The evolution of intelligence: adaptive specializations versus general process

Divergent association between pain intensity and resting-state fMRI-based brain entropy in different age groups

Pain is a multidimensional subjective experience sustained by multiple brain regions involved in different aspects of pain experience. We used brain entropy (BEN) estimated from resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) data to investigate the neural correlates of pain experience. BEN was estimated from rs-fMRI data provided by two datasets with different age range: the Human Connectome Project-Young Adult (HCP-YA) and the Human Connectome project-Aging (HCP-A) datasets. Retrospective assessment of experienced pain intensity was retrieved from both datasets. No main effect of pain intensity was observed. The interaction between pain and age, however, was related to increased BEN in several pain-related brain regions, reflecting greater variability of spontaneous brain activity. Dividing the sample into a young adult group (YG) and a middle age-aging group (MAG) resulted in two divergent patterns of pain-BEN association: In the YG, pain intensity was related to reduced BEN in brain regions involved in the sensory processing of pain; in the MAG, pain was associated with increased BEN in areas related to both sensory and cognitive aspects of pain experience.

The Fractal Geometry of the Human Brain: An Evolutionary Perspective

The evolution of the brain in mammals is characterized by changes in size, architecture, and internal organization. Consequently, the geometry of the brain, and especially the size and shape of the cerebral cortex, has changed notably during evolution. Comparative studies of the cerebral cortex suggest that there are general architectural principles governing its growth and evolutionary development. In this chapter, some of the design principles and operational modes that underlie the fractal geometry and information processing capacity of the cerebral cortex in primates, including humans, will be explored. It is shown that the development of the cortex coordinates folding with connectivity in a way that produces smaller and faster brains.

Why is the Rescorla-Wagner model so influential?

The influence of the Rescorla-Wagner model cannot be overestimated, despite that (1) the model does not differ much computationally from its predecessors and competitors, and (2) its shortcomings are well-known in the learning community. Here we discuss the reasons behind its widespread influence in the cognitive and neural sciences, and argue that it is the constant search for general-process theories by learning scholars which eventually produced a model whose application spans many different areas of research to this day. We focus on the theoretical and empirical background of the model, the theoretical connections that it has with later developments across Marr's levels of analysis, as well as the broad variety of research that it has guided and inspired.

Among-individual differences in auditory and physical cognitive abilities in zebra finches

Among-individual variation in performance on cognitive tasks is ubiquitous across species that have been examined, and understanding the evolution of cognitive abilities requires investigating among-individual variation because natural selection acts on individual differences. However, relatively little is known about the extent to which individual differences in cognition are determined by domain-specific compared with domain-general cognitive abilities. We examined individual differences in learning speed of zebra finches across seven different tasks to determine the extent of domain-specific versus domain-general learning abilities, as well as the relationship between learning speed and learning generalization. Thirty-two zebra finches completed a foraging board experiment that included visual and structural discriminations, and then these same birds went through an acoustic operant discrimination experiment that required discriminating between different natural categories of acoustic stimuli. We found evidence of domain-general learning abilities as birds' relative performance on the seven learning tasks was weakly repeatable and a principal components analysis found a first principal component that explained 36% of the variance in performance across tasks with all tasks loading unidirectionally on this component. However, the few significant correlations between tasks and high repeatability within each experiment suggest the potential for domain-specific abilities. Learning speed did not influence an individual's ability to generalize learning. These results suggest that zebra finch performance across visual, structural, and auditory learning relies upon some common mechanism; some might call this evidence of "general intelligence"(g), but it is also possible that this finding is due to other noncognitive mechanisms such as motivation.

Equivalent learning, but unequal participation: Male bumble bees learn comparably to females, but participate in cognitive assessments at lower rates

Sex-specific cognitive abilities are well documented. These can occur when sexes engage in different ecological contexts. Less known is whether different ecological contexts can also drive sex-specific participation rates in behavioral tests. Here, we explore this question in bumble bees, a group of eusocial insects where worker females and males exhibit stark socioecological differences. Among myriad colony maintenance tasks, workers forage for themselves and developing brood, while males forage only for themselves while mate-searching. Following upon previous studies suggesting no sex differences in bumble bee learning, we test the hypothesis that despite having equivalent associative learning abilities, males participate in cognitive assessments offering nutritional rewards at lower rates. Testing > 500 bees from nine colonies in a differential conditioning protocol, we find support for our hypothesis. An equivalent proportion of workers and males successfully completed our cognitive assessment, while a significantly lower proportion of males participated in the entire protocol. Unequal participation is a perennial issue in the behavioral sciences, limiting sample size and potentially biasing results. Our results suggest that to understand the true range of variation in cognition, sex-differences in participation must be accounted for.

