Morality in autism spectrum disorder: A systematic review

Digital interventions to support morality: A scoping review

BACKGROUND

Morality and moral reasoning develop over the course of life, but such development may encounter obstacles. Psycho-educational interventions could be designed to improve moral reasoning and attitude towards prosociality. In the last decades, many interventions employed digital technologies ranging from multicomponent online platforms to serious games and virtual reality, making use of interactivity and immersive properties that could make moral stimuli more engaging.

AIMS

This study aimed at reviewing the literature on digital interventions to support morality and moral reasoning, carried out with subjects of all age groups.

METHODS AND RESULTS

Two electronic databases were searched with a systematic approach, and retrieved publications were scanned by authors against inclusion criteria. Twenty-three articles were reviewed. In general, the literature describes encouraging results of digital interventions to support morality. Moreover, a huge variety of morality conceptualizations emerged across various contexts (e.g., professional, school and sports) as well as various outcome measurements (e.g., change in attitudes and change in behaviour).

CONCLUSIONS

Effectiveness of digital interventions may relate to immersive and interactive simulations in particular, in that they allow participants not only to learn about moral rules and principles but also to actively exercise their own morality to make decisions. Future research may build on the present scoping review to analyse specific types of interventions' effectiveness with a meta-analytical approach.

Oxytocin, but not vasopressin, decreases willingness to harm others by promoting moral emotions of guilt and shame

Prosocial and moral behaviors have overlapping neural systems and can both be affected in a number of psychiatric disorders, although whether they involve similar neurochemical systems is unclear. In the current registered randomized placebo-controlled trial on 180 adult male and female subjects, we investigated the effects of intranasal administration of oxytocin and vasopressin, which play key roles in influencing social behavior, on moral emotion ratings for situations involving harming others and on judgments of moral dilemmas where others are harmed for a greater good. Oxytocin, but not vasopressin, enhanced feelings of guilt and shame for intentional but not accidental harm and reduced endorsement of intentionally harming others to achieve a greater good. Neither peptide influenced arousal ratings for the scenarios. Effects of oxytocin on guilt and shame were strongest in individuals scoring lower on the personal distress subscale of trait empathy. Overall, findings demonstrate for the first time that oxytocin, but not vasopressin, promotes enhanced feelings of guilt and shame and unwillingness to harm others irrespective of the consequences. This may reflect associations between oxytocin and empathy and vasopressin with aggression and suggests that oxytocin may have greater therapeutic potential for disorders with atypical social and moral behavior.

Autistic adults' inclination to lie in everyday situations

LAY ABSTRACT

Differences in social communication and understanding others' mental states may mean that autistic adults are less likely to deceive others than non-autistic individuals. We investigated whether autistic and non-autistic adults differ in their inclination to lie and which psychological factors are involved in the inclination to lie. We found that autistic and non-autistic groups reported a similar inclination to lie, and the extent to which participants viewed lying as acceptable helped to explain their inclination to deceive others. However, the other underlying psychological factors associated with deception inclination differed between autistic and non-autistic groups. Autistic adults' belief about their ability to lie and also how quickly they could lie helped to explain whether they were more or less inclined to lie. For non-autistic adults, their memory and ability to understand others' mental states helped to explain their lie inclination. We discuss these findings and recommend areas for future research.

Development of Moral Judgments in Impersonal and Personal Dilemmas in Autistic Spectrum Disorders from Childhood to Late Adolescence

A potential underlying mechanism associated with the difficulties in social interactions in Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) concerns the abnormal development of moral reasoning. The present study examined utilitarian and deontological judgments in impersonal and personal moral dilemmas, comparing 66 individuals with ASD and 61 typically developing (TD) individuals between 6 and 18 years. Utilitarian judgments decreased with age. This decline was much more gradual for personal dilemmas in the ASD than in the TD group. ASD individuals rated utilitarian judgments as more appropriate but felt less calm, consistent with the Empathy Imbalance hypothesis. Utilitarian judgments were associated with social interaction difficulties in ASD. These findings identify possible social therapeutic targets for more efficient coping strategies in individuals with ASD.

