Negligible fronto-parietal BOLD activity accompanying unreportable switches in bistable perception

Tracking rivalry with neural rhythms: multivariate SSVEPs reveal perception during binocular rivalry

The contents of awareness can substantially change without any modification to the external world. Such effects are exemplified in binocular rivalry, where a different stimulus is presented to each eye causing instability in perception. This phenomenon has made binocular rivalry a quintessential method for studying consciousness and the necessary neural correlates for awareness. However, to conduct research on binocular rivalry usually requires self-reports of changes in percept, which can produce confounds and exclude states and contexts where self-reports are undesirable or unreliable. Here, we use a novel multivariate spatial filter dubbed 'Rhythmic Entrainment Source Separation' to extract steady state visual evoked potentials from electroencephalography data. We show that this method can be used to quantify the perceptual switch-rate of participants during binocular rivalry and therefore may be valuable in experimental contexts where self-reports are methodologically problematic or impossible, particularly as an adjunct. Our analyses also reveal that 'no-report' conditions may affect the deployment of attention and thereby neural correlates, another important consideration for consciousness research.

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.

Neural representations of competing stimuli along the dorsal and ventral visual pathways during binocular rivalry

Binocular rivalry arises when two discrepant stimuli are simultaneously presented to different eyes, during which observers consciously experience vivid perceptual alternations without physical changes in visual inputs. Neural dynamics tracking such perceptual alternations have been identified at both early and late visual areas, leading to the fundamental debate concerning the primary neural substrate underlying binocular rivalry. One promising hypothesis that might reconcile these seemingly paradoxical findings is a gradual shift from interocular competition between monocular neurons to pattern competition among binocular neurons. Here, we examined this hypothesis by investigating how neural representations of rivalrous stimuli evolved along the visual pathway. We found that representations of the dominant and the suppressed stimuli initially co-existed in V1, which were enhanced and attenuated respectively in extrastriate visual areas. Notably, neural activity in V4 was dictated by the representation of the dominant stimulus, while the representation of the suppressed stimulus was only partially inhibited in dorsal areas V3A and MT+. Our findings revealed a progressive transition from the co-existing representations of the rivalrous inputs to the dictatorial representation of the dominant stimulus in the ventral pathway, and advocated different cortical evolutionary patterns of visual representations between the dorsal and the ventral pathways.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

The functions of consciousness in visual processing

Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.

Human visual consciousness involves large scale cortical and subcortical networks independent of task report and eye movement activity

The full neural circuits of conscious perception remain unknown. Using a visual perception task, we directly recorded a subcortical thalamic awareness potential (TAP). We also developed a unique paradigm to classify perceived versus not perceived stimuli using eye measurements to remove confounding signals related to reporting on conscious experiences. Using fMRI, we discovered three major brain networks driving conscious visual perception independent of report: first, increases in signal detection regions in visual, fusiform cortex, and frontal eye fields; and in arousal/salience networks involving midbrain, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula; second, increases in frontoparietal attention and executive control networks and in the cerebellum; finally, decreases in the default mode network. These results were largely maintained after excluding eye movement-based fMRI changes. Our findings provide evidence that the neurophysiology of consciousness is complex even without overt report, involving multiple cortical and subcortical networks overlapping in space and time.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Hierarchical processing underpins competition in tactile perceptual bistability

Ambiguous sensory information can lead to spontaneous alternations between perceptual states, recently shown to extend to tactile perception. The authors recently proposed a simplified form of tactile rivalry which evokes two competing percepts for a fixed difference in input amplitudes across antiphase, pulsatile stimulation of the left and right fingers. This study addresses the need for a tactile rivalry model that captures the dynamics of perceptual alternations and that incorporates the structure of the somatosensory system. The model features hierarchical processing with two stages. The first and the second stages of model could be located at the secondary somatosensory cortex (area S2), or in higher areas driven by S2. The model captures dynamical features specific to the tactile rivalry percepts and produces general characteristics of perceptual rivalry: input strength dependence of dominance times (Levelt's proposition II), short-tailed skewness of dominance time distributions and the ratio of distribution moments. The presented modelling work leads to experimentally testable predictions. The same hierarchical model could generalise to account for percept formation, competition and alternations for bistable stimuli that involve pulsatile inputs from the visual and auditory domains.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

