On a confusion about a function of consciousness

Towards an interdisciplinary "science of the mind": A call for enhanced collaboration between philosophy and neuroscience

In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena-as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind-to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long-lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own.

Do androids dream of informed consent? The need to understand the ethical implications of experimentation on simulated beings

Creating simulations of the world can be a valuable way to test new ideas, predict the future, and broaden our understanding of a given topic. Presumably, the more similar the simulation is to the real world, the more transferable the knowledge generated in the simulation will be and, therefore, the more useful. As such, there is an incentive to create more advanced and representative simulations of the real world. Simultaneously, there are ethical and practical limitation to what can be done in human and animal research, so creating simulated beings to stand in their place could be a way of advancing research while avoiding some of these issues. However, the value of representativeness implies that there will be an incentive to create simulated beings as similar to real-world humans as possible to better transfer the knowledge gained from that research. This raises important ethical questions related to how we ought to treat advanced simulated beings and consider if they might have autonomy and wellbeing concerns that ought to be respected. As such, the uncertainty and potential of this line of research should be carefully considered before the simulation begins.

Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions

Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.

Conscious vision in blindness: A new perceptual phenomenon implemented on the "wrong" side of the brain

Patients with lesions in the visual cortex are blind in corresponding regions of the visual field, but they still may process visual information, a phenomenon referred to as residual vision or "blindsight". Here we report behavioral and fMRI observations with a patient who reports conscious vision across an extended area of blindness for moving, but not for stationary stimuli. This completion effect is shown to be of perceptual and not of conceptual origin, most likely mediated by spared representations of the visual field in the striate cortex. The neural output to extra-striate areas from regions of the deafferented striate cortex is apparently still intact; this is, for instance, indicated by preserved size constancy of visually completed stimuli. Neural responses as measured with fMRI reveal an activation only for moving stimuli, but importantly on the ipsilateral side of the brain. In a conceptual model this shift of activation to the "wrong" hemisphere is explained on the basis of an imbalance of excitatory and inhibitory interactions within and between the striate cortices due to the brain injury. The observed neuroplasticity indicated by this shift together with the behavioral observations provide important new insights into the functional architecture of the human visual system and provide new insight into the concept of consciousness.

How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism

Despite recent criticism, the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is still at the core of a contemporary neuroscience of consciousness. One common aim is to distinguish merely statistical correlates from "NCCs proper", i.e., NCCs that are uniquely associated with a conscious experience and lend themselves to a metaphysical interpretation. We should then distinguish between NCCs as data and NCCs as hypotheses, where the first is just recorded data while the second goes beyond any set of recorded data. Still, such NCC-hypotheses ought to be testable. Here, I present a framework for so-called "sufficiency tests." We can distinguish four different classes of such tests, depending on whether they predict creature consciousness (which systems are conscious), state consciousness (when a system is conscious), phenomenal content (what a system is conscious of), or phenomenal character (how a system experiences). For each kind of test, I provide examples from the empirical literature. I also argue that tests for phenomenal character (How-Tests) are preferable because they bracket problematic aspects of the other kinds of tests. However, How-Tests imply a metaphysical tie between the neural and phenomenal domain that is stronger than supervenience, delivers explanations but does not close the explanatory gap, uses first-person methods to test hypotheses, and thereby relies on a form of direct neurophenomenal structuralism.

Design and evaluation of a global workspace agent embodied in a realistic multimodal environment

As the apparent intelligence of artificial neural networks (ANNs) advances, they are increasingly likened to the functional networks and information processing capabilities of the human brain. Such comparisons have typically focused on particular modalities, such as vision or language. The next frontier is to use the latest advances in ANNs to design and investigate scalable models of higher-level cognitive processes, such as conscious information access, which have historically lacked concrete and specific hypotheses for scientific evaluation. In this work, we propose and then empirically assess an embodied agent with a structure based on global workspace theory (GWT) as specified in the recently proposed "indicator properties" of consciousness. In contrast to prior works on GWT which utilized single modalities, our agent is trained to navigate 3D environments based on realistic audiovisual inputs. We find that the global workspace architecture performs better and more robustly at smaller working memory sizes, as compared to a standard recurrent architecture. Beyond performance, we perform a series of analyses on the learned representations of our architecture and share findings that point to task complexity and regularization being essential for feature learning and the development of meaningful attentional patterns within the workspace.