Disgust Processing and Potential Relationships with Behaviors in Autism

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

While there are reports of differences in emotion processing in autism, it is less understood whether the emotion of disgust, in particular, plays a significant role in these effects. Here, we review literature on potential disgust processing differences in autism and its possible associations with autistic traits.

RECENT FINDINGS

In autism, there is evidence for differences in physical disgust processing, pica behaviors, attention away from other's disgust facial expressions, and differences in neural activity related to disgust processing. In typically developing individuals, disgust processing is related to moral processing, but modulated by individual differences in interoception and alexithymia. Autistic individuals may experience atypical disgust, which may lead to difficulty avoiding contaminants and affect socio-emotional processing. In autism, such outcomes may lead to increased occurrences of illness, contribute to gastrointestinal issues, diminish vicarious learning of disgust expression and behaviors, and potentially contribute to differences in processes related to moral reasoning, though further research is needed.

The role of the prefrontal cortex in social interactions of animal models and the implications for autism spectrum disorder

Social interaction is a complex behavior which requires the individual to integrate various internal processes, such as social motivation, social recognition, salience, reward, and emotional state, as well as external cues informing the individual of others' behavior, emotional state and social rank. This complex phenotype is susceptible to disruption in humans affected by neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders, including autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Multiple pieces of convergent evidence collected from studies of humans and rodents suggest that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a pivotal role in social interactions, serving as a hub for motivation, affiliation, empathy, and social hierarchy. Indeed, disruption of the PFC circuitry results in social behavior deficits symptomatic of ASD. Here, we review this evidence and describe various ethologically relevant social behavior tasks which could be employed with rodent models to study the role of the PFC in social interactions. We also discuss the evidence linking the PFC to pathologies associated with ASD. Finally, we address specific questions regarding mechanisms employed by the PFC circuitry that may result in atypical social interactions in rodent models, which future studies should address.

Increased levels of autistic traits are associated with atypical moral judgments

Despite evidence often showing differences between groups with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and neurotypical controls in moral judgment, the precise nature of these differences has been difficult to establish. At least two reasons for this are (1) that ASD (and its associated characteristics) is difficult to define and (2) that morality, and the inclinations that undergird it, are hard to measure empirically. These challenges have made conclusive associations between ASD and particular patterns of moral judgment hard to come by. Thus, in the current study, participants levels of a traits associated with ASD were assessed by their responses to a questionnaire (i.e., the Iowa Screener) before they made moral judgments across a set of 20 moral dilemmas that independently assess utilitarian and deontological processing. Interestingly, results indicated that increased levels of autistic traits were associated with fewer moral judgments corresponding to either moral theory; that is, higher levels of autistic traits were associated with atypical patterns of moral judgment. In addition, and consistent with some prior methods (e.g., Gaeth et al., 2016), participant scores on the Iowa Screener, as well as their self-identification, were used to categorize participants between two groups (i.e., ASD and Typical) for exploratory purposes. Taken together, this research better informs the relationship between ASD and its associated traits with moral judgment and can inform certain discrepant findings in the field. Implications and ideas for future research are discussed, such as whether traits associated with ASD might relate to alternative moral inclinations, beyond deontology and utilitarianism.

Emotional descriptions increase accidental harm punishment and its cortico-limbic signatures during moral judgment in autism