Decoding internally generated transitions of conscious contents in the prefrontal cortex without subjective reports

A major debate about the neural correlates of conscious perception concerns its cortical organization, namely, whether it includes the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which mediates executive functions, or it is constrained within posterior cortices. It has been suggested that PFC activity during paradigms investigating conscious perception is conflated with post-perceptual processes associated with reporting the contents of consciousness or feedforward signals originating from exogenous stimulus manipulations and relayed via posterior cortical areas. We addressed this debate by simultaneously probing neuronal populations in the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta) PFC during a no-report paradigm, capable of instigating internally generated transitions in conscious perception, without changes in visual stimulation. We find that feature-selective prefrontal neurons are modulated concomitantly with subjective perception and perceptual suppression of their preferred stimulus during both externally induced and internally generated changes in conscious perception. Importantly, this enables reliable single-trial, population decoding of conscious contents. Control experiments confirm significant decoding of stimulus contents, even when oculomotor responses, used for inferring perception, are suppressed. These findings suggest that internally generated changes in the contents of conscious visual perception are reliably reflected within the activity of prefrontal populations in the absence of volitional reports or changes in sensory input.

The role of the prefrontal cortex in conscious perception is debated because of its involvement in task relevant behaviour, such as subjective perceptual reports. Here, the authors show that prefrontal activity in rhesus macaques correlates with subjective perception and the contents of consciousness can be decoded from prefrontal population activity even without reports.

Neural oscillations promoting perceptual stability and perceptual memory during bistable perception

Ambiguous images elicit bistable perception, wherein periods of momentary perceptual stability are interrupted by sudden perceptual switches. When intermittently presented, ambiguous images trigger a perceptual memory trace in the intervening blank periods. Understanding the neural bases of perceptual stability and perceptual memory during bistable perception may hold clues for explaining the apparent stability of visual experience in the natural world, where ambiguous and fleeting images are prevalent. Motivated by recent work showing the involvement of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) in bistable perception, we conducted a transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) study with a double-blind, within-subject cross-over design to test a potential causal role of rIFG in these processes. Subjects viewed ambiguous images presented continuously or intermittently while under EEG recording. We did not find any significant tDCS effect on perceptual behavior. However, the fluctuations of oscillatory power in the alpha and beta bands predicted perceptual stability, with higher power corresponding to longer percept durations. In addition, higher alpha and beta power predicted enhanced perceptual memory during intermittent viewing. These results reveal a unified neurophysiological mechanism sustaining perceptual stability and perceptual memory when the visual system is faced with ambiguous input.

Bi-Stable Perception: Self-Coordinating Brain Regions to Make-Up the Mind

Bi-stable perception is a strong instance of cognitive self-organization, providing a research model for how ‘the brain makes up its mind.’ The complexity of perceptual bistability prevents a simple attribution of functions to areas, because many cognitive processes, recruiting multiple brain regions, are simultaneously involved. The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests the activation of a large network of distant brain areas. Concurrently, electroencephalographic and magnetoencephalographic (MEEG) literature shows sub second oscillatory activity and phase synchrony on several frequency bands. Strongly represented are beta and gamma bands, often associated with neural/cognitive integration processes. The spatial extension and short duration of brain activities suggests the need for a fast, large-scale neural coordination mechanism. To address the range of temporo-spatial scales involved, we systematize the current knowledge from mathematical models, cognitive sciences and neuroscience at large, from single-cell- to system-level research, including evidence from human and non-human primates. Surprisingly, despite evidence spanning through different organization levels, models, and experimental approaches, the scarcity of integrative studies is evident. In a final section of the review we dwell on the reasons behind such scarcity and on the need of integration in order to achieve a real understanding of the complexities underlying bi-stable perception processes.