Discovering the sensory, emotional, and interactive experiences of a place

This article proposes a data collection technique for describing experiences of a built environment. Besides the experiences of the visual and physical aspects of the place, this technique helps describe the sensory, bodily, emotional, interactive, and social experiences occurring during the human-environment encounter. The enabling technique presented is called Reactions and Actions Description Survey (RADES). It employs 120 images depicting people going through different situations involving all the senses, showing expressions related to positive and negative emotions, and realizing varied activities. Forty-five participants visited the esplanade in the exterior of a historic building called Obispado. The case study is located on a hill and is a scenic viewpoint of Monterrey, Mexico. The participants answered the RADES and the Environmental Description Survey (ENVIDES), which focuses on describing the qualities of the place and the appraisals with which it is experienced. The comments about the experiences of the place obtained through both surveys were grouped into 133 categories. Qualitative and quantitative data about the experiences of the place were obtained through both techniques. A quantitative analysis of the data was realized since the participants not only described their experiences with words but also indicated numerically the intensity of such experiences. Spearman correlations between the experiences were calculated, and a general map of the experiences of the place was created through multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS). The study revealed the connections between the elements and qualities of the site and the views with specific positive and negative experiences occurring during the visit. Furthermore, MDS allowed the discovery of 10 dimensions of environmental experience-pleasure/displeasure, high/low arousal, dominance/submissiveness, knowing/inhabiting, environment/self, higher/lower cognition, spatiality/materiality, states/processes, natural/built, and visual/sensory. The presented techniques and the findings obtained through them can assist architects in recognizing valuable environmental features for the design of livable spaces.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

A global neuronal workspace model of functional neurological disorders

We introduce here a general model of Functional Neurological Disorders based on the following hypothesis: a Functional Neurological Disorder could correspond to a consciously initiated voluntary top-down process causing involuntary lasting consequences that are consciously experienced and subjectively interpreted by the patient as involuntary. We develop this central hypothesis according to Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness, that is particularly suited to describe interactions between conscious and non-conscious cognitive processes. We then present a list of predictions defining a research program aimed at empirically testing their validity. Finally, this general model leads us to reinterpret the long-debated links between hypnotic suggestion and functional neurological disorders. Driven by both scientific and therapeutic goals, this theoretical paper aims at bringing closer the psychiatric and neurological worlds of functional neurological disorders with the latest developments of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness.

An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn't the content NCC

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this "upper-deck" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which "ensemble statistics" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models

Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations ('phenomenal consciousness'). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality-but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions-with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.

The hidden structure of consciousness

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

Extrapolating animal consciousness

I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or "distant" to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision-such as those related to being an object, background or detail-constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework

Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.

Two models of mind blanking

Mind blanking is a mental state in which attention does not bring any perceptual input into conscious awareness. As this state is still largely unexplored, we suggest that a comprehensive understanding of mind blanking can be achieved through a multifaceted approach combining self-assessment methods, neuroimaging and neuromodulation. In this article, we explain how electroencephalography and transcranial magnetic stimulation could be combined to help determine whether mind blanking is associated with a lack of mental content or a lack of linguistically or conceptually determinable mental content. We also question whether mind blanking occurs spontaneously or intentionally and whether these two forms are instantiated by the same or different neural correlates.