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) present difficulties in integrating mental state information in complex moral tasks. Yet, ASD research has not examined whether this process is influenced by emotions, let alone while capturing its neural bases. We investigated how language-induced emotions modulate intent-based moral judgment in ASD. In a fMRI task, 30 adults with ASD and 27 neurotypical controls read vignettes whose protagonists commit harm either accidentally or intentionally, and then decided how much punishment the protagonist deserved. Emotional content was manipulated across scenarios through the use of graphic language (designed to trigger arousing negative responses) vs. plain (just-the-facts, emotionless) language. Off-line functional connectivity correlates of task performance were also analyzed. In ASD, emotional (graphic) descriptions amplified punishment ratings of accidental harms, associated with increased activity in fronto-temporo-limbic, precentral, and postcentral/supramarginal regions (critical for emotional and empathic processes), and reduced connectivity among the orbitofrontal cortex and the angular gyrus (involved in mentalizing). Language manipulation did not influence intentional harm processing in ASD. In conclusion, in arousing and ambiguous social situations that lack intentionality clues (i.e. graphic accidental harm scenarios), individuals with ASD would misuse their emotional responses as the main source of information to guide their moral decisions. Conversely, in face of explicit harmful intentions, they would be able to compensate their socioemotional alterations and assign punishment through non-emotional pathways. Despite limitations, such as the small sample size and low ecological validity of the task, results of the present study proved reliable and have relevant theoretical and translational implications.

Moral judgements among neurotypical children, autistic children and adults with intellectual disability

Background: The present study investigates the possible differences between neurotypical children (NT), autistic children, and adults with intellectual disability (ID) related to (i) morality of the agent, (ii) morality of the action, and (iii) culpability in inappropriate situations. Method: Eighty-four Spanish participants (32 NT, 30 autistic children, and 22 adults with ID) responded to a task of moral transgression with an unambiguous structure (bad intention - bad outcome), where the stories were classified as first-order Theory of Mind (ToM) (based on simple desires) and second-order ToM (based on revenge). Results: Autistic group judged similarly to NT group. However, adults with ID had greater difficulty judging the (ii) morality of the action (compared with the autistic and NT group) and (iii) culpability (compared with the NT group). Also, ID adults encountered problems responding the moral questions in the balloon story (second-order ToM) and ice-cream story (first-order ToM). Conclusions: Autistic and NT children were able to make similar moral judgements, however adults with ID did not respond in the same way - as they were more benevolent in their judgements.

Grievance-fueled violence can be better understood using an enactive approach

Understanding lone actor grievance-fueled violence remains a challenge. We believe that the concept of grievance provides an opportunity to add an engaged, first-person perspective to the assessment of lone actor extreme violence. We propose an enactivist philosophical approach that can help to understand the why and how of the pathway from grievance to violent extremism. Enactivism sees grievance as a dynamic, interpersonal, and context-sensitive construct that indicates how (potential) offenders make sense of the world they live in and how under certain circumstances it fuels violent behavior. Hence, grievance should not be understood as a given thing, but as an unfolding experience that involves sense-making through (regulation of one’s) interaction with the (social) environment. This (self-)relational and ecological understanding requires another approach than looking at demographic factors or life histories, only from an outsider’s perspective. Enactivism invites us to look at such risk factors as external indices of an ongoing process of active self-regulation and sense-making, and in some cases spiraling toward extreme violence. To understand the mindset of the offender we need to look more in depth at the processes that shape this mindset: why does this person, with this history, in this context, and at this point in time, proceed to use violence? The enactivist approach to the mind offers a complementary framework that may help us to understand the dynamics of grievance as a possible precursor to violent extremism. It also helps to appreciate why the relative unpredictability of the pathway toward lone actor extreme violence is not necessarily a sign of empirical weakness but a matter of principle due to the non-linearity of the processes involved. We end by summarizing how enactivism could contribute to the prevention of extremist violence and research and how it can help to avoid reinforcing stigmas and re-establishing a confirmation bias.

Moral Agency, Rules, and Temporality in People Who Are Diagnosed With Mild Forms of Autism: In Defense of a Sentimentalist View

