Brains evolution and neurolinguistic preconditions

Human cooperation and evolutionary transitions in individuality

A major evolutionary transition in individuality involves the formation of a cooperative group and the transformation of that group into an evolutionary entity. Human cooperation shares principles with those of multicellular organisms that have undergone transitions in individuality: division of labour, communication, and fitness interdependence. After the split from the last common ancestor of hominoids, early hominins adapted to an increasingly terrestrial niche for several million years. We posit that new challenges in this niche set in motion a positive feedback loop in selection pressure for cooperation that ratcheted coevolutionary changes in sociality, communication, brains, cognition, kin relations and technology, eventually resulting in egalitarian societies with suppressed competition and rapid cumulative culture. The increasing pace of information innovation and transmission became a key aspect of the evolutionary niche that enabled humans to become formidable cooperators with explosive population growth, the ability to cooperate and compete in groups of millions, and emergent social norms, e.g. private property. Despite considerable fitness interdependence, the rise of private property, in concert with population explosion and socioeconomic inequality, subverts potential transition of human groups into evolutionary entities due to resurgence of latent competition and conflict. This article is part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions'.

The language faculty that wasn't: a usage-based account of natural language recursion

In the generative tradition, the language faculty has been shrinking—perhaps to include only the mechanism of recursion. This paper argues that even this view of the language faculty is too expansive. We first argue that a language faculty is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary considerations. We then focus on recursion as a detailed case study, arguing that our ability to process recursive structure does not rely on recursion as a property of the grammar, but instead emerges gradually by piggybacking on domain-general sequence learning abilities. Evidence from genetics, comparative work on non-human primates, and cognitive neuroscience suggests that humans have evolved complex sequence learning skills, which were subsequently pressed into service to accommodate language. Constraints on sequence learning therefore have played an important role in shaping the cultural evolution of linguistic structure, including our limited abilities for processing recursive structure. Finally, we re-evaluate some of the key considerations that have often been taken to require the postulation of a language faculty.

The language faculty that wasn't: a usage-based account of natural language recursion

In the generative tradition, the language faculty has been shrinking-perhaps to include only the mechanism of recursion. This paper argues that even this view of the language faculty is too expansive. We first argue that a language faculty is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary considerations. We then focus on recursion as a detailed case study, arguing that our ability to process recursive structure does not rely on recursion as a property of the grammar, but instead emerges gradually by piggybacking on domain-general sequence learning abilities. Evidence from genetics, comparative work on non-human primates, and cognitive neuroscience suggests that humans have evolved complex sequence learning skills, which were subsequently pressed into service to accommodate language. Constraints on sequence learning therefore have played an important role in shaping the cultural evolution of linguistic structure, including our limited abilities for processing recursive structure. Finally, we re-evaluate some of the key considerations that have often been taken to require the postulation of a language faculty.

Language Evolution: Why Hockett's Design Features are a Non-Starter

The set of design features developed by Charles Hockett in the 1950s and 1960s remains probably the most influential means of juxtaposing animal communication with human language. However, the general theoretical perspective of Hockett is largely incompatible with that of modern language evolution research. Consequently, we argue that his classificatory system-while useful for some descriptive purposes-is of very limited use as a theoretical framework for evolutionary linguistics. We see this incompatibility as related to the ontology of language, i.e. deriving from Hockett's interest in language as a product rather than a suite of sensorimotor, cognitive and social abilities that enable the use but also acquisition of language by biological creatures (the faculty of language). After a reconstruction of Hockett's views on design features, we raise two criticisms: focus on the means at the expense of content and focus on the code itself rather than the cognitive abilities of its users. Finally, referring to empirical data, we illustrate some of the problems resulting from Hockett's approach by addressing three specific points-namely arbitrariness and semanticity, cultural transmission, and displacement-and show how the change of perspective allows to overcome those difficulties.

Neuroanatomical structures and segregated circuits

Segregated neural circuits that effect particular domain-specific behaviors can be differentiated from neuroanatomical structures implicated in many different aspects of behavior. The basal ganglionic components of circuits regulating nonlinguistic motor behavior, speech, and syntax all function in a similar manner. Hence, it is unlikely that special properties and evolutionary mechanisms are associated with the neural bases of human language.

