Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver

Auditory Processing of Intonational Rises and Falls in German: Rises Are Special in Attention Orienting

This article investigates the processing of intonational rises and falls when presented unexpectedly in a stream of repetitive auditory stimuli. It examines the neurophysiological correlates (ERPs) of attention to these unexpected stimuli through the use of an oddball paradigm where sequences of repetitive stimuli are occasionally interspersed with a deviant stimulus, allowing for elicitation of an MMN. Whereas previous oddball studies on attention toward unexpected sounds involving pitch rises were conducted on nonlinguistic stimuli, the present study uses as stimuli lexical items in German with naturalistic intonation contours. Results indicate that rising intonation plays a special role in attention orienting at a pre-attentive processing stage, whereas contextual meaning (here a list of items) is essential for activating attentional resources at a conscious processing stage. This is reflected in the activation of distinct brain responses: Rising intonation evokes the largest MMN, whereas falling intonation elicits a less pronounced MMN followed by a P3 (reflecting a conscious processing stage). Subsequently, we also find a complex interplay between the phonological status (i.e., accent/head marking vs. boundary/edge marking) and the direction of pitch change in their contribution to attention orienting: Attention is not oriented necessarily toward a specific position in prosodic structure (head or edge). Rather, we find that the intonation contour itself and the appropriateness of the contour in the linguistic context are the primary cues to two core mechanisms of attention orienting, pre-attentive and conscious orientation respectively, whereas the phonological status of the pitch event plays only a supplementary role.

Visual perspective, distance, and felt presence of others in dreams

The peripersonal space, that is, the limited space surrounding the body, involves multisensory coding and representation of the self in space. Previous studies have shown that peripersonal space representation and the visual perspective on the environment can be dramatically altered when neurotypical individuals self-identify with a distant avatar (i.e., in virtual reality) or during clinical conditions (i.e., out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, depersonalization). Despite its role in many cognitive/social functions, the perception of peripersonal space in dreams, and its relationship with the perception of other characters (interpersonal distance in dreams), remain largely uncharted. The present study aimed to explore the visuospatial properties of this space, which is likely to underlie self-location as well as self/other distinction in dreams. 530 healthy volunteers answered a web-based questionnaire to measure their dominant visuo-spatial perspective in dreams, the frequency of recall for felt distances between their dream self and other dream characters, and the dreamers' viewing angle of other dream characters. Most participants reported dream experiences from a first-person perspective (1PP) (82%) compared to a third-person perspective (3PP) (18%). Independent of their dream perspective, participants reported that they generally perceived other dream characters in their close space, that is, at distance of either between 0 and 90 cm, or 90-180 cm, than in further spaces (180-270 cm). Regardless of the perspective (1PP or 3PP), both groups also reported more frequently seeing other dream characters from eye level (0° angle of viewing) than from above (30° and 60°) or below eye level (-30° and -60°). Moreover, the intensity of sensory experiences in dreams, as measured by the Bodily Self-Consciousness in Dreams Questionnaire, was higher in individuals who habitually see other dream characters closer to their personal dream self (i.e., within 0-90 cm and 90-180 cm). These preliminary findings offer a new, phenomenological account of space representation in dreams with regards to the felt presence of others. They might provide insights not only to our understanding of how dreams are formed, but also to the type of neurocomputations involved in self/other distinction.

Dual Process Theory: Embodied and Predictive; Symbolic and Classical

Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality in reasoning and decision-making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2). A problem for this theory is identifying a common principle that binds these features together, explaining why they form a unity, the unity problem. To solve it, a hypothesis is developed combining embodied predictive processing with symbolic classical approaches. The hypothesis, simplified, states that Type 1 processes are bound together because they rely on embodied predictive processing whereas Type 2 processes form a unity because they are accomplished by symbolic classical cognition. To show that this is likely the case, the features of Dual Process Theory are discussed in relation to these frameworks.

Adaptation in Predictive Prosodic Processing in Bilinguals

Native language listeners engage in predictive processing in many processing situations and adapt their predictive processing to the statistics of the input. In contrast, second language listeners engage in predictive processing in fewer processing situations. The current study uses eye-tracking data from two experiments in bilinguals’ native language (L1) and second language (L2) to explore their predictive processing based on contrastive pitch accent cues, and their adaptation in the face of prediction errors. The results of the first experiment show inhibition effects for unpredicted referents in both the L1 and the L2 that can be modeled with a Bayesian adaptation model, suggesting that bilinguals adapt their prediction in the face of prediction errors in a way that is compatible with the model. In contrast, the results of the second experiment, after a training phase that increased the predictive validity of the cue, show inhibition effects for unpredicted referents only in the L1, but not in the L2. In addition, the Bayesian adaptation model significantly predicts only the L1, but not the L2 data. The results are discussed with respect to adaptation to the statistical properties of the input.