The origin of moral agency is a much-debated issue. While rationalists or Kantians have argued that moral agency is rooted in reason, sentimentalists or Humeans have ascribed its origin to empathic feelings. This debate between rationalists and sentimentalists still stands with respect to persons with mental disorders, such as individuals diagnosed with mild forms of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), without intellectual impairment. Individuals with ASD are typically regarded as moral agents, however their ability for empathy remains debated. The goal of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms of moral actions in people with ASD, by finding arguments for the origin of their moral actions, supporting either the sentimentalist or the rationalist view of the dispute. We propose to revisit the debate using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to study the autobiographies of individuals with High-Functioning Autism (HFA) and Asperger Syndrome (AS). While conducting the systematic analysis of 10 autobiographies, we re-examined both the rationalist and the sentimentalist positions, considering the links between empathic feelings and moral agency. The investigation of the temporal dimensions of emotional experiences, an aspect overlooked by previous research, indicated that individuals with ASD empathize with others, but in different ways as compared to neurotypicals. A relationship between emotional experience and the type of moral agency exhibited by individuals with forms of ASD was established. As a consequence, our analyses support the sentimentalist stance on moral action.

Moral judgment and hormones: A systematic literature review

This systematic review of the literature aims to evaluate possible associations between moral judgment and hormones. The electronic databases PsycINFO, PubMed, Scielo, Web of Science, Scopus, and LILACS were used. Twenty studies with different methodological designs were reviewed, covering the hormones cortisol, oxytocin, and testosterone, assessing aspects related to polymorphisms in receptor genes, endogenous levels, and exogenous administration. Taken together, the reviewed studies showed a trend towards an association between hormones and moral judgment, with important specificities involving biological, environmental, and individual aspects. Endogenous levels of cortisol, released under stress, showed negative associations with altruistic and utilitarian decisions only in highly emotionally charged dilemmas. Oxytocin receptor gene polymorphisms (rs2268498, rs237889, and rs2254298) and acute administration of this hormone were associated with variability in moral judgment, with sex as an important moderating variable. Testosterone studies have tended to show a positive association with utilitarian moral judgments, particularly in female and in individuals with low prenatal exposure to this hormone. Knowing how hormones influence moral judgment may help expand our understanding of the plurality of human behavior. However, this area of research is new and still little explored, which does not allow for conclusions with a high level of evidence. Subsequent research will benefit from methodological improvements to extend current findings.

Theory of Mind and Preference Learning at the Interface of Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and AI: A Review

Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability of the human mind to attribute mental states to others-is a key component of human cognition. In order to understand other people's mental states or viewpoint and to have successful interactions with others within social and occupational environments, this form of social cognition is essential. The same capability of inferring human mental states is a prerequisite for artificial intelligence (AI) to be integrated into society, for example in healthcare and the motoring industry. Autonomous cars will need to be able to infer the mental states of human drivers and pedestrians to predict their behavior. In the literature, there has been an increasing understanding of ToM, specifically with increasing cognitive science studies in children and in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Similarly, with neuroimaging studies there is now a better understanding of the neural mechanisms that underlie ToM. In addition, new AI algorithms for inferring human mental states have been proposed with more complex applications and better generalisability. In this review, we synthesize the existing understanding of ToM in cognitive and neurosciences and the AI computational models that have been proposed. We focus on preference learning as an area of particular interest and the most recent neurocognitive and computational ToM models. We also discuss the limitations of existing models and hint at potential approaches to allow ToM models to fully express the complexity of the human mind in all its aspects, including values and preferences.

Decision Flexibilities in Autism Spectrum Disorder: An fMRI Study of Moral Dilemmas

People make flexible decisions across a wide range of contexts to resolve social or moral conflicts. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) frequently report difficulties in such behaviors, which hinders the flexibility in changing strategies during daily activities or adjustment of perspective during communication. However, the underlying mechanisms of this issue are insufficiently understood. This study aimed to investigate decision flexibility in ASD using a functional magnetic resonance imaging task that involved recognizing and resolving two types of moral dilemmas: cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and mitigating inevitable misconducts (MIM). The CBA session assessed the participants’ pitting of result-oriented outcomes against distressful harmful actions, whereas the MIM session assessed their pitting of the extenuation of a criminal sentence against a sympathetic situation of defendants suffering from violence or disease. The behavioral outcome in CBA-related flexibility was significantly lower in the ASD group compared to that of the typical development group. In the corresponding CBA contrast, activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus was lower in the ASD group. Meanwhile, in the MIM-related flexibility, there were no significant group differences in behavioral outcome or brain activity. Our findings add to our understanding of flexible decision-making in ASD.

