Subjective measures of unconscious knowledge

ENIGMA: A Web Application for Running Online Artificial Grammar Learning Experiments

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) is an experimental paradigm frequently adopted to investigate the unconscious and conscious learning and application of linguistic knowledge. This paper will introduce ENIGMA ( https://enigma-lang.org ) as a free, flexible, and lightweight Web-based tool for running online AGL experiments. The application is optimized for desktop and mobile devices with a user-friendly interface, which can present visual and aural stimuli and elicit judgment responses with RT measures. Without limits in time and space, ENIGMA could help collect more data from participants with diverse personal and language backgrounds and variable cognitive skills. Such data are essential to explain complex factors influencing learners' performance in AGL experiments and answer various research questions regarding L1/L2 acquisition. The introduction of the core features in ENIGMA is followed by an example study that partially replicated Chen (Lang Acquis 27(3):331-361, 2020) to illustrate possible experimental designs and examine the quality of the collected data.

Extrapolating animal consciousness

I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.

The "Starting-Small" Effect in Phonology: Evidence From Biased Learning of Opaque and Transparent Vowel Harmony

The starting-small effect is a cognitive advantage in language acquisition when learners begin by generalizing on regularities from structurally simple and shorter tokens in a skewed input distribution. Our study explored this effect as a potential explanation for the biased learning of opaque and transparent vowel harmony. In opaque vowel harmony, feature agreement occurs strictly between adjacent vowels, and an intervening "neutral vowel" blocks long-distance vowel harmony. Thus, opaque vowel harmony could be acquired even if learners start with structurally simpler and more frequent disyllabic tokens. Alternatively, transparent vowel harmony can only be observed in longer tokens demonstrating long-distance agreement by skipping a neutral vowel. Opaque vowel harmony is predicted to be learned more efficiently due to its compatibility with local dependency acquired via starting-small learning. In two artificial grammar learning experiments, learners were exposed to both vowel harmony patterns embedded in an equal number of disyllabic and trisyllabic tokens or a skewed distribution with twice as many disyllabic tokens. In Exp I, learners' test performance suggests the consistently biased learning of local and opaque vowel harmony with starting-small learning. Furthermore, in Exp II, the acquired vowel harmony patterns varied significantly by working memory capacity with a balanced but not skewed input distribution, presumably because of the ease of cognitive demand with starting-small learning.

The association between subjective anti-doping knowledge and objective knowledge among Japanese university athletes: a cross-sectional study

Introduction

This study aimed to assess the association between subjective anti-doping knowledge (subjective ADK) and objective anti-doping knowledge (objective ADK) among Japanese university athletes, framed within the context of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB).

Methods

Eligible participants were 486 university athletes [320 men (65.8%), 166 women; mean age of 18.9 ± 1.0 years]. The participants categorized themselves in terms of the quality of their anti-doping knowledge. This assessment resulted in an independent variable coded as "(1) substantial lack of adequate knowledge," "(2) some lack of adequate knowledge," "(3) fair amount of knowledge" or "(4) good amount of knowledge." Objective ADK was assessed using the Athlete Learning Program about Health and Anti-Doping (ALPHA) test, a set of questions derived from the ALPHA-a former World Anti-Doping Agency e-learning program. The test comprises 12 questions (four choices each; passing index: ≧10 points or 80% correct answer rate). ANCOVA was conducted using subjective ADK as an independent variable and ALPHA scores as a dependent variable, adjusting for confounding factors (anti-doping experience).

Results

The ALPHA corrected answer rate across subjective ADK levels for the group were 73.10% for "(1) substantial lack of adequate knowledge," 71.97% for "(2) some lack of adequate knowledge," 75.18% for "(3) fair amount of knowledge" and 72.86% for "(4) good amount of knowledge." Comparison between different levels of subjective ADK revealed no significant differences in ALPHA score considering the main effects or any of their interactions.

Discussion

The present results revealed that Japanese university athletes' subjective ADK did not match their objective ADK. In the context of the TPB, there may be limitations in the perceived behavioral control in anti-doping knowledge. Even if athletes view doping as a wrongful act and have formed attitudes and subjective norms to comply with the rules, the results suggest that errors may occur in the composition of behavioral intentions due to a lack of knowledge. This could lead to the possibility of facing the risk of unintentional anti-doping rule violations. It highlights the need for targeted educational interventions to align subjective ADK of athletes with their objective ADK.

Episodic and semantic feeling-of-knowing in aging: a systematic review and meta-analysis

A complex pattern of preservation and deterioration in metacognition in aging is found, especially regarding predicting future memory retrieval (i.e., feeling-of-knowing, FOK). While semantic FOK (sFOK) is preserved with age, studies on episodic tasks (eFOK) produce equivocal findings. We present a meta-analysis of 20 studies on eFOK and sFOK, analyzing the difference in metacognitive sensitivity between 922 younger and 966 older adults, taking into account the difference in memory performance. The sFOK studies yielded no overall age effect (8 effects, g = -0.10 [-0.29, 0.10]). However, we found a reliable age-group difference on eFOK (22 effects, g = 0.53 [0.28, 0.78]), which was moderated when considering recognition performance. Moreover, using aggregated data of 134 young and 235 older adults from published and unpublished studies from our lab, we investigated memory performance as an explanation of the eFOK deficit. We show that older adults are less metacognitively sensitive than younger adults for eFOKs which is, at least partly, due to the age-related memory decline. We highlight two non-exclusive explanations: a recollection deficit at play in the first and second order tasks, and a confound between first order performance and the measure used to assess metacognitive sensitivity.

