Greenbeard Genes: Theory and Reality

Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations

We investigate conditions for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in finite populations with assortment of players by group founders and general payoff functions for cooperation and defection within groups. Using a diffusion approximation in the limit of a large population size that does not depend on the precise updating rule, we show that the first-order effect of selection on the fixation probability of cooperation when represented once can be expressed as the difference between time-averaged payoffs with respect to effective time that cooperators and defectors spend in direct competition in the different group states. Comparing this fixation probability to its value under neutrality and to the corresponding fixation probability for defection, we deduce conditions for the evolution of cooperation. We show that these conditions are generally less stringent as the level of assortment increases under a wide range of assumptions on the payoffs such as additive, synergetic or discounted benefits for cooperation, fixed cost for cooperation and threshold benefit functions. This is not necessarily the case, however, when payoffs in pairwise interactions are multiplicatively compounded within groups.

The greenbeard gene tgrB1 regulates altruism and cheating in Dictyostelium discoideum

Greenbeard genetic elements encode rare perceptible signals, signal recognition ability, and altruism towards others that display the same signal. Putative greenbeards have been described in various organisms but direct evidence for all the properties in one system is scarce. The tgrB1-tgrC1 allorecognition system of Dictyostelium discoideum encodes two polymorphic membrane proteins which protect cells from chimerism-associated perils. During development, TgrC1 functions as a ligand-signal and TgrB1 as its receptor, but evidence for altruism has been indirect. Here, we show that mixing wild-type and activated tgrB1 cells increases wild-type spore production and relegates the mutants to the altruistic stalk, whereas mixing wild-type and tgrB1-null cells increases mutant spore production and wild-type stalk production. The tgrB1-null cells cheat only on partners that carry the same tgrC1-allotype. Therefore, TgrB1 activation confers altruism whereas TgrB1 inactivation causes allotype-specific cheating, supporting the greenbeard concept and providing insight into the relationship between allorecognition, altruism, and exploitation.

Greenbeards in plants?

Greenbeards are selfish genetic elements that make their bearers behave either altruistically towards individuals bearing similar greenbeard copies or harmfully towards individuals bearing different copies. They were first proposed by W. D. Hamilton over 50 yr ago, to illustrate that kin selection may operate at the level of single genes. Examples of greenbeards have now been reported in a wide range of taxa, but they remain undocumented in plants. In this paper, we discuss the theoretical likelihood of greenbeard existence in plants. We then question why the greenbeard concept has never been applied to plants and speculate on how hypothetical greenbeards could affect plant-plant interactions. Finally, we point to different research directions to improve our knowledge of greenbeards in plants.

Crozier's paradox and kin recognition: Insights from simplified models

Crozier's paradox suggests that genetic kin recognition will not be evolutionarily stable. The problem is that more common tags (markers) are more likely to be recognised and helped. This causes common tags to increase in frequency, eliminating the genetic variability that is required for genetic kin recognition. In recent years, theoretical models have resolved Crozier's paradox in different ways, but they are based on very complicated multi-locus population genetics. Consequently, it is hard to see exactly what is going on, and whether different theoretical resolutions of Crozier's paradox lead to different types of kin discrimination. I address this by making unrealistic simplifying assumptions to produce a more tractable and understandable model of Crozier's paradox. I use this to interpret a more complex multi-locus population genetic model where I have not made the same simplifying assumptions. I explain how Crozier's paradox can be resolved, and show that only one known theoretical resolution of Crozier's paradox - multiple social encounters - leads without restrictive assumptions to the type of highly cooperative and reliable form of kin discrimination that we observe in nature. More generally, I show how adopting a methodological approach where complex models are compared with simplified ones can lead to greater understanding and accessibility.

SOCfinder: a genomic tool for identifying social genes in bacteria

Bacteria cooperate by working collaboratively to defend their colonies, share nutrients, and resist antibiotics. Nevertheless, our understanding of these remarkable behaviours primarily comes from studying a few well-characterized species. Consequently, there is a significant gap in our understanding of microbial social traits, particularly in natural environments. To address this gap, we can use bioinformatic tools to identify genes that control cooperative or otherwise social traits. Existing tools address this challenge through two approaches. One approach is to identify genes that encode extracellular proteins, which can provide benefits to neighbouring cells. An alternative approach is to predict gene function using annotation tools. However, these tools have several limitations. Not all extracellular proteins are cooperative, and not all cooperative behaviours are controlled by extracellular proteins. Furthermore, existing functional annotation methods frequently miss known cooperative genes. We introduce SOCfinder as a new tool to find bacterial genes that control cooperative or otherwise social traits. SOCfinder combines information from several methods, considering if a gene is likely to [1] code for an extracellular protein [2], have a cooperative functional annotation, or [3] be part of the biosynthesis of a cooperative secondary metabolite. We use data on two extensively-studied species (P. aeruginosa and B. subtilis) to show that SOCfinder is better at finding known cooperative genes than existing tools. We also use theory from population genetics to identify a signature of kin selection in SOCfinder cooperative genes, which is lacking in genes identified by existing tools. SOCfinder opens up a number of exciting directions for future research, and is available to download from https://github.com/lauriebelch/SOCfinder.

