previous studies supported this hypothesis by showing that perception of meaningful visual stimuli causes richer, more-variable experiences than perception of meaningless stimuli, and this is reflected in greater brain signal diversity. To investigate whether this relation is consistent across sensory modalities, to participants we presented three versions of naturalistic visual and auditory stimuli (videos and audiobooks) that varied in the amount of meaning (original, scrambled, and noise), while recording electroencephalographic signals. We report three main findings. First, greater meaningfulness of visual stimuli was related to higher Lempel-Ziv diversity of EEG signals, but the opposite effect was found in the auditory modality. Second, visual perception was related to generally higher EEG diversity than auditory perception. Third, perception of meaningful visual stimuli and auditory stimuli respectively resulted in higher and lower EEG diversity in comparison to the resting state. In conclusion, the signal diversity of continuous brain signals depends on the stimulated sensory modality, therefore it is not a generic index of the variability of conscious experience.

Separating weak integrated information theory into inspired and aspirational approaches

Mediano et al. (The strength of weak integrated information theory. Trends Cogn Sci 2022;26: 646-55.) separate out strong and weak flavours of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. They describe 'strong IIT' as attempting to derive a universal formula for consciousness and 'weak IIT' as searching for empirically measurable correlates of aspects of consciousness. We put forward that their overall notion of 'weak IIT' may be too weak. Rather, it should be separated out to distinguish 'aspirational-IIT', which aims to empirically test IIT by making trade-offs to its proposed measures, and 'IIT-inspired' approaches, which adopt high-level ideas of IIT while dropping the mathematical framework it reaches through its introspective, first-principles approach to consciousness.

How much consciousness is there in complexity?

The notion of complexity currently receives significant attention in neuroscience, mainly through the popularity of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). It has proven successful in research centred on discriminating states of consciousness, while little theoretical and experimental effort was directed toward studying the content. In this paper, we argue that exploring the relationship between complexity and conscious content is necessary to understand the importance of information-theoretic measures for consciousness research properly. We outline how content could be experimentally operationalised and how rudimental testable hypotheses can be formulated without requiring IIT formalisms. This approach would not only allow for a better understanding of aspects of consciousness captured by complexity but could also facilitate comparison efforts for theories of consciousness.