Be Quiet! Effects of Competing Speakers and Individual Characteristics on Listening Comprehension for Primary School Students

Students learn in noisy classrooms, where the main sources of noise are their own voices. In this sound environment, students are not equally at risk from background noise interference during lessons, due to the moderation effect of the individual characteristics on the listening conditions. This study investigates the effect of the number of competing speakers on listening comprehension and whether this is modulated by selective attention skills, working memory, and noise sensitivity. Seventy-one primary school students aged 10 to 13 years completed a sentence comprehension task in three listening conditions: quiet, two competing speakers, and four competing speakers. Outcome measures were accuracy, listening effort (response times and self-reported), motivation, and confidence in completing the task. Individual characteristics were assessed in quiet. Results showed that the number of competing speakers has no direct effects on the task, whilst the individual characteristics were found to moderate the effect of the listening conditions. Selective attention moderated the effects on accuracy and response times, working memory on motivation, and noise sensitivity on both perceived effort and confidence. Students with low cognitive abilities and high noise sensitivity were found to be particularly at risk in the condition with two competing speakers.

The effect of face masks on sign language comprehension: performance and metacognitive dimensions

In spoken languages, face masks represent an obstacle to speech understanding and influence metacognitive judgments, reducing confidence and increasing effort while listening. To date, all studies on face masks and communication involved spoken languages and hearing participants, leaving us with no insight on how masked communication impacts on non-spoken languages. Here, we examined the effects of face masks on sign language comprehension and metacognition. In an online experiment, deaf participants (N = 60) watched three parts of a story signed without mask, with a transparent mask or with an opaque mask, and answered questions about story content, as well as their perceived effort, feeling of understanding, and confidence in their answers. Results showed that feeling of understanding and perceived effort worsened as the visual condition changed from no mask to transparent or opaque masks, while comprehension of the story was not significantly different across visual conditions. We propose that metacognitive effects could be due to the reduction of pragmatic, linguistic and para-linguistic cues from the lower face, hidden by the mask. This reduction could impact on lower-face linguistic components perception, attitude attribution, classification of emotions and prosody of a conversation, driving the observed effects on metacognitive judgments but leaving sign language comprehension substantially unchanged, even if with a higher effort. These results represent a novel step towards better understanding what drives metacognitive effects of face masks while communicating face to face and highlight the importance of including the metacognitive dimension in human communication research.

Differentiating the reported time of intent and action on the basis of temporal binding behaviors and confidence ratings

The reported time of intent (W) and the reported time of action (M) have been used as indices of consciousness during simple voluntary actions. However, it is unclear whether W is exclusively inferred from M. Past studies have suggested that W is inferred from M by demonstrating that W varies when judged in conjunction with M. The current study offers counterevidence by showing that W is independent of M under some circumstances related to temporal binding. Participants performed a voluntary keypress that elicited a tone (briefly delayed at 5 and 60 ms). Subsequently, they reported W or M and indicated the confidence of their report. Binding strength was measured as the extent to which the W and M reports gravitated toward the time of the tone. Moreover, the binding strength was evaluated in conjunction with time course and knowledge to assess whether the strength increases due to repeated exposure or weakens if informed of the tone delay manipulation, respectively. We observed that the binding strength associated with W increased over time, and being informed of the tone manipulation did not affect W's binding behaviors. In contrast, M's binding behaviors did not change over time but being informed of the tone manipulation may release M from binding. The corresponding confidence ratings associated with W were uniform whereas those associated with M fluctuated over time. Collectively, the results suggest that binding behaviors associated with W and M differ, and that W is not simply derived from M.

The functional dissociation of posterior parietal regions during multimodal memory formation

The incidental acquisition of multimodal associations is a key memory function for everyday life. While the posterior parietal cortex has been frequently shown to be involved for these memory functions, ventral and dorsal regions revealed differences in their functional recruitment and the precise difference in multimodal memory processing with respect to the associative process has not been differentiated. Using an incidental multimodal learning task, we isolated the associative process during multimodal learning and recollection. The result of the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study demonstrated that during both learning and recollection a clear functional differentiation between ventral and dorsal posterior parietal regions was found and can be related directly to the associative process. The recruitment of a ventral region, the angular gyrus, was specific for learning and recollection of multimodal associations. In contrast, a dorsal region, the superior parietal lobule, could be attributed to memory guided attentional processing. Independent of the memory stage, we assumed a general role for the angular gyrus in the generation of associative representations and updating of fixed association, episodic memory.

