Ambiguity drives higher-order Pavlovian learning

In the natural world, stimulus-outcome associations are often ambiguous, and most associations are highly complex and situation-dependent. Learning to disambiguate these complex associations to identify which specific outcomes will occur in which situations is critical for survival. Pavlovian occasion setters are stimuli that determine whether other stimuli will result in a specific outcome. Occasion setting is a well-established phenomenon, but very little investigation has been conducted on how occasion setters are disambiguated when they themselves are ambiguous (i.e., when they do not consistently signal whether another stimulus will be reinforced). In two preregistered studies, we investigated the role of higher-order Pavlovian occasion setting in humans. We developed and tested the first computational model predicting direct associative learning, traditional occasion setting (i.e., 1st-order occasion setting), and 2nd-order occasion setting. This model operationalizes stimulus ambiguity as a mechanism to engage in higher-order Pavlovian learning. Both behavioral and computational modeling results suggest that 2nd-order occasion setting was learned, as evidenced by lack and presence of transfer of occasion setting properties when expected and the superior fit of our 2nd-order occasion setting model compared to the 1st-order occasion setting or direct associations models. These results provide a controlled investigation into highly complex associative learning and may ultimately lead to improvements in the treatment of Pavlovian-based mental health disorders (e.g., anxiety disorders, substance use).

Novelty Knows No Boundaries: Why a Proper Investigation of Novelty Effects Within SHRI Should Begin by Addressing the Scientific Plurality of the Field

Research on psychological novelty effects within the fields of Social Robotics and Human-Robot Interaction (together: SHRI) so far has failed to gather the momentum it deserves. With the aid of exemplary descriptions of how psychological novelty is currently approached and researched across (certain main regions of) the larger scientific landscape, I argue that the treatment of novelty effects within the multidisciplinary SHRI reflects larger circumstances of fragmentation and heterogeneity in novelty research in general. I further propose that while the concept of novelty may currently function as a Boundary Object between the contributing domains of SHRI, a properly integrated, interdisciplinary concept of novelty is needed in order to capture and investigate the scope and scale of novelty effects within research on social human-robot interaction. Building on research on the New Ontological Category Hypothesis and related studies, I argue that the novelty of social robots can be understood as radical to the extent that their comprehension requires revisions of traditional core categories of being. In order to investigate the sui generis effects of such novelty, which should not be narrowly understood as mere “noise” in the data, it is paramount that the field of SHRI begin by working out a shared, integrative framework of psychological novelty and novelty effects.

Being surprised and surprising ourselves: A geography of personal and social change

Surprises are refuted expectations and therefore an inevitable concomitant of errors of anticipating the future. This paper argues that the timing is just right for a spatial account of surprise, or rather, for a geography of personal and social change that deploys the trope of surprise to help explain how and why change happens. Whether we are surprised by what transpires in our surroundings or we are surprising ourselves by leaping forward in impetuous deeds of reinventing who we are, the common denominator of these processes of becoming is that they produce geographical space and are produced by it.

Resolving uncertainty in a social world

Consider the range of social behaviours we engage in every day. In each case, there are a multitude of unknowns, reflecting the many sources of uncertainty inherent to social inference. We describe how uncertainty manifests in social environments (the thoughts and intentions of others are largely hidden, making it difficult to predict a person's behaviour) and why people are motivated to reduce the aversive feelings generated by uncertainty. We propose a three-part model whereby social uncertainty is initially reduced through automatic modes of inference (such as impression formation) before more control-demanding modes of inference (such as perspective-taking) are deployed to narrow one's predictions even more. Finally, social uncertainty is attenuated further through learning processes that update these predictions based on new information. Our framework integrates research across fields to offer an account of the mechanisms motivating social cognition and action, laying the groundwork for future experiments that can illuminate the impact of uncertainty on social cognition.

Routines and Meaning in Life

Previous research links the experience of meaning in life (MIL) with environmental structure and the coherence of external stimuli. The current studies directly test the association between one source of structure in everyday life-routines-and MIL. First, Study 1 ( N = 317) found a positive relationship between trait preference for routine and MIL. Study 2 expanded upon this cross-sectional finding with experience sampling data ( N = 85; 2,590 episodes) showing that the degree to which current, naturally occurring, behavior followed a typical routine positively related to participants' momentary feelings of MIL. These findings have implications for conceptualizations of MIL, suggesting a previously unnoted, mundane, and ubiquitous source of MIL. The potential roles of boredom and novelty and individual and situational differences for these effects are discussed.