Assessing mismatch negativity (MMN) and P3b within-individual sensitivity - A comparison between the local-global paradigm and two specialized oddball sequences

Mismatch negativity (MMN) and P3b are well known for their clinical utility. There exists no gold standard, however, for acquiring them as EEG markers of consciousness in clinical settings. This may explain why the within-individual sensitivity of MMN/P3b paradigms is often quite poor and why seemingly identical EEG markers can behave differently across Disorders of consciousness (DoC) studies. Here, we compare two traditional paradigms for MMN or P3b assessment with the recently more popular local-global paradigm that promises to assess MMN and P3b orthogonally within one oddball sequence. All three paradigms were administered to healthy participants (N = 15) with concurrent EEG. A clear MMN and local effect were found for 15/15 participants. The P3b and global effect were found for 14/15 and 13/15 participants, respectively. There were no systematic differences between the global effect and P3b. Indeed, P3b amplitude was highly correlated across paradigms. The local effect differed clearly from the MMN, however. It occurred earlier than MMN and was followed by a much more prominent P3a. The peak latencies and amplitudes were also not correlated across paradigms. Caution should therefore be exercised when comparing the local effect and MMN across studies. We conclude that the within-individual MMN sensitivity is adequate for both the local-global and a dedicated MMN paradigm. The within-individual sensitivity of P3b was lower than expected for both the local-global and a dedicated P3b paradigm, which may explain the often-low sensitivity of P3b paradigms in patients with DoC.

Sources of richness and ineffability for phenomenally conscious states

Conscious states-state that there is something it is like to be in-seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience-two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling.

Vague sensations. About the background and consequences of discordance between actual and perceived physiological changes

Empirical evidence consistently shows that discordance, also called dissociation or discrepancy, between actual physiological (mainly visceral) events and their perceived counterparts is substantial. On the one hand, we typically do not perceive actual visceral events occurring in our bodies; on the other hand, sometimes we do perceive bodily changes that do not really take place. This narrative review presents the available empirical findings on the discordance, and summarizes possible explanations that approach the phenomenon from the viewpoint of evolution, cognitive development, and predictive processing. Also, the role of top-down factors, such as expectations and experiences is discussed. Finally, practically relevant consequences of the discordance are presented using the examples of mind-body practices, the placebo and nocebo phenomenon, and medically unexplained symptoms. It is concluded that the discordance between actual and perceived body changes can have a negative impact on health, mainly through issues with adherence and other behavioral factors. The existence of actual-perceived discordance should be taught and demonstrated in the elementary and high school, as well as in many areas of higher education.

The ABC of happiness: Validation of the tridimensional model of subjective well-being (affect, cognition, and behavior) using Bifactor Polytomous Multidimensional Item Response Theory

Background

Happiness is often conceptualized as subjective well-being, which comprises people's evaluations of emotional experiences (i.e., the affective dimension: positive and negative feelings and emotions) and judgements of a self-imposed ideal (i.e., the cognitive dimension: life satisfaction). Recent research has established these two dimensions as primary parts of a higher order factor. However, theoretical, conceptual, and empirical work suggest that people's evaluations of harmony in their life (i.e., the sense of balance and capacity to behave and adapt with both acceptance and flexibility to inter- and intrapersonal circumstances) constitutes a third dimension (i.e., the behavioral dimension). This tridemensional conceptualization of subjective well-being has recently been verified using Unidimensional Item Response Theory (UIRT) and Classical Test Theory (CTT). Here, we use a recently developed and more robust approach that combines these two methods (i.e., Multidimensional Item Response Theory, MIRT) to simultaneously address the complex interactions and multidimensionality behind how people feel, think, and behave in relation to happiness in their life.

Method

A total of 435 participants (197 males and 238 females) with an age mean of 44.84 (sd = 13.36) responded to the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (10 positive affect items, 10 negative affect items), the Satisfaction with Life Scale (five items), and the Harmony in life Scale (five items). We used Bifactor-Graded Response MIRT for the main analyses.

Result

At the general level, each of the 30 items had a strong capacity to discriminate between respondents across all three dimensions of subjective well-being. The investigation of different parameters (e.g., marginal slopes, ECV, IECV) strongly reflected the multidimensionality of subjective well-being at the item, the scale, and the model level. Indeed, subjective well-being could explain 64 % of the common variance in the whole model. Moreover, most of the items measuring positive affect (8/10) and life satisfaction (4/5) and all the items measuring harmony in life (5/5) accounted for a larger amount of variance of subjective well-being compared to that of their respective individual dimensions. The negative affect items, however, measured its own individual concept to a lager extent rather than subjective well-being. Thus, suggesting that the experience of negative affect is a more independent dimension within the whole subjective well-being model. We also found that specific items (e.g., "Alert", "Distressed", "Irritable", "I am satisfied with my life") were the recurrent exceptions in our results. Last but not the least, experiencing high levels in one dimension seems to compensate for low levels in the others and vice versa.