Enhanced Sensitivity to Optimistic Cues is Manifested in Brain Structure: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study

Recent research shows that congruent outcomes are more rapidly (and incongruent less rapidly) detected when individuals receive optimistic rather than pessimistic cues, an effect that was termed optimism robustness. In the current voxel-based morphometry study, we examined whether optimism robustness has a counterpart in brain structure. The participants' task was to detect two different letters (symbolizing monetary gain or loss) in a visual search matrix. Prior to each onset of the search matrix, two different verbal cues informed our participants about a high probability to gain (optimistic expectancy) or lose (pessimistic expectancy) money. The target presented was either congruent or incongruent with these induced expectancies. Optimism robustness revealed in the participants' reaction times correlated positively with gray matter volume (GMV) in brain regions involved in selective attention (medial visual association area, intraparietal sulcus), emphasizing the strong intertwinement of optimistic expectancies and attention deployment. In addition, GMV in the primary visual cortex diminished with increasing optimism robustness, in line with the interpretation of optimism robustness arising from a global, context-oriented perception. Future studies should address the malleability of these structural correlates of optimism robustness. Our results may assist in the identification of treatment targets in depression.

Are Linguistic Prediction Deficits Characteristic of Adults with Dyslexia?

Individuals with dyslexia show deficits in phonological abilities, rapid automatized naming, short-term/working memory, processing speed, and some aspects of sensory and visual processing. There is currently one report in the literature that individuals with dyslexia also show impairments in linguistic prediction. The current study sought to investigate prediction in language processing in dyslexia. Forty-one adults with dyslexia and 43 typically-developing controls participated. In the experiment, participants made speeded-acceptability judgements in sentences with word final cloze manipulations. The final word was a high-cloze probability word, a low-cloze probability word, or a semantically anomalous word. Reaction time from the onset of the final word to participants' response was recorded. Results indicated that individuals with dyslexia showed longer reaction times, and crucially, they showed clear differences from controls in low predictability sentences, which is consistent with deficits in linguistic prediction. Conclusions focus on the mechanism supporting prediction in language comprehension and possible reasons why individuals with dyslexia show less prediction.

Relational and affective neuroscience: a quiet revolution in psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice

We consider some advances in relational and affective neuroscience and related disciplines that attempt to resolve some fundamental aspects of the mind–brain problem. We consider the key role of affect in generating consciousness and in meeting our essential survival needs; the neural correlates of relating; how self and other are represented in the brain and awareness of self and other is generated through interoceptive predictive processes. We describe some leading models of the generation and purpose of consciousness, linking theories of affective and cognitive consciousness. We discuss psychiatric and psychotherapeutic innovations arising from this research, new integrated biopsychosocial interventions and the obstacles to be overcome in applying these models in practice.

If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?

The success of the Bayesian perspective in explaining perceptual phenomena has motivated the view that perceptual representation is probabilistic. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why does normal conscious perception not reflect the full probability functions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in cortical area MT that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. The standard solution in terms of sampling runs into the problem that sampling is an account of perceptual decision rather than perception. This paper argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

The Neuronal Basis of Predictive Coding Along the Auditory Pathway: From the Subcortical Roots to Cortical Deviance Detection

In this review, we attempt to integrate the empirical evidence regarding stimulus-specific adaptation (SSA) and mismatch negativity (MMN) under a predictive coding perspective (also known as Bayesian or hierarchical-inference model). We propose a renewed methodology for SSA study, which enables a further decomposition of deviance detection into repetition suppression and prediction error, thanks to the use of two controls previously introduced in MMN research: the many-standards and the cascade sequences. Focusing on data obtained with cellular recordings, we explain how deviance detection and prediction error are generated throughout hierarchical levels of processing, following two vectors of increasing computational complexity and abstraction along the auditory neuraxis: from subcortical toward cortical stations and from lemniscal toward nonlemniscal divisions. Then, we delve into the particular characteristics and contributions of subcortical and cortical structures to this generative mechanism of hierarchical inference, analyzing what is known about the role of neuromodulation and local microcircuitry in the emergence of mismatch signals. Finally, we describe how SSA and MMN are occurring at similar time frame and cortical locations, and both are affected by the manipulation of N-methyl- D-aspartate receptors. We conclude that there is enough empirical evidence to consider SSA and MMN, respectively, as the microscopic and macroscopic manifestations of the same physiological mechanism of deviance detection in the auditory cortex. Hence, the development of a common theoretical framework for SSA and MMN is all the more recommendable for future studies. In this regard, we suggest a shared nomenclature based on the predictive coding interpretation of deviance detection.