Do you know your best side? Awareness of lateral posing asymmetries

People tend to show the left cheek to broadly express emotions while they tend to show the right cheek to hide emotions because emotions were expressed more on the left than on the right side of the face. The present study investigated the level of awareness on the left- and right-cheek poses using the method of structural knowledge attributions. When asked to broadly express emotions for a family portrait, right-handed participants were more likely to show the left cheek than the right. On the other hand, when asked to conceal emotions to show a calm and reassuring attitude as a scientist, they were more likely to show the right cheek. After the posing session, participants selected the conscious level of their knowledge about posing from five categories: Random, intuition, familiarity, recollection, and rules. Most participants rated their knowledge as unconscious (i.e., either as random, intuition, or familiarity). The choice of the conscious level did not differ across posing orientations and posing instructions. These results suggest that although people do not have an acute awareness of their lateral posing preference, they reliably show one side of their faces to express or hide emotions.

Avoiding pitfalls: Bayes factors can be a reliable tool for post hoc data selection in implicit learning

Research on implicit processes has revealed problems with awareness categorizations based on nonsignificant results. Moreover, post hoc categorizations result in regression to the mean (RTM), by which aware participants are wrongly categorized as unaware. Using Bayes factors to obtain sensitive evidence for participants' lack of knowledge may deal with nonsignificance being nonevidential, but also may prevent regression-to-the-mean effects. Here, we examine the reliability of a novel Bayesian awareness categorization procedure. Participants completed a reward learning task followed by a flanker task measuring attention towards conditioned stimuli. They were categorized as B_Aware and B_Unaware of stimulus-outcome contingencies, and those with insensitive Bayes factors were deemed B_Insensitive. We found that performance for B_Unaware participants was below chance level using unbiased tests. This was further confirmed using a resampling procedure with multiple iterations, contrary to the prediction of RTM effects. Conversely, when categorizing participants using t tests, t_Unaware participants showed RTM effects. We also propose a group boundary optimization procedure to determine the threshold at which regression to the mean is observed. Using Bayes factors instead of t tests as a post hoc categorization tool allows evaluating evidence of unawareness, which in turn helps avoid RTM. The reliability of the Bayesian awareness categorization procedure strengthens previous evidence for implicit reward conditioning. The toolbox used for the categorization procedure is detailed and made available. Post hoc group selection can provide evidence for implicit processes; the relevance of RTM needs to be considered for each study and cannot simply be assumed to be a problem.

Unmasking the Difficulty of Listening to Talkers With Masks: lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic

Interactions with talkers wearing face masks have become part of our daily routine since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using an on-line experiment resembling a video conference, we examined the impact of face masks on speech comprehension. Typical-hearing listeners performed a speech-in-noise task while seeing talkers with visible lips, talkers wearing a surgical mask, or just the name of the talker displayed on screen. The target voice was masked by concurrent distracting talkers. We measured performance, confidence and listening effort scores, as well as meta-cognitive monitoring (the ability to adapt self-judgments to actual performance). Hiding the talkers behind a screen or concealing their lips via a face mask led to lower performance, lower confidence scores, and increased perceived effort. Moreover, meta-cognitive monitoring was worse when listening in these conditions compared with listening to an unmasked talker. These findings have implications on everyday communication for typical-hearing individuals and for hearing-impaired populations.

Implicit learning of two artificial grammars

This study investigated the implicit learning of two artificial systems. Two finite-state grammars were implemented with the same tone set (leading to short melodies) and played by the same timbre in exposure and test phases. The grammars were presented in separate exposure phases, and potentially acquired knowledge was tested with two experimental tasks: a grammar categorization task (Experiment 1) and a grammatical error detection task (Experiment 2). Results showed that participants were able to categorize new items as belonging to one or the other grammar (Experiment 1) and detect grammatical errors in new sequences of each grammar (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest the capacity of intra-modal learning of regularities in the auditory modality and based on stimuli that share the same perceptual properties.

Enhanced Verbal Statistical Learning in Glossolalia

Glossolalia ("speaking in tongues") is a rhythmic utterance of word-like strings of sounds, regularly occurring in religious mass gatherings or various forms of private religious practices (e.g., prayer and meditation). Although specific verbal learning capacities may characterize glossolalists, empirical evidence is lacking. We administered three statistical learning tasks (artificial grammar, phoneme sequence, and visual-response sequence) to 30 glossolalists and 30 matched control volunteers. In artificial grammar, participants decide whether pseudowords and sentences follow previously acquired implicit rules or not. In sequence learning, they gradually draw out rules from repeating regularities in sequences of speech sounds or motor responses. Results revealed enhanced artificial grammar and phoneme sequence learning performances in glossolalists compared to control volunteers. There were significant positive correlations between daily glossolalia activity and artificial grammar learning. These results indicate that glossolalists exhibit enhanced abilities to extract the statistical regularities of verbal information, which may be related to their unusual language abilities.

Nocebo hyperalgesia induced by implicit conditioning

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Nocebo hyperalgesia (i.e., increased pain sensitivity based on expectations) can be induced by conditioning, but is supposed to be mediated by conscious expectation. Although recent evidence points to the feasibility of subliminal conditioning of nocebo hyperalgesia with masked faces, face processing might be a special case and the practical implications of subliminal conditioning remain questionable. This study aimed to implicitly condition nocebo hyperalgesia using supraliminal cues.