Conclusion

As expected, the three subjective well-being dimensions do not work separately. Interestingly, the order and magnitude of the effect by each dimension on subjective well-being mirror how people define happiness in their life: first as harmony, second as satisfaction, third as positive emotions, and fourth, albeit to a much lesser degree, as negative emotions. Ergo, we argue that subjective well-being functions as a complex biopsychosocial adaptive system mirroring our attitude towards life in these three dimensions (A: affective dimension; B: behavioral dimension; C: cognitive dimension). Ergo, researchers and practitioners need to take in to account all three to fully understand, measure, and promote people's experience of the happy life. Moreover, our results also suggest that negative affect, especially regarding high activation unpleasant emotions, need considerable changes and further analyses if it is going to be included as a construct within the affective dimension of a general subjective well-being factor.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience

Interactions with large language models (LLMs) have led to the suggestion that these models may soon be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the inputs to LLMs lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Secondly, the architectures of present-day artificial intelligence algorithms are missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Finally, the evolutionary and developmental trajectories that led to the emergence of living conscious organisms arguably have no parallels in artificial systems as envisioned today. The existence of living organisms depends on their actions and their survival is intricately linked to multi-level cellular, inter-cellular, and organismal processes culminating in agency and consciousness.

Varieties of instrumental theories of emotional action: commentary on "a perceptual control theory of emotional action"

Eder proposes a theory of action causation based on Powers' control theory and Hommel's theory of event coding in which emotional feelings play a crucial role. After presenting a rough description of Eder's theory in which I try to spell out the various steps in the control cycle, I compare his theory to my own goal-directed theory. The two theories converge in that they (a) rely on a control cycle in which different states are compared and (b) emphasise the instrumental or goal-directed nature of emotional actions. Points of divergence include the content of the representations involved in the control cycle and the meaning and role of feelings.

Playing Brains: The Ethical Challenges Posed by Silicon Sentience and Hybrid Intelligence in DishBrain

The convergence of human and artificial intelligence is currently receiving considerable scholarly attention. Much debate about the resulting Hybrid Minds focuses on the integration of artificial intelligence into the human brain through intelligent brain-computer interfaces as they enter clinical use. In this contribution we discuss a complementary development: the integration of a functional in vitro network of human neurons into an in silico computing environment.To do so, we draw on a recent experiment reporting the creation of silico-biological intelligence as a case study (Kagan et al., 2022b). In this experiment, multielectrode arrays were plated with stem cell-derived human neurons, creating a system which the authors call DishBrain. By embedding the system into a virtual game-world, neural clusters were able to receive electrical input signals from the game-world and to respond appropriately with output signals from pre-assigned motor regions. Using this design, the authors demonstrate how the DishBrain self-organises and successfully learns to play the computer game 'Pong', exhibiting 'sentient' and intelligent behaviour in its virtual environment.The creation of such hybrid, silico-biological intelligence raises numerous ethical challenges. Following the neuroscientific framework embraced by the authors themselves, we discuss the arising ethical challenges in the context of Karl Friston's Free Energy Principle, focusing on the risk of creating synthetic phenomenology. Following the DishBrain's creator's neuroscientific assumptions, we highlight how DishBrain's design may risk bringing about artificial suffering and argue for a congruently cautious approach to such synthetic biological intelligence.

Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.

