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O'Madagain C, Helming KA, Schmidt MFH, Shupe E, Call J, Tomasello M. Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions. Proc Biol Sci 2022; 289:20212686. [PMID: 35317676 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2021.2686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cathal O'Madagain
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Collective Intelligence, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique, Ben Guérir, Morocco
| | - Katharina A Helming
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
| | - Marco F H Schmidt
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany
| | - Eli Shupe
- Department of Philosophy and the Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA
| | - Josep Call
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
| | - Michael Tomasello
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.,Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
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2
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Allritz M, McEwen ES, Call J. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show subtle signs of uncertainty when choices are more difficult. Cognition 2021; 214:104766. [PMID: 34051422 PMCID: PMC8346948 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2020] [Revised: 05/04/2021] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Humans can tell when they find a task difficult. Subtle uncertainty behaviors like changes in motor speed and muscle tension precede and affect these experiences. Theories of animal metacognition likewise stress the importance of endogenous signals of uncertainty as cues that motivate metacognitive behaviors. However, while researchers have investigated second-order behaviors like information seeking and declining difficult trials in nonhuman animals, they have devoted little attention to the behaviors that express the cognitive conflict that gives rise to such behaviors in the first place. Here we explored whether three chimpanzees would, like humans, show hand wavering more when faced with more difficult choices in a touch screen transitive inference task. While accuracy was very high across all conditions, all chimpanzees wavered more frequently in trials that were objectively more difficult, demonstrating a signature behavior which accompanies experiences of difficulty in humans. This lends plausibility to the idea that feelings of uncertainty, like other emotions, can be studied in nonhuman animals. We propose to routinely assess uncertainty behaviors to inform models of procedural metacognition in nonhuman animals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Allritz
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany.
| | - Emma Suvi McEwen
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
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3
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Abstract
Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Adam Bulley
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.,School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.,Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
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4
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Are there Metacognitivists in the Fox Hole? A Preliminary Test of Information Seeking in an Arctic Fox ( Vulpes lagopus). Behav Sci (Basel) 2020; 10:bs10050081. [PMID: 32357527 PMCID: PMC7287701 DOI: 10.3390/bs10050081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2020] [Revised: 04/22/2020] [Accepted: 04/23/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Over the last two decades, evidence has accrued that at least some nonhuman animals possess metacognitive abilities. However, of the carnivores, only domestic dogs have been tested. Although rarely represented in the psychological literature, foxes are good candidates for metacognition given that they cache their food. Two experiments assessed metacognition in one male arctic fox (Vulpes lagopus) for the first time. An information-seeking paradigm was used, in which the subject had the opportunity to discover which compartment was baited before making a choice by looking through a transparent window in the apparatus. In the first experiment, choice accuracy during seen trials was equal to choice accuracy on unseen trials. Importantly, there was no significant difference between the subject's looking behavior on seen versus unseen trials. In the second experiment, with chance probabilities reduced, the subject's choice accuracy on both seen and unseen trials was below chance. The subject did not exhibit looking behavior in any of the trials. Latencies to choose were not influenced by whether he witnessed baiting. Although we did not obtain evidence of metacognition in our tests of a single subject, we maintain that foxes may be good candidates for further tests using similar methodologies to those introduced here.
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5
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Smith JD, Jackson BN, Church BA. The Cognitive Architecture of Uncertainty. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION 2019; 6:236-246. [PMID: 33335976 DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.03.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
| | - Brooke N Jackson
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
| | - Barbara A Church
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.,Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States
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6
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Church BA, Jackson BN, Beran MJ, Smith JD. Simultaneous versus prospective/retrospective uncertainty monitoring: The effect of response competition across cognitive levels. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2019; 45:311-321. [PMID: 31021131 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000207] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Early animal-metacognition researchers singled out simultaneous metacognition paradigms for theoretical criticism, because these paradigms presented concretely rewarded perceptual responses and the metacognitive response simultaneously. This method potentially introduced associative cues into the situation that could confound the interpretation of the metacognitive response. Evaluating this possibility, we compared humans' metacognitive performances in simultaneous and nonsimultaneous (prospective, retrospective) paradigms that were otherwise identical. Results show that the metacognition response in these tasks is not prompted by associative cues arising from the simultaneous task format. To the contrary, the metacognitive response is used more robustly and accurately when it is removed from direct competition with the primary perceptual responses. Thus, early researchers were correct to judge that the nonsimultaneous paradigms tap metacognition more robustly and sensitively. However, this is probably true because the simultaneous paradigm mingles responses adjudicated on two different cognitive-processing levels. And, in that case, the metacognitive response can be outcompeted and suppressed by the salient presence of primary, concretely rewarded perceptual responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Language Research Center
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7
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Abstract
Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans' capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change-in concert-the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 30303-5010, USA.