METHODS

Implicit differential nocebo conditioning (N = 48 healthy participants) was implemented by coupling high and low painful electric stimuli to varying visual stimuli that only differed in the symmetry/asymmetry of one component (CS+/CS-) and contained further distracting components. In the test phase, only the low painful stimulus followed both CS to test for conditioned nocebo effects in intensity and aversiveness ratings and electrodermal activity. A behavioral contingency test and a post-experimental questionnaire assessed contingency awareness.

RESULTS

A conditioned effect emerged in the aversiveness (p = .036; η² = 0.09), but not in the intensity rating (p = .195) while controlling for contingency awareness. Further, increased skin conductance levels in response to CS + emerged, irrespective of contingency awareness (p = .014, η² = 0.13). No conditioned responses in skin conductance responses emerged (p = .872).

LIMITATIONS

Expected effects only emerged in part of the outcome variables.

CONCLUSIONS

The results support the notion that implicit conditioning of nocebo hypoalgesia is feasible using a novel experimental conditioning design with supraliminal stimulus presentation, although further research is needed. So far, implicitly conditioned nocebo effects might have been underestimated despite vast clinical implications.

Implicit Learning, Bilingualism, and Dyslexia: Insights From a Study Assessing AGL With a Modified Simon Task

This paper presents an experimental study investigating artificial grammar learning in monolingual and bilingual children, with and without dyslexia, using an original methodology. We administered a serial reaction time task, in the form of a modified Simon task, in which the sequence of the stimuli was manipulated according to the rules of a simple Lindenmayer grammar (more specifically, a Fibonacci grammar). By ensuring that the subjects focused on the correct response execution at the motor stage in presence of congruent or incongruent visual stimuli, we could meet the two fundamental criteria for implicit learning: the absence of an intention to learn and the lack of awareness at the level of resulting knowledge. The participants of our studies were four groups of 10-year-old children: 30 Italian monolingual typically developing children, 30 bilingual typically developing children with Italian L2, 24 Italian monolingual dyslexic children, and 24 bilingual dyslexic children with Italian L2. Participants were administered the modified Simon task developed according to the rules of the Fibonacci grammar and tested with respect to the implicit learning of three regularities: (i) a red is followed by a blue, (ii) a sequence of two blues is followed by a red, and (iii) a blue can be followed either by a red or by a blue. Results clearly support the hypothesis that learning took place, since participants of all groups became increasingly sensitive to the structure of the input, implicitly learning the sequence of the trials and thus appropriately predicting the occurrence of the relevant items, as manifested by faster reaction times in predictable trials. Moreover, group differences were found, with bilinguals being overall faster than monolinguals and dyslexics less accurate than controls. Finally, an advantage of bilingualism in dyslexia was found, with bilingual dyslexics performing consistently better than monolingual dyslexics and, in some conditions, at the level of the two control groups. These results are taken to suggest that bilingualism should be supported also among linguistically impaired individuals.

Evaluative Conditioning as Memory-Based Judgment

The article proposes a view of evaluative conditioning (EC) as resulting from judgments based on learning instances stored in memory. It is based on the formal episodic memory model MINERVA 2. Additional assumptions specify how the information retrieved from memory is used to inform specific evaluative dependent measures. The present approach goes beyond previous accounts in that it uses a well-specified formal model of episodic memory; it is however more limited in scope as it aims to explain EC phenomena that do not involve reasoning processes. The article illustrates how the memory-based-judgment view accounts for several empirical findings in the EC literature that are often discussed as evidence for dual-process models of attitude learning. It sketches novel predictions, discusses limitations of the present approach, and identifies challenges and opportunities for its future development.

Prevailing theories of consciousness are challenged by novel cross-modal associations acquired between subliminal stimuli

While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the 'conscious access hypothesis', which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1-4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession. A supraliminal task followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions. The target profession was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually. All three experiments revealed the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are consciously perceived. Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it.

Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?

Is activity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception? Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role of PFC, providing an opportunity to arbitrate between these views empirically. Here we address three common misconceptions: (1) PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception; (2) PFC activity does not reflect specific perceptual content; and (3) PFC involvement in studies of perceptual awareness is solely driven by the need to make reports required by the experimental tasks rather than subjective experience per se. These claims are incompatible with empirical findings, unless one focuses only on studies using methods with limited sensitivity. The literature highlights PFC's essential role in enabling the subjective experience in perception, contra the objective capacity to perform visual tasks; conflating the two can also be a source of confusion.Dual Perspectives Companion Paper: Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence, by Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Bradley R. Postle, Christof Koch, and Giulio Tononi.