Host-parasite coevolution and the stability of genetic kin recognition

Crozier's paradox suggests that genetic kin recognition will not be evolutionarily stable. The problem is that more common tags (markers) are more likely to be recognized and helped. This causes common tags to increase in frequency, eliminating the genetic variability that is required for genetic kin recognition. Two potential solutions to this problem have been suggested: host-parasite coevolution and multiple social encounters. We show that the host-parasite coevolution hypothesis does not work as commonly assumed. Host-parasite coevolution only stabilizes kin recognition at a parasite resistance locus if parasites adapt rapidly to hosts and cause intermediate or high levels of damage (virulence). Additionally, when kin recognition is stabilized at a parasite resistance locus, this can have an additional cost of making hosts more susceptible to parasites. However, we show that if the genetic architecture is allowed to evolve, meaning natural selection can choose the recognition locus, genetic kin recognition is more likely to be stable. The reason for this is that host-parasite coevolution can maintain tag diversity at another (neutral) locus by genetic hitchhiking, allowing that other locus to be used for genetic kin recognition. These results suggest a way that host-parasite coevolution can resolve Crozier's paradox, without making hosts more susceptible to parasites. However, the opportunity for multiple social encounters may provide a more robust resolution of Crozier's paradox.

The role of recognition error in the stability of green-beard genes

The empirical examples of the green-beard genes, once a conundrum of evolutionary biology, are accumulating, while theoretical analyses of this topic are occasional compared to those concerning (narrow-sense) kin selection. In particular, the recognition error of the green-beard effect that the cooperator fails to accurately recognize the other cooperators or defectors is readily found in numerous green-beard genes. To our knowledge, however, no model up to date has taken that effect into account. In this article, we investigated the effect of recognition error on the fitness of the green-beard gene. By employing theories of evolutionary games, our mathematical model predicts that the fitness of the green-beard gene is frequency dependent (frequency of the green-beard gene), which was corroborated by experiments performed with yeast FLO1. The experiment also shows that the cells with the green-beard gene (FLO1) are sturdier under severe stress. We conclude that the low recognition error among the cooperators, the higher reward of cooperation, and the higher cost of defection confer an advantage to the green-beard gene under certain conditions, confirmed by numerical simulation as well. Interestingly, we expect that the recognition error to the defectors may promote the cooperator fitness if the cooperator frequency is low and mutual defection is detrimental. Our ternary approach of mathematical analysis, experiments, and simulation lays the groundwork of the standard model for the green-beard gene that can be generalized to other species.

Individual Genetic Heterogeneity

Genetic variation has been widely covered in literature, however, not from the perspective of an individual in any species. Here, a synthesis of genetic concepts and variations relevant for individual genetic constitution is provided. All the different levels of genetic information and variation are covered, ranging from whether an organism is unmixed or hybrid, has variations in genome, chromosomes, and more locally in DNA regions, to epigenetic variants or alterations in selfish genetic elements. Genetic constitution and heterogeneity of microbiota are highly relevant for health and wellbeing of an individual. Mutation rates vary widely for variation types, e.g., due to the sequence context. Genetic information guides numerous aspects in organisms. Types of inheritance, whether Mendelian or non-Mendelian, zygosity, sexual reproduction, and sex determination are covered. Functions of DNA and functional effects of variations are introduced, along with mechanism that reduce and modulate functional effects, including TARAR countermeasures and intraindividual genetic conflict. TARAR countermeasures for tolerance, avoidance, repair, attenuation, and resistance are essential for life, integrity of genetic information, and gene expression. The genetic composition, effects of variations, and their expression are considered also in diseases and personalized medicine. The text synthesizes knowledge and insight on individual genetic heterogeneity and organizes and systematizes the central concepts.

Tag-based Spite with Correlated Interactions

We use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of harming behavior (spite) in settings involving both tags and (anti-)correlated interaction. Our results show an interesting interaction between these mechanisms. The presence of tags shows that pure spite is less likely to evolve when theoretically expected, but that conditional spite is more likely than expected. Moreover, we identify a novel tag-based equilibrium where spite occurs within but not between groups. We discuss implications for the evolution of spite, punishment, and the methodological approach of using exogenous parameters to represent (anti-)correlated interactions.