Rituals, Repetitiveness and Cognitive Load : A Competitive Test of Ritual Benefits for Stress

A central hypothesis to account for the ubiquity of rituals across cultures is their supposed anxiolytic effects: rituals being maintained because they reduce existential anxiety and uncertainty. We aimed to test the anxiolytic effects of rituals by investigating two possible underlying mechanisms for it: cognitive load and repetitive movement. In our pre-registered experiment (osf.io/rsu9x), 180 undergraduates took part in either a stress or a control condition and were subsequently assigned to either control, cognitive load, undirected movement, a combination of undirected movement and cognitive load, or a ritualistic intervention. Using both repeated self-report measures and continuous physiological indicators of anxiety, we failed to find direct support for a cognitive suppression effect of anxiety through ritualistic behavior. Nevertheless, we found that induced stress increased participants' subsequent repetitive behavior, which in turn reduced physiological arousal. This study provides novel evidence for plausible underlying effects of the proposed anxiolytic effect of rituals: repetitive behavior but not cognitive load may decrease physiological stress responses during ritual.

Integration and Prediction in Language Processing: A Synthesis of Old and New

Current theories of language processing emphasize prediction as a mechanism to facilitate comprehension, which contrasts with the state of the field a few decades ago, when prediction was rarely mentioned. We argue that the field of psycholinguistics would benefit from revisiting these earlier theories of comprehension which attempted to explain integration and the processes underlying the formation of rich representations of linguistic input, and that emphasized informational newness over redundancy. We suggest further that integration and anticipation may be complementary mechanisms that operate on elaborated, coherent discourse representations, supporting enhanced comprehension and memory. In addition, the traditional emphasis on language as a tool for communication implies that much linguistic content will be nonredundant; moreover, the purpose of anticipation is probably not to permit the prediction of exact lexical or syntactic forms, but instead to induce a state of preparedness that allows the comprehender to be receptive to new information, thus facilitating its processing.

After phrenology: Time for a paradigm shift in cognitive science

Anderson (2014) uses an impressive, consolidating review of the literature to argue for major changes in cognitive science. Arguably, however, much of what he proposes is not particularly new. He also neglects important predictive coding approaches that call his perspective of the brain into question, and his misconstrual of evolutionary psychology devalues an influential paradigm that promises to complement his own.

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation of the Right Lateral Prefrontal Cortex Changes a priori Normative Beliefs in Voluntary Cooperation

A priori normative beliefs, the precondition of social norm compliance that reflects culture and values, are considered unique to human social behavior. Previous studies related to the ultimatum game revealed that right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC) has no stimulation effects on normative beliefs. However, no research has focused on the effects of a priori belief on the rLPFC in voluntary cooperation attached to the public good (PG) game. In this study, we used a linear asymmetric PG to confirm the influence of the rLPFC on a priori normative beliefs without threats of external punishment through transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Participants engaged via computer terminals in groups of four (i.e., two high-endowment players with 35G$ and two low-endowment players with 23G$). They were anonymous and had no communication during the entire process. They were randomly assigned to receive 15 min of either anodal, cathodal, or sham stimulation and then asked to answer questions concerning a priori normative beliefs (norm.belief and pg.belief). Results suggested that anodal/cathodal tDCS significantly (P < 0.001) shifted the participants' a priori normative beliefs in opposite directions compared to the shift in the sham group. In addition, different identities exhibited varying degrees of change (28.80-54.43%). These outcomes provide neural evidence of the rLPFC mechanism's effect on the normative beliefs in voluntary cooperation based on the PG framework.