The effects of spatial stability and cue type on spatial learning: Implications for theories of parallel memory systems

Some theories of spatial learning predict that associative rules apply under only limited circumstances. For example, learning based on a boundary has been claimed to be immune to cue competition effects because boundary information is the basis for the formation of a cognitive map, whilst landmark learning does not involve cognitive mapping. This is referred to as the cue type hypothesis. However, it has also been claimed that cue stability is a prerequisite for the formation of a cognitive map, meaning that whichever cue type was perceived as stable would enter a cognitive map and thus be immune to cue competition, while unstable cues will be subject to cue competition, regardless of cue type. In experiments 1 and 2 we manipulated the stability of boundary and landmark cues when learning the location of two hidden goals. One goal location was constant with respect to the boundary, and the other constant with respect to the landmark cues. For both cue types, the presence of distal orientation cues provided directional information. For half the participants the landmark cues were unstable relative to the boundary and orientation cues, whereas for the remainder of the participants the boundary was unstable relative to landmarks and orientation cues. In a second stage of training, all cues remained stable so that both goal locations could be learned with respect to both landmark and boundary information. According to the cue type hypothesis, boundary information should block learning about landmarks regardless of cue stability. According to the cue stability hypothesis, however, landmarks should block learning about the boundary when the landmarks appear stable relative to the boundary. Regardless of cue type or stability the results showed reciprocal blocking, contrary to both formulations of incidental cognitive mapping. Experiment 3 established that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 could not be explained in terms of difficulty in learning certain locations with respect to different cue types. In a final experiment, following training in which both landmarks and boundary cues signalled two goal locations, a new goal location was established with respect to the landmark cues, before testing with the boundary, which had never been used to define the new goal location. The results of this novel test of the interaction between boundary and landmark cues indicated that new learning with respect to the landmark had a profound effect on navigation with respect to the boundary, counter to the predictions of incidental cognitive mapping of boundaries.

Nesting ecology does not explain slow-fast cognitive differences among honeybee species

Slow-fast behavioral and life history differences have been tied to slow-fast variation in cognition that is part of the general speed-accuracy tradeoff. While there is growing evidence for such cognitive variation and its association with behavior and life history at the intraspecific level, it is unknown if a similar relationship extends to the interspecific level. Since interspecific differences in cognition have been shown to be a function of ecology and life history, such differences should be reflected in multiple traits that comprise the slow-fast cognitive axis. In this study, by measuring multiple cognitive traits in individuals, we tested for differences in the cognitive phenotype among four honeybee species, which differ in their behavior and life history in a manner that is associated with differences in their nesting ecology. Our results indicate that a set of cognitive traits consistently covary within each species, resulting in slow and fast cognitive phenotypes that largely meet the predictions of the speed-accuracy tradeoff. We also find that the four species group into two distinct clusters on a slow-fast cognitive axis, although their positions do not align with the known differences in their life history and nesting ecology. We instead find that cognitive differences among the four species are correlated with their brain size. We discuss the possible implications of these results for the role of ecology on slow-fast cognitive differences and the evolution of cognition.

Evolutionary transitions in learning and cognition

We define a cognitive system as a system that can learn, and adopt an evolutionary-transition-oriented framework for analysing different types of neural cognition. This enables us to classify types of cognition and point to the continuities and discontinuities among them. The framework we use for studying evolutionary transitions in learning capacities focuses on qualitative changes in the integration, storage and use of neurally processed information. Although there are always grey areas around evolutionary transitions, we recognize five major neural transitions, the first two of which involve animals at the base of the phylogenetic tree: (i) the evolutionary transition from learning in non-neural animals to learning in the first neural animals; (ii) the transition to animals showing limited, elemental associative learning, entailing neural centralization and primary brain differentiation; (iii) the transition to animals capable of unlimited associative learning, which, on our account, constitutes sentience and entails hierarchical brain organization and dedicated memory and value networks; (iv) the transition to imaginative animals that can plan and learn through selection among virtual events; and (v) the transition to human symbol-based cognition and cultural learning. The focus on learning provides a unifying framework for experimental and theoretical studies of cognition in the living world. This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.

Variation in reversal learning by three generalist mesocarnivores

Urbanization imposes novel challenges for wildlife, but also provides new opportunities for exploitation. Generalist species are commonly found in urban habitats, but the cognitive mechanisms facilitating their successful behavioral adaptations and exploitations are largely under-investigated. Cognitive flexibility is thought to enable generalists to be more plastic in their behavior, thereby increasing their adaptability to a variety of environments, including urban habitats. Yet direct measures of cognitive flexibility across urban wildlife are lacking. We used a classic reversal-learning paradigm to investigate the cognitive flexibility of three generalist mesocarnivores commonly found in urban habitats: striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis), raccoons (Procyon lotor), and coyotes (Canis latrans). We developed an automated device and testing protocol that allowed us to administer tests of reversal learning in captivity without extensive training or experimenter involvement. Although most subjects were able to rapidly form and reverse learned associations, we found moderate variation in performance and behavior during trials. Most notably, we observed heightened neophobia and a lack of habituation expressed by coyotes. We discuss the implications of such differences among generalists with regard to urban adaptation and we identify goals for future research. This study is an important step in investigating the relationships between cognition, generalism, and urban adaptation.

Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia

Macphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible problem-solving capacity (“intelligence”), but limiting the discussion to vertebrates is too arbitrary. As an example, we focus here on Portia, a spider with an especially intricate predatory strategy and a preference for other spiders as prey. We review research on pre-planned detours, expectancy violation, and a capacity to solve confinement problems where, in each of these three contexts, there is experimental evidence of innate cognitive capacities and reliance on internal representation. These cognitive capacities are related to, but not identical to, intelligence. When discussing intelligence, as when discussing cognition, it is more useful to envisage a continuum instead of something that is simply present or not; in other words, a continuum pertaining to flexible problem-solving capacity for “intelligence” and a continuum pertaining to reliance on internal representation for “cognition.” When envisaging a continuum pertaining to intelligence, Daniel Dennett’s notion of four Creatures (Darwinian, Skinnerian, Popperian, and Gregorian) is of interest, with the distinction between Skinnerian and Popperian Creatures being especially relevant when considering Portia. When we consider these distinctions, a case can be made for Portia being a Popperian Creature. Like Skinnerian Creatures, Popperian Creatures express flexible problem solving capacity, but the manner in which this capacity is expressed by Popperian Creatures is more distinctively cognitive.

Place and Environment in the Ongoing Evolution of Cognitive Neuroscience

Cognitive science today increasingly is coming under the influence of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive perspectives, superimposed on the more traditional cybernetic, computational assumptions of classical cognitive research. Neuroscience has contributed to a greatly enhanced understanding of brain function within the constraints of the traditional cognitive science approach, but interpretations of many of its findings can be enriched by the newer alternative perspectives. Here, we note in particular how these frameworks highlight the cognitive requirements of an animal situated within its particular environment, how the coevolution of an organism's biology and ecology shape its cognitive characteristics, and how the cognitive realm extends beyond the brain of the perceiving animal. We argue that these insights of the embodied cognition paradigm reveal the central role that "place" plays in the cognitive landscape and that cognitive scientists and philosophers alike can gain from paying heed to the importance of a concept of place. We conclude with a discussion of how this concept can be applied with respect to cognitive function, species comparisons, ecologically relevant experimental designs, and how the "hard problem" of consciousness might be approached, among its other implications.

Renewed Perspectives on the Deep Roots and Broad Distribution of Animal Consciousness

The vast majority of neurobiologists have long abandoned the Cartesian view of non-human animals as unconscious automatons-acknowledging instead the high likelihood that mammals and birds have mental experiences akin to subjective consciousness. Several lines of evidence are now extending those limits to all vertebrates and even some invertebrates, though graded in degrees as argued originally by Darwin, correlated with the complexity of the animal's brain. A principal argument for this view is that the function of consciousness is to promote the survival of an animal-especially one actively moving about-in the face of dynamic changes and real-time contingencies. Cognitive ecologists point to the unique features of each animal's environment and the specific behavioral capabilities that different environments invoke, thereby suggesting that consciousness must take on a great variety of forms, many of which differ substantially from human subjective experience.

Macphail’s Null Hypothesis of Vertebrate Intelligence: Insights From Avian Cognition

Macphail famously criticized two foundational assumptions that underlie the evolutionary approach to comparative psychology: that there are differences in intelligence across species, and that intelligent behavior in animals is based on more than associative learning. Here, we provide evidence from recent work in avian cognition that supports both these assumptions: intelligence across species varies, and animals can perform intelligent behaviors that are not guided solely by associative learning mechanisms. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of comparative psychology that led to Macphail’s claims and suggest strategies researchers can use to make more advances in the field.

Humanity and the left hemisphere: The story of half a brain

Until fairly late in the nineteenth century, it was held that the brain was bilaterally symmetrical. With the discovery of left-brain dominance for language, the so-called "laws of symmetry" were revoked, and asymmetry was then seen as critical to the human condition, with the left hemisphere, in particular, assuming superordinate properties. I trace this idea from the early discoveries of the late nineteenth century through the split-brain studies of the 1960s, and beyond. Although the idea has persisted, the evidence has revealed widespread cerebral asymmetries in nonhuman animals, and even language and its asymmetries are increasingly understood to have evolved gradually, rather than in a single speciation event. The left hemisphere nevertheless seemed to take over a role previously taken by other structures, such as the pineal gland and the hippocampus minor, in a determined effort to place humans on a pedestal above all other species.

