Performance feedback promotes proactive but not reactive adaptation of conflict-control

A spatial version of the Stroop task for examining proactive and reactive control independently from non-conflict processes

Conflict-induced control refers to humans' ability to regulate attention in the processing of target information (e.g., the color of a word in the color-word Stroop task) based on experience with conflict created by distracting information (e.g., an incongruent color word), and to do so either in a proactive (preparatory) or a reactive (stimulus-driven) fashion. Interest in conflict-induced control has grown recently, as has the awareness that effects attributed to those processes might be affected by conflict-unrelated processes (e.g., the learning of stimulus-response associations). This awareness has resulted in the recommendation to move away from traditional interference paradigms with small stimulus/response sets and towards paradigms with larger sets (at least four targets, distractors, and responses), paradigms that allow better control of non-conflict processes. Using larger sets, however, is not always feasible. Doing so in the Stroop task, for example, would require either multiple arbitrary responses that are difficult for participants to learn (e.g., manual responses to colors) or non-arbitrary responses that can be difficult for researchers to collect (e.g., vocal responses in online experiments). Here, we present a spatial version of the Stroop task that solves many of those problems. In this task, participants respond to one of six directions indicated by an arrow, each requiring a specific, non-arbitrary manual response, while ignoring the location where the arrow is displayed. We illustrate the usefulness of this task by showing the results of two experiments in which evidence for proactive and reactive control was obtained while controlling for the impact of non-conflict processes.

Cognitive control controls the effect of irrelevant stimulus-response learning

Research has established that two cognitive processes, cognitive control and irrelevant stimulus-response (S-R) learning, may underlie the proportion congruency effect, which refers to the findings that the size of interference effects (e.g., the Stroop, Simon, or Eriksen flanker effect) reduces with increasing the proportion of incongruent trials. Further studies have begun to investigate the interaction between these two cognitive processes, which not only provide more plausible accounts for empirical data, but also advance theories. The present study set out to investigate whether cognitive control can modulate the effect of irrelevant S-R learning. In two experiments, we combined a color-letter contingency task, in which we manipulated the contingencies (low vs. high) of irrelevant S-R associations, with a color-Chinese character Stroop task, in which we manipulated the ratio of neutral to incongruent trials (mostly neutral (MN) versus mostly incongruent (MI)). Experiment 1 showed a proportion neutral effect (the Stroop effect was smaller in the MI than in the MN condition), suggesting changes in control demand. Critically, the contingency effect (faster responses in the high- than in the low-contingency condition) reduced in the MI than in the MN condition. Experiment 2 (preregistered) increased the number of Chinese characters to exclude a familiarity account for the proportion neutral effect, which replicated the findings of Experiment 1. These results suggest that cognitive control induced in the Stroop task transferred to the contingency task and modulated the contingency effect. Thus, this study provides clear evidence that cognitive control can modulate the effect of irrelevant S-R learning.

Impaired proactive cognitive control in Parkinson's disease

Adaptive control has been studied in Parkinson's disease mainly in the context of proactive control and with mixed results. We compared reactive- and proactive control in 30 participants with Parkinson's disease to 30 age matched healthy control participants. The electroencephalographic activity of the participants was recorded over 128 channels while they performed a numerical Stroop task, in which we controlled for confounding stimulus-response learning. We assessed effects of reactive- and proactive control on reaction time-, accuracy- and electroencephalographic time-frequency data. Behavioural results show distinct impairments of proactive- and reactive control in participants with Parkinson's disease, when tested on their usual medication. Compared to healthy control participants, participants with Parkinson's disease were impaired in their ability to adapt cognitive control proactively and were less effective to resolve conflict using reactive control. Successful reactive and proactive control in the healthy control group was accompanied by a reduced conflict effect between congruent and incongruent items in midline-frontal theta power. Our findings provide evidence for a general impairment of proactive control in Parkinson's disease and highlight the importance of controlling for the effects of S-R learning when studying adaptive control. Evidence concerning reactive control was inconclusive, but we found that participants with Parkinson's disease were less effective than healthy control participants in resolving conflict during the reactive control task.