Growing a social brain

It has long been assumed that social animals, such as humans, are born with a brain system that has evolved to support social affiliation. However, the evidence does not necessarily support this assumption. Alternatively, social animals can be defined as those who cannot survive alone and rely on members from their group to regulate their ongoing physiology (or allostasis). The rather simple evolutionary constraint of social dependency for survival can be sufficient to make the social environment vitally salient, and to provide the ultimate driving force for socially crafted brain development and learning. In this Perspective, we propose a framework for sociality and specify a set of hypotheses on the mechanisms of social development and underlying neural systems. The theoretical shift proposed here implies that profound human characteristics, including but not limited to sociality, are acquired at an early age, while social interactions provide key wiring instructions that determine brain development.

Sustained sensorimotor control as intermittent decisions about prediction errors: computational framework and application to ground vehicle steering

A conceptual and computational framework is proposed for modelling of human sensorimotor control and is exemplified for the sensorimotor task of steering a car. The framework emphasises control intermittency and extends on existing models by suggesting that the nervous system implements intermittent control using a combination of (1) motor primitives, (2) prediction of sensory outcomes of motor actions, and (3) evidence accumulation of prediction errors. It is shown that approximate but useful sensory predictions in the intermittent control context can be constructed without detailed forward models, as a superposition of simple prediction primitives, resembling neurobiologically observed corollary discharges. The proposed mathematical framework allows straightforward extension to intermittent behaviour from existing one-dimensional continuous models in the linear control and ecological psychology traditions. Empirical data from a driving simulator are used in model-fitting analyses to test some of the framework's main theoretical predictions: it is shown that human steering control, in routine lane-keeping and in a demanding near-limit task, is better described as a sequence of discrete stepwise control adjustments, than as continuous control. Results on the possible roles of sensory prediction in control adjustment amplitudes, and of evidence accumulation mechanisms in control onset timing, show trends that match the theoretical predictions; these warrant further investigation. The results for the accumulation-based model align with other recent literature, in a possibly converging case against the type of threshold mechanisms that are often assumed in existing models of intermittent control.

Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition

We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.

Emotion in Action: A Predictive Processing Perspective and Theoretical Synthesis

Starting from a decidedly Frijdian perspective on emotion in action, we adopt neurocognitive theories of action control to analyze the mechanisms through which emotional action arises. Appraisal of events vis-à-vis concerns gives rise to a determinate motive to establish a specific state of the world; the pragmatic idea of the action's effects incurs the valuation of action options and a change in action readiness in the form of incipient ideomotor capture of the selected action. Forward modeling of the sensory consequences of the selected action option allows for the evaluation and fine-tuning of anticipated action effects, which renders the emotional action impulsive yet purposive. This novel theoretical synthesis depicts the cornerstone principles for a mechanistic view on emotion in action.

A Predictive Coding Account of Psychotic Symptoms in Autism Spectrum Disorder

The co-occurrence of psychotic and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms represents an important clinical challenge. Here we consider this problem in the context of a computational psychiatry approach that has been applied to both conditions-predictive coding. Some symptoms of schizophrenia have been explained in terms of a failure of top-down predictions or an enhanced weighting of bottom-up prediction errors. Likewise, autism has been explained in terms of similar perturbations. We suggest that this theoretical overlap may explain overlapping symptomatology. Experimental evidence highlights meaningful distinctions and consistencies between these disorders. We hypothesize individuals with ASD may experience some degree of delusions without the presence of any additional impairment, but that hallucinations are likely indicative of a distinct process.

Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars

Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the "representation wars" of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing's account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based representational architecture with organism-relative contents that functions in the service of pragmatic success, not veridical representation. Finally, I argue that internal representation so understood is either impervious to the three anti-representationalist challenges I outline or can actively embrace them.

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing ("prediction-signal", "error-signal", "prior", "likelihood", and "posterior probability"). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the 'representation wars'; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak's IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.

Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms-or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought.