How to grow a human

I enlarge on the theme that the brain mechanisms required for languageand other aspects of the human mind evolved through selective changes in the regulatory genes governing growth. Extension of the period of postnatal growth increases the role of the environment in structuring the brain, and spatiotemporal programming (heterochrony) ofgrowth might explain hierarchical representation, hemispheric specialization, and perhaps sex differences.

Genes, specificity, and the lexical/functional distinction in language acquisition

Contrary to Müller's claims, and in support of modular theories, genetic factors play a substantial and significant role in language. The finding that some children with specific language impairment (SLI) have nonlinguistic impairments may reflect improper diagnosis of SLI or impairments that are secondary to linguistic impairments. Thus, such findings do not argue against the modularity thesis. The lexical/functional distinction appears to be innate and specifically linguistic and could be instantiated in either symbolic or connectionist systems.

Autonomy of syntactic processing and the role of Broca's area

Both autonomy and local specificity are compatible with observed interconnectivity at the cell level when considering two different levels: cell assemblies and brain systems. Early syntactic structuring processes in particular are likely to representan autonomous module in the language/brain system.

The lithic technology of Cebus apella and its implications for brain evolution and the preconditions of language in Homo habilis

Wilkins & Wakefield (1995) provide a thoughtful contribution to our understanding of language origins. In this commentary I attempt to define the relationship between object-manipulation and primate brain function further by reviewing research on aimed throwing and the production and use of stone tools by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebtis apella). I propose that examining the relation between brain function and object-manipulation in Cebus will provide insight into the preconditions of language in our hominid ancestors.

The dating of linguistic beginnings

The problem of how certain structure–function composites of high complexity could have evolved gradually and by natural selection has been with us at least since Charles Darwin admitted how difficult it was to explain, “his” theory, the origins of “organs of extreme perfection and complication” – such as the eyes of higher animals. Human language capacity is another evolutionary achievement of extraordinary perfection and complexity. Like other skilled human activities, it involves both central (neural) and peripheral (vocal and respiratory) complexes. The reduction of these to simpler building stones to which evolutionary principles may be applied is staggeringly difficult.

And what of human musicality?

The hypothesized brain evolution and preconditions for language may have allowed for the emergence of musicality either simultaneously with or before the emergence of language. Music and language are parallel in their hierarchical, temporally organized structure, and the evolution of hierarchical representation in hominids may have provided the basis for musical representation. Because music could have been produced manually or vocally before the production of spoken language, it remains possible that language emerged from music and that music thus served as a communicative precursor to language.

Neurobiological approaches to language: Falsehoods and fallacies

The conclusion that language is not really innate or modular is based on several fallacies. I show that the target article confuses communicative skills with linguistic abilities, and that its discussion of brain/language relations is replete with factual errors. I also criticize its attempt to contrast biological and linguistic principles. Finally, I argue that no case is made for the “alternative” approach proposed here.

Is human language just another neurobiological specialization?

One can disagree with Müller that it is neurobiologically questionable to suppose that human language is innate, specialized, and species-specific, yet agree that the precise brain mechanisms controlling language in any individual will be influenced by epigenesis and genetic variability, and that the interplay between inherited and acquired aspects of linguistic capacity deserves to be investigated.

Evolutionary principles and the emergence of syntax

The belief that syntax is an innate, autonomous, species-specific module is highly questionable. Syntax demonstrates the mosaic nature of evolutionary change, in that it made use of (and led to the enhancement of) numerous preexisting neurocognitive features. It is best understood as an emergent characteristic of the explosion of semantic complexity that occurred during hominid evolution.

Neurobiology and linguistics are not yet unifiable

Neurobiological models of language need a level of analysis that can account for the typical range of language phenomena. Because linguistically motivated models have been successful in explaining numerous language properties, it is premature to dismiss them as biologically irrelevant. Models attempting to unify neurobiology and linguistics need to be sensitive to both sources of evidence.