Principles of cognitive control over task focus and task switching

Adaptive behaviour requires the ability to focus on a task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability) and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). Burgeoning research literatures have aimed to understand how people achieve task focus and task switch readiness. In this Perspective, I integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of cognitive stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and task switch readiness are supported by independent mechanisms. However, I also suggest that the strategic regulation of both mechanisms is governed by shared learning principles: an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic) and episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic). Finally, I discuss algorithmic and neural implementations of these processes, as well as clinical implications.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Evaluating the learning of stimulus-control associations through incidental memory of reinforcement events

Cognitive control describes the ability to use internal goals to strategically guide how we process and respond to our environment. Changes in the environment lead to adaptation in control strategies. This type of control learning can be observed in performance adjustments in response to varying proportions of easy to hard trials over blocks of trials on classic control tasks. Known as the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, increased difficulty is met with enhanced attentional control. Recent research has shown that motivational manipulations may enhance the LWPC effect, but the underlying mechanisms are not yet understood. We manipulated Stroop proportion congruency over blocks of trials and, after each trial, provided participants with either performance-contingent feedback ("correct/incorrect") or noncontingent feedback ("response logged") above trial-unique, task-irrelevant images (reinforcement events). The LWPC task was followed by a surprise recognition memory task, which allowed us to test whether attention to feedback (incidental memory for the images) varies as a function of proportion congruency, time, performance contingency, and individual differences. We replicated a robust LWPC effect in a large sample (N = 402) but observed no differences in behavior between feedback groups. Importantly, the memory data revealed better encoding of feedback images from context-defining trials (e.g., congruent trials in a mostly congruent block), especially early in a new context and in congruent conditions. Individual differences in reward and punishment sensitivity were not strongly associated with control-learning effects. These results suggest that statistical learning of contextual demand may have a larger impact on control learning than individual differences in motivation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Minimal impact of consolidation on learned switch-readiness

Adaptive behavior is characterized by our ability to create, maintain, and update (or switch) rules by which we categorize and respond to stimuli across changing contexts (cognitive flexibility). Recent research suggests that people can link the control process of task-switching to contextual cues through associative learning, whereby the behavioral cost of switching is reduced for contexts that require frequent switching. One example is the listwide proportion switch (LWPS) effect, denoting smaller switch costs in blocks of trials where switching is more frequent. However, the conditions that govern such learned cognitive flexibility are poorly understood. One major unanswered question is whether this type of learning benefits from memory consolidation effects. To address this question, we manipulated whether task-sets and/or specific task stimuli were more frequently linked with task-switching (vs. repeating), and ran participants over two experimental sessions, separated by a 24-hr delay. We expected that consolidation would facilitate learned cognitive flexibility, resulting in a greater reduction of switch costs with increasing task-switch likelihood on Session 2 compared with Session 1. Across two experiments, we observed robust LWPS effects in both sessions. However, we found little evidence for effects of consolidation on learned cognitive flexibility: The magnitude of the LWPS effect did not change from Session 1 to 2. Altogether our results suggest that people reliably and quickly acquire task-set and stimulus-based switch associations, but this form of control learning-unlike many instances of reward-based learning-does not benefit from long-term memory consolidation. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Contextual Adaptation of Cognitive Flexibility is driven by Task- and Item-Level Learning

Adaptive behavior requires finding, and adjusting, an optimal tradeoff between focusing on a current task-set (cognitive stability) and updating that task-set when the environment changes (cognitive flexibility). Such dynamic adjustments of cognitive flexibility are observed in cued task-switching paradigms, where switch costs tend to decrease as the proportion of switch trials over blocks increases. However, the learning mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, here referred to as the list-wide proportion switch effect (LWPSE), are currently unknown. We addressed this question across four behavioral experiments. Experiment 1 replicated the basic LWPSE reported in previous studies. Having participants switch between three instead of two tasks, Experiment 2 demonstrated that the LWPSE is preserved even when the specific alternate task to switch to cannot be anticipated. Experiments 3a and 3b tested for the generalization of list-wide switch-readiness to an unbiased "transfer task," presented equally often as switch and repeat trials, by intermixing the transfer task with biased tasks. Despite the list-wide bias, the LWPSE was only found for biased tasks, suggesting that the modulations of switch costs are task set and/or task stimulus (item)-specific. To evaluate these two possibilities, Experiment 4 employed biased versus unbiased stimuli within biased task sets and found switch-cost modulations for both stimuli sets. These results establish how people adapt their stability-flexibility tradeoff to different contexts. Specifically, our findings show that people learn to associate context-appropriate levels of switch readiness with switch-predictive cues, provided by task sets as well as specific task stimuli.