Getting older isn't all that bad: better decisions and coping when facing "sunk costs"

Anxiety, concerns and emotion regulation in individuals with Williams syndrome and Down syndrome during the COVID-19 outbreak: a global study

Individuals with neurodevelopmental conditions (NDCs) have been reported to experience increased levels of anxiety during the COVID-19 pandemic. In our study, we document how individuals with Down Syndrome (DS; N = 557; Mage = 16.52; 233 female) and Williams syndrome (WS, N = 247; Mage = 18.43; 113 female) experienced the first wave (April 2020-May 2020) of the COVID-19 pandemic across the world. Using multilevel linear mixed regressions, we studied (a) parental reported anxiety of individuals with DS and WS, (b) these individuals' specific concerns, and (c) their use and efficacy of emotion regulation (ER) strategies during the first wave of COVID-19. Predictors of anxiety, such as the age of the individual with NDC, type of condition, and time, were investigated. Individuals with WS experienced higher levels of anxiety compared to those with DS and the older the individuals with NDC were the more anxiety they experienced. In terms of concerns, group effects indicated that individuals with WS scored higher for most of the concerns. There were no gender differences in concerns, yet most of the concerns increased with age except for concerns about loss of routine, boredom, loss of institutional support and family conflict. Finally, significant group effects were found and indicated a more frequent use of a variety of adaptive and maladaptive ER strategies in individuals with WS. We did not identify group differences in the efficacy of ER strategies. Our results indicate that individuals with WS are likely to exhibit higher levels of anxiety, but also higher levels of concerns depending on their age. Similarly, individuals with WS use a variety of ER strategies more frequently but these strategies are not necessarily more efficient for them. We discuss the impact of these findings in relation to anxiety identification and support across individuals with NDCs.

Age Influences Loss Aversion Through Effects on Posterior Cingulate Cortical Thickness

Decision-making strategies shift during normal aging and can profoundly affect wellbeing. Although overweighing losses compared to gains, termed "loss aversion," plays an important role in choice selection, the age trajectory of this effect and how it may be influenced by associated changes in brain structure remain unclear. We therefore investigated the relationship between age and loss aversion, and tested for its mediation by cortical thinning in brain regions that are susceptible to age-related declines and are implicated in loss aversion - the insular, orbitofrontal, and anterior and posterior cingulate cortices. Healthy participants (n = 106, 17-54 years) performed the Loss Aversion Task. A subgroup (n = 78) provided structural magnetic resonance imaging scans. Loss aversion followed a curvilinear trajectory, declining in young adulthood and increasing in middle-age, and thinning of the posterior cingulate cortex mediated this trajectory. The findings suggest that beyond a threshold in middle adulthood, atrophy of the posterior cingulate cortex influences loss aversion.

The Appraisal Approach to Aging and Emotion: An Integrative Theoretical Framework

To advance our understanding of how emotional experience changes across the adult life span, we propose an integrative theoretical framework: the appraisal approach to aging and emotion (AAAE). AAAE posits that (a) age-related cognitive, motivational, and physical changes fundamentally change the appraisal system in certain ways, and that (b) older adults often deploy appraisal processes in different ways relative to their younger counterparts. As such, we hypothesize that these age-related changes to the appraisal process underlie the finding that older and younger adults tend to experience different emotions. In this paper we integrate findings from the aging literature with appraisal theory, grounding AAAE in theoretical and empirical work relevant to the relationship between aging and appraisal processes. Using our theoretical framework, it is possible to identify critical points of investigation for aging and emotion researchers to further develop our understanding of the proximal-level determinants of age differences in emotion.

Harm to others reduces the sunk-cost effect

The sunk-cost effect (SCE) is the tendency to continue investing in something that is not working out because of previous investments that cannot be recovered. In three experiments, we examine the SCE when continued investment violates the ethic of care by harming others. In Experiment 1, the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision resulted in harmful consequences towards others (an interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care). In Experiment 2, participants considered vignettes from their own or another person's perspective. We observed an interpersonal SCE - people showed the SCE when taking the perspective of others. We did not replicate the interaction found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we used statistically more powerful analyses - Bayesian sequential hypothesis testing - to examine the interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care. We found evidence in favor of the interaction; the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision harmed others. We suggest that violating one's ethic of care de-biases decision-making by overshadowing sunk costs. These findings may help explain decision-making in real-world situations involving large investments.

Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence?

Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.

