Theory of collective mind

The social cognitive evolution of myths: Collective narratives of shared pasts as markers for coalitions' communicative and cooperative prowess

To understand why humans put much effort into celebrating cultural myths, it is crucial to approach this phenomenon as part of humans' broader social cognitive evolution. Specifically, humans' unique capacity to bond with others through shared/collective representations of shared experiences has likely caused individuals to use myths to assess not only coalitions' fitness interdependence, but also their cooperative prowess.

Mapping the mentalizing brain: An ALE meta-analysis to differentiate the representation of social scenes and ages on theory of mind

Theory of mind (ToM) involves understanding others' mental states and relies on brain regions like the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). This meta-analytic review categorizes ToM studies into six sub-components across three pairs: (1) Theory of collective mind (ToCM) and individualized theory of mind (iToM), (2) Social intention ToM and private intention ToM, and (3) ToM in adults and ToM in children. We conducted coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analyses and meta-analytic connectivity modeling (MACM) for each sub-component. We found that the ToM components utilized in social or group situations were associated with both the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) and right superior temporal sulcus (STS), whereas the ToM components focused on personal concentration were associated with both the lateral PFC and the left STS. The coactivation patterns for the group and age sub-component pairs showed significant spatial overlap with the language networks. These findings indicate that ToM is a multidimensional construct that is related to distinct functional networks for processing each of the ToM sub-components.

Preschoolers' in-group bias promotes altruistic sharing and reduces second-party punishment: The role of theory of mind

This study examines how in-group bias affects altruistic sharing and second-party punishment in preschoolers and the role of theory of mind (ToM) in in-group bias. Preschoolers aged 4 to 7 years (N = 309; 160 girls) were asked to share resources with an in-group member and an out-group member (Dictator Game) and to reject or accept an unequal allocation proposed by an in-group member and an out-group member (Ultimatum Game). The results showed that preschoolers shared more resources with, and tolerated more unfair behaviors from, in-group members. ToM influenced the in-group bias in both altruistic sharing and second-party punishment. Notably, children's degree of in-group favoritism in altruistic sharing was positively related to the second-party punishment children imposed on out-group members. However, this pattern was found only among children who had acquired first-order ToM. This study reveals the developmental patterns of preschoolers' in-group bias in altruistic sharing and second-party punishment and the effects of ToM on in-group bias.

Enhancement of joint flanker effect in intergroup competition

Representing the mental state of the partner lays the foundation for successful social interaction. While the representation of group members has been extensively studied, it is unclear how intergroup interactions affect it. In three experiments utilizing the joint flanker task, we found that competition between groups brought about a greater joint flanker effect (Experiment 1). Such phenomenon was not due to competition per se, as competition that occurred between individuals from different groups did not enhance the joint flanker effect (Experiment 2). Using the minimal grouping method to directly manipulate group entitativity, we found that the joint flanker effect was larger when participants perceived the group as being more closely connected; conversely, when they perceived the group as less close, the joint flanker effect was attenuated (Experiment 3). These results suggested that beliefs about the group may be key to how group competition enhanced the joint flanker effect. The potential cognitive mechanisms producing this phenomenon are fully discussed. Overall, our study is the first to explore the impact of intergroup interactions on the joint flanker effect and provides a new perspective on understanding the relationship between within-group representations and intergroup interactions.

Collaborative imagination synchronizes representations of the future and fosters social connection in the present

From close friends to people on a first date, imagining a shared future appears fundamental to relationships. Yet, no previous research has conceptualized the act of imagination as a socially constructed process that affects how connected we feel to others. The present studies provide a framework for investigating imagination as a collaborative process in which individuals cocreate shared representations of hypothetical events-what we call collaborative imagination. Across two preregistered studies (N = 244), we provide evidence that collaborative imagination of a shared future fosters social connection in novel dyads-beyond imagining a shared future individually or shared experience in general. Subjective ratings and natural language processing of participants' imagined narratives illuminate the representational features of imagined events shaped by collaborative imagination. Together, the present findings have the potential to shift how we view the structure and function of imagination with implications for better understanding interpersonal relationships and collective cognition.

The Emerging Science of Interacting Minds

For over a century, psychology has focused on uncovering mental processes of a single individual. However, humans rarely navigate the world in isolation. The most important determinants of successful development, mental health, and our individual traits and preferences arise from interacting with other individuals. Social interaction underpins who we are, how we think, and how we behave. Here we discuss the key methodological challenges that have limited progress in establishing a robust science of how minds interact and the new tools that are beginning to overcome these challenges. A deep understanding of the human mind requires studying the context within which it originates and exists: social interaction.

A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social Bonding

Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are unique to the species. These involve various kinds of interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding have no explanation for why humans should have these unique bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and communicative activities that both depend on and create shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation toward them and because the shared representations created during such interactions make subsequent cooperative interactions easier and more effective.