An innate language faculty needs neither modularity nor localization

Müller misconstrues autonomy to mean strict locality of brain function, something quite different from the functional autonomy that linguists claim. Similarly, he misperceives the interaction of learned and innate components hypothesized in current generative models. Evidence from sign languages, Creole languages, and neurological studies of rare forms of aphasia also argues against his conclusions.

Sign language and the brain: Apes, apraxia, and aphasia

The study of signed languages has inspired scientific' speculation regarding foundations of human language. Relationships between the acquisition of sign language in apes and man are discounted on logical grounds. Evidence from the differential hreakdown of sign language and manual pantomime places limits on the degree of overlap between language and nonlanguage motor systems. Evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging reveals neural areas of convergence and divergence underlying signed and spoken languages.

Further issues in neurolinguistic preconditions

This response to continuing commentary addresses brain-hand relationships in Cebus apella (as introduced in West-ergaard's commentary), the evolutionary and acquisition parallels between music and language (suggested by Lynch), and the potential behavioral linguistic consequences of the evolutionary neurobiology in Australopithecus africanus and Homo habilis (discussed by Tobias). Finally, we reiterate the importance of well informed, multidisciplinary approaches to the study of the emergence of human species-specific cognition, especially linguistic capacity.

Innateness, autonomy, universality? Neurobiological approaches to language

The concepts of the innateness, universality, species-specificity, and autonomy of the human language capacity have had an extreme impact on the psycholinguistic debate for over thirty years. These concepts are evaluated from several neurobiological perspectives, with an emphasis on the emergence of language and its decay due to brain lesion and progressive brain disease.

Evidence of perceptuomotor homologies and preadaptations for human language in nonhuman primates suggests a gradual emergence of language during hominid evolution. Regarding ontogeny, the innate component of language capacity is likely to be polygenic and shared with other developmental domains. Dissociations between verbal and nonverbal development are probably rooted in the perceptuomotor specializations of neural substrates rather than the autonomy of a grammar module. Aphasiologicaldata often assumed to suggest modular linguistic subsystems can be accounted for in terms of a neurofunctional model incorporating perceptuomotor-based regional specializationsand distributivity of representations. Thus, dissociations between grammatical functors and content words are due to different conditions of acquisition and resulting differences in neural representation. Human brains are characterized by multifactorial interindividual variability, and strict universality of functional organization is biologically unrealistic.

A theoretical alternative is proposed according to which (1) linguistic specialization of brain areas is due to epigenetic and probabilistic maturational events, not to genetic ”hard-wiring,” and (2) linguistic knowledge is neurally represented in distributed cell assemblies whose topography reflects the perceptuomotor modalities involved in the acquisition and use of a given item of knowledge.

From communication signals to human language and thought: evolution or revolution?

This article addresses a question which has in recent years been widely discussed: that of the specific features of mental functions and language in humans as compared with other higher biological species. The main hypotheses of the origin and evolution of humans and their language are discussed, along with studies identifying genes responsible for higher functions. The cognitive capacities of animals and their communication signals are addressed, as are the basic principles of brain functions.

Language as shaped by the brain

It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a "moving target" both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG--the mesh between learners and languages--arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent "organism," which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics.

Language evolution: neural homologies and neuroinformatics☆

This paper contributes to neurolinguistics by grounding an evolutionary account of the readiness of the human brain for language in the search for homologies between different cortical areas in macaque and human. We consider two hypotheses for this grounding, that of Aboitiz and Garci;a [Brain Res. Rev. 25 (1997) 381] and the Mirror System Hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib [Trends Neurosci. 21 (1998) 188] and note the promise of computational modeling of neural circuitry of the macaque and its linkage to analysis of human brain imaging data. In addition to the functional differences between the two hypotheses, problems arise because they are grounded in different cortical maps of the macaque brain. In order to address these divergences, we have developed several neuroinformatics tools included in an on-line knowledge management system, the NeuroHomology Database, which is equipped with inference engines both to relate and translate information across equivalent cortical maps and to evaluate degrees of homology for brain regions of interest in different species.