Crossing the Rubicon: Behaviorism, Language, and Evolutionary Continuity

Euan Macphail's work and ideas captured a pivotal time in the late 20th century when behavioral laws were considered to apply equally across vertebrates, implying equal intelligence, but it was also a time when behaviorism was challenged by the view that language was unique to humans, and bestowed a superior mental status. Subsequent work suggests greater continuity between humans and their forebears, challenging the Chomskyan assumption that language evolved in a single step ("the great leap forward") in humans. Language is now understood to be based on an amalgam of cognitive functions, including mental time travel, theory of mind, and what may be more broadly defined as imagination. These functions probably evolved gradually in hominin evolution and are present in varying degrees in non-human species. The blending of language into cognition provides for both interspecies differences in mental function, and continuity between humans and other species. What does seem to be special to humans is the ability to communicate the contents of imagination, although even this is not absolute, and is perhaps less adaptive than we like to think.

Associations of brain entropy (BEN) to cerebral blood flow and fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations in the resting brain

Entropy is a fundamental trait of human brain. Using fMRI-based brain entropy (BEN) mapping, interesting findings have been increasingly revealed in normal brain and neuropsychiatric disorders. As BEN is still relatively new, an often-raised question is how much new information can this measure tell about the brain compared to other more established brain activity measures. The study aimed to address that question by examining the relationship between BEN and cerebral blood flow (CBF) and the fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (fALFF), two widely used resting state brain state measures. fMRI data acquired from a large cohort of normal subjects were used to calculate the three metrics; inter-modality associations were assessed at each voxel through the Pearson correlation analysis. A moderate to high positive BEN-CBF and BEN-fALFF correlations were found in orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) and posterior inferior temporal cortex (ITC); Strong negative BEN-fALFF correlations were found in visual cortex (VC), anterior ITC, striatum, motor network, precuneus, and lateral parietal cortex. Positive CBF-fALFF correlations were found in medial OFC (MOFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), left angular gyrus, and left precuneus. Significant gender effects were observed for all three metrics and their correlations. Our data clearly demonstrated that BEN provides unique information that cannot be revealed by CBF and fALFF.

Selection for associative learning of color stimuli reveals correlated evolution of this learning ability across multiple stimuli and rewards

We are only starting to understand how variation in cognitive ability can result from local adaptations to environmental conditions. A major question in this regard is to what extent selection on cognitive ability in a specific context affects that ability in general through correlated evolution. To address this question, we performed artificial selection on visual associative learning in female Nasonia vitripennis wasps. Using appetitive conditioning in which a visual stimulus was offered in association with a host reward, the ability to learn visual associations was enhanced within 10 generations of selection. To test for correlated evolution affecting this form of learning, the ability to readily form learned associations in females was also tested using an olfactory instead of a visual stimulus in the appetitive conditioning. Additionally, we assessed whether the improved associative learning ability was expressed across sexes by color-conditioning males with a mating reward. Both females and males from the selected lines consistently demonstrated an increased associative learning ability compared to the control lines, independent of learning context or conditioned stimulus. No difference in relative volume of brain neuropils was detected between the selected and control lines.

The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning

The minimal state of consciousness is sentience. This includes any phenomenal sensory experience - exteroceptive, such as vision and olfaction; interoceptive, such as pain and hunger; or proprioceptive, such as the sense of bodily position and movement. We propose unlimited associative learning (UAL) as the marker of the evolutionary transition to minimal consciousness (or sentience), its phylogenetically earliest sustainable manifestation and the driver of its evolution. We define and describe UAL at the behavioral and functional level and argue that the structural-anatomical implementations of this mode of learning in different taxa entail subjective feelings (sentience). We end with a discussion of the implications of our proposal for the distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom, suggesting testable predictions, and revisiting the ongoing debate about the function of minimal consciousness in light of our approach.

Women's fertility across the cycle increases the short-term attractiveness of creative intelligence

Male provisioning ability may have evolved as a "good dad" indicator through sexual selection, whereas male creativity may have evolved partly as a "good genes" indicator. If so, women near peak fertility (midcycle) should prefer creativity over wealth, especially in short-term mating. Forty-one normally cycling women read vignettes describing creative but poor men vs. uncreative but rich men. Women's estimated fertility predicted their short-term (but not long-term) preference for creativity over wealth, in both their desirability ratings of individual men (r=.40, p<.01) and their forced-choice decisions between men (r=.46, p<.01). These preliminary results are consistent with the view that creativity evolved at least partly as a good genes indicator through mate choice.

