People focus on optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios while predicting task completion times

The Best-Case Heuristic: Relative Optimism in Relationships, Politics, and a Global Health Pandemic

In four experiments covering three different life domains, participants made future predictions in what they considered the most realistic scenario, an optimistic best-case scenario, or a pessimistic worst-case scenario (N = 2,900 Americans). Consistent with a best-case heuristic, participants made "realistic" predictions that were much closer to their best-case scenario than to their worst-case scenario. We found the same best-case asymmetry in health-related predictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, for romantic relationships, and a future presidential election. In a fully between-subject design (Experiment 4), realistic and best-case predictions were practically identical, and they were naturally made faster than the worst-case predictions. At least in the current study domains, the findings suggest that people generate "realistic" predictions by leaning toward their best-case scenario and largely ignoring their worst-case scenario. Although political conservatism was correlated with lower covid-related risk perception and lower support of early public-health interventions, the best-case prediction heuristic was ideologically symmetric.

Do Risky Scenarios Affect Forecasts of Savings and Expenses?

Many people do not possess the necessary savings to deal with unexpected financial events. People’s biases play a significant role in their ability to forecast future financial shocks: they are typically overoptimistic, present-oriented, and generally underestimate future expenses. The purpose of this study is to investigate how varying risk information influences people’s financial awareness, in order to reduce the chance of a financial downfall. Specifically, we contribute to the literature by exploring the concept of ‘nudging’ and its value for behavioural changes in personal financial management. While of great practical importance, the role of nudging in behavioural financial forecasting research is scarce. Additionally, the study steers away from the standard default choice architecture nudge, and adds originality by focusing on eliciting implementation intentions and precommitment strategies as types of nudges. Our experimental scenarios examined how people change their financial projections in response to nudges in the form of new information on relevant risks. Participants were asked to forecast future expenses and future savings. They then received information on potential events identified as high-risk, low-risk or no-risk. We investigated whether they adjusted their predictions in response to various risk scenarios or not and how such potential adjustments were affected by the information given. Our findings suggest that the provision of risk information alters financial forecasting behaviour. Notably, we found an adjustment effect even in the no-risk category, suggesting that governments and institutions concerned with financial behaviour can increase financial awareness merely by increasing salience about possible financial risks. Another practical implication relates to splitting savings into different categories, and by using different wordings: A financial advisory institution can help people in their financial behaviour by focusing on ‘targets’, and by encouraging (nudging) people to make breakdown forecasts rather than general ones.

Top Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview

Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. This article identifies the 10 most important behavioral biases for project management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is half the story; political bias the other half. Second, we list the top 10 behavioral biases in project management: (1) strategic misrepresentation, (2) optimism bias, (3) uniqueness bias, (4) the planning fallacy, (5) overconfidence bias, (6) hindsight bias, (7) availability bias, (8) the base rate fallacy, (9) anchoring, and (10) escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined, and its impacts on project management are explained, with examples. Third, base rate neglect is identified as a primary reason that projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exist in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in conventional theory.

The role of prior task experience in temporal misestimation

The effect of experience with a preceding task on the accuracy of predictions of duration was examined in three experiments, where two tasks comprising similar or different mental operators were performed consecutively. Results supported an anchoring account of misestimation, which states that misestimation occurs because predictions are anchored to the duration of the preceding task. Preceding performance of a longer task led to overestimation on a shorter task with similar mental operators (Experiment 1), whereas preceding performance of a shorter task comprising similar or different mental operators led to underestimation on a longer task (Experiments 1 to 3). Contrary to the planning fallacy account (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), these findings indicate that preceding task performance is considered when predicting duration, but that using such information does not necessarily improve accuracy.

The Effects of Mindset on Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implemental Frames of Mind

The effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets—cognitive and motivational states associated with predecisional and postdecisional frames of mind, respectively—were examined in the context of the self-regulation of behavior. Participants who had been induced to deliberate the merits of participating in a specified task formulated more pessimistic expectations about this task than did participants who had been induced to imagine implementing a plan to complete the task. Moreover, participants in the deliberation condition underperformed relative to the participants in the implemental condition, demonstrating that deliberative and implemental thinking can influence behavior as well as cognition.

Flawed Self-Assessment

Research from numerous corners of psychological inquiry suggests that self-assessments of skill and character are often flawed in substantive and systematic ways. We review empirical findings on the imperfect nature of self-assessment and discuss implications for three real-world domains: health, education, and the workplace.