Predictions Shape Confidence in Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus

It is clear that prior expectations shape perceptual decision-making, yet their contribution to the construction of subjective decision confidence remains largely unexplored. We recorded fMRI data while participants made perceptual decisions and confidence judgments, manipulating perceptual prior expectations while controlling for potential confounds of attention. Results show that subjective confidence increases as expectations increasingly support the decision, and that this relationship is associated with BOLD activity in right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Specifically, rIFG is sensitive to the discrepancy between expectation and decision (mismatch), and higher mismatch responses are associated with lower decision confidence. Connectivity analyses revealed expectancy information to be represented in bilateral orbitofrontal cortex and sensory signals to be represented in intracalcarine sulcus. Together, our results indicate that predictive information is integrated into subjective confidence in rIFG, and reveal an occipital-frontal network that constructs confidence from top-down and bottom-up signals. This interpretation was further supported by exploratory findings that the white matter density of right orbitofrontal cortex negatively predicted its respective contribution to the construction of confidence. Our findings advance our understanding of the neural basis of subjective perceptual processes by revealing an occipitofrontal functional network that integrates prior beliefs into the construction of confidence.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Perceptual decision-making is typically conceived as an integration of bottom-up and top-down influences. However, perceptual decisions are accompanied by a sense of confidence. Confidence is an important facet of perceptual consciousness yet remains poorly understood. Here we implicate right inferior frontal gyrus in constructing confidence from the discrepancy between perceptual judgment and its prior probability. Furthermore, we place right inferior frontal gyrus within an occipitofrontal network, consisting of orbitofrontal cortex and intracalcarine sulcus, which represents and communicates relevant top-down and bottom-up signals. Together, our data reveal a role of frontal regions in the top-down processes enabling perceptual decisions to become available for conscious report.

Gleaning Structure from Sound: The Role of Prosodic Contrast in Learning Non-adjacent Dependencies

The ability to detect non-adjacent dependencies (i.e. between a and b in aXb) in spoken input may support the acquisition of morpho-syntactic dependencies (e.g. The princess is kiss ing the frog). Functional morphemes in morpho-syntactic dependencies are often marked by perceptual cues that render them distinct from lexical elements. We use an artificial grammar learning experiment with adults to investigate the role of perceptual cues in non-adjacent dependency learning, by manipulating the perceptual/prosodic properties of the a / b elements in aXb strings and testing participants' incidental learning of these dependencies. Our results show that non-adjacent dependencies are learned both when the dependent elements are perceptually prominent, and when they are perceptually reduced compared to the intervening material (in the same way that functional words are reduced compared to lexical words), but only if integrated into a natural prosodic contour. This result supports the idea that the prosodic properties of natural languages facilitate non-adjacent dependency learning.

Visibility Is Not Equivalent to Confidence in a Low Contrast Orientation Discrimination Task

In several visual tasks, participants report that they feel confident about discrimination responses at a level of stimulation at which they would report not seeing the stimulus. How general and reliable is this effect? We compared subjective reports of discrimination confidence and subjective reports of visibility in an orientation discrimination task with varying stimulus contrast. Participants applied more liberal criteria for subjective reports of discrimination confidence than for visibility. While reports of discrimination confidence were more efficient in predicting trial accuracy than reports of visibility, only reports of visibility but not confidence were associated with stimulus contrast in incorrect trials. It is argued that the distinction between discrimination confidence and visibility can be reconciled with both the partial awareness hypothesis and higher order thought theory. We suggest that consciousness research would benefit from differentiating between subjective reports of visibility and confidence.

Lost in dissociation: The main paradigms in unconscious cognition

Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets and reported findings.

The Regulation of Task Performance: A Trans-Disciplinary Review

Definitions of meta-cognition typically have two components: (1) knowledge about one's own cognitive functioning; and, (2) control over one's own cognitive activities. Since Flavell and his colleagues provided the empirical foundation on which to build studies of meta-cognition and the autonoetic (self) knowledge required for effective learning, the intervening years have seen the extensive dissemination of theoretical and empirical research on meta-cognition, which now encompasses a variety of issues and domains including educational psychology and neuroscience. Nevertheless, the psychological and neural underpinnings of meta-cognitive predictions and reflections that determine subsequent regulation of task performance remain ill understood. This article provides an outline of meta-cognition in the science of education with evidence drawn from neuroimaging, psycho-physiological, and psychological literature. We will rigorously explore research that addresses the pivotal role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in controlling the meta-cognitive processes that underpin the self-regulated learning (SRL) strategies learners employ to regulate task performance. The article delineates what those strategies are, and how the learning environment can facilitate or frustrate strategy use by influencing learners' self-efficacy.

The development of a sense of control scale

In the past decades, sense of control-the feeling that one is in control of one's actions has gained much scientific interests. Various scales have been used to measure sense of control in previous studies, yet no study has allowed participants to create a scale for rating their control experiences despite advances in the neighboring field of conscious vision has been linked to this approach. Here, we examined how participants preferred to rate sense of control during a simple motor control task by asking them to create a scale to be used to describe their sense of control experience during the task. Scale with six steps was most frequently created. Even though some variability was observed in the number of preferred scale steps, descriptions were highly similar across all participants when scales were converted to the same continuum. When we divided participants into groups based on their number of preferred scale steps, mean task performance and sense of control could be described as sigmoid functions of the noise level, and the function parameters were equivalent across groups. We also showed that task performance increased exponentially as a function of control rating, and that, again, function parameters were equivalent for all groups. In summary, the present study established a participant-generated 6-point sense of control rating scale for simple computerized motor control tasks that can be empirically tested against other measures of control in future studies.