Comparative thanatology, an integrative approach: exploring sensory/cognitive aspects of death recognition in vertebrates and invertebrates

Evolutionary thanatology benefits from broad taxonomic comparisons of non-human animals' responses to death. Furthermore, exploring the sensory and cognitive bases of these responses promises to allow classification of the underlying mechanisms on a spectrum from phylogenetically ancient to more derived traits. We draw on studies of perception and cognition in invertebrate and vertebrate taxa (with a focus on arthropods, corvids, proboscids, cetaceans and primates) to explore the cues that these animals use to detect life and death in others, and discuss proximate and ultimate drivers behind their capacities to do so. Parallels in thanatological behaviour exhibited by the last four taxa suggest similar sensory-cognitive processing rules for dealing with corpses, the evolution of which may have been driven by complex social environments. Uniting these responses is a phenomenon we term 'animacy detection malfunction', whereupon the corpse, having both animate and inanimate attributes, creates states of fear/curiosity manifested as approach/avoidance behaviours in observers. We suggest that integrating diverse lines of evidence (including the 'uncanny valley' effect originating from the field of robotics) provides a promising way to advance the field, and conclude by proposing avenues for future research.This article is part of the theme issue 'Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals'.

Distinctiveness Benefits Novelty (and Not Familiarity), but Only Up to a Limit: The Prior Knowledge Perspective

Novelty is a pivotal player in cognition, and its contribution to superior memory performance is a widely accepted convention. On the other hand, mnemonic advantages for familiar information are also well documented. Here, we examine the role of experimental distinctiveness as a potential explanation for these apparently conflicting findings. Across two experiments, we demonstrate that conceptual novelty, an unfamiliar combination of familiar constituents, is sensitive to its experimental proportions: Improved memory for novelty was observed when novel stimuli were relatively rare. Memory levels for familiar items, in contrast, were completely unaffected by experimental proportions, highlighting their insensitivity to list-based distinctiveness. Finally, no mnemonic advantage for conceptual novelty over familiarity was observed even when novel stimuli were extremely rare at study. Together, these results imply that novel and familiar items are processed via partially distinct mechanisms, with (at least some facets of) novelty not providing a mnemonic advantage over familiarity.

Brain and Emotion

Progress in understanding the relation between brain profiles and emotions is being slowed by the belief in a collection of basic emotional states, with the names: fear, anger, joy, disgust, and sadness, that do not specify the species or age of the experiencing agent, the origin of the state, or the evidence used to infer it. This article evaluates critically the premise that decontextualized emotional words refer to natural kinds. It also suggests that investigators set aside the currently popular words and search for relations, in humans and animals, between patterns of measures to varied incentives presented in distinctive contexts.

What's in a name? Intolerance of uncertainty, other uncertainty-relevant constructs, and their differential relations to worry and generalized anxiety disorder

A number of studies have examined the association of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) to trait worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, few studies have examined the extent of overlap between IU and other psychological constructs that bear conceptual resemblance to IU, despite the fact that IU-type constructs have been discussed and examined extensively within psychology and other disciplines. The present study investigated (1) the associations of IU, trait worry, and GAD status to a negative risk orientation, trait curiosity, indecisiveness, perceived constraints, self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism, intolerance of ambiguity, the need for predictability, and the need for order and structure and (2) whether IU is a unique correlate of trait worry and of the presence versus absence of Probable GAD, when overlap with other uncertainty-relevant constructs is accounted for. N = 255 adults completed self-report measures of the aforementioned constructs. Each of the constructs was significantly associated with IU. Only IU, and a subset of the other uncertainty-relevant constructs were correlated with trait worry or distinguished the Probable GAD group from the Non-GAD group. IU was the strongest unique correlate of trait worry and of the presence versus absence of Probable GAD. Indecisiveness, self-oriented perfectionism and the need for predictability were also unique correlates of trait worry or GAD status. Implications of the findings are discussed, in particular as they pertain to the definition, conceptualization, and cognitive-behavioral treatment of IU in GAD.

(The Feeling of) Meaning-as-Information

The desire for meaning is recognized as a central human motive. Yet, knowing that people want meaning does not explain its function. What adaptive problem does this experience solve? Drawing on the feelings-as-information hypothesis, we propose that the feeling of meaning provides information about the presence of reliable patterns and coherence in the environment, information that is not provided by affect. We review research demonstrating that manipulations of stimulus coherence influence subjective reports of meaning in life but not affect. We demonstrate that manipulations that foster an associative mindset enhance meaning. The meaning-as-information perspective embeds meaning in a network of foundational functions including associative learning, perception, cognition, and neural processing. This approach challenges assumptions about meaning, including its motivational appeal, the roles of expectancies and novelty in this experience, and the notion that meaning is inherently constructed. Implications for constructed meaning and existential meanings are discussed.