The neural substrate of analogical reasoning: an fMRI study

This study investigated the anatomical substrate of analogical reasoning using functional magnetic resonance imaging. In the study, subjects performed a verbal analogy task (e.g., soldier is to army as drummer is to band) and, to control for activation caused by purely semantic access, a semantic judgment task. Significant activation differences between the verbal analogy and the semantic judgment task were found bilaterally in the prefrontal cortex (right BA 11/BA 47 and left BA45), the fusiform gyrus, and the basal ganglia; left lateralized in the postero-superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) and the (para) hippocampal region; and right lateralized in the anterior cingulate. The role of these areas in analogical reasoning is discussed.

On the nature and evolution of the neural bases of human language

The traditional theory equating the brain bases of language with Broca's and Wernicke's neocortical areas is wrong. Neural circuits linking activity in anatomically segregated populations of neurons in subcortical structures and the neocortex throughout the human brain regulate complex behaviors such as walking, talking, and comprehending the meaning of sentences. When we hear or read a word, neural structures involved in the perception or real-world associations of the word are activated as well as posterior cortical regions adjacent to Wernicke's area. Many areas of the neocortex and subcortical structures support the cortical-striatal-cortical circuits that confer complex syntactic ability, speech production, and a large vocabulary. However, many of these structures also form part of the neural circuits regulating other aspects of behavior. For example, the basal ganglia, which regulate motor control, are also crucial elements in the circuits that confer human linguistic ability and abstract reasoning. The cerebellum, traditionally associated with motor control, is active in motor learning. The basal ganglia are also key elements in reward-based learning. Data from studies of Broca's aphasia, Parkinson's disease, hypoxia, focal brain damage, and a genetically transmitted brain anomaly (the putative "language gene," family KE), and from comparative studies of the brains and behavior of other species, demonstrate that the basal ganglia sequence the discrete elements that constitute a complete motor act, syntactic process, or thought process. Imaging studies of intact human subjects and electrophysiologic and tracer studies of the brains and behavior of other species confirm these findings. As Dobzansky put it, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution" (cited in Mayr, 1982). That applies with as much force to the human brain and the neural bases of language as it does to the human foot or jaw. The converse follows: the mark of evolution on the brains of human beings and other species provides insight into the evolution of the brain bases of human language. The neural substrate that regulated motor control in the common ancestor of apes and humans most likely was modified to enhance cognitive and linguistic ability. Speech communication played a central role in this process. However, the process that ultimately resulted in the human brain may have started when our earliest hominid ancestors began to walk.

Parametrically dissociating speech and nonspeech perception in the brain using fMRI

Candidate brain regions constituting a neural network for preattentive phonetic perception were identified with fMRI and multivariate multiple regression of imaging data. Stimuli contrasted along speech/nonspeech, acoustic, or phonetic complexity (three levels each) and natural/synthetic dimensions. Seven distributed brain regions' activity correlated with speech and speech complexity dimensions, including five left-sided foci [posterior superior temporal gyrus (STG), angular gyrus, ventral occipitotemporal cortex, inferior/posterior supramarginal gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus (MFG)] and two right-sided foci (posterior STG and anterior insula). Only the left MFG discriminated natural and synthetic speech. The data also supported a parallel rather than serial model of auditory speech and nonspeech perception.

Whistle matching in wild bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus)

Dolphin communication is suspected to be complex, on the basis of their call repertoires, cognitive abilities, and ability to modify signals through vocal learning. Because of the difficulties involved in observing and recording individual cetaceans, very little is known about how they use their calls. This report shows that wild, unrestrained bottlenose dolphins use their learned whistles in matching interactions, in which an individual responds to a whistle of a conspecific by emitting the same whistle type. Vocal matching occurred over distances of up to 580 meters and is indicative of animals addressing each other individually.

Dopamine and the origins of human intelligence

A general theory is proposed that attributes the origins of human intelligence to an expansion of dopaminergic systems in human cognition. Dopamine is postulated to be the key neurotransmitter regulating six predominantly left-hemispheric cognitive skills critical to human language and thought: motor planning, working memory, cognitive flexibility, abstract reasoning, temporal analysis/sequencing, and generativity. A dopaminergic expansion during early hominid evolution could have enabled successful chase-hunting in the savannas of sub-Saharan Africa, given the critical role of dopamine in counteracting hyperthermia during endurance activity. In turn, changes in physical activity and diet may have further increased cortical dopamine levels by augmenting tyrosine and its conversion to dopamine in the central nervous system (CNS). By means of the regulatory action of dopamine and other substances, the physiological and dietary changes may have contributed to the vertical elongation of the body, increased brain size, and increased cortical convolutedness that occurred during human evolution. Finally, emphasizing the role of dopamine in human intelligence may offer a new perspective on the advanced cognitive reasoning skills in nonprimate lineages such as cetaceans and avians, whose cortical anatomy differs radically from that of primates.