| | - Barbara A Church
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, 30303-5010, USA
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8
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Smith JD, Boomer J, Church BA, Zakrzewski AC, Beran MJ, Baum ML. I scan, therefore I decline: The time course of difficulty monitoring in humans (homo sapiens) and macaques (macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol 2018; 132:152-165. [PMID: 29658725 PMCID: PMC5945321 DOI: 10.1037/com0000100] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The study of nonhumans' metacognitive judgments about trial difficulty has grown into an important comparative literature. However, the potential for associative-learning confounds in this area has left room for behaviorist interpretations that are strongly asserted and hotly debated. This article considers how researchers may be able to observe animals' strategic cognitive processes more clearly by creating temporally extended problems within which associative cues are not always immediately available. We asked humans and rhesus macaques to commit to completing spatially extended mazes or to decline completing them through a trial-decline response. The mazes could sometimes be completed successfully, but other times had a constriction that blocked completion. A deliberate, systematic scanning process could preevaluate a maze and determine the appropriate response. Latency analyses charted the time course of the evaluative process. Both humans and macaques appeared, from the pattern of their latencies, to scan the mazes through before committing to completing them. Thus monkeys, too, can base trial-decline responses on temporally extended evaluation processes, confirming that those responses have strategic cognitive-processing bases in addition to behavioral-reactive bases. The results also show the value of temporally and spatially extended problems to let researchers study the trajectory of animals' online cognitive processes. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Language Research Center, Georgia State University
| | - Joseph Boomer
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
| | | | | | | | - Michael L Baum
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
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9
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Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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10
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Zakrzewski AC, Church BA, Smith JD. The transfer of category knowledge by macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens). J Comp Psychol 2018; 132:58-74. [PMID: 29239647 PMCID: PMC5814353 DOI: 10.1037/com0000095] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive psychologists distinguish implicit, procedural category learning (stimulus-response associations learned outside declarative cognition) from explicit-declarative category learning (conscious category rules). These systems are dissociated by category learning tasks with either a multidimensional, information-integration (II) solution or a unidimensional, rule-based (RB) solution. In the present experiments, humans and two monkeys learned II and RB category tasks fostering implicit and explicit learning, respectively. Then they received occasional transfer trials-never directly reinforced-drawn from untrained regions of the stimulus space. We hypothesized that implicit-procedural category learning-allied to associative learning-would transfer weakly because it is yoked to the training stimuli. This result was confirmed for humans and monkeys. We hypothesized that explicit category learning-allied to abstract category rules-would transfer robustly. This result was confirmed only for humans. That is, humans displayed explicit category knowledge that transferred flawlessly. Monkeys did not. This result illuminates the distinctive abstractness, stimulus independence, and representational portability of humans' explicit category rules. (PsycINFO Database Record
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11
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Ferrigno S, Kornell N, Cantlon JF. A metacognitive illusion in monkeys. Proc Biol Sci 2017; 284:20171541. [PMID: 28878068 PMCID: PMC5597844 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2017.1541] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2017] [Accepted: 07/31/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Like humans, monkeys can make accurate judgements about their own memory by reporting their confidence during cognitive tasks. Some have suggested that animals use associative learning to make accurate confidence judgements, while others have suggested animals directly access and estimate the strength of their memories. Here we test a third, non-exclusive possibility: perhaps monkeys, like humans, base metacognitive inferences on heuristic cues. Humans are known to use cues like perceptual fluency (e.g. how easy something is to see) when making metacognitive judgements. We tested monkeys using a match-to-sample task in which the perceptual fluency of the stimuli was manipulated. The monkeys made confidence wagers on their accuracy before or after each trial. We found that monkeys' wagers were affected by perceptual fluency even when their accuracy was not. This is novel evidence that animals are susceptible to metacognitive illusions similar to those experienced by humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen Ferrigno
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
| | - Nate Kornell
- Department of Psychology, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, USA
| | - Jessica F Cantlon
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
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12
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Checking behavior in rhesus monkeys is related to anxiety and frontal activity. Sci Rep 2017; 7:45267. [PMID: 28349919 PMCID: PMC5368664 DOI: 10.1038/srep45267] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2016] [Accepted: 02/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
When facing doubt, humans can go back over a performed action in order to optimize subsequent performance. The present study aimed to establish and characterize physiological doubt and checking behavior in non-human primates (NHP). We trained two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a newly designed “Check-or-Go” task that allows the animal to repeatedly check and change the availability of a reward before making the final decision towards obtaining that reward. By manipulating the ambiguity of a visual cue in which the reward status is embedded, we successfully modulated animal certainty and created doubt that led the animals to check. This voluntary checking behavior was further characterized by making EEG recordings and measuring correlated changes in salivary cortisol. Our data show that monkeys have the metacognitive ability to express voluntary checking behavior similar to that observed in humans, which depends on uncertainty monitoring, relates to anxiety and involves brain frontal areas.