Individual consistency in the accuracy and distribution of confidence judgments

We examine which aspects of the confidence distributions - its shape, its bias toward higher or lower values, and its ability to distinguish correct from erred trials - are idiosyncratic of the who (individual specificity), the when (variability across days) and the what (task specificity). Measuring confidence across different sessions of four different perceptual tasks we show that: (1) Confidence distributions are virtually identical when measured in different days for the same subject and the same task, constituting a subjective fingerprint, (2) The capacity of confidence reports to distinguish correct from incorrect responses is only modestly (but significantly) correlated when compared across tasks, (3) Confidence distributions are very similar for tasks that involve different sensory modalities but have similar structure, (4) Confidence accuracy is independent of the mean and width of the confidence distribution, (5) The mean of the confidence distribution (an individual's confidence bias) constitutes the most efficient indicator to infer a subject's identity from confidence reports and (6) Confidence bias measured in simple perceptual decisions correlates with an individual's optimism bias measured with standard questionnaire.

Invisible Stimuli, Implicit Thresholds: Why Invisibility Judgments Cannot be Interpreted in Isolation

Some studies of unconscious cognition rely on judgments of participants stating that they have "not seen" the critical stimulus (e.g., in a masked-priming experiment). Trials in which participants gave invisibility judgments are then treated as those where the critical stimulus was "subliminal" or "unconscious," as opposed to trials with higher visibility ratings. Sometimes, only these trials are further analyzed, for instance, for unconscious priming effects. Here I argue that this practice requires implicit assumptions about subjective measures of awareness incompatible with basic models of categorization under uncertainty (e.g., modern signal-detection and threshold theories). Most importantly, it ignores the potential effects of response bias. Instead of taking invisibility judgments literally, they would better be employed in parametric experiments where stimulus visibility is manipulated systematically, not accidentally. This would allow studying qualitative and double dissociations between measures of awareness and of stimulus processing per se.

Metacognitive sensitivity of subjective reports of decisional confidence and visual experience

Previous studies provided contradicting results regarding metacognitive sensitivity estimated from subjective reports of confidence in comparison to subjective reports of visual experience. We investigated whether this effect of content of subjective reports is influenced by the statistical method to quantify metacognitive sensitivity. Comparing logistic regression and meta-d in a masked orientation task, a masked shape task, and a random-dot motion task, we observed metacognitive sensitivity of reports regarding decisional confidence was greater than of reports about visual experience irrespective of mathematical procedures. However, the relationship between subjective reports and the logistic transform of accuracy was often not linear, implying that logistic regression is not a consistent measure of metacognitive sensitivity. We argue that a science of consciousness would benefit from the assessment of both visual experience and decisional confidence, and recommend meta-d as measure of metacognitive sensitivity for future studies.

The neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant Chinese tonal sequence

The present study sought to investigate the neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant perceptual sequence. A novel SRT task, the serial syllable identification task (SSI task), was used in which the participants were asked to recognize which one of two Chinese syllables was presented. The tones of the syllables were irrelevant to the task but followed an underlying structured sequence. Participants were scanned while they performed the SSI task. Results showed that, at the behavioral level, faster RTs for the sequential material indicated that task-irrelevant sequence knowledge could be learned. In the subsequent prediction test of knowledge of the tonal cues using subjective measures, we found that the knowledge was obtained unconsciously. At the neural level, the left caudate, bilateral hippocampus and bilateral superior parietal lobule were engaged during the sequence condition relative to the random condition. Further analyses revealed that greater learning-related activation (relative to random) in the right caudate nucleus, bilateral hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule were found during the second half of the training phase compared with the first half. When people reported that they were guessing, the magnitude of the right hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule activations was positively related to the accuracy of prediction test, which was significantly better than chance. Together, the present results indicated that the caudate, hippocampus and superior parietal lobule played critical roles in the implicit perceptual sequence learning even when the perceptual features were task irrelevant.

Confidence measurement in the light of signal detection theory

We compare three alternative methods for eliciting retrospective confidence in the context of a simple perceptual task: the Simple Confidence Rating (a direct report on a numerical scale), the Quadratic Scoring Rule (a post-wagering procedure), and the Matching Probability (MP; a generalization of the no-loss gambling method). We systematically compare the results obtained with these three rules to the theoretical confidence levels that can be inferred from performance in the perceptual task using Signal Detection Theory (SDT). We find that the MP provides better results in that respect. We conclude that MP is particularly well suited for studies of confidence that use SDT as a theoretical framework.

Stimulation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex changes subjective evaluation of percepts

Nelson and Narens have proposed a metacognition model that dissociates the objective processing of information (object-level) and the subjective evaluation of the performance (i.e., the metalevel). Neurophysiological evidence also indicates that the prefrontal cortices (PFC) are the brain areas which perform the metalevel function [1]-[3]. A corresponding neural mechanism of Nelson and Narens's model, called dynamic filtering theory [4], [5], indicates that object-level processing is distributed in the posterior cortices and regulated by the prefrontal cortices with a filtering or gating mechanism to select appropriate signals and suppress inappropriate signals and noise. Based on this model, a hypothesis can be developed that, in the case of uncertainty or overloading of object-level processing, the prefrontal cortices will become more active in order to modulate signals and noise. This hypothesis is supported by a recent fMRI study [6] showing that the PFC (Brodmann area 9, BA9) was activated when subjects were overloaded in a bimodal attentional task, compared to a unimodal task. Here, we report a study showing that applying repetitive transmagnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the BA9 in order to interfere with its functional activity resulted in significant increas in guessed responses, compared to three other control conditions (i.e., no-TMS, sham TMS on BA9, and rTMS on Cz). The results are compatible with the dynamic filtering theory and suggest that a malfunction of the PFC would weaken the quality of meta-cognitive percepts and increase the number of guessed responses.