Evolution cannot explain how minds work

Following Jerry Hogan, I argue that questions of function and evolution, and questions of mechanism should be seen as logically distinct. Evolution is concerned with a historical reconstruction of traits, while the actual underlying mechanisms are the domain of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Functional and evolutionary considerations may be used to generate hypotheses regarding the underlying mechanisms. But these hypotheses may be false and should always be tested empirically. Many researchers still hold that common descent implies cognitive closeness. Studies on birds suggest that evolutionary convergence may be the rule rather than the exception in animal cognition. Neurocognitive differences between classes of individuals are often thought to be the result of adaptive specialisation. In the case of learning and memory, however, empirical results are more consistent with a 'general process' interpretation, without qualitative differences between different taxa. Evolutionary psychology (EP) argues that the mind of modern humans was formed as a result of selection pressures in the Stone Age. The empirical data are often overinterpreted, and EP is mostly based upon an outdated view of evolutionary biology. In human speech and language, both neurogenetic homology and evolutionary convergence are involved regarding speech, but human language has a unique combinatorial complexity. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: In Honor of Jerry Hogan.

Evolutionary perspectives on learning: conceptual and methodological issues in the study of adaptive specializations

Inquiry into evolutionary adaptations has flourished since the modern synthesis of evolutionary biology. Comparative methods, genetic techniques, and various experimental and modeling approaches are used to test adaptive hypotheses. In psychology, the concept of adaptation is broadly applied and is central to comparative psychology and cognition. The concept of an adaptive specialization of learning is a proposed account for exceptions to general learning processes, as seen in studies of Pavlovian conditioning of taste aversions, sexual responses, and fear. The evidence generally consists of selective associations forming between biologically relevant conditioned and unconditioned stimuli, with conditioned responses differing in magnitude, persistence, or other measures relative to non-biologically relevant stimuli. Selective associations for biologically relevant stimuli may suggest adaptive specializations of learning, but do not necessarily confirm adaptive hypotheses as conceived of in evolutionary biology. Exceptions to general learning processes do not necessarily default to an adaptive specialization explanation, even if experimental results "make biological sense". This paper examines the degree to which hypotheses of adaptive specializations of learning in sexual and fear response systems have been tested using methodologies developed in evolutionary biology (e.g., comparative methods, quantitative and molecular genetics, survival experiments). A broader aim is to offer perspectives from evolutionary biology for testing adaptive hypotheses in psychological science.

Mechanisms of object recognition: what we have learned from pigeons

Behavioral studies of object recognition in pigeons have been conducted for 50 years, yielding a large body of data. Recent work has been directed toward synthesizing this evidence and understanding the visual, associative, and cognitive mechanisms that are involved. The outcome is that pigeons are likely to be the non-primate species for which the computational mechanisms of object recognition are best understood. Here, we review this research and suggest that a core set of mechanisms for object recognition might be present in all vertebrates, including pigeons and people, making pigeons an excellent candidate model to study the neural mechanisms of object recognition. Behavioral and computational evidence suggests that error-driven learning participates in object category learning by pigeons and people, and recent neuroscientific research suggests that the basal ganglia, which are homologous in these species, may implement error-driven learning of stimulus-response associations. Furthermore, learning of abstract category representations can be observed in pigeons and other vertebrates. Finally, there is evidence that feedforward visual processing, a central mechanism in models of object recognition in the primate ventral stream, plays a role in object recognition by pigeons. We also highlight differences between pigeons and people in object recognition abilities, and propose candidate adaptive specializations which may explain them, such as holistic face processing and rule-based category learning in primates. From a modern comparative perspective, such specializations are to be expected regardless of the model species under study. The fact that we have a good idea of which aspects of object recognition differ in people and pigeons should be seen as an advantage over other animal models. From this perspective, we suggest that there is much to learn about human object recognition from studying the "simple" brains of pigeons.

Exclusion performance in dwarf goats (Capra aegagrus hircus) and sheep (Ovis orientalis aries)

Using a comparative approach, we investigated the ability of dwarf goats and sheep to use direct and indirect information about the location of a food reward in an object-choice task. Subjects had to choose between two cups with only one covering a reward. Before making a choice, subjects received information about the baited (direct information) or non-baited cup (indirect information). Both goats and sheep were able to use direct information (presence of food) in the object choice task. After controlling for local enhancement, we found that goats rather than sheep were able to use indirect information (i.e., the absence of food) to find a reward. The actual test setup could not clarify whether individual goats were able to inferentially reason about the content of the baited cup when only shown the content of the non-baited cup or if they simply avoided the empty cup in that situation. As browsing species, feral and wild goats exhibit highly selective feeding behaviour compared to the rather unselective grazing sheep. The potential influence of this species-specific foraging flexibility of goats and sheep for using direct and indirect information to find a food reward is discussed in relation to a higher aversion to losses in food acquisition in goats compared to sheep.