"Near" and "far" in language and perception

A major interest in cognitive science is the relationship between linguistic and perceptual representations of space. One approach to exploring this relationship has been to investigate aspects of the linguistic encoding of space that correspond closely to aspects of the visual system. Another approach, which does not contradict the first but rather complements it, is to investigate ways in which linguistic and visual representations of space are different. This paper pursues the second approach by arguing that the distinction between proximal and distal demonstratives (e.g. this vs. that, here vs. there) does not correspond to an independently established distinction between near and far space in the visual system but is instead based on language-internal factors. Recent neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies suggest that the brain contains separate mechanisms for representing, on the one hand, near or peripersonal space which extends roughly to the perimeter of arm's reach and, on the other hand, far or extrapersonal space which expands outward from that boundary. In addition, crosslinguistic research suggests that it is very common for languages to have two basic types of demonstrative terms - proximal and distal. This parallelism raises the possibility that the linguistic distinction may derive from the perceptual distinction. However, several arguments support the contrary view that the two distinctions are independent of one another. A substantial proportion of languages in the world have demonstrative systems that divide space into three or more egocentrically-grounded regions, thereby violating the two-way perceptual contrast. Even more importantly, empirical studies of how demonstratives are used in ongoing discourse in different languages suggest that they do not encode quantitative spatial information such as within vs. beyond arm's reach; instead, they specify abstract semantic notions that, when combined with the unique pragmatic features of communicative contexts, allow speakers to make a virtually unlimited range of spatial distance contrasts. Thus, demonstratives constitute an interesting case of divergence between linguistic and perceptual representations of space.

The evolution of human speech: the role of enhanced breathing control

Many cognitive and physical features must have undergone change for the evolution of fully modern human language. One neglected aspect is the evolution of increased breathing control. Evidence presented herein shows that modern humans and Neanderthals have an expanded thoracic vertebral canal compared with australopithecines and Homo ergaster, who had canals of the same relative size as extant nonhuman primates. Based on previously published analyses, these results demonstrate that there was an increase in thoracic innervation during human evolution. Possible explanations for this increase include postural control for bipedalism, increased difficulty of parturition, respiration for endurance running, an aquatic phase, and choking avoidance. These can all be ruled out, either because of their evolutionary timing, or because they are insufficiently demanding neurologically. The remaining possible functional cause is increased control of breathing for speech. The main muscles involved in the fine control of human speech breathing are the intercostals and a set of abdominal muscles which are all thoracically innervated. Modifications to quiet breathing are essential for modern human speech, enabling the production of long phrases on single expirations punctuated with quick inspirations at meaningful linguistic breaks. Other linguistically important features affected by variation in subglottal air pressure include emphasis of particular sound units, and control of pitch and intonation. Subtle, complex muscle movements, integrated with cognitive factors, are involved. The vocalizations of nonhuman primates involve markedly less respiratory control. Without sophisticated breath control, early hominids would only have been capable of short, unmodulated utterances, like those of extant nonhuman primates. Fine respiratory control, a necessary component for fully modern language, evolved sometime between 1.6 Mya and 100,000 ya.