Nature and extent of person recognition impairments associated with Capgras syndrome in Lewy body dementia

Patients with Capgras syndrome (CS) adopt the delusional belief that persons well-known to them have been replaced by an imposter. Several current theoretical models of CS attribute such misidentification problems to deficits in covert recognition processes related to the generation of appropriate affective autonomic signals. These models assume intact overt recognition processes for the imposter and, more broadly, for other individuals. As such, it has been suggested that CS could reflect the "mirror-image" of prosopagnosia. The purpose of the current study was to determine whether overt person recognition abilities are indeed always spared in CS. Furthermore, we examined whether CS might be associated with any impairments in overt affective judgments of facial expressions. We pursued these goals by studying a patient with Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) who showed clear signs of CS, and by comparing him to another patient with DLB who did not experience CS, as well as to a group of healthy control participants. Clinical magnetic resonance imaging scans revealed medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) atrophy that appeared to be uniquely associated with the presence CS. We assessed overt person recognition with three fame recognition tasks, using faces, voices, and names as cues. We also included measures of confidence and probed pertinent semantic knowledge. In addition, participants rated the intensity of fearful facial expressions. We found that CS was associated with overt person recognition deficits when probed with faces and voices, but not with names. Critically, these deficits were not present in the DLB patient without CS. In addition, CS was associated with impairments in overt judgments of affect intensity. Taken together, our findings cast doubt on the traditional view that CS is the mirror-image of prosopagnosia and that it spares overt recognition abilities. These findings can still be accommodated by models of CS that emphasize deficits in autonomic responding, to the extent that the potential role of interoceptive awareness in overt judgments is taken into account.

How to measure metacognition

The ability to recognize one's own successful cognitive processing, in e.g., perceptual or memory tasks, is often referred to as metacognition. How should we quantitatively measure such ability? Here we focus on a class of measures that assess the correspondence between trial-by-trial accuracy and one's own confidence. In general, for healthy subjects endowed with metacognitive sensitivity, when one is confident, one is more likely to be correct. Thus, the degree of association between accuracy and confidence can be taken as a quantitative measure of metacognition. However, many studies use a statistical correlation coefficient (e.g., Pearson's r) or its variant to assess this degree of association, and such measures are susceptible to undesirable influences from factors such as response biases. Here we review other measures based on signal detection theory and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis that are "bias free," and relate these quantities to the calibration and discrimination measures developed in the probability estimation literature. We go on to distinguish between the related concepts of metacognitive bias (a difference in subjective confidence despite basic task performance remaining constant), metacognitive sensitivity (how good one is at distinguishing between one's own correct and incorrect judgments) and metacognitive efficiency (a subject's level of metacognitive sensitivity given a certain level of task performance). Finally, we discuss how these three concepts pose interesting questions for the study of metacognition and conscious awareness.

The Timing and Neuroanatomy of Conscious Vision as Revealed by TMS-induced Blindsight

Following damage to the primary visual cortex, some patients exhibit “blindsight,” where they report a loss of awareness while retaining the ability to discriminate visual stimuli above chance. Transient disruption of occipital regions with TMS can produce a similar dissociation, known as TMS-induced blindsight. The neural basis of this residual vision is controversial, with some studies attributing it to the retinotectal pathway via the superior colliculus whereas others implicate spared projections that originate predominantly from the LGN. Here we contrasted these accounts by combining TMS with visual stimuli that either activate or bypass the retinotectal and magnocellular (R/M) pathways. We found that the residual capacity of TMS-induced blindsight occurs for stimuli that bypass the R/M pathways, indicating that such pathways, which include those to the superior colliculus, are not critical. We also found that the modulation of conscious vision was time and pathway dependent. TMS applied either early (0–40 msec) or late (280–320 msec) after stimulus onset modulated detection of stimuli that did not bypass R/M pathways, whereas during an intermediate period (90–130 msec) the effect was pathway independent. Our findings thus suggest a prominent role for the R/M pathways in supporting both the preparatory and later stages of conscious vision. This may help resolve apparent conflict in previous literature by demonstrating that the roles of the retinotectal and geniculate pathways are likely to be more nuanced than simply corresponding to the unconscious/conscious dichotomy.

Repeating a strongly masked stimulus increases priming and awareness

Previous studies [Marcel, A. J. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15(2), 197-237; Wentura, D., & Frings, C. (2005). Repeated masked category primes interfere with related exemplars: New evidence for negative semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(1), 108-120] suggested that repeatedly presenting a masked stimulus improves priming without increasing perceptual awareness. However, neural theories of consciousness predict the opposite: Increasing bottom-up strength in such a paradigm should also result in increasing availability to awareness. Here, we tested this prediction by manipulating the number of repetitions of a strongly masked digit. Our results do not replicate the dissociation observed in previous studies and are instead suggestive that repeating an unconscious and attended masked stimulus enables the progressive emergence of perceptual awareness.