Cognitive ecology: ecological factors, life-styles, and cognition

Cognitive ecology integrates cognition, ecology, and neurobiology in one topic and has recently broadened into an exciting diversity of themes covering the entire range of cognition and ecological conditions. The review identifies three major environmental factors interacting with cognition: environmental variation (predictable and unpredictable), environmental complexity and predation. Generally, variable environments favor cognitive abilities such as exploration, learning, innovation, memory and also result in larger brains as compared to stable environments. Likewise, cognition is enhanced in complex versus simple environments, whereas the relationship between predation and cognitive abilities can be positive or negative. However, organisms have often evolved entire life-styles (e.g., residency versus migration, food-caching versus noncaching, generalism versus specialism) to deal with these environmental factors. Considering cognition within this framework provides a much more diverse picture of how cognitive abilities evolved in conjunction with other adaptations to environmental challenges. This integrated approach identifies gaps of knowledge and allows the formulation of hypotheses for future testing. Several recently emerged approaches study cognitive abilities at a new and in part highly integrated level. For example, the effect that environment has on the development of cognitive abilities during ontogeny will improve our understanding about cause and effect and gene-environment interactions. Together with two recently emerged highly integrative approaches that link personality and pace-of-life syndromes with cognitive ecology these new directions will improve insight how cognition is interlinked with other major organizational processes. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

Evolution of the human brain: when bigger is better

Comparative studies of the brain in mammals suggest that there are general architectural principles governing its growth and evolutionary development. We are beginning to understand the geometric, biophysical and energy constraints that have governed the evolution and functional organization of the brain and its underlying neuronal network. The object of this review is to present current perspectives on primate brain evolution, especially in humans, and to examine some hypothetical organizing principles that underlie the brain's complex organization. Some of the design principles and operational modes that underlie the information processing capacity of the cerebral cortex in primates will be explored. It is shown that the development of the cortex coordinates folding with connectivity in a way that produces smaller and faster brains, then otherwise would have been possible. In view of the central importance placed on brain evolution in explaining the success of our own species, one may wonder whether there are physical limits that constrain its processing power and evolutionary potential. It will be argued that at a brain size of about 3500 cm(3), corresponding to a brain volume two to three times that of modern man, the brain seems to reach its maximum processing capacity. The larger the brain grows beyond this critical size, the less efficient it will become, thus limiting any improvement in cognitive power.

Tracking changing environments: innovators are fast, but not flexible learners

Behavioural innovations are increasingly thought to provide a rich source of phenotypic plasticity and evolutionary change. Innovation propensity shows substantial variation across avian taxa and provides an adaptive mechanism by which behaviour is flexibly adjusted to changing environmental conditions. Here, we tested for the first time the prediction that inter-individual variation in innovation propensity is equally a measure of behavioural flexibility. We used Indian mynas, Sturnus tristis, a highly successful worldwide invader. Results revealed that mynas that solved an extractive foraging task more quickly learnt to discriminate between a cue that predicted food, and one that did not more quickly. However, fast innovators were slower to change their behaviour when the significance of the food cues changed. This unexpected finding appears at odds with the well-established view that avian taxa with larger brains relative to their body size, and therefore greater neural processing power, are both faster, and more flexible learners. We speculate that the existence of this relationship across taxa can be reconciled with its absence within species by assuming that fast, innovative learners and non innovative, slow, flexible learners constitute two separate individual strategies, which are both underpinned by enhanced neural processing power. This idea is consistent with the recent proposal that individuals may differ consistently in 'cognitive style', differentially trading off speed against accuracy in cognitive tasks.

Mammalian collection on Noah's Ark: the effects of beauty, brain and body size

The importance of today's zoological gardens as the so-called "Noah's Ark" grows as the natural habitat of many species quickly diminishes. Their potential to shelter a large amount of individuals from many species gives us the opportunity to reintroduce a species that disappeared in nature. However, the selection of animals to be kept in zoos worldwide is highly selective and depends on human decisions driven by both ecological criteria such as population size or vulnerability and audience-driven criteria such as aesthetic preferences. Thus we focused our study on the most commonly kept and bred animal class, the mammals, and we asked which factors affect various aspects of the mammalian collection of zoos. We analyzed the presence/absence, population size, and frequency per species of each of the 123 mammalian families kept in the worldwide zoo collection. Our aim was to explain these data using the human-perceived attractiveness of mammalian families, their body weight, relative brain size and species richness of the family. In agreement with various previous studies, we found that the body size and the attractiveness of mammals significantly affect all studied components of the mammalian collection of zoos. There is a higher probability of the large and attractive families to be kept. Once kept, these animals are presented in larger numbers in more zoos. On the contrary, the relative mean brain size only affects the primary selection whether to keep the family or not. It does not affect the zoo population size or the number of zoos that keep the family.