Conflict monitoring and attentional adjustment during binocular rivalry

To make sense of ambiguous and, at times, fragmentary sensory input, the brain must rely on a process of active interpretation. At any given moment, only one of several possible perceptual representations prevails in our conscious experience. Our hypothesis is that the competition between alternative representations induces a pattern of neural activation resembling cognitive conflict, eventually leading to fluctuations between different perceptual outcomes in the case of steep competition. To test this hypothesis, we probed changes in perceptual awareness between competing images using binocular rivalry. We drew our predictions from the conflict monitoring theory, which holds that cognitive control is invoked by the detection of conflict during information processing. Our results show that fronto-medial theta oscillations (5-7 Hz), an established electroencephalography (EEG) marker of conflict, increases right before perceptual alternations and decreases thereafter, suggesting that conflict monitoring occurs during perceptual competition. Furthermore, to investigate conflict resolution via attentional engagement, we looked for a neural marker of perceptual switches as by parieto-occipital alpha oscillations (8-12 Hz). The power of parieto-occipital alpha displayed an inverse pattern to that of fronto-medial theta, reflecting periods of high interocular inhibition during stable perception, and low inhibition around moments of perceptual change. Our findings aim to elucidate the relationship between conflict monitoring mechanisms and perceptual awareness.

Causal roles of prefrontal cortex during spontaneous perceptual switching are determined by brain state dynamics

The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to orchestrate cognitive dynamics. However, in tests of bistable visual perception, no direct evidence supporting such presumable causal roles of the PFC has been reported except for a recent work. Here, using a novel brain-state-dependent neural stimulation system, we identified causal effects on percept dynamics in three PFC activities—right frontal eye fields, dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC), and inferior frontal cortex (IFC). The causality is behaviourally detectable only when we track brain state dynamics and modulate the PFC activity in brain-state-/state-history-dependent manners. The behavioural effects are underpinned by transient neural changes in the brain state dynamics, and such neural effects are quantitatively explainable by structural transformations of the hypothetical energy landscapes. Moreover, these findings indicate distinct functions of the three PFC areas: in particular, the DLPFC enhances the integration of two PFC-active brain states, whereas IFC promotes the functional segregation between them. This work resolves the controversy over the PFC roles in spontaneous perceptual switching and underlines brain state dynamics in fine investigations of brain-behaviour causality.

A cube that seems to shift its spatial arrangement as you keep looking; the elegant silhouette of a pirouetting dancer, which starts to spin in the opposite direction the more you stare at it; an illustration that shows two profiles – or is it a vase? These optical illusions are examples of bistable visual perception. Beyond their entertaining aspect, they provide a way for scientists to explore the dynamics of human consciousness, and the neural regions involved in this process.

Some studies show that bistable visual perception is associated with the activation of the prefrontal cortex, a brain area involved in complex cognitive processes. However, it is unclear whether this region is required for the illusions to emerge. Some research has showed that even if sections of the prefrontal cortex are temporally deactivated, participants can still experience the illusions.

Instead, Takamitsu Watanabe proposes that bistable visual perception is a process tied to dynamic brain states – that is, that distinct regions of the prefontal cortex are required for this fluctuating visual awareness, depending on the state of the whole brain. Such causal link cannot be observed if brain activity is not tracked closely.

To investigate this, the brain states of 65 participants were recorded as individuals were experiencing the optical illusions; the activity of their various brain regions could therefore be mapped, and then areas of the prefrontal cortex could precisely be inhibited at the right time using transcranial magnetic stimulation. This revealed that, indeed, prefrontal cortex regions were necessary for bistable visual perception, but not in a simple way. Instead, which ones were required and when depended on activity dynamics taking place in the whole brain. Overall, these results indicate that monitoring brain states is necessary to better understand – and ultimately, control – the neural pathways underlying perception and behaviour.

Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Task Relevance in Face Perception Using Simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current theories of visual consciousness disagree about whether it emerges during early stages of processing in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network becomes involved. Moreover, disentangling conscious perception from task-related postperceptual processes (e.g., report) and integrating results across different neuroscientific methods remain ongoing challenges. The present study addressed these problems using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and a specific inattentional blindness paradigm with three physically identical phases in female and male human participants. In phase 1, participants performed a distractor task during which line drawings of faces and control stimuli were presented centrally. While some participants spontaneously noticed the faces in phase 1, others remained inattentionally blind. In phase 2, all participants were made aware of the task-irrelevant faces but continued the distractor task. In phase 3, the faces became task-relevant. Bayesian analysis of brain responses demonstrated that conscious face perception was most strongly associated with activation in fusiform gyrus (fMRI) as well as the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG). Smaller awareness effects were revealed in the occipital and prefrontal cortex (fMRI). Task-relevant face processing, on the other hand, led to strong, extensive activation of occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks (fMRI). In EEG, it enhanced early negativities and elicited a pronounced P3b component. Overall, we provide evidence that conscious visual perception is linked with early processing in stimulus-specific sensory brain areas but may additionally involve prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the strong activation of widespread brain networks and the P3b are more likely associated with task-related processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does our brain generate visual consciousness-the subjective experience of what it is like to see, for example, a face? To date, it is hotly debated whether it emerges early in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network is activated. Here, we use simultaneous fMRI and EEG for high spatial and temporal resolution and demonstrate that conscious face perception is predominantly linked to early and occipitotemporal processes, but also prefrontal activity. Task-related processes (e.g., decision-making), on the other hand, elicit brain-wide activations including late and strong frontoparietal activity. These findings challenge numerous previous studies and highlight the importance of investigating the neural correlates of consciousness in the absence of task relevance.

Neural Mechanism Underlying the Sleep Deprivation-Induced Abnormal Bistable Perception

Quality sleep is vital for physical and mental health. No matter whether sleep problems are a consequence of or contributory factor to mental disorders, people with psychosis often suffer from severe sleep disturbances. Previous research has shown that acute sleep deprivation (SD) can cause transient brain dysfunction and lead to various cognitive impairments in healthy individuals. However, the relationship between sleep disturbance and bistable perception remains unclear. Here, we investigated whether the bistable perception could be affected by SD and elucidated the functional brain changes accompanying SD effects on bistable perception using functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that the 28-h SD resulted in slower perceptual transitions in healthy individuals. The reduced perceptual transition was accompanied by the decreased activations in rivalry-related frontoparietal areas, including the right superior parietal lobule, right frontal eye field, and right temporoparietal junction. We speculated that SD might disrupt the normal function of these regions crucial for bistable perception, which mediated the slower rivalry-related perceptual transitions in behavior. Our findings revealed the neural changes underlying the abnormal bistable perception following the SD. It also suggested that SD might offer a new window to understand the neural mechanisms underlying the bistable perception.

Blinded by our sight: Understanding the prominence of visual information in judgments of competence and performance

Visual information often quickly dominates people's judgments of others' competence and performance, including in the selection of leaders and decision makers. Reviewing recent research on static and dynamic visual cues, we discuss how people extrapolate judgments of competence and performance from visual information. We highlight how these two streams of research contribute to understanding performance perceptions and offer future avenues for research integrating the consideration of both static and dynamic visual cues.

An active role of inferior frontal cortex in conscious experience

In the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, it has remained controversial whether prefrontal cortex determines what is consciously experienced or, alternatively, serves only complementary functions, such as introspection or action. Here, we provide converging evidence from computational modeling and two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments that indicated a key role of inferior frontal cortex in detecting perceptual conflicts caused by ambiguous sensory information. Crucially, the detection of perceptual conflicts by prefrontal cortex turned out to be critical in the process of transforming ambiguous sensory information into unambiguous conscious experiences: in a third experiment, disruption of neural activity in inferior frontal cortex through transcranial magnetic stimulation slowed down the updating of conscious experience that occurs in response to perceptual conflicts. These findings show that inferior frontal cortex actively contributes to the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. Prefrontal cortex is thus causally involved in determining the contents of conscious experience.