Ten recent insights for our understanding of cooperation

Since Hamilton published his seminal papers in 1964, our understanding of the importance of cooperation for life on Earth has evolved beyond recognition. Early research was focused on altruism in the social insects, where the problem of cooperation was easy to see. In more recent years, research into cooperation has expanded across the entire tree of life, and has been revolutionized by advances in genetic, microbiological and analytical techniques. We highlight ten insights that have arisen from these advances, which have illuminated generalizations across different taxa, making the world simpler to explain. Furthermore, progress in these areas has opened up numerous new problems to solve, suggesting exciting directions for future research.

Antagonistic interactions subdue inter-species green-beard cooperation in bacteria

Cooperation can be favoured through the green-beard mechanism, where a set of linked genes encodes both a cooperative trait and a phenotypic marker (green beard), which allows carriers of the trait to selectively direct cooperative acts to other carriers. In theory, the green-beard mechanism should favour cooperation even when interacting partners are totally unrelated at the genome level. Here, we explore such an extreme green-beard scenario between two unrelated bacterial species-Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Burkholderia cenocepacia, which share a cooperative locus encoding the public good pyochelin (an iron-scavenging siderophore) and its cognate receptor (green beard) required for iron-pyochelin uptake. We show that pyochelin, when provided in cell-free supernatants, can be mutually exchanged between species and provide fitness benefits under iron limitation. However, in co-culture we observed that these cooperative benefits vanished and communities were dominated by P. aeruginosa, regardless of strain background and species starting frequencies. Our results further suggest that P. aeruginosa engages in interference competition to suppress B. cenocepacia, indicating that inter-species conflict arising from dissimilarities at the genome level overrule the aligned cooperative interests at the pyochelin locus. Thus, green-beard cooperation is subdued by competition, indicating that interspecific siderophore cooperation is difficult to evolve and to be maintained.

Kin recognition and outer membrane exchange (OME) in myxobacteria

Myxobacteria conduct complex social traits that requires populations to be highly related and devoid of exploiters. To enrich for clonal cells in populations, they employ kin discrimination mechanisms. One key system involves a polymorphic cell surface receptor, TraA, which recognizes self by homotypic interactions with neighboring myxobacterial cells. Recent studies revealed that TraA and its partner TraB are fluid outer membrane proteins that coalesce into foci upon recognition of kin. The formation of foci leads to transient membrane fusion junctions and the bidirectional exchange of outer membrane components that facilitates cooperative behaviors. Additionally, expansive suites of polymorphic lipoprotein toxins are exchanged, which act as self-identity barcodes that exquisitely discriminate against nonself to assemble homogenous populations.

Polymorphic Toxins and Their Immunity Proteins: Diversity, Evolution, and Mechanisms of Delivery

All bacteria must compete for growth niches and other limited environmental resources. These existential battles are waged at several levels, but one common strategy entails the transfer of growth-inhibitory protein toxins between competing cells. These antibacterial effectors are invariably encoded with immunity proteins that protect cells from intoxication by neighboring siblings. Several effector classes have been described, each designed to breach the cell envelope of target bacteria. Although effector architectures and export pathways tend to be clade specific, phylogenetically distant species often deploy closely related toxin domains. Thus, diverse competition systems are linked through a common reservoir of toxin-immunity pairs that is shared via horizontal gene transfer. These toxin-immunity protein pairs are extraordinarily diverse in sequence, and this polymorphism underpins an important mechanism of self/nonself discrimination in bacteria. This review focuses on the structures, functions, and delivery mechanisms of polymorphic toxin effectors that mediate bacterial competition.

Evolution of strategic cooperation

Group‐beneficial behaviors have presented a long‐standing challenge for evolutionary theory because, although their benefits are available to all group members, their costs are borne by individuals. Consequently, an individual could benefit from “cheating” their group mates by not paying the costs while still reaping the benefits. There have been many proposed evolutionary mechanisms that could favor cooperation (and disfavor cheating) in particular circumstances. However, if cooperation is still favored in some circumstances, then we might expect evolution to favor strategic cooperation, where the level of contribution toward group‐beneficial behavior is varied in response to the social context. To uncover how and why individuals should contribute toward group‐beneficial behavior across social contexts, we model strategic cooperation as an evolutionary game where players can quantitatively adjust the amount they contribute toward group‐beneficial behavior. We find that the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) predicts, unsurprisingly, that players should contribute in relation to their relatedness to the group. However, we surprisingly find that players often contribute to cooperation in such a way that their fitness is inverse to their relatedness to the group such that those that contribute to cooperation end up with the same return from group‐beneficial behavior, essentially removing any potential advantage of higher relatedness. These results bring to light a paradox of group‐beneficial cooperation: groups do best when they contain highly related individuals, but those with the highest relatedness to the group will often have the lowest fitness within the group.