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13
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Insabato A, Pannunzi M, Deco G. Multiple Choice Neurodynamical Model of the Uncertain Option Task. PLoS Comput Biol 2017; 13:e1005250. [PMID: 28076355 PMCID: PMC5226718 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005250] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2016] [Accepted: 11/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The uncertain option task has been recently adopted to investigate the neural systems underlying the decision confidence. Latterly single neurons activity has been recorded in lateral intraparietal cortex of monkeys performing an uncertain option task, where the subject is allowed to opt for a small but sure reward instead of making a risky perceptual decision. We propose a multiple choice model implemented in a discrete attractors network. This model is able to reproduce both behavioral and neurophysiological experimental data and therefore provides support to the numerous perspectives that interpret the uncertain option task as a sensory-motor association. The model explains the behavioral and neural data recorded in monkeys as the result of the multistable attractor landscape and produces several testable predictions. One of these predictions may help distinguish our model from a recently proposed continuous attractor model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Insabato
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Center for Brain and Cognition, Barcelona, Spain
- * E-mail:
| | - Mario Pannunzi
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Center for Brain and Cognition, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Gustavo Deco
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Center for Brain and Cognition, Barcelona, Spain
- Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain
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14
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The interplay between uncertainty monitoring and working memory: Can metacognition become automatic? Mem Cognit 2016; 43:990-1006. [PMID: 25971878 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-015-0527-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The uncertainty response has grounded the study of metacognition in nonhuman animals. Recent research has explored the processes supporting uncertainty monitoring in monkeys. It has revealed that uncertainty responding, in contrast to perceptual responding, depends on significant working memory resources. The aim of the present study was to expand this research by examining whether uncertainty monitoring is also working memory demanding in humans. To explore this issue, human participants were tested with or without a cognitive load on a psychophysical discrimination task that included either an uncertainty response (allowing the participant to decline difficult trials) or a middle-perceptual response (labeling the same intermediate trial levels). The results demonstrated that cognitive load reduced uncertainty responding, but increased middle responding. However, this dissociation between uncertainty and middle responding was only observed when participants either lacked training or had very little training with the uncertainty response. If more training was provided, the effect of load was small. These results suggest that uncertainty responding is resource demanding, but with sufficient training, human participants can respond to uncertainty either by using minimal working memory resources or by effectively sharing resources. These results are discussed in relation to the literature on animal and human metacognition.
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15
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Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. An assessment of domain-general metacognitive responding in rhesus monkeys. Behav Processes 2016; 135:132-144. [PMID: 27939856 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2016.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2016] [Revised: 10/25/2016] [Accepted: 12/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control one's cognition. Monitoring may involve either public cues or introspection of private cognitive states. We tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a series of generalization tests to determine which type of cues control metacognition. In Experiment 1, monkeys learned a perceptual discrimination in which a "decline-test" response allowed them to avoid tests and receive a guaranteed small reward. Monkeys declined more difficult than easy tests. In Experiments 2-4, we evaluated whether monkeys generalized this metacognitive responding to new perceptual tests. Monkeys showed a trend toward generalization in Experiments 2 & 3, and reliable generalization in Experiment 4. In Experiments 5 & 6, we presented the decline-test response in a delayed matching-to-sample task. Memory tests differed from perceptual tests in that the appearance of the test display could not control metacognitive responding. In Experiment 6, monkeys made prospective metamemory judgments before seeing the tests. Generalization across perceptual tests with different visual properties and mixed generalization from perceptual to memory tests provide provisional evidence that domain-general, private cues controlled metacognition in some monkeys. We observed individual differences in generalization, suggesting that monkeys differ in use of public and private metacognitive cues.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emily Kathryn Brown
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
| | | | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
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16
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Suchow JW, Fougnie D, Alvarez GA. Looking inward and back: Real-time monitoring of visual working memories. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 2016; 43:660-668. [PMID: 27685022 DOI: 10.1037/xlm0000320] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Confidence in our memories is influenced by many factors, including beliefs about the perceptibility or memorability of certain kinds of objects and events, as well as knowledge about our skill sets, habits, and experiences. Notoriously, our knowledge and beliefs about memory can lead us astray, causing us to be overly confident in eyewitness testimony or to overestimate the frequency of recent experiences. Here, using visual working memory as a case study, we stripped away all these potentially misleading cues, requiring observers to make confidence judgments by directly assessing the quality of their memory representations. We show that individuals can monitor the status of information in working memory as it degrades over time. Our findings suggest that people have access to information reflecting the existence and quality of their working memories, and furthermore, that they can use this information to guide their behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record
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17
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Rosati AG, Santos LR. Spontaneous Metacognition in Rhesus Monkeys. Psychol Sci 2016; 27:1181-91. [PMID: 27388917 DOI: 10.1177/0956797616653737] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2015] [Accepted: 05/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to think about thinking. Although monitoring and controlling one's knowledge is a key feature of human cognition, its evolutionary origins are debated. In the current study, we examined whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; N = 120) could make metacognitive inferences in a one-shot decision. Each monkey experienced one of four conditions, observing a human appearing to hide a food reward in an apparatus consisting of either one or two tubes. The monkeys tended to search the correct location when they observed this baiting event, but engaged in information seeking-by peering into a center location where they could check both potential hiding spots-if their view had been occluded and information seeking was possible. The monkeys only occasionally approached the center when information seeking was not possible. These results show that monkeys spontaneously use information about their own knowledge states to solve naturalistic foraging problems, and thus provide the first evidence that nonhumans exhibit information-seeking responses in situations with which they have no prior experience.