The evolutionary origin of the language areas in the human brain. A neuroanatomical perspective

The capacity to learn syntactic rules is a hallmark of the human species, but whether this has been acquired by the process of natural selection has been the subject of controversy. Furthermore, the cortical localization of linguistic capacities has prompted some authors to suggest a modular representation of language in the brain. In this paper, we rather propose that the neural device involved in language is embedded into a large-scale neurocognitive network comprising widespread connections between the temporal, parietal and frontal (especially prefrontal) cortices. This network is involved in the temporal organization of behavior and motor sequences, and in working (active) memory, a sort of short-term memory that participates in immediate cognitive processing. In human evolution, a precondition for language was the establishment of strong cortico-cortical interactions in the postrolandic cortex that enabled the development of multimodal associations. Wernicke's area originated as a converging place in which such associations (concepts) acquired a phonological correlate. We postulate that these phonological representations projected into inferoparietal areas, which were connected to the incipient Broca's area, thus forming a working memory circuit for processing and learning complex vocalizations. As a result of selective pressure for learning capacity and memory storage, this device yielded a sophisticated system able to generate complicated utterances (precursors of syntax) as it became increasingly connected with other brain regions, especially in the prefrontal cortex. This view argues for a gradual origin of the neural substrate for language as required by natural selection.

Neurobiology of speech perception

The mechanisms by which human speech is processed in the brain are reviewed from both behavioral and neurobiological perspectives. Special consideration is given to the separation of speech processing as a complex acoustic-processing task versus a linguistic task. Relevant animal research is reviewed, insofar as these data provide insight into the neurobiological basis of complex acoustic processing in the brain.

Double dissociation, modularity, and distributed organization

Müller argues that double dissociations do not imply underlying modularity of the cognitive system, citing neural networks as examples of fully distributed systems that can give rise to double dissociations. We challenge this claim, noting that suchdouble dissociations typically do not “scale-up,” and that even some singledissociations can be difficult to account for in a distributed system.

Familial language impairment: The evidence

Müller argues that general cognitive skills and linguistic skills are not necessarily independent. However, cross-linguistic evidence from an inherited specific language disorder affecting productive rules suggests significant degrees of modularity, innateness, and universality of language. Confident claims about the overall nature of such a complex system still await more interdisciplinary research.

Innateness, autonomy, universality, and the neurobiology of regular and irregular inflectional morphology

Müller's goal of bringing neuroscience to bear on controversies in linguistics is laudable. However, some of his specific proposals about innateness and autonomy are misguided. Recent studies on the neurobiology of regular and irregular inflectional morphology indicate that these two linguistic processes are subserved by anatomically and physiologically distinct neural subsystems, whose functional organization is likely to be under direct genetic control rather than assembled by strictly epigenetic factors.

Biology of language: Principle predictions and evidence

Müller's target article aims to summarize approaches to the question of how language elements (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) and rules are laid down in the brain. However, it suffers from being too vague about basic assumptions and empirical predictions of neurobiological models, and the empirical evidence available to test the models is not appropriately evaluated. (1) In a neuroscientific model of language, different cortical localizations of words can only be based on biological principles. These need to be made explicit. (2) Evidence for and against word class differences could be evaluated more rigorously. (3) All (and only) humans are able to learn languages with complex syntactic structures; it is, therefore, not appropriate to deny innateness and universality of syntactic principles. The real question appears to be the following: Which neurobiological principles are the linguistic principles based on?

Müller's conclusions and linguistic research

Because Müiller fails to distinguish between two senses of the term “autonomy,” there is a danger that his results will be misinterpreted by both linguists and neuroscientists. Although he may very well have been successful in refuting one sense of autonomy, he may actually have helped to provide an explanation for the correctness of autonomy in its other sense.

Speaking of language: Thoughts on associations

Müller attempts to downplay cases of dissociation between language and cognition as evidence against the modularity of language. We review cases of associations between verbal and nonverbal abilities as further evidence against the notion of language as an autonomous subsystem. We also point out a discrepancy between his proposal of homologies between nonhuman primates' communication and human language and recent proposals on the evolution of language.

It's a far cry from speech to language

We agree with Müller's epigenetic view of evolution and ontogeny and applaud his multilevel perspective. With him, we stress the importance in ontogeny of progressive specialisation rather than prewired structures. However, we argue that he slips from “speech” to “language” and that, in seeking homologies, these two levels need to be kept separate in the analysis of evolution and ontogeny.

A worthy enterprise injured by overinterpretation and misrepresentation

The synthetic position adopted by Müller is weakened by a large number of overinterpretations and misrepresentations, together with a caricatured view of innateness and modularity.