In general, people's self-views hold only a tenuous to modest relationship with their actual behavior and performance. The correlation between self-ratings of skill and actual performance in many domains is moderate to meager—indeed, at times, other people's predictions of a person's outcomes prove more accurate than that person's self-predictions. In addition, people overrate themselves. On average, people say that they are “above average” in skill (a conclusion that defies statistical possibility), overestimate the likelihood that they will engage in desirable behaviors and achieve favorable outcomes, furnish overly optimistic estimates of when they will complete future projects, and reach judgments with too much confidence. Several psychological processes conspire to produce flawed self-assessments.

Research focusing on health echoes these findings. People are unrealistically optimistic about their own health risks compared with those of other people. They also overestimate how distinctive their opinions and preferences (e.g., discomfort with alcohol) are among their peers—a misperception that can have a deleterious impact on their health. Unable to anticipate how they would respond to emotion-laden situations, they mispredict the preferences of patients when asked to step in and make treatment decisions for them. Guided by mistaken but seemingly plausible theories of health and disease, people misdiagnose themselves—a phenomenon that can have severe consequences for their health and longevity.

Similarly, research in education finds that students' assessments of their performance tend to agree only moderately with those of their teachers and mentors. Students seem largely unable to assess how well or poorly they have comprehended material they have just read. They also tend to be overconfident in newly learned skills, at times because the common educational practice of massed training appears to promote rapid acquisition of skill—as well as self-confidence—but not necessarily the retention of skill. Several interventions, however, can be introduced to prompt students to evaluate their skill and learning more accurately.

In the workplace, flawed self-assessments arise all the way up the corporate ladder. Employees tend to overestimate their skill, making it difficult to give meaningful feedback. CEOs also display overconfidence in their judgments, particularly when stepping into new markets or novel projects—for example, proposing acquisitions that hurt, rather then help, the price of their company's stock. We discuss several interventions aimed at circumventing the consequences of such flawed assessments; these include training people to routinely make cognitive repairs correcting for biased self-assessments and requiring people to justify their decisions in front of their peers.

The act of self-assessment is an intrinsically difficult task, and we enumerate several obstacles that prevent people from reaching truthful self-impressions. We also propose that researchers and practitioners should recognize self-assessment as a coherent and unified area of study spanning many subdisciplines of psychology and beyond. Finally, we suggest that policymakers and other people who makes real-world assessments should be wary of self-assessments of skill, expertise, and knowledge, and should consider ways of repairing self-assessments that may be flawed.

Integrating Temporal Biases

We provide an integrative account of temporal biases (confidence changes, planning fallacy, impact bias, and hindsight bias). Students listed either 3 or 12 thoughts about success or failure before an upcoming real-life exam or immediately after learning their grades. Previous explanations had focused on how thought content alone (what comes to mind) influences temporal biases. We found, however, an interaction between thought content and accessibility experiences (how easily or difficultly thoughts come to mind). Thinking about 3 ways to succeed (success was easy to bring to mind) was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to fail (failure was difficult to bring to mind), and conversely, thinking about 3 ways to fail was equivalent to thinking about 12 ways to succeed. In no case was thought content alone sufficient to predict the biases. These results have implications for debiasing strategies and other judgments over time.

Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism

Researchers have used terms such as unrealistic optimism and optimistic bias to refer to concepts that are similar but not synonymous. Drawing from three decades of research, we critically discuss how researchers define unrealistic optimism and we identify four types that reflect different measurement approaches: unrealistic absolute optimism at the individual and group level and unrealistic comparative optimism at the individual and group level. In addition, we discuss methodological criticisms leveled against research on unrealistic optimism and note that the criticisms are primarily relevant to only one type-the group form of unrealistic comparative optimism. We further clarify how the criticisms are not nearly as problematic even for unrealistic comparative optimism as they might seem. Finally, we note boundary conditions on the different types of unrealistic optimism and reflect on five broad questions that deserve further attention.

A Primer on Unrealistic Optimism

People display unrealistic optimism in their predictions for countless events, believing that their personal future outcomes will be more desirable than can possibly be true. We summarize the vast literature on unrealistic optimism by focusing on four broad questions: What is unrealistic optimism; when does it occur; why does it occur; and what are its consequences.

Desirable and undesirable future thoughts call for different scene construction processes

Despite the growing interest in the ability of foreseeing (episodic future thinking), it is still unclear how healthy people construct possible future scenarios. We suggest that different future thoughts require different processes of scene construction. Thirty-five participants were asked to imagine desirable and less desirable future events. Imagining desirable events increased the ease of scene construction, the frequency of life scripts, the number of internal details, and the clarity of sensorial and spatial temporal information. The initial description of general personal knowledge lasted longer in undesirable than in desirable anticipations. Finally, participants were more prone to explicitly indicate autobiographical memory as the main source of their simulations of undesirable episodes, whereas they equally related the simulations of desirable events to autobiographical events or semantic knowledge. These findings show that desirable and undesirable scenarios call for different mechanisms of scene construction. The present study emphasizes that future thinking cannot be considered as a monolithic entity.