The bilingual brain turns a blind eye to negative statements in the second language

Neurobilingualism research has failed to reveal significant language differences in the processing of affective content. However, the evidence to date derives mostly from studies in which affective stimuli are presented out of context, which is unnatural and fails to capture the complexity of everyday sentence-based communication. Here we investigated semantic integration of affectively salient stimuli in sentential context in the first- and second-language (L2) of late fluent Polish–English bilinguals living in the UK. The 19 participants indicated whether Polish and English sentences ending with a semantically and affectively congruent or incongruent adjective of controlled affective valence made sense while undergoing behavioral and electrophysiological recordings. We focused on the N400, a wave of event-related potentials known to index semantic integration. We expected N400 amplitude to index increased processing demands in L2 English comprehension and potential language–valence interactions to reveal differences in affective processing between languages. Contrary to our initial expectation, we found increased N400 for sentences in L1 Polish, possibly driven by greater affective salience of sentences in the native language. Critically, language interacted with affective valence, such that N400 amplitudes were reduced for English sentences ending in a negative fashion as compared to all other conditions. We interpreted this as a sign that bilinguals suppress L2 content embedded in naturalistic L2 sentences when it has negative valence, thus extending the findings of previous research on single words in clinical and linguistic research.

[Delusions: current psychodynamic and neurocognitive approaches]

BACKGROUND

The symptom "delusions" is a central psychopathological symptom in psychiatric diseases. Since the beginning of psychiatry various disciplines have attempted to explain and understand delusions but even now no generally accepted definition of this phenomenon exists.

AIM

A comprehensive review of current psychopathological and neurobiological theories of delusions is given.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

PubMed and Google scholar searches were performed using the keywords "delusion", "psychodynamic" and "neurobiology", both in English and German. Relevant German textbooks of psychiatry were also included.

DISCUSSION

A differentiated perspective of the phenomenon of delusions appears to be necessary to approach this complex and fascinating symptom. A one-dimensional approach does not do justice to the complexity of delusions. The various explanatory approaches can increasingly be linked to each other and are no longer considered to be mutually exclusive.

A Hierarchical Predictive Coding Model of Object Recognition in Natural Images

Predictive coding has been proposed as a model of the hierarchical perceptual inference process performed in the cortex. However, results demonstrating that predictive coding is capable of performing the complex inference required to recognise objects in natural images have not previously been presented. This article proposes a hierarchical neural network based on predictive coding for performing visual object recognition. This network is applied to the tasks of categorising hand-written digits, identifying faces, and locating cars in images of street scenes. It is shown that image recognition can be performed with tolerance to position, illumination, size, partial occlusion, and within-category variation. The current results, therefore, provide the first practical demonstration that predictive coding (at least the particular implementation of predictive coding used here; the PC/BC-DIM algorithm) is capable of performing accurate visual object recognition.

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications-with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation-to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of 'body-representations', and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal 'representations' arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.

The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

Toward Self-Referential Autonomous Learning of Object and Situation Models

Most current approaches to scene understanding lack the capability to adapt object and situation models to behavioral needs not anticipated by the human system designer. Here, we give a detailed description of a system architecture for self-referential autonomous learning which enables the refinement of object and situation models during operation in order to optimize behavior. This includes structural learning of hierarchical models for situations and behaviors that is triggered by a mismatch between expected and actual action outcome. Besides proposing architectural concepts, we also describe a first implementation of our system within a simulated traffic scenario to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.

The erotetic theory of delusional thinking

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we argue for a novel account of one cognitive factor implicated in delusional cognition. According to the erotetic theory of delusion we present, the central cognitive factor in delusion is impaired endogenous question raising.

METHOD

After presenting the erotetic theory, we draw on it to model three distinct patterns of reasoning exhibited by delusional and schizophrenic patients, and contrast our explanations with Bayesian alternatives.

RESULTS

We argue that the erotetic theory has considerable advantages over Bayesian models. Specifically, we show that it offers a superior explanation of three phenomena: the onset and persistence of the Capgras delusion; recent data indicating that schizophrenic subjects manifest superior reasoning with conditionals in certain contexts; and evidence that schizophrenic and delusional subjects have a tendency to "jump to conclusions." Moreover, since the cognitive mechanisms we appeal to are independently motivated, we avoid having to posit distinct epistemic states that are intrinsically irrational in order to fit our model to the variety of data.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to Bayesian models, the erotetic theory offers a simple, unified explanation of a range of empirical data. We therefore conclude that it offers a more plausible framework for explaining delusional cognition.

When expectancies collide: Action dynamics reveal the interaction between stimulus plausibility and congruency

The cognitive architecture routinely relies on expectancy mechanisms to process the plausibility of stimuli and establish their sequential congruency. In two computer mouse-tracking experiments, we use a cross-modal verification task to uncover the interaction between plausibility and congruency by examining their temporal signatures of activation competition as expressed in a computer- mouse movement decision response. In this task, participants verified the content congruency of sentence and scene pairs that varied in plausibility. The order of presentation (sentence-scene, scene-sentence) was varied between participants to uncover any differential processing. Our results show that implausible but congruent stimuli triggered less accurate and slower responses than implausible and incongruent stimuli, and were associated with more complex angular mouse trajectories independent of the order of presentation. This study provides novel evidence of a disassociation between the temporal signatures of plausibility and congruency detection on decision responses.