Subjective and objective measures of visual awareness converge

Within consciousness research, the most appropriate assessment of visual awareness is matter of a controversial debate: Subjective measures rely on introspections of the observer related to perceptual experiences, whereas objective measures are based on performance of the observer to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus in question across a series of trials. In the present study, we compared subjective and objective awareness measurements across different stimulus feature and contrast levels using a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. This task has the advantage to provide an objective psychophysical performance measurement, while minimizing biases from unconscious processing. Thresholds based on subjective ratings with the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) and on performance accuracy were determined for detection (stimulus presence) and discrimination (letter case) tasks at high and low stimulus contrast. We found a comparable pattern of thresholds across tasks and contrasts for objective and subjective measurements of awareness. These findings suggest that objective performance measures based on accuracy and subjective ratings of the visual experience can provide similar information on the feature-content of a percept. The observed similarity of thresholds validates psychophysical and subjective approaches to awareness as providing converging and thus most likely veridical measures of awareness.

The claustrum and consciousness: An update

The seminal paper of Crick and Koch (2005) proposed that the claustrum, an enigmatic and thin grey matter structure that lies beside the insular cortex, may be involved in the processing of consciousness. As a result, this otherwise obscure structure has received ever-increasing interest in the search for neural correlates of consciousness. Here we review theories of consciousness and discuss the possible relationship between the claustrum and consciousness. We review relevant experimental evidence collected since the Crick and Koch (2005) paper and consider whether these findings support or contradict their hypothesis. We also explore how future experimental work can be designed to clarify how consciousness emerges from neural activity and to understand the role of the claustrum in consciousness.

Masked priming under the Bayesian microscope: Exploring the integration of local elements into global shape through Bayesian model comparison

To investigate whether local elements are grouped into global shapes in the absence of awareness, we introduced two different masked priming designs (e.g., the classic dissociation paradigm and a trial-wise probe and prime discrimination task) and collected both objective (i.e., performance based) and subjective (using the perceptual awareness scale [PAS]) awareness measures. Prime visibility was manipulated using three different prime-mask stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and an unmasked condition. Our results showed that assessing prime visibility trial-wise heavily interfered with masked priming preventing any prime facilitation effect. The implementation of Bayesian regression models, which predict priming effects for participants whose awareness levels are at chance level, provided strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that local elements group into global shape in the absence of awareness for SOAs longer than 50 ms, suggesting that prime-mask SOA is a crucial factor in the processing of the global shape without awareness.

Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System

Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a structure originating in the brainstem-the ascending reticular activating system-be functional. Hence, there can be situations in which even small brainstem lesions render individuals irreversibly comatose and thus forever preclude access to their mental states, while the neural correlates of the states themselves are retained. In these situations, Lockeans are forced to regard as fulfilled their criterion of diachronic persistence since psychological continuity, as they construe it, is not disrupted. Deeming an entity that is never again going to have any mental experiences to be a person, however, is an untenable position for a psychological account to adopt. In their current form, Lockean views of personal identity are therefore incompatible with human neurophysiology.

What Is It like to Be a Brain Organoid? Phenomenal Consciousness in a Biological Neural Network

It has been shown that three-dimensional self-assembled multicellular structures derived from human pluripotent stem cells show electrical activity similar to EEG. More recently, neurons were successfully embedded in digital game worlds. The biologically inspired neural network (BNN), expressing human cortical cells, was able to show internal modification and learn the task at hand (predicting the trajectory of a digital ball while moving a digital paddle). In other words, the system allowed to read motor information and write sensory data into cell cultures. In this article, we discuss Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) theories, and their capacity to predict or even allow for consciousness in a BNN. We found that Information Integration Theory (IIT) is the only NCC that offers the possibility for a BNN to show consciousness, since the Φ value in the BNN is >0. In other words, the recording of real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli. IIT argues that any system capable of integrating information will have some degree of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that the pattern of activity appearing in the BNN, with increased density of sensory information leading to better performance, implies that the BNN could be conscious. This may have profound implications from a psychological, philosophical, and ethical perspective.

Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential - yet controversial - dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult - if not impossible - to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness.

Six ways of failing to see (and why the differences matter)

Sometimes we look but fail to see: our car keys on a cluttered desk, a repeated word in a carefully proofread email, or a motorcycle at an intersection. Wolfe and colleagues present a unifying, mechanistic framework for understanding these "Looked But Failed to See" errors, explaining how such misses arise from natural constraints on human visual processing. Here, we offer a conceptual taxonomy of six distinct ways we might be said to fail to see, and explore: how these relate to processes in Wolfe et al.'s model; how they can be distinguished experimentally; and, why the differences matter.