Expecting the unexpected: predicting physiological and psychological wildfire preparedness from perceived risk, responsibility, and obstacles

People who live in wildfire-prone communities tend to form their own hazard-related expectations, which may influence their willingness to prepare for a fire. Past research has already identified two important expectancy-based factors associated with people's intentions to prepare for a natural hazard: Perceived risk (i.e., perceived threat likelihood and severity) and perceived protection responsibility. We expanded this research by differentiating the influence of these factors on different types of wildfire preparedness (e.g., preparations for evacuation vs. for defending the house) and measured actual rather than intended preparedness. In addition, we tested the relation between preparedness and two additional threat-related expectations: the expectation that one can rely on an official warning and the expectation of encountering obstacles (e.g., the loss of utilities) during a fire. A survey completed by 1,003 residents of wildfire-prone areas in Perth, Australia, revealed that perceived risk (especially risk severity) and perceived protection responsibility were both positively associated with all types of preparedness, but the latter did not significantly predict preparedness after controlling for other predictors and demographics. Also, the two new expectancy-based factors were significantly associated with all types of preparedness, and remained significant predictors of some types of preparedness after controlling for other predictors and demographics: the expectation of being able to rely on an official fire warning and expecting to lose electricity both still predicted less preparedness around house resilience, and expecting to lose water still predicted increased planning preparedness. We discuss public policy implications that follow from this research.

Actors, observers, and the estimation of task duration

People are often wrong in estimating both how long tasks have taken in the past and how long they will take in the future. Bias could be due to factors such as task involvement, an individual's engagement or motivation in completing the task, or aspects of the task such as its relative duration or memory storage size associated with it. We examined time estimation bias in actors (likely to experience high levels of task involvement) and observers (likely to experience low levels of task involvement) for both predictions of and memory of task duration. Results suggest that bias appears to be due to memory storage size rather than to involvement with the task.

How important is an apology to you? Forecasting errors in evaluating the value of apologies

Apologies are commonly used to deal with transgressions in relationships. Results to date, however, indicate that the positive effects of apologies vary widely, and the match between people's judgments of apologies and the true value of apologies has not been studied. Building on the affective and behavioral forecasting literature, we predicted that people would overestimate how much they value apologies in reality. Across three experimental studies, our results showed that after having been betrayed by another party (or after imagining this to be the case), people (a) rated the value of an apology much more highly when they imagined receiving an apology than when they actually received an apology and (b) displayed greater trusting behavior when they imagined receiving an apology than when they actually received an apology. These results suggest that people are prone to forecasting errors regarding the effectiveness of an apology and that they tend to overvalue the impact of receiving one.

Predictors and Consequences of Daily Goal Adaptation

Efficient self-regulation has been argued to consist of more than just setting goals and tenaciously pursuing them – it also requires that people adapt their goals to changing circumstances. Although previous studies have already focused on interindividual differences in goal disengagement (one aspect of goal adaptation), so far, no study has looked at predictors and consequences of daily work goal adaptation. As predicted, daily goal adaptation was related to the amount of unplanned tasks and the extent to which the time needed for tasks was underestimated. However, unlike previous research on goal disengagement, daily goal adaptation had a negative (and not a positive) effect on well-being and subjective productivity. It is suggested that the emotional aspect of goal adaptation/goal disengagement needs more research attention.

Relationships among optimism, well-being, self-transcendence, coping, and social support in women during treatment for breast cancer

OBJECTIVE

The impact of diagnosis and treatment for breast cancer, stressors that affect emotional well-being, is influenced by several psychosocial factors and the relationships among them. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between optimism and emotional well-being (EWB) and the individual and combined mediation of this relationship by perceived social support (SS), problem focused coping (PFC), and self-transcendence in women with breast cancer during radiation therapy.

METHODS

Ninety-three women receiving radiation treatment for breast cancer completed questionnaires that measured EWB, optimism, SS, PFC, and self-transcendence.

RESULTS

Correlational and multiple regression analysis revealed that optimism was positively related to EWB. Of the three mediators, self-transcendence alone was found to partially mediate the relationship between optimism and EWB. The relationship between optimism and PFC was not significant. Optimism was related to SS, but its indirect effect on EWB through SS did not reach significance.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

During breast cancer treatment, the positive effects of optimism on EWB are partially mediated by a woman's level of self-transcendence. Brief screening of women's optimism may help identify women at risk for psychological distress. Early detection and interventions to promote psychological adjustment throughout the cancer trajectory (e.g. enhancing self-transcendence) should receive attention in future research.