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18
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Czaczkes TJ, Weichselgartner T, Bernadou A, Heinze J. The Effect of Trail Pheromone and Path Confinement on Learning of Complex Routes in the Ant Lasius niger. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0149720. [PMID: 26959996 PMCID: PMC4784821 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0149720] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/28/2015] [Accepted: 01/25/2016] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Route learning is key to the survival of many central place foragers, such as bees and many ants. For ants which lay pheromone trails, the presence of a trail may act as an important source of information about whether an error has been made. The presence of trail pheromone has been demonstrated to support route learning, and the effect of pheromones on route choice have been reported to persist even after the pheromones have been removed. This could be explained in two ways: the pheromone may constrain the ants onto the correct route, thus preventing errors and aiding learning. Alternatively, the pheromones may act as a ‘reassurance’, signalling that the learner is on the right path and that learning the path is worthwhile. Here, we disentangle pheromone presence from route confinement in order to test these hypotheses, using the ant Lasius niger as a model. Unexpectedly, we did not find any evidence that pheromones support route learning. Indeed, there was no evidence that ants confined to the correct route learned at all. Thus, while we cannot support the ‘reassurance’ hypothesis, we can rule out the ‘confinement’ hypothesis. Other findings, such as a reduction in pheromone deposition in the presence of trail pheromones, are remarkably consistent with previous experiments. As previously reported, ants which make errors on their outward journey upregulate pheromone deposition on their return. Surprisingly, ants which would go on to make an error down-regulate pheromone deposition on their outward journey, hinting at a capacity for ants to gauge the quality of their own memories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tomer J. Czaczkes
- Fakultät für Biologie und Vorklinische Medizin, LS Zoologie / Evolutionsbiologie, Universität Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
- * E-mail:
| | - Tobias Weichselgartner
- Fakultät für Biologie und Vorklinische Medizin, LS Zoologie / Evolutionsbiologie, Universität Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Abel Bernadou
- Fakultät für Biologie und Vorklinische Medizin, LS Zoologie / Evolutionsbiologie, Universität Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Jürgen Heinze
- Fakultät für Biologie und Vorklinische Medizin, LS Zoologie / Evolutionsbiologie, Universität Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Church BA, Smith JD. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2016; 42:32-43. [PMID: 26551351 PMCID: PMC4710549 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.
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Tu HW, Pani AA, Hampton RR. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) adaptively adjust information seeking in response to information accumulated. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2015; 129:347-55. [PMID: 26280597 DOI: 10.1037/a0039595] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition consists of monitoring and control processes. Monitoring has been inferred when nonhumans use a "decline test" response to selectively escape difficult test trials. Cognitive control has been inferred from selective information-seeking behavior by nonhumans ignorant of needed knowledge. Here we describe a computerized paradigm that extends previous work and assesses dynamic interactions between monitoring and control. Monkeys classified images as containing birds, fish, flowers, or people. To-be-classified images were initially masked, and monkeys were trained to gradually reveal the images by touching a "reveal button." Monkeys could choose to classify images at any time or to reveal more of the images. Thus, they had the opportunity to assess when enough of an image had been revealed to support accurate classification. In Experiment 1, monkeys made more reveal responses before classifying when smaller amounts of the image were revealed by each button touch. In Experiment 2, to-be-classified images were shrunk and covered by 1 critical blocker among other blockers that did not provide information when removed. Monkeys made more reveal responses as the critical blocker was removed later in the trial. In Experiment 3, monkeys were presented with previously classified images with either more or fewer blockers obscuring the image than was the case when they chose to classify that image previously. Monkeys made more reveal responses when information was insufficient than when it was excessive. These results indicate that monkeys dynamically monitor evolving decision processes and adaptively collect information as necessary to maintain accuracy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hsiao-Wei Tu
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
| | - Alex A Pani
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
| | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Futch SE, Smith JD, Evans TA, Parrish AE. Go when you know: Chimpanzees' confidence movements reflect their responses in a computerized memory task. Cognition 2015; 142:236-46. [PMID: 26057831 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/23/2014] [Revised: 04/14/2015] [Accepted: 05/26/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States.
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, United States
| | - Sara E Futch
- Department of Psychology, Wofford College, United States
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, United States
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, United States
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States
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22
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Basile BM, Schroeder GR, Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. Evaluation of seven hypotheses for metamemory performance in rhesus monkeys. J Exp Psychol Gen 2015; 144:85-102. [PMID: 25365530 PMCID: PMC4308511 DOI: 10.1037/xge0000031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Knowing the extent to which nonhumans and humans share mechanisms for metacognition will advance our understanding of cognitive evolution and will improve selection of model systems for biomedical research. Some nonhuman species avoid difficult cognitive tests, seek information when ignorant, or otherwise behave in ways consistent with metacognition. There is agreement that some nonhuman animals "succeed" in these metacognitive tasks, but little consensus about the cognitive mechanisms underlying performance. In one paradigm, rhesus monkeys visually searched for hidden food when ignorant of the location of the food, but acted immediately when knowledgeable. This result has been interpreted as evidence that monkeys introspectively monitored their memory to adaptively control information seeking. However, convincing alternative hypotheses have been advanced that might also account for the adaptive pattern of visual searching. We evaluated seven hypotheses using a computerized task in which monkeys chose either to take memory tests immediately or to see the answer again before proceeding to the test. We found no evidence to support the hypotheses of behavioral cue association, rote response learning, expectancy violation, response competition, generalized search strategy, or postural mediation. In contrast, we repeatedly found evidence to support the memory monitoring hypothesis. Monkeys chose to see the answer when memory was poor, either from natural variation or experimental manipulation. We found limited evidence that monkeys also monitored the fluency of memory access. Overall, the evidence indicates that rhesus monkeys can use memory strength as a discriminative cue for information seeking, consistent with introspective monitoring of explicit memory.