Lexical stress assignment as a problem of probabilistic inference

A new conceptualization of the process of stress assignment, couched in the principles of (Bayesian) probabilistic inference, is introduced in this paper. According to this approach, in deciding where to place stress in a polysyllabic word, a reader estimates the posterior probabilities of alternative stress patterns. This estimation is accomplished by adjusting a prior belief about the likelihoods of alternative stress patterns (derived from experience with the distribution of stress patterns in the language) by using lexical and non-lexical sources of evidence for stress derived from the orthographic input. The proposed theoretical framework was used to compute probabilities of stress patterns for Russian disyllabic words and nonwords which were then compared with the performance of readers. The results showed that the estimated probabilities of stress patterns were reflective of actual stress assignment performance and of naming latencies, suggesting that the mechanisms that are involved in the process of stress assignment might indeed be inferentially-based.

Voices and Thoughts in Psychosis: An Introduction

In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), a number of worries for this account, and some potential responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in psychosis, and then present the motivation and composition of this special issue.

Perceptually walking in another's shoes: goals and memories constrain spatial perception

Perceptual variables such as perceived distance contain information about future actions. Often our goals involve the integration of another's goals, such as lifting heavy objects together. The purpose of this study was to investigate how another's actions might influence one's own goal-oriented perceptions (i.e., verbal distance estimates). Using a within-subject paradigm, we replicated a well-known finding that carrying a weighted backpack results in larger distance estimates relative to not carrying a backpack. In a crucial second condition, this effect was reversed: distance estimates were significantly greater when not carrying a weighted backpack than when carrying a backpack. In this condition, participants provided distance estimates while wearing a weighted backpack during the first phase and then gave estimates while not wearing a backpack, but following an experimenter wearing a weighted backpack in the second phase. Three additional conditions systematically documented how the observation of another's actions influenced distance estimates.

Voluntary initiation of movement: multifunctional integration of subjective agency

This paper investigates subjective agency (SA) as a special type of efficacious action consciousness. Our central claims are, firstly, that SA is a conscious act of voluntarily initiating bodily motion. Secondly, we argue that SA is a case of multifunctional integration of behavioral functions being analogous to multisensory integration of sensory modalities. This is based on new perspectives on the initiation of action opened up by recent advancements in robot assisted neuro-rehabilitation which depends on the active participation of the patient and yields experimental evidence that there is SA in terms of a conscious act of voluntarily initiating bodily motion (phenomenal performance). Conventionally, action consciousness has been considered as a sense of agency (SoA). According to this view, the conscious subject merely echoes motor performance and does not cause bodily motion. Depending on sensory input, SoA is implemented by means of unifunctional integration (binding) and inevitably results in non-efficacious action consciousness. In contrast, SA comes as a phenomenal performance which causes motion and builds on multifunctional integration. Therefore, the common conception of the brain should be shifted toward multifunctional integration in order to allow for efficacious action consciousness. For this purpose, we suggest the heterarchic principle of asymmetric reciprocity and neural operators underlying SA. The general idea is that multifunctional integration allows conscious acts to be simultaneously implemented with motor behavior so that the resulting behavior (SA) comes as efficacious action consciousness. Regarding the neural implementation, multifunctional integration rather relies on operators than on modular functions. A robotic case study and possible experimental setups with testable hypotheses building on SA are presented.

Disturbed interplay between mid- and high-level vision in ASD? Evidence from a contour identification task with everyday objects

Atypical visual processing in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) does not seem to reside in an isolated processing component, such as global or local processing. We therefore developed a paradigm that requires the interaction between different processes-an identification task with Gaborized object outlines-and applied this to two age groups of 6-to-10 and 10-to-14 year old children with and without ASD. Event history analyses demonstrated an identification disadvantage in the ASD group, which remained quite stable during the temporal unfolding of the outline. The typically developing group particularly outperformed the ASD group when more complex contours were shown. Together, our results suggest that the interplay between local and global processes and between bottom-up and top-down processes is disturbed in ASD.