EXPRESS: Judging accidental harm: reasoning style modulates the weight of intention and harm severity

When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct information pertaining to the perpetrator and victim. The present study investigates how reasoning style modulates the contribution of the victim's harm and the perpetrator's intention to third-party judgment of accidental harm. In two pre-registered online experiments, we simultaneously manipulated harm severity and the perpetrator's intention. Participants completed reasoning measures as well as a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim. In experiment 1, we manipulated the perpetrator's intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the victim's harm (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2, we aimed to manipulate intent in accidental harm scenarios exclusively, using positive or neutral intents and manipulating harm severity (mild vs. severe harm). As expected, intent and harm severity moderated participants' moral judgment of acceptability, punishment and blame. Most importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator's intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style. While moral judgments of more intuitive reasoners were less sensitive to intent, more deliberative reasoners were more forgiving of accidental harm, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that reasoning style interacts with intent and harm severity to shape moral judgment of accidents.

Moral Foundations Theory Among Autistic and Neurotypical Children

Morality can help guide behavior and facilitate relationships. Although moral judgments by autistic people are similar to neurotypical individuals, many researchers argue that subtle differences signify deficits in autistic individuals. Moral foundation theory describes moral judgments in terms of differences rather than deficits. The current research, aimed at assessing autistic individuals' moral inclinations using Haidt's framework, was co-designed with autistic community members. Our aim was to describe autistic moral thinking from a strengths-based perspective while acknowledging differences that may pose interpersonal challenges among autistic youth. We assessed 25 autistic and 23 neurotypical children's moral judgments using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for Kids. We used semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis with a subset of participants to describe children's moral reasoning. Analyses suggested that autistic and neurotypical children make similar judgments about moral transgressions across all five moral foundations. General linear mixed modeling showed that the greatest predictor of recommending punishment was how bad children deemed moral transgressions to be. We also found a trend that autistic children were more likely to recommend punishment for harmless norms violations than were neurotypical children. Future research could use longitudinal methods to understand the development of moral judgments among autistic and neurotypical children.

Right Temporoparietal Junction Underlies Avoidance of Moral Transgression in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by a core difference in theory-of-mind (ToM) ability, which extends to alterations in moral judgment and decision-making. Although the function of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), a key neural marker of ToM and morality, is known to be atypical in autistic individuals, the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying its specific changes in moral decision-making remain unclear. Here, we addressed this question by using a novel fMRI task together with computational modeling and representational similarity analysis (RSA). ASD participants and healthy control subjects (HCs) decided in public or private whether to incur a personal cost for funding a morally good cause (Good Context) or receive a personal gain for benefiting a morally bad cause (Bad Context). Compared with HC, individuals with ASD were much more likely to reject the opportunity to earn ill gotten money by supporting a bad cause than were HCs. Computational modeling revealed that this resulted from heavily weighing benefits for themselves and the bad cause, suggesting that ASD participants apply a rule of refusing to serve a bad cause because they evaluate the negative consequences of their actions more severely. Moreover, RSA revealed a reduced rTPJ representation of the information specific to moral contexts in ASD participants. Together, these findings indicate the contribution of rTPJ in representing information concerning moral rules and provide new insights for the neurobiological basis underpinning moral behaviors illustrated by a specific difference of rTPJ in ASD participants.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Previous investigations have found an altered pattern of moral behaviors in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is closely associated with functional changes in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). However, the specific neurocomputational mechanisms at play that drive the altered function of the rTPJ in moral decision-making remain unclear. Here, we show that ASD individuals are more inflexible when following a moral rule although an immoral action can benefit themselves, and experience an increased concern about their ill-gotten gains and the moral cost. Moreover, a selectively reduced rTPJ representation of information concerning moral rules was observed in ASD participants. These findings deepen our understanding of the neurobiological roots that underlie atypical moral behaviors in ASD individuals.