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Abstract
Metacognition, the monitoring of one's own mental states, is a fundamental aspect of human intellect. Despite tests in nonhuman animals suggestive of uncertainty monitoring, some authors interpret these results solely in terms of primitive psychological mechanisms and reinforcement regimes, where "reinforcement" is invariably considered to be the delivery and consumption of earned food rewards. Surprisingly, few studies have detailed the trial-by-trial behaviour of animals engaged in such tasks. Here we report ethology-based observations on a rhesus monkey completing sparse-dense discrimination problems, and given the option of escaping trials (i.e., responding "uncertain") at its own choosing. Uncertainty responses were generally made on trials of high objective difficulty, and were characterized by long latencies before beginning visible trials, long times taken for response, and, even after controlling for difficulty, high degrees of wavering during response. Incorrect responses were also common in trials of high objective difficulty, but were characterized by low degrees of wavering. This speaks to the likely adaptive nature of "hesitation," and is inconsistent with models which argue or predict implicit, inflexible information-seeking or "alternative option" behaviours whenever challenging problems present themselves, Confounding models which suggest that nonhuman behaviour in metacognition tasks is driven solely by food delivery/consumption, the monkey was also observed allowing pellets to accumulate and consuming them during and after trials of all response/outcome categories (i.e., whether correct, incorrect, or escaped). This study thus bolsters previous findings that rhesus monkey behaviour in metacognition tasks is in some respects disassociated from mere food delivery/consumption, or even the avoidance of punishment. These and other observations fit well with the evolutionary status and natural proclivities of rhesus monkeys, but weaken arguments that responses in such tests are solely associated with associative mechanisms, and instead suggest more derived and controlled cognitive processing. The latter interpretation appears particularly parsimonious given the neurological adaptations of primates, as well as their highly flexible social and ecological behaviour.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ken Sayers
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - Emilie Menzel
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, the State University of New York, 346 Park Hall, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA
| | - Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
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Davies AC, Nicol CJ, Persson ME, Radford AN. Behavioural and physiological effects of finely balanced decision-making in chickens. PLoS One 2014; 9:e108809. [PMID: 25275440 PMCID: PMC4183509 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108809] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2014] [Accepted: 08/25/2014] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
In humans, more difficult decisions result in behavioural and physiological changes suggestive of increased arousal, but little is known about the effect of decision difficulty in other species. A difficult decision can have a number of characteristics; we aimed to monitor how finely balanced decisions, compared to unbalanced ones, affected the behaviour and physiology of chickens. An unbalanced decision was one in which the two options were of unequal net value (1 (Q1) vs. 6 (Q6) pieces of sweetcorn with no cost associated with either option); a finely balanced decision was one in which the options were of equal net value (i.e. hens were "indifferent" to both options). To identify hens' indifference, a titration procedure was used in which a cost (electromagnetic weight on an access door) was applied to the Q6 option, to find the individual point at which hens chose this option approximately equally to Q1 via a non-weighted door. We then compared behavioural and physiological indicators of arousal (head movements, latency to choose, heart-rate variability and surface body temperature) when chickens made decisions that were unbalanced or finely balanced. Significant physiological (heart-rate variability) and behavioural (latency to pen) differences were found between the finely balanced and balanced conditions, but these were likely to be artefacts of the greater time and effort required to push through the weighted doors. No other behavioural and physiological measures were significantly different between the decision categories. We suggest that more information is needed on when best to monitor likely changes in arousal during decision-making and that future studies should consider decisions defined as difficult in other ways.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna C Davies
- School of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
| | - Christine J Nicol
- School of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
| | - Mia E Persson
- Avian Behavioural Genomics and Physiology Group, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Andrew N Radford
- School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
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25
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Kuroda T, Lattal KA, García-Penagos A. An Analysis of an Autoclitic Analogue in Pigeons. Anal Verbal Behav 2014; 30:89-99. [PMID: 27525216 DOI: 10.1007/s40616-014-0019-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Using a conditional discrimination procedure, pigeons were exposed to a nonverbal analogue of qualifying autoclitics such as definitely and maybe. It has been suggested that these autoclitics are similar to tacts except that they are under the control of private discriminative stimuli. Instead of the conventional assumption of privacy, which precludes direct manipulation of the controlling variable, the autoclitic was here identified as a response that is jointly determined by its function as a modifier for the consequence of the tact and by some variable that modifies stimulus control of the tact. Following this modified conceptualization, a novel conditional discrimination procedure was developed as an analogue for establishing autoclitic-like behavior in pigeons. Under some conditions, autoclitic-like behavior was established. Methodological challenges in developing an autoclitic analogue in nonhumans are discussed, followed by a consideration of the implications of such analogues for the understanding of verbal and, more broadly, human behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Toshikazu Kuroda
- Faculty of Humanities, Aichi Bunkyo University, Komaki, Aichi 485-8565 Japan
| | - Kennon A Lattal
- Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506-6040 USA
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Smith JD. What are my chances? Closing the gap in uncertainty monitoring between rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2014; 40:303-16. [PMID: 25368870 PMCID: PMC4215522 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Previous studies have indicated that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) but not capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) respond to difficult or ambiguous situations by choosing not to respond or by seeking more information. Here we assessed whether a task with very low chance accuracy could diminish this species difference, presumably indicating that capuchins—compared to macaques—are less risk averse as opposed to less sensitive to signals of uncertainty. Monkeys searched for the largest of 6 stimuli on a computer screen. Trial difficulty was varied, and monkeys could choose to opt out of any trial. All rhesus monkeys, including some with no prior use of the uncertainty response, selectively avoided the most difficult trials. The majority of capuchins sometimes made uncertainty responses, but at lower rates than rhesus monkeys. Nonetheless, the presence of some adaptive uncertainty responding suggests that capuchins also experience uncertainty and can respond to it, though with less proficiency than macaque monkeys.