Future time perspective drives younger and older adults to continue investing in failing activities

Inspired by socioemotional selectivity theory, we investigated age differences in further investment in failing situations by considering goal type and future time perspective. In Experiment 1, 32 younger and 30 older adults reported their likelihood of continued investing following an unsuccessful investment. Older adults were more willing to invest with emotional goals as opposed to knowledge and unspecified goals, while younger adults showed a greater willingness to invest with emotional and knowledge goals rather than unspecified goals. In Experiment 2, another sample of 32 younger and 34 older adults completed the same decision tasks as those in Experiment 1. After future time perspective restriction, the younger adults made decisions resembling Experiment 1's older adults, while after future time perspective expansion, the older adults behaved like Experiment 1's younger adults. These results indicate that future time perspective modification could reverse participants' goal prioritisation, manifesting in differential willingness to pursue further investment in decision scenarios with different goals. Our results represent important steps towards understanding the mechanism of older and younger adults' further investment in failing situations and illustrate that forging connections between the lifespan theory of motivation and further investment decision is critical for understanding adults' decision behaviours.

Taking the Biggest First: Age Differences in Preferences for Monetary and Hedonic Sequences

OBJECTIVES

People face decisions about how to sequence payments and events, including when to schedule bigger events relative to smaller ones. We examine age differences in these sequence preferences.

METHODS

We gave a national adult life-span sample (n = 1,296, mean = 53.06 years, standard deviation = 16.33) four scenarios describing a positive or negative hedonic (enjoyable weekends, painful dental procedures) or monetary (receiving versus paying money) event. We considered associations among age, sequence preferences, three self-reported decision-making processes-emphasizing experience, emotion, and reasoning-and two dimensions of future time perspective-focusing on future opportunities and limited time.

RESULTS

Older age was associated with taking the "biggest" event sooner instead of later, especially for receiving money, but also for the other three scenarios. Older age was associated with greater reported use of reason and experience and lesser reported use of emotion. These decision-making processes played a role in understanding age differences in sequence preferences, but future time perspective did not.

DISCUSSION

We discuss "taking the biggest first" preferences in light of prior mixed findings on age differences in sequence preferences. We highlight the distinct roles of experience- and emotion-based decision-making processes. We propose applications to financial and health-care settings.

The feeling of throwing good money after bad: The role of affective reaction in the sunk-cost fallacy

Continuing investing in a failing plan (i.e., the sunk-cost fallacy) is a common error that people are inclined to make when making decisions. It is impossible to get resources back that already have been invested. Hence, economic theory implies that decision makers' decisions should only be guided by future gains and losses. According to the literature, the sunk-cost fallacy is driven by negative affect. Previous studies focused on negative incidental affect. We investigated, in contrast, whether the sunk-cost fallacy is caused by integral affect elicited by the specific decision context. Study 1 demonstrated a positive relationship between affective reaction and the sunk-cost fallacy. Study 2 replicated the finding in Study 1 in a within-subjects design, and demonstrated a full mediation of type of scenario (invest vs. non-invest) on the sunk-cost effect, mediated by integral affective reaction. A mediation using a within-subjects design additionally demonstrated that the effect is mediated by integral emotional responses experienced in relation to each scenario, and not by incidental emotional states that are unrelated to the scenarios. Study 3 replicated findings in the previous studies, and demonstrated that the relation between the sunk-cost fallacy and affect is moderated by justification. Participants who justified their decision were more resistant to the sunk-cost fallacy, and showed less negative affect elicited by the scenarios, than participants who did not justify their decision. Study 4 provided supporting evidence for our hypothesis by hindering conscious deliberation, and promoting reliance on affect, via cognitive load. The results showed that the relation between affect and the sunk-cost fallacy was stronger for participants under high cognitive load, than under low-load. The paper discussed how this research leads to new ways to protect against the sunk-cost fallacy in the discussion.