Probing the unimaginable: The impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception

Different individuals experience varying degrees of vividness in their visual mental images. The distribution of these variations across different imagery domains, such as object shape, color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships, remains unknown. To address this issue, we conducted a study with 117 healthy participants who reported different levels of imagery vividness. Of these participants, 44 reported experiencing absent or nearly absent visual imagery, a condition known as "aphantasia". These individuals were compared to those with typical (N = 42) or unusually vivid (N = 31) imagery ability. We used an online version of the French-language Battérie Imagination-Perception (eBIP), which consists of tasks tapping each of the above-mentioned domains, both in visual imagery and in visual perception. We recorded the accuracy and response times (RTs) of participants' responses. Aphantasic participants reached similar levels of accuracy on all tasks compared to the other groups (Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA, BF = .02). However, their RTs were slower in both imagery and perceptual tasks (BF = 266), and they had lower confidence in their responses on perceptual tasks (BF = 7.78e5). A Bayesian regression analysis revealed that there was an inverse correlation between subjective vividness and RTs for the entire participant group: higher levels of vividness were associated with faster RTs. The pattern was similar in all the explored domains. The findings suggest that individuals with congenital aphantasia experience a slowing in processing visual information in both imagery and perception, but the precision of their processing remains unaffected. The observed performance pattern lends support to the hypotheses that congenital aphantasia is primarily a deficit of phenomenal consciousness, or that it employs alternative strategies other than visualization to access preserved visual information.

The Current of Consciousness: Neural Correlates and Clinical Aspects

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

In this review, we summarize the current understanding of consciousness including its neuroanatomic basis. We discuss major theories of consciousness, physical exam-based and electroencephalographic metrics used to stratify levels of consciousness, and tools used to shed light on the neural correlates of the conscious experience. Lastly, we review an expanded category of 'disorders of consciousness,' which includes disorders that impact either the level or experience of consciousness.

RECENT FINDINGS

Recent studies have revealed many of the requisite EEG, ERP, and fMRI signals to predict aspects of the conscious experience. Neurological disorders that disrupt the reticular activating system can affect the level of consciousness, whereas cortical disorders from seizures and migraines to strokes and dementia may disrupt phenomenal consciousness. The recently introduced memory theory of consciousness provides a new explanation of phenomenal consciousness that may explain better than prior theories both experimental studies and the neurologist's clinical experience. Although the complete neurobiological basis of consciousness remains a mystery, recent advances have improved our understanding of the physiology underlying level of consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? 'Simpler' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.

About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness

This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.

From molecule to oblivion: dedicated brain circuitry underlies anesthetic loss of consciousness permitting pain-free surgery

The canonical view of how general anesthetics induce loss-of-consciousness (LOC) permitting pain-free surgery posits that anesthetic molecules, distributed throughout the CNS, suppress neural activity globally to levels at which the cerebral cortex can no longer sustain conscious experience. We support an alternative view that LOC, in the context of GABAergic anesthesia at least, results from anesthetic exposure of a small number of neurons in a focal brainstem nucleus, the mesopontine tegmental anesthesia area (MPTA). The various sub-components of anesthesia, in turn, are effected in distant locations, driven by dedicated axonal pathways. This proposal is based on the observations that microinjection of infinitesimal amounts of GABAergic agents into the MPTA, and only there, rapidly induces LOC, and that lesioning the MPTA renders animals relatively insensitive to these agents delivered systemically. Recently, using chemogenetics, we identified a subpopulation of MPTA "effector-neurons" which, when excited (not inhibited), induce anesthesia. These neurons contribute to well-defined ascending and descending axonal pathways each of which accesses a target region associated with a key anesthetic endpoint: atonia, anti-nociception, amnesia and LOC (by electroencephalographic criteria). Interestingly, the effector-neurons do not themselves express GABA_A-receptors. Rather, the target receptors reside on a separate sub-population of presumed inhibitory interneurons. These are thought to excite the effectors by disinhibition, thus triggering anesthetic LOC.