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Abstract
Human decision-making strategies are strongly influenced by an awareness of certainty or uncertainty (a form of metacognition) to increase the chances of making a right choice. Humans seek more information and defer choosing when they realize they have insufficient information to make an accurate decision, but whether animals are aware of uncertainty is currently highly contentious. To explore this issue, we examined how honey bees (Apis mellifera) responded to a visual discrimination task that varied in difficulty between trials. Free-flying bees were rewarded for a correct choice, punished for an incorrect choice, or could avoid choosing by exiting the trial (opting out). Bees opted out more often on difficult trials, and opting out improved their proportion of successful trials. Bees could also transfer the concept of opting out to a novel task. Our data show that bees selectively avoid difficult tasks they lack the information to solve. This finding has been considered as evidence that nonhuman animals can assess the certainty of a predicted outcome, and bees' performance was comparable to that of primates in a similar paradigm. We discuss whether these behavioral results prove bees react to uncertainty or whether associative mechanisms can explain such findings. To better frame metacognition as an issue for neurobiological investigation, we propose a neurobiological hypothesis of uncertainty monitoring based on the known circuitry of the honey bee brain.
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Morgan G, Kornell N, Kornblum T, Terrace HS. Retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Anim Cogn 2013; 17:249-57. [PMID: 23812677 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-013-0657-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2011] [Revised: 05/20/2013] [Accepted: 06/17/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
A growing body of research suggests that some non-human animals are capable of making accurate metacognitive judgments. In previous studies, non-human animals have made either retrospective or prospective judgments (about how they did on a test or how they will do on a test, respectively). These two types of judgments are dissociable in humans. The current study tested the abilities of two rhesus macaque monkeys to make both retrospective and prospective judgments about their performance on the same memory task. Both monkeys had been trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments. Both monkeys successfully demonstrated transfer of retrospective metacognitive judgments to the new memory task. Furthermore, both monkeys transferred their retrospective judgments to the prospective task (one, immediately, and one, following the elimination of a response bias). This study is the first to demonstrate both retrospective and prospective monitoring abilities in the same monkeys and on the same task, suggesting a greater level of flexibility in animals' metacognitive monitoring abilities than has been reported previously.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gin Morgan
- Department of Psychology, New Mexico State University, P.O. Box 30001, Las Cruces, NM, 88003, USA,
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29
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Smith JD, Coutinho MVC, Church BA, Beran MJ. Executive-attentional uncertainty responses by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Gen 2013; 142:458-75. [PMID: 22889164 PMCID: PMC3609932 DOI: 10.1037/a0029601] [Citation(s) in RCA: 98] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The uncertainty response has been influential in studies of human perception, and it is crucial in the growing research literature that explores animal metacognition. However, the uncertainty response's interpretation is still sharply debated. The authors sought to clarify this interpretation using the dissociative technique of cognitive loads imposed on ongoing discrimination performance. Four macaques (Macaca mulatta) performed a sparse-dense discrimination within which an uncertainty response let them decline difficult trials or a middle response let them identify middle stimuli. Concurrent memory tasks were occasionally overlain on ongoing discrimination performance. The concurrent tasks disrupted macaques' uncertainty responses far more than their sparse, middle, or dense discrimination responses. This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response is a higher level decisional response that is particularly dependent on working memory and attentional resources. This is consistent with the theoretical possibility that the uncertainty response is an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty monitoring or metacognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA.
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30
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Beran MJ, Smith JD, Perdue BM. Language-trained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) name what they have seen but look first at what they have not seen. Psychol Sci 2013; 24:660-6. [PMID: 23508741 DOI: 10.1177/0956797612458936] [Citation(s) in RCA: 53] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition can be defined as knowing what one knows, and the question of whether nonhuman animals are metacognitive has driven an intense debate. We tested 3 language-trained chimpanzees in an information-seeking task in which the identity of a food item was the critical piece of information needed to obtain the food. The chimpanzees could either report the identity of the food immediately or first check a container in which the food had been hidden. In two experiments, the chimpanzees were significantly more likely to visit the container first on trials in which they could not know its contents but were more likely to just name the food item without looking into the container on trials in which they had seen its contents. Thus, chimpanzees showed efficient information-seeking behavior that suggested they knew what they had or had not already seen when it was time to name a hidden item.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University. Atlanta, GA 30302, USA.