Restricting future time perspective reduces failure to act after a missed opportunity

Inaction inertia occurs when missing an attractive opportunity (vs. not having been offered it) decreases the likelihood of acting on another similar opportunity. We experimentally manipulated future time perspective to reduce inaction inertia. Middle-aged and older adults from the Health and Retirement Study were randomly assigned to imagining restricted or expansive time left to live, or to no instructions. Across age, imagining a restricted future (vs. the other two instructions) reduced inaction inertia and future time perspective. Imagining living longer increased future time perspective among relatively younger participants. Consequences of restricted time perspective for decisions and life regrets are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Sensitivity to "sunk costs" in mice, rats, and humans

Sunk costs are irrecoverable investments that should not influence decisions, because decisions should be made on the basis of expected future consequences. Both human and nonhuman animals can show sensitivity to sunk costs, but reports from across species are inconsistent. In a temporal context, a sensitivity to sunk costs arises when an individual resists ending an activity, even if it seems unproductive, because of the time already invested. In two parallel foraging tasks that we designed, we found that mice, rats, and humans show similar sensitivities to sunk costs in their decision-making. Unexpectedly, sensitivity to time invested accrued only after an initial decision had been made. These findings suggest that sensitivity to temporal sunk costs lies in a vulnerability distinct from deliberation processes and that this distinction is present across species.

Cognitive Control As a Double-Edged Sword

Cognitive control, the ability to limit attention to goal-relevant information, aids performance on a wide range of laboratory tasks. However, there are many day-to-day functions which require little to no control and others which even benefit from reduced control. We review behavioral and neuroimaging evidence demonstrating that reduced control can enhance the performance of both older and, under some circumstances, younger adults. Using healthy aging as a model, we demonstrate that decreased cognitive control benefits performance on tasks ranging from acquiring and using environmental information to generating creative solutions to problems. Cognitive control is thus a double-edged sword - aiding performance on some tasks when fully engaged, and many others when less engaged.

Decision-making competence in younger and older adults: which cognitive abilities contribute to the application of decision rules?

Older adults perform worse than younger adults when applying decision rules to choose between options that vary along multiple attributes. Although previous studies have shown that general fluid cognitive abilities contribute to the accurate application of decision rules, relatively little is known about which specific cognitive abilities play the most important role. We examined the independent roles of working memory, verbal fluency, semantic knowledge, and components of executive functioning. We found that age-related decline in applying decision rules was statistically mediated by age-related decline in working memory and verbal fluency. Our results have implications for theories of aging and decision-making.

What were they thinking? Reducing sunk-cost bias in a life-span sample

We tested interventions to reduce "sunk-cost bias," the tendency to continue investing in failing plans even when those plans have soured and are no longer rewarding. We showed members of a national U.S. life-span panel a hypothetical scenario about a failing plan that was halfway complete. Participants were randomly assigned to an intervention to focus on how to improve the situation, an intervention to focus on thoughts and feelings, or a no-intervention control group. First, we found that the thoughts and feelings intervention reduced sunk-cost bias in decisions about project completion, as compared to the improvement intervention and the no-intervention control. Second, older age was associated with greater willingness to cancel the failing plan across all 3 groups. Third, we found that introspection processes helped to explain the effectiveness of the interventions. Specifically, the larger reduction in sunk-cost bias as observed in the thoughts and feelings intervention (vs. the improvement intervention) was associated with suppression of future-oriented thoughts of eventual success, and with suppression of augmentations of the scenario that could make it seem reasonable to continue the plan. Fourth, we found that introspection processes were related to age differences in decisions. Older people were less likely to mention future-oriented thoughts of eventual success associated with greater willingness to continue the failing plan. We discuss factors to consider when designing interventions for reducing sunk-cost bias. (PsycINFO Database Record

Late-life Depression, Suicidal Ideation, and Attempted Suicide: The Role of Individual Differences in Maximizing, Regret, and Negative Decision Outcomes

Suicide rates are highest in adults of middle and older age. Research with psychiatric patients has shown that proneness to feel regret about past decisions can grow so intense that suicide becomes a tempting escape. Here, we examine the additional role of individual differences in maximizing, or the tendency to strive for the best decision, rather than one that is good enough. We provided individual-differences measures of maximizing, regret proneness, and negative life decision outcomes (as reported on the Decision Outcome Inventory or DOI) to a non-psychiatric control group, as well as three groups of psychiatric patients in treatment for suicide attempts, suicidal ideation, or non-suicidal depression. We found that scores on the three individual-differences measures were worse for psychiatric patients than for non-psychiatric controls, and were correlated to clinical assessments of depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. More importantly, maximizing was associated with these clinical assessments, even after taking into account maximizers' worse life decision outcomes. Regret proneness significantly mediated those relationships, suggesting that maximizers could be at risk for clinical depression because of their proneness to regret. We discuss the theoretical relevance of our findings and their promise for clinical practice. Ultimately, late-life depression and suicidal ideation may be treated with interventions that promote better decision making and regret regulation.