Visual object categorization in birds and primates: integrating behavioral, neurobiological, and computational evidence within a "general process" framework

Previous comparative work has suggested that the mechanisms of object categorization differ importantly for birds and primates. However, behavioral and neurobiological differences do not preclude the possibility that at least some of those mechanisms are shared across these evolutionarily distant groups. The present study integrates behavioral, neurobiological, and computational evidence concerning the "general processes" that are involved in object recognition in vertebrates. We start by reviewing work implicating error-driven learning in object categorization by birds and primates, and also consider neurobiological evidence suggesting that the basal ganglia might implement this process. We then turn to work with a computational model showing that principles of visual processing discovered in the primate brain can account for key behavioral findings in object recognition by pigeons, including cases in which pigeons' behavior differs from that of people. These results provide a proof of concept that the basic principles of visual shape processing are similar across distantly related vertebrate species, thereby offering important insights into the evolution of visual cognition.

Neural correlates of cognitive ability

The challenge to neuroscientists working on intelligence is to discover what neural structures and mechanisms are at the basis of such a complex and variegated capability. Several psychologists agree on the view that behavioral flexibility is a good measure of intelligence, resulting in the appearance of novel solutions that are not part of the animal's normal behavior. This article tries to indicate how the supposed differences in intelligence between species can be related to brain properties and suggests that the best neural indicators may be the ones that convey more information processing capacity to the brain, i.e., high conduction velocity of fibers and small distances between neurons, associated with a high number of neurons and an adequate level of connectivity. The neural bases of human intelligence have been investigated by means of anatomical, neurophysiological, and neuropsychological methods. These investigations have led to two important findings that are briefly discussed: the parietofrontal integration theory of intelligence, which assumes that a distributed network of cortical areas having its main nodes in the frontal and parietal lobes constitutes a probable substrate for smart behavior, and the neural efficiency hypothesis, according to which intelligent people process information more efficiently, showing weaker neural activations in a smaller number of areas than less intelligent people.

A new approach to comparing problem solving, flexibility and innovation

Comparative cognition aims at unfolding the cognitive processes underlying animal behavior and their evolution, and is concerned with testing hypotheses about the evolution of the brain and intelligence in general. It is a developing field still challenged by conceptual and methodological issues. Systematic cross-species comparisons of cognitive abilities, taking both phylogeny and ecology into account are still scarce. One major reason for this is that it is very hard to find universally applicable paradigms that can be used to investigate the same cognitive ability or 'general intelligence' in several species. Many comparative paradigms have not paid sufficient attention to interspecific differences in anatomical, behavioral and perceptual features, besides psychological variables such as motivation, attentiveness or neophobia, thus potentially producing misrepresentative results. A new stance for future comparative research may be to establish behavioral and psychological profiles prior or alongside to comparing specific cognitive skills across species. Potentially revealing profiles could be obtained from examining species differences in how novel experimental (extractive foraging) tasks are explored and approached, how solutions are discovered and which ones are preferred, how flexibly multiple solutions are used and how much individual variation occurs, before proceeding to more detailed tests. Such new comparative approach is the Multi-Access-Box. It presents the animal with a novel problem that can be solved in several ways thus offering the possibility to examine species differences in all the above, and extract behavioral and perceptual determinants of their performance. Simultaneously, it is a suitable paradigm to collect comparative data about flexibility, innovativeness and problem solving ability, i.e., theoretical covariates of 'general intelligence', in a standardized manner.

Tough times call for bigger brains

Memory is crucial for survival in many animals. Spatial memory in particular is important for food-caching species and may be influenced by selective pressures such as climate. The influence of climate on memory may be facilitated through the hippocampus (Hp), the part of the brain responsible in part for spatial memory. In a recent paper, we conducted the first large-scale test of the relationship between memory, the climate and the brain in a single food-caching species, the black-capped chickadee (Poecile atricapillus). We found that birds from more harsh northern climates had significantly larger hippocampal volumes and more neurons than those from more mild southern latitudes. This work suggests that environmental pressures are capable of influencing specific brain regions, which may result in enhanced memory, and hence survival, in harsh climates. This work gives us a better understanding of how the brain responds to different environments and how animals can adapt to their environment in general.

Darwin in mind: new opportunities for evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary Psychology (EP) views the human mind as organized into many modules, each underpinned by psychological adaptations designed to solve problems faced by our Pleistocene ancestors. We argue that the key tenets of the established EP paradigm require modification in the light of recent findings from a number of disciplines, including human genetics, evolutionary biology, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and paleoecology. For instance, many human genes have been subject to recent selective sweeps; humans play an active, constructive role in co-directing their own development and evolution; and experimental evidence often favours a general process, rather than a modular account, of cognition. A redefined EP could use the theoretical insights of modern evolutionary biology as a rich source of hypotheses concerning the human mind, and could exploit novel methods from a variety of adjacent research fields.

The synthetic approach to the study of spatial memory: have we properly addressed Tinbergen's "four questions"?