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31
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Smith JD, Berg ME, Cook RG, Murphy MS, Crossley MJ, Boomer J, Spiering B, Beran MJ, Church BA, Ashby FG, Grace RC. Implicit and explicit categorization: a tale of four species. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2012; 36:2355-69. [PMID: 22981878 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.09.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 78] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2012] [Revised: 08/09/2012] [Accepted: 09/04/2012] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Categorization is essential for survival, and it is a widely studied cognitive adaptation in humans and animals. An influential neuroscience perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based categorization system from an implicit system that slowly associates response outputs to different regions of perceptual space. This perspective is being extended to study categorization in other vertebrate species, using category tasks that have a one-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans, macaques, and capuchin monkeys strongly dimensionalize perceptual stimuli and learn rule-based tasks more quickly. In sharp contrast, pigeons learn these two tasks equally quickly. Pigeons represent a cognitive system in which the commitment to dimensional analysis and category rules was not strongly made. Their results may reveal the character of the ancestral vertebrate categorization system from which that of primates emerged. The primate results establish continuity with human cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates share aspects of humans' capacity for explicit cognition. The emergence of dimensional analysis and rule learning could have been an important step in primates' cognitive evolution.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA.
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Smith JD, Couchman JJ, Beran MJ. The highs and lows of theoretical interpretation in animal-metacognition research. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2012; 367:1297-309. [PMID: 22492748 PMCID: PMC3318761 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0366] [Citation(s) in RCA: 63] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether animals share this cognitive capacity, and thus animal metacognition has become an influential research area within comparative psychology. Researchers have explored this question by testing many species using perception and memory paradigms. There is an emerging consensus that animals share functional parallels with humans' conscious metacognition. Of course, this research area poses difficult issues of scientific inference. How firmly should we hold the line in insisting that animals' performances are low-level and associative? How high should we set the bar for concluding that animals share metacognitive capacities with humans? This area offers a constructive case study for considering theoretical problems that often confront comparative psychologists. The authors present this case study and address diverse issues of scientific judgement and interpretation within comparative psychology.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, The University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260-4110, USA.
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Couchman JJ, Beran MJ, Coutinho MVC, Boomer J, Zakrzewski A, Church B, Smith JD. Do actions speak louder than words? A comparative perspective on implicit versus explicit meta-cognition and theory of mind. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2012; 30:210-21. [PMID: 22429042 PMCID: PMC3533493 DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02065.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Research in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they know and when they do not know. In contrast, animals have generally not shown robust theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. Comparative research uses methods that are non-verbal, and thus might easily be labelled 'implicit' using the terminology of traditional human cognition. However, comparative psychology has developed several non-verbal methods that are designed to test for aspects of meta-cognition that - while perhaps not fully explicit - go beyond the merely implicit or associative. We believe similar methods might be useful to developmental researchers who work with young children, and may provide a sound empirical alternative to verbal reports. Comparative psychology has moved away from all-or-none categorical labels (e.g., 'implicit' vs. 'explicit') towards a theoretical framework that contains a spectrum of mental abilities ranging from implicit to explicit, and from associative to cognitive to fully conscious. We discuss how this same framework might be applied to developmental psychology when it comes to implicit versus explicit processing and ToM.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justin J Couchman
- Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Fredonia, Fredonia, New York, USA.
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34
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Templer VL, Hampton RR. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) show robust evidence for memory awareness across multiple generalization tests. Anim Cogn 2011; 15:409-19. [PMID: 22183204 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-011-0468-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2011] [Revised: 10/20/2011] [Accepted: 12/05/2011] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The possibility that memory awareness occurs in nonhuman animals has been evaluated by providing opportunity to decline memory tests. Current evidence suggests that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) selectively decline tests when memory is weak (Hampton in Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98:5359-5362, 2001; Smith et al. in Behav Brain Sci 26:317-374, 2003). However, much of the existing research in nonhuman metacognition is subject to the criticism that, after considerable training on one test type, subjects learn to decline difficult trials based on associative learning of external test-specific contingencies rather than by evaluating the private status of memory or other cognitive states. We evaluated whether such test-specific associations could account for performance by presenting monkeys with a series of generalization tests across which no single association with external stimuli was likely to adaptively control use of the decline response. Six monkeys performed a four alternative delayed matching to location task and were significantly more accurate on trials with a decline option available than on trials without it, indicating that subjects selectively declined tests when memory was weak. Monkeys transferred appropriate use of the decline response under three conditions that assessed generalization: two tests that weakened memory and one test that enhanced memory in a novel way. Bidirectional generalization indicates that use of the decline response by monkeys is not controlled by specific external stimuli but is rather a flexible behavior based on a private assessment of memory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Emory University, 36 Eagle Row, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
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Abstract
The human response to uncertainty has been well studied in tasks requiring attention and declarative memory systems. However, uncertainty monitoring and control have not been studied in multi-dimensional, information-integration categorization tasks that rely on non-declarative procedural memory. Three experiments are described that investigated the human uncertainty response in such tasks. Experiment 1 showed that following standard categorization training, uncertainty responding was similar in information-integration tasks and rule-based tasks requiring declarative memory. In Experiment 2, however, uncertainty responding in untrained information-integration tasks impaired the ability of many participants to master those tasks. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that the deficit observed in Experiment 2 was not because of the uncertainty response option per se, but rather because the uncertainty response provided participants a mechanism via which to eliminate stimuli that were inconsistent with a simple declarative response strategy. These results are considered in the light of recent models of category learning and metacognition.