Effects of Age and Initial Risk Perception on Balloon Analog Risk Task: The Mediating Role of Processing Speed and Need for Cognitive Closure

According to the dual-process theoretical perspective adopted in the presented research, the efficiency of deliberative processes in decision making declines with age, but experiential processes are relatively well-preserved. The age-related differences in deliberative and experiential processes in risky decision-making were examined in this research by applying the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART). We analyzed the influence of age on risk acceptance and decision-making performance in two age groups of female participants (younger adults, n = 81; older adults, n = 76), with additional experimental manipulation of initial risk perception. We predicted and confirmed that aging significantly worsens performance on the behavioral BART measures due to age-related decline in deliberative processes. Older participants were found to exhibit significantly higher risk aversion and lower BART performance, and the effect of age was mediated by cognitive (processing speed) and motivational (need for cognitive closure) mechanisms. Moreover, older adults adapt to the initial failure (vs. success) similarly, as younger adults due to preserved efficiency of experiential processes. These results suggest future directions for minimizing negative effects of aging in risky decision-making and indicate compensatory processes, which are preserved during aging.

Choosing to be happy? Age differences in "maximizing" decision strategies and experienced emotional well-being

Maximizing is a decision strategy that seeks the very best option, which is more elaborate and potentially more regret inducing than choosing an option that is "good enough." In surveys with a large national sample, we find that older adults are less likely than younger adults to self-report maximizing, which is associated with their better experienced well-being reported 2 years later. This pattern holds after controlling for demographic characteristics and negative life events. Our findings suggest that older adults could possibly be opting for decision strategies that make them happier. We discuss implications for interventions that aim to improve decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record

Aiding Lay Decision Making Using a Cognitive Competencies Approach

Two prescriptive approaches have evolved to aid human decision making: just in time interventions that provide support as a decision is being made; and just in case interventions that educate people about future events that they may encounter so that they are better prepared to make an informed decision when these events occur. We review research on these two approaches developed in the context of supporting everyday decisions such as choosing an apartment, a financial product or a medical procedure. We argue that the lack of an underlying prescriptive theory has limited the development and evaluation of these interventions. We draw on recent descriptive research on the cognitive competencies that underpin human decision making to suggest new ways of interpreting how and why existing decision aids may be effective and suggest a different way of evaluating their effectiveness. We also briefly outline how our approach has the potential to develop new interventions to support everyday decision making and highlight the benefits of drawing on descriptive research when developing and evaluating interventions.

Variations in Decision-Making Profiles by Age and Gender: A Cluster-Analytic Approach

Using cluster-analysis, we investigated whether rational, intuitive, spontaneous, dependent, and avoidant styles of decision making (Scott & Bruce, 1995) combined to form distinct decision-making profiles that differed by age and gender. Self-report survey data were collected from 1,075 members of RAND's American Life Panel (56.2% female, 18-93 years, Mage = 53.49). Three decision-making profiles were identified: affective/experiential, independent/self-controlled, and an interpersonally-oriented dependent profile. Older people were less likely to be in the affective/experiential profile and more likely to be in the independent/self-controlled profile. Women were less likely to be in the affective/experiential profile and more likely to be in the interpersonally-oriented dependent profile. Interpersonally-oriented profiles are discussed as an overlooked but important dimension of how people make important decisions.

New perspectives for motivating better decisions in older adults

Decision-making competence in later adulthood is affected by declines in cognitive skills, and age-related changes in affect and experience can sometimes compensate. However, recent findings suggest that age-related changes in motivation also affect the extent to which adults draw from experience, affect, and deliberative skills when making decisions. To date, relatively little attention has been given to strategies for addressing age-related changes in motivation to promote better decisions in older adults. To address this limitation, we draw from diverse literatures to suggest promising intervention strategies for motivating older recipients’ motivation to make better decisions. We start by reviewing the life-span developmental literature, which suggests that older adults’ motivation to put effort into decisions depends on the perceived personal relevance of decisions as well as their self-efficacy (i.e., confidence in applying their ability and knowledge). Next, we discuss two approaches from the health intervention design literature, the mental models approach and the patient activation approach, which aim to improve motivation for decision making by improving personal relevance or by building self-efficacy or confidence to use new information and skills. Using examples from these literatures, we discuss how to construct interventions to motivate good decisions in later adulthood.