What if my colleague was wrong and I was right? The impact of counterfactual mindsets and interpersonal focus on written communication and decision making in a hidden profile task

Past research on counterfactual mindsets (CFMs) has mainly focused on how those influence dealing with own information, without addressing the potential impact of CFMs on responses to others' information. Thus, this study examined how CFMs combined with an interpersonal focus influence responses to others' statements in a decision making context. Results reveal that a CFM combined with an interpersonal focus leads to more biased communication in response to others' information, thereby reinforcing own preferences. No such effect was observed in an intrapersonal focus or a control condition. A congruency between induction and application context thus seems to make the application of CFMs more likely. We discuss our findings in relation to previous work on counterfactual thinking and the mindset literature in general.

Cognitive neuroscience of human counterfactual reasoning

Counterfactual reasoning is a hallmark of human thought, enabling the capacity to shift from perceiving the immediate environment to an alternative, imagined perspective. Mental representations of counterfactual possibilities (e.g., imagined past events or future outcomes not yet at hand) provide the basis for learning from past experience, enable planning and prediction, support creativity and insight, and give rise to emotions and social attributions (e.g., regret and blame). Yet remarkably little is known about the psychological and neural foundations of counterfactual reasoning. In this review, we survey recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicating that counterfactual thought depends on an integrative network of systems for affective processing, mental simulation, and cognitive control. We review evidence to elucidate how these mechanisms are systematically altered through psychiatric illness and neurological disease. We propose that counterfactual thinking depends on the coordination of multiple information processing systems that together enable adaptive behavior and goal-directed decision making and make recommendations for the study of counterfactual inference in health, aging, and disease.

Hindsight Bias

Hindsight bias occurs when people feel that they "knew it all along," that is, when they believe that an event is more predictable after it becomes known than it was before it became known. Hindsight bias embodies any combination of three aspects: memory distortion, beliefs about events' objective likelihoods, or subjective beliefs about one's own prediction abilities. Hindsight bias stems from (a) cognitive inputs (people selectively recall information consistent with what they now know to be true and engage in sensemaking to impose meaning on their own knowledge), (b) metacognitive inputs (the ease with which a past outcome is understood may be misattributed to its assumed prior likelihood), and (c) motivational inputs (people have a need to see the world as orderly and predictable and to avoid being blamed for problems). Consequences of hindsight bias include myopic attention to a single causal understanding of the past (to the neglect of other reasonable explanations) as well as general overconfidence in the certainty of one's judgments. New technologies for visualizing and understanding data sets may have the unintended consequence of heightening hindsight bias, but an intervention that encourages people to consider alternative causal explanations for a given outcome can reduce hindsight bias.

Fairness judgments and counterfactual thinking: pricing goods versus services

Purpose

– This paper aims to propose and empirically document the idea that people’s perceptions of having been treated fairly depend, in part, on whether the explanation provided to them of a product’s pricing is primarily based on the costs of labor (a service) versus materials (goods). Because materials are more fixed and tangible than the effort of labor, it is argued that people will have fewer counterfactual thoughts about how things could have been different with the cost of materials than those associated with labor. This has implications for fairness judgments more generally, as it suggests that people may be uneven in which types of data they attend to when making fairness judgments. Three experiments are presented that empirically test the relationship between the salience of goods versus services in the price paid and the resulting perceptions of fairness. Findings confirm that thoughts of money spent on a service were associated with lesser feelings of fairness than were thoughts of money spent on a good. This research uniquely identifies the mechanism by which some evaluations are considered fairer than others. Implications for organizational processes, such as procedural justice and fair compensation, are discussed.

Design/methodology/approach

– Three experiments are presented that empirically test the relationship between the salience of goods versus services in the price paid, and the resulting perceptions of fairness.

Findings

– Findings confirm that thoughts of money spent on a service were associated with lesser feelings of fairness than were thoughts of money spent on a good.

Originality/value

– This research uniquely identifies the mechanism by which some evaluations are considered fairer than others. Implications for organizational processes, such as procedural justice and fair compensation, are discussed.

Encouraging Children to Think Counterfactually Enhances Blocking in a Causal Learning Task

According to a higher order reasoning account, inferential reasoning processes underpin the widely observed cue competition effect of blocking in causal learning. The inference required for blocking has been described as modus tollens (if p then q, not q therefore not p). Young children are known to have difficulties with this type of inference, but research with adults suggests that this inference is easier if participants think counterfactually. In this study, 100 children (51 five-year-olds and 49 six- to seven-year-olds) were assigned to two types of pretraining groups. The counterfactual group observed demonstrations of cues paired with outcomes and answered questions about what the outcome would have been if the causal status of cues had been different, whereas the factual group answered factual questions about the same demonstrations. Children then completed a causal learning task. Counterfactual pretraining enhanced levels of blocking as well as modus tollens reasoning but only for the younger children. These findings provide new evidence for an important role for inferential reasoning in causal learning.

Hindsight Bias and Causal Attribution

Hindsight bias describes characteristic changes in the perceptions of events or facts once their outcomes are known. This article focuses on one important facet of this, named creeping determinism, denoting enhanced hindsight perceptions of the inevitability of event outcomes. We suggest a systematic link between the literatures on causal attribution and hindsight bias/creeping determinism and introduce a comprehensive causal model theory (CMT) of creeping determinism. We then distinguish between two alternative versions of CMT, which reflect recent debates in the causal attribution literature. These versions assume, respectively, that individuals make causal attributions by means of covariation analysis or via the discovery of some underlying mechanism. In order to contrast these assumptions, we introduce a new hypothesis concerning the magnitude of creeping determinism, based on the conjunction effect in causal attribution, and we present empirical evidence concerning this hypothesis.