Is There a Budget Fallacy? The Role of Savings Goals in the Prediction of Personal Spending

The authors extend research and theory on self prediction into the realm of personal financial behavior. Four studies examined people’s ability to predict their future personal spending and the findings supported the two main hypotheses. First, participants tended to underestimate their future spending. They predicted spending substantially less money in the coming week than they actually spent or than they remembered spending in the previous week. Second, the prediction bias stemmed from people’s savings goals—defined as the general desire to save money or minimize future spending—at the time of prediction. Participants who reported (Studies 2 and 3) or were induced to experience (Study 4) a stronger savings goal predicted they would spend less money. However, savings goals were not related to actual spending and thus contributed to the bias in prediction.

Before Escalation: Behavioral and Affective Forecasting in Escalation of Commitment

This research examines preinvestment forecasting processes in escalation of commitment, considering two questions: whether individuals are able to accurately predict their behavior and affect in escalation situations and how forecasting processes may be linked to actual escalation. Three experiments demonstrated that individuals underpredicted their escalation and overpredicted their postescalation regret. Two of the experiments also indicated that the less individuals predicted being entrapped, the more they escalated. Counter to expectations, anticipated regret did not predict escalation. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical importance of forecasting on escalation and on the importance of understanding both behavioral and affective forecasting effects simultaneously.

Bias in memory predicts bias in estimation of future task duration

Both anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence suggest that people underestimate how long it will take them to complete future tasks. A possible reason for this tendency is that people remember tasks as taking less time than they actually did, with these biased memories causing a corresponding bias in prediction. Two experiments were performed to determine whether or not a systematic bias in memory could explain a similar systematic bias in prediction. In support, it was found that (1) the tendency to underestimate future duration disappears when the task is novel, (2) there is similar bias in estimation of both past and future durations, and (3) variables that affect memory of duration, such as level of experience with the task and duration of delay before estimation, affect prediction of duration in the same way. It appears that, at least in part, people underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

The future is now: prospective temporal self-appraisals among defensive pessimists and optimists

Three studies found that prospective temporal self-appraisals can be part of defensive pessimists' strategy; they felt closer to equally distant negative than positive futures. In Study 1, defensive pessimists felt closer to future failures and reported more negative affect than those considering success. In Study 2, when manipulated negative futures were close, defensive pessimists felt bad and performed well; results suggested that viewing negative futures as close may be part of their natural strategy. Study 3 found that prospective self-appraisals influenced performances through felt preparation. Optimists did not use prospective self-appraisals (Study 1) and their performances were unaffected by manipulated temporal distance (Studies 2 and 3). Discussion centers on prospective self-appraisals and multiple strategies of defensive pessimists.

Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

Conceiving the past and future

The authors compared people's views of their histories and futures by asking them to recall and anticipate personally significant episodes. It was hypothesized and found in Study 1 that individuals spontaneously recall an affectively mixed past, containing both "highs" and "lows," whereas they anticipate homogeneously ideal futures. It was further hypothesized that people devote little thought to negative futures, and this was tested directly in Studies 2 and 3 by assessing how quickly past and likely future events came to mind. Asked to report positive and negative episodes from the past and future, participants took longer to generate future negative than positive events. Speed of recall was unaffected by the valence of past episodes. In Study 4, the response latency difference was again replicated for future events and it was demonstrated that people are slower in both generating negative future events and judging those events as likely.

From self-prediction to self-defeat: behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation.

Temporal construal

Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people's responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived essence of the events (high-level construals) rather than in terms of more concrete and incidental details of the events (low-level construals). The informational and evaluative implications of high-level construals, compared with those of low-level construals, should therefore have more impact on responses to distant-future events than near-future events. This article explores the implications of construal level theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. The authors suggest that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioral consequences of psychological distance from events.

Episodic future thinking

Thinking about the future is an integral component of human cognition - one that has been claimed to distinguish us from other species. Building on the construct of episodic memory, we introduce the concept of 'episodic future thinking': a projection of the self into the future to pre-experience an event. We argue that episodic future thinking has explanatory value when considering recent work in many areas of psychology: cognitive, social and personality, developmental, clinical and neuropsychology. Episodic future thinking can serve as a unifying concept, connecting aspects of diverse research findings and identifying key questions requiring further reflection and study.