Anterior insula regulates brain network transitions that gate conscious access

Conscious access to sensory information is likely gated at an intermediate site between primary sensory and transmodal association cortices, but the structure responsible remains unknown. We perform functional neuroimaging to determine the neural correlates of conscious access using a volitional mental imagery task, a report paradigm not confounded by motor behavior. Titrating propofol to loss of behavioral responsiveness in healthy volunteers creates dysfunction of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in association with an impairment of dynamic transitions of default-mode and dorsal attention networks. Candidate subcortical regions mediating sensory gating or arousal (thalamus, basal forebrain) fail to show this association. The gating role of the AIC is consistent with findings in awake participants, whose conscious access is predicted by pre-stimulus AIC activity near perceptual threshold. These data support the hypothesis that AIC, situated at an intermediate position of the cortical hierarchy, regulates brain network transitions that gate conscious access.

In a human neuroimaging study, Huang et al. manipulate the level and content of consciousness using independent experimental protocols to demonstrate that the anterior insula, situated between unimodal and transmodal cortical areas along the brain’s functional hierarchy, serves as a gate for conscious access of sensory information.

Don't tell anyone: the importance of no-report paradigms in neuroscience of consciousness

The neural correlates of perceptual awareness are usually investigated by comparing experimental conditions in which subjects are aware or not aware of the delivered stimulus. This, however, implies that subjects report their experience, possibly biasing the neural responses with the postperceptual processes involved. This Neuro Forum article reviews evidence from an electroencephalography (EEG) study by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen M, Ortego K, Kyroudis A, Pitts M. J Neurosci 40: 4925-4935, 2020) addressing the importance of no-report paradigms in the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, authors show that P3b, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of the conscious processing, is strongly elicited only when subjects have to report their experience, proposing a reconsideration in the approach to the neuroscience of consciousness.

Zooming-in on higher-level vision: High-resolution fMRI for understanding visual perception and awareness

One of the central questions in visual neuroscience is how the sparse retinal signals leaving our eyes are transformed into a rich subjective visual experience of the world. Invasive physiology studies, which offers the highest spatial resolution, have revealed many facts about the processing of simple visual features like contrast, color, and orientation, focusing on the early visual areas. At the same time, standard human fMRI studies with comparably coarser spatial resolution have revealed more complex, functionally specialized, and category-selective responses in higher visual areas. Although the visual system is the best understood among the sensory modalities, these two areas of research remain largely segregated. High-resolution fMRI opens up a possibility for linking them. On the one hand, it allows studying how the higher-level visual functions affect the fine-scale activity in early visual areas. On the other hand, it allows discovering the fine-scale functional organization of higher visual areas and exploring their functional connectivity with visual areas lower in the hierarchy. In this review, I will discuss examples of successful work undertaken in these directions using high-resolution fMRI and discuss where this method could be applied in the future to advance our understanding of the complexity of higher-level visual processing.

A functional theory of bistable perception based on dynamical circular inference

When we face ambiguous images, the brain cannot commit to a single percept; instead, it switches between mutually exclusive interpretations every few seconds, a phenomenon known as bistable perception. While neuromechanistic models, e.g., adapting neural populations with lateral inhibition, may account for the dynamics of bistability, a larger question remains unresolved: how this phenomenon informs us on generic perceptual processes in less artificial contexts. Here, we propose that bistable perception is due to our prior beliefs being reverberated in the cortical hierarchy and corrupting the sensory evidence, a phenomenon known as “circular inference”. Such circularity could occur in a hierarchical brain where sensory responses trigger activity in higher-level areas but are also modulated by feedback projections from these same areas. We show that in the face of ambiguous sensory stimuli, circular inference can change the dynamics of the perceptual system and turn what should be an integrator of inputs into a bistable attractor switching between two highly trusted interpretations. The model captures various aspects of bistability, including Levelt’s laws and the stabilizing effects of intermittent presentation of the stimulus. Since it is related to the generic perceptual inference and belief updating mechanisms, this approach can be used to predict the tendency of individuals to form aberrant beliefs from their bistable perception behavior. Overall, we suggest that feedforward/feedback information loops in hierarchical neural networks, a phenomenon that could lead to psychotic symptoms when overly strong, could also underlie perception in nonclinical populations.