Subliminal understanding of negation: unconscious control by subliminal processing of word pairs

A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun of the pair--even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using a grey-scale contrast method of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-response links established during conscious rehearsal.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

The perception of visual emotion: comparing different measures of awareness

Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings (CRs), with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale (PAS), through which participants categorize "raw" visual experience, and post-decision wagering (PDW), which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR measure was the most exhaustive and the most graded. In contrast, the PAS and PDW measures suggested instead that consciousness of emotional stimuli is dichotomous. Possible explanations of the inconsistency were discussed. Finally, our results also indicate that PDW biases awareness ratings by enhancing first-order accuracy of emotion perception. This effect was possibly a result of higher motivation induced by monetary incentives.

Unconsciously learning task-irrelevant perceptual sequences

We demonstrated unconscious learning of task-irrelevant perceptual regularities in a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task in both visual and auditory domains. Participants were required to respond to different letters ('F' or 'J', experiment 1) or syllables ('can' or 'you', experiment 2) which occurred in random order. Unbeknownst to participants, the color (red, green, blue or yellow) of the two letters or the tone (1-4) of the syllables varied according to certain rules. Reaction times indicated that people indeed learnt both the color and tonal regularities indicating that task-irrelevant sequence structure can be learned perceptually. In a subsequent prediction test of knowledge of the color or tonal cues using subjective measures, we showed that people could acquire task irrelevant knowledge unconsciously.

The speed of metacognition: taking time to get to know one's structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).

Implicit learning of recursive context-free grammars

Context-free grammars are fundamental for the description of linguistic syntax. However, most artificial grammar learning experiments have explored learning of simpler finite-state grammars, while studies exploring context-free grammars have not assessed awareness and implicitness. This paper explores the implicit learning of context-free grammars employing features of hierarchical organization, recursive embedding and long-distance dependencies. The grammars also featured the distinction between left- and right-branching structures, as well as between centre- and tail-embedding, both distinctions found in natural languages. People acquired unconscious knowledge of relations between grammatical classes even for dependencies over long distances, in ways that went beyond learning simpler relations (e.g. n-grams) between individual words. The structural distinctions drawn from linguistics also proved important as performance was greater for tail-embedding than centre-embedding structures. The results suggest the plausibility of implicit learning of complex context-free structures, which model some features of natural languages. They support the relevance of artificial grammar learning for probing mechanisms of language learning and challenge existing theories and computational models of implicit learning.

Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access

In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

The neural basis of metacognitive ability

Ability in various cognitive domains is often assessed by measuring task performance, such as the accuracy of a perceptual categorization. A similar analysis can be applied to metacognitive reports about a task to quantify the degree to which an individual is aware of his or her success or failure. Here, we review the psychological and neural underpinnings of metacognitive accuracy, drawing on research in memory and decision-making. These data show that metacognitive accuracy is dissociable from task performance and varies across individuals. Convergent evidence indicates that the function of the rostral and dorsal aspect of the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for the accuracy of retrospective judgements of performance. In contrast, prospective judgements of performance may depend upon medial PFC. We close with a discussion of how metacognitive processes relate to concepts of cognitive control, and propose a neural synthesis in which dorsolateral and anterior prefrontal cortical subregions interact with interoceptive cortices (cingulate and insula) to promote accurate judgements of performance.

Associative vocabulary learning: development and testing of two paradigms for the (re-) acquisition of action- and object-related words

Despite a growing number of studies, the neurophysiology of adult vocabulary acquisition is still poorly understood. One reason is that paradigms that can easily be combined with neuroscientfic methods are rare. Here, we tested the efficiency of two paradigms for vocabulary (re-) acquisition, and compared the learning of novel words for actions and objects. Cortical networks involved in adult native-language word processing are widespread, with differences postulated between words for objects and actions. Words and what they stand for are supposed to be grounded in perceptual and sensorimotor brain circuits depending on their meaning. If there are specific brain representations for different word categories, we hypothesized behavioural differences in the learning of action-related and object-related words. Paradigm A, with the learning of novel words for body-related actions spread out over a number of days, revealed fast learning of these new action words, and stable retention up to 4 weeks after training. The single-session Paradigm B employed objects and actions. Performance during acquisition did not differ between action-related and object-related words (time*word category: p = 0.01), but the translation rate was clearly better for object-related (79%) than for action-related words (53%, p = 0.002). Both paradigms yielded robust associative learning of novel action-related words, as previously demonstrated for object-related words. Translation success differed for action- and object-related words, which may indicate different neural mechanisms. The paradigms tested here are well suited to investigate such differences with neuroscientific means. Given the stable retention and minimal requirements for conscious effort, these learning paradigms are promising for vocabulary re-learning in brain-lesioned people. In combination with neuroimaging, neuro-stimulation or pharmacological intervention, they may well advance the understanding of language learning to optimize therapeutic strategies.