Where is the mind within the brain? Transient selection of subnetworks by metabotropic receptors and G protein-gated ion channels

Perhaps the most important question posed by brain research is: How the brain gives rise to the mind. To answer this question, we have primarily relied on the connectionist paradigm: The brain's entire knowledge and thinking skills are thought to be stored in the connections; and the mental operations are executed by network computations. I propose here an alternative paradigm: Our knowledge and skills are stored in metabotropic receptors (MRs) and the G protein-gated ion channels (GPGICs). Here, mental operations are assumed to be executed by the functions of MRs and GPGICs. As GPGICs have the capacity to close or open branches of dendritic trees and axon terminals, their states transiently re-route neural activity throughout the nervous system. First, MRs detect ligands that signal the need to activate GPGICs. Next, GPGICs transiently select a subnetwork within the brain. The process of selecting this new subnetwork is what constitutes a mental operation - be it in a form of directed attention, perception or making a decision. Synaptic connections and network computations play only a secondary role, supporting MRs and GPGICs. According to this new paradigm, the mind emerges within the brain as the function of MRs and GPGICs whose primary function is to continually select the pathways over which neural activity will be allowed to pass. It is argued that MRs and GPGICs solve the scaling problem of intelligence from which the connectionism paradigm suffers.

Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Functional characterization of correct and incorrect feature integration

Our sensory system constantly receives information from the environment and our own body. Despite our impression to the contrary, we remain largely unaware of this information and often cannot report it correctly. Although perceptual processing does not require conscious effort on the part of the observer, it is often complex, giving rise to errors such as incorrect integration of features (illusory conjunctions). In the present study, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the neural bases of feature integration in a dual task that produced ~30% illusions. A distributed set of regions demonstrated increased activity for correct compared to incorrect (illusory) feature integration, with increased functional coupling between occipital and parietal regions. In contrast, incorrect feature integration (illusions) was associated with increased occipital (V1-V2) responses at early stages, reduced functional connectivity between right occipital regions and the frontal eye field at later stages, and an overall decrease in coactivation between occipital and parietal regions. These results underscore the role of parietal regions in feature integration and highlight the relevance of functional occipito-frontal interactions in perceptual processing.

Minimal theory of 3D vision: new approach to visual scale and visual shape

Since Kepler and Descartes in the early-1600s, vision science has been committed to a triangulation model of stereo vision. But in the early-1800s, we realized that disparities are responsible for stereo vision. And we have spent the past 200 years trying to shoe-horn disparities back into the triangulation account. The first part of this article argues that this is a mistake, and that stereo vision is a solution to a different problem: the eradication of rivalry between the two retinal images, rather than the triangulation of objects in space. This leads to a 'minimal theory of 3D vision', where 3D vision is no longer tied to estimating the scale, shape, and direction of objects in the world. The second part of this article then asks whether the other aspects of 3D vision, which go beyond stereo vision, really operate at the same level of visual experience as stereo vision? I argue they do not. Whilst we want a theory of real-world 3D vision, the literature risks giving us a theory of picture perception instead. And I argue for a two-stage theory, where our purely internal 'minimal' 3D percept (from stereo vision) is linked to the world through cognition. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

How voluntary control over information and body movements determines "what it's like" to have perceptual, bodily, emotional and mental experiences

Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have "something it's like." One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem "external" (perceptual), "internal" (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or "mental." A second fundamental aspect is the imposingness of experiences. They can seem "present" to us in different ways, sometimes seeming displayed before us with "spatio-temporal presence." Both these aspects of "what it's like" can be identified with the degree to which we can voluntarily control what we are doing when we engage in an experience. The external/internal/mental dimension is determined by how our voluntary bodily actions can influence the sensorimotor flow of information. The degree of imposingness of experiences and their "spatio-temporal presence" Is determined by how our voluntary actions are impeded or assisted by innate, attention-grabbing mechanisms. By elucidating these two most fundamental aspects of "what it's like," and taken together with prior work on inter- and intra-modal differences in experiences, this article suggests a path toward a scientific theory of the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness, explaining why experiences feel like something rather than feeling like nothing.