In 1963, Niko Tinbergen suggested that to truly understand the behavior of an animal, the ultimate causes (e.g., adaptive value, evolutionary history) as well as the proximate mechanisms (e.g., neurobiology, development) that result in the production of the behavior must be understood in an integrated framework. We examine whether the study of spatial memory in food storing birds has adequately addressed Tinbergen's questions and highlight the work of Sara Shettleworth, who has made a tremendous contribution to this area of study, and whom this issue honors. Our conclusion is that while the study of food caching and spatial memory in birds has been a very good model of a program of research that has addressed Tinbergen's questions, additional work remains.

Integrating ecology, psychology and neurobiology within a food-hoarding paradigm

Many animals regularly hoard food for future use, which appears to be an important adaptation to a seasonally and/or unpredictably changing environment. This food-hoarding paradigm is an excellent example of a natural system that has broadly influenced both theoretical and empirical work in the field of biology. The food-hoarding paradigm has played a major role in the conceptual framework of numerous fields from ecology (e.g. plant-animal interactions) and evolution (e.g. the coevolution of caching, spatial memory and the hippocampus) to psychology (e.g. memory and cognition) and neurobiology (e.g. neurogenesis and the neurobiology of learning and memory). Many food-hoarding animals retrieve caches by using spatial memory. This memory-based behavioural system has the inherent advantage of being tractable for study in both the field and laboratory and has been shaped by natural selection, which produces variation with strong fitness consequences in a variety of taxa. Thus, food hoarding is an excellent model for a highly integrative approach to understanding numerous questions across a variety of disciplines. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the complexity of animal cognition such as future planning and episodic-like-memory as well as in the relationship between memory, the environment and the brain. In addition, new breakthroughs in neurobiology have enhanced our ability to address the mechanisms underlying these behaviours. Consequently, the field is necessarily becoming more integrative by assessing behavioural questions in the context of natural ecological systems and by addressing mechanisms through neurobiology and psychology, but, importantly, within an evolutionary and ecological framework. In this issue, we aim to bring together a series of papers providing a modern synthesis of ecology, psychology, physiology and neurobiology and identifying new directions and developments in the use of food-hoarding animals as a model system.

Is bigger always better? A critical appraisal of the use of volumetric analysis in the study of the hippocampus

A well-developed spatial memory is important for many animals, but appears especially important for scatter-hoarding species. Consequently, the scatter-hoarding system provides an excellent paradigm in which to study the integrative aspects of memory use within an ecological and evolutionary framework. One of the main tenets of this paradigm is that selection for enhanced spatial memory for cache locations should specialize the brain areas involved in memory. One such brain area is the hippocampus (Hp). Many studies have examined this adaptive specialization hypothesis, typically relating spatial memory to Hp volume. However, it is unclear how the volume of the Hp is related to its function for spatial memory. Thus, the goal of this article is to evaluate volume as a main measurement of the degree of morphological and physiological adaptation of the Hp as it relates to memory. We will briefly review the evidence for the specialization of memory in food-hoarding animals and discuss the philosophy behind volume as the main currency. We will then examine the problems associated with this approach, attempting to understand the advantages and limitations of using volume and discuss alternatives that might yield more specific hypotheses. Overall, there is strong evidence that the Hp is involved in the specialization of spatial memory in scatter-hoarding animals. However, volume may be only a coarse proxy for more relevant and subtle changes in the structure of the brain underlying changes in behaviour. To better understand the nature of this brain/memory relationship, we suggest focusing on more specific and relevant features of the Hp, such as the number or size of neurons, variation in connectivity depending on dendritic and axonal arborization and the number of synapses. These should generate more specific hypotheses derived from a solid theoretical background and should provide a better understanding of both neural mechanisms of memory and their evolution.

Using ecology to guide the study of cognitive and neural mechanisms of different aspects of spatial memory in food-hoarding animals

Understanding the survival value of behaviour does not tell us how the mechanisms that control this behaviour work. Nevertheless, understanding survival value can guide the study of these mechanisms. In this paper, we apply this principle to understanding the cognitive mechanisms that support cache retrieval in scatter-hoarding animals. We believe it is too simplistic to predict that all scatter-hoarding animals will outperform non-hoarding animals on all tests of spatial memory. Instead, we argue that we should look at the detailed ecology and natural history of each species. This understanding of natural history then allows us to make predictions about which aspects of spatial memory should be better in which species. We use the natural hoarding behaviour of the three best-studied groups of scatter-hoarding animals to make predictions about three aspects of their spatial memory: duration, capacity and spatial resolution, and we test these predictions against the existing literature. Having laid out how ecology and natural history can be used to predict detailed cognitive abilities, we then suggest using this approach to guide the study of the neural basis of these abilities. We believe that this complementary approach will reveal aspects of memory processing that would otherwise be difficult to discover.