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Abstract
Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have shown the ability to monitor their own mental states, but fail the mirror self-recognition test. In humans, the sense of self-agency is closely related to self-awareness, and results from monitoring the relationship between intentional, sensorimotor and perceptual information. Humans and rhesus monkeys were trained to move a computer icon with a joystick while a distractor icon partially matched their movements. Both humans and monkeys were able to monitor and identify the icon they were controlling, suggesting they have some understanding of self-agency.
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Middlebrooks PG, Sommer MA. Metacognition in monkeys during an oculomotor task. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 2011; 37:325-37. [PMID: 21171807 DOI: 10.1037/a0021611] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
This study investigated whether rhesus monkeys show evidence of metacognition in a reduced, visual oculomotor task that is particularly suitable for use in fMRI and electrophysiology. The 2-stage task involved punctate visual stimulation and saccadic eye movement responses. In each trial, monkeys made a decision and then made a bet. To earn maximum reward, they had to monitor their decision and use that information to bet advantageously. Two monkeys learned to base their bets on their decisions within a few weeks. We implemented an operational definition of metacognitive behavior that relied on trial-by-trial analyses and signal detection theory. Both monkeys exhibited metacognition according to these quantitative criteria. Neither external visual cues nor potential reaction time cues explained the betting behavior; the animals seemed to rely exclusively on internal traces of their decisions. We documented the learning process of one monkey. During a 10-session transition phase, betting switched from random to a decision-based strategy. The results reinforce previous findings of metacognitive ability in monkeys and may facilitate the neurophysiological investigation of metacognitive functions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul G Middlebrooks
- Department of Neuroscience, Center for Neuroscience, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
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Beran MJ, Smith JD, Coutinho MVC, Couchman JJ, Boomer J. The psychological organization of "uncertainty" responses and "middle" responses: a dissociation in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR PROCESSES 2009; 35:371-81. [PMID: 19594282 PMCID: PMC3901429 DOI: 10.1037/a0014626] [Citation(s) in RCA: 56] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Some studies of nonhuman animals' metacognitive capacity encourage competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of trial-decline responses by animals in uncertainty-monitoring tasks. To evaluate the force of these behavioral descriptions, the authors presented 6 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) with 2 density discrimination tasks between sparse and dense stimuli. In one task, difficult trials with stimuli near the middle of the density continuum could be declined through an "uncertainty" response. In the other task, making a "middle" response to the same stimuli was rewarded. In Experiment 1, capuchins essentially did not use the uncertainty response, but they did use the middle response. In Experiment 2, the authors replicated this result with 5 of 6 monkeys while equating the overall pace and reinforcement structure of the 2 tasks, although 1 monkey also showed appropriate use of the uncertainty response. These results challenge a purely associative interpretation of some uncertainty-monitoring performances by monkeys while sharpening the theoretical question concerning the nature of the psychological signal that occasions uncertainty responses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.
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Hampton RR. Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging evidence or multiple mechanisms? COMPARATIVE COGNITION & BEHAVIOR REVIEWS 2009; 4:17-28. [PMID: 20046911 PMCID: PMC2748335 DOI: 10.3819/ccbr.2009.40002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 108] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or "gamble" more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition.
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Trimmer PC, Houston AI, Marshall JAR, Bogacz R, Paul ES, Mendl MT, McNamara JM. Mammalian choices: combining fast-but-inaccurate and slow-but-accurate decision-making systems. Proc Biol Sci 2008; 275:2353-61. [PMID: 18611852 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2008.0417] [Citation(s) in RCA: 84] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Empirical findings suggest that the mammalian brain has two decision-making systems that act at different speeds. We represent the faster system using standard signal detection theory. We represent the slower (but more accurate) cortical system as the integration of sensory evidence over time until a certain level of confidence is reached. We then consider how two such systems should be combined optimally for a range of information linkage mechanisms. We conclude with some performance predictions that will hold if our representation is realistic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pete C Trimmer
- Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB, UK.
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Smith JD, Beran MJ, Couchman JJ, Coutinho MVC. The comparative study of metacognition: sharper paradigms, safer inferences. Psychon Bull Rev 2008; 15:679-91. [PMID: 18792496 PMCID: PMC4607312 DOI: 10.3758/pbr.15.4.679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 94] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Results that point to animals' metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden, given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. In this article, formal models are used to evaluate the force of these descriptions. One example is that many existing studies have directly rewarded so-called uncertainty responses. Modeling confirms that this practice is an interpretative danger because it supports associative processes and encourages simpler interpretations. Another example is that existing studies raise the concern that animals avoid difficult stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored, but because of aversion given error-causing or reinforcement-lean stimuli. Modeling also justifies this concern and shows that this problem is not addressed by the common practice of comparing performance on chosen and forced trials. The models and related discussion have utility for metacognition researchers and theorists broadly, because they specify the experimental operations that will best indicate a metacognitive capacity in humans or animals by eliminating alternative behavioral accounts.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, State University of New York, Buffalo, New York 14260, USA.
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