In cases of high ambiguity, our perceptual system cannot commit to a single percept and switches between different interpretations, giving rise to bistable perception. In this paper we outline a computational model of bistability based on the notion of circular inference, i.e. a form of suboptimal hierarchical inference in which priors and / or sensory inputs are reverberated and over-counted. We suggest that descending loops (i.e. reverberated priors) transform our perceptual system from a simple accumulator of sensory inputs into a bistable attractor, that switches between two highly-trusted interpretations. Using analytical methods we derive the necessary conditions for bistable perception to occur. We show that our dynamical circular inference model is able to capture many features of bistability, such as Levelt’s laws and the stabilizing effects of intermittent presentation of the stimulus. Finally we make novel predictions about the behavior of psychotic patients.

A new no-report paradigm reveals that face cells encode both consciously perceived and suppressed stimuli

A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. We found that large proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Furthermore, on single trials we could decode both the conscious percept and the suppressed stimulus. Together, these findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.

Virtual reality video promotes effectiveness in advance care planning

Background

In 2019, the Patient Autonomy Act went into effect, allowing Taiwanese citizens to establish legal advance decisions. In an effort to secure a more realistic and accurate perception of situations, a virtual reality video was developed by the palliative care team of Chi-Mei hospital in southern Taiwan for citizens to use before advance care planning. This study explores the change in participants’ preference and certainty regarding end-of-life decisions after using this tool.

Methods

Participants were at least 20 years old and capable of reading and understanding the information provided in the written handout with information about the legal process of making an advance decision. They completed pre-test questionnaires, viewed a six-minute 360-degree virtual reality video on a portable headset, and then completed a post-test questionnaire about their preference on the five medical options—CPR, life-sustaining treatments, antibiotics, blood transfusion, and artificial nutrition and hydration—followed by feedback on the helpfulness of the virtual reality. The control group included 40 participants who only read the handout and completed pre-test and post-test questionnaires.

Results

After viewing the virtual reality video, preference for not using CPR, life-sustaining treatment, antibiotics, blood transfusion, and artificial nutrition and hydration increased significantly in the virtual reality intervention group. Uncertainty regarding the five medical options mentioned above significantly decreased. The intervention was generally recognized by participants for its help in making decisions.

Discussion

The decrease in the number of participants who could not make decisions indicates that the virtual reality video may be helpful for users in making end-of-life decision. According to feedback, the virtual reality video helped equip users with better understanding of medical scenarios, and that it is a good decision tool for advance care planning.

Conclusion

This is the first study since the Patient Autonomy Act has been passed that explores the effectiveness of using a virtual reality video as a decision tool in advance care planning and reveals decreased preference of CPR, life sustaining treatment, antibiotics, blood transfusion, and artificial nutrition and hydration after intervention. This decision aid proved to be an effective tool for clarifying their end-of-life care preferences.

Predictive coding: Neuroscience and art

This paper examines the applicability of predictive coding as an explanatory model for perception. This is carried out from two perspectives. First, the central assumptions of the model are re-examined in light of the neuroscientific evidence for the structure and functioning of key brain areas involved in perception. The inferential processes involved in predictive coding are then investigated in the context of ambiguous stimuli. This showed that while predictive coding may provide an accurate explanation for our perceptual experiences in some cases, there are also several instances where the picture is not as clear cut. Following on from this, particular emphasis is placed on ambiguous art in order to examine the psychological and cognitive implications of predictive coding in affective states. This not only sheds light on the impact of predictive coding for cognition and emotion, but also helps clarify the nature of ambiguous art.

Intracranial Recordings Reveal Unique Shape and Timing of Responses in Human Visual Cortex during Illusory Visual Events

During binocular rivalry, perception spontaneously changes without any alteration to the visual stimulus. What neural events bring about this illusion that a constant stimulus is changing? We recorded from intracranial electrodes placed on the occipital and posterior temporal cortex of two patients with epilepsy while they experienced illusory changes of a face-house binocular-rivalry stimulus or observed a control stimulus that physically changed. We performed within-patient comparisons of broadband high-frequency responses, focusing on single epochs recorded along the ventral processing stream. We found transient face- and house-selective responses localized to the same electrodes for illusory and physical changes, but the temporal characteristics of these responses markedly differed. In comparison with physical changes, responses to illusory changes were longer lasting, in particular exhibiting a characteristic slow rise. Furthermore, the temporal order of responses across the visual hierarchy was reversed for illusory as compared to physical changes: for illusory changes, higher order fusiform and parahippocampal regions responded before lower order occipital regions. Our tentative interpretation of these findings is that two stages underlie the initiation of illusory changes: a destabilization stage in which activity associated with the impending change gradually accumulates across the visual hierarchy, ultimately graduating in a top-down cascade of activity that may stabilize the new perceptual interpretation of the stimulus.

Invisible Adaptation: The Effect of Awareness on the Strength of the Motion Aftereffect

The ability to process information despite the lack of perceptual awareness is one of the most fascinating aspects of the visual system. Such unconscious processing is often investigated using adaptation, where any presence of the former can be traced by its footprint on aftereffects following the latter. We have investigated the mechanisms of the motion aftereffect (MAE) using random dot displays of varying motion coherence as well as crowding to modulate both the physical as well as the perceptual strength of the adaptation stimulus. Perceptual strength was quantitatively measured as the performance in a forced-choice direction-discrimination task. A motion-nulling technique was used to quantitatively measure the strength of the MAE. We show that the strength of the dynamic MAE is independently influenced by both the physical stimulus strength as well as the subjective perceptual strength, with the effect of the former being more prominent than that of the latter. We further show that the MAE still persists under conditions of subthreshold perception. Our results suggest that perceptual awareness can influence the strength of visual processing, but the latter is not fully dependent on the former and can still take place at its partial or even total absence.

Visual Cultural Biases in Food Classification

This article investigates how visual biases influence the choices made by people and machines in the context of online food. To this end the paper investigates three research questions and shows (i) to what extent machines are able to classify images, (ii) how this compares to human performance on the same task and (iii) which factors are involved in the decision making of both humans and machines. The research reveals that algorithms significantly outperform human labellers on this task with a range of biases being present in the decision-making process. The results are important as they have a range of implications for research, such as recommender technology and crowdsourcing, as is discussed in the article.

Novel method to measure temporal windows based on eye movements during viewing of the Necker cube

Bistable stimuli can give rise to two different interpretations between which our perception will alternate. Recent results showed a strong coupling between eye movements and reports of perceptual alternations with motion stimuli, which provides useful tools to objectively assess perceptual alternations. However, motion might entrain eye movements, and here we check with a static picture, the Necker cube, whether eye movements and perceptual reports (manual responses) reveal similar or different alternation rates, and similar or different sensitivity to attention manipulations. Using a cluster analysis, ocular temporal windows were defined based on the dynamics of ocular fixations during viewing of the Necker cube and compared to temporal windows extracted from manual responses. Ocular temporal windows were measured also with a control condition, where the physical stimulus presented to viewers alternated between two non-ambiguous versions of the Necker cube. Attention was manipulated by asking subjects to either report spontaneous alternations, focus on one percept, or switch as fast as possible between percepts. The validity of the ocular temporal windows was confirmed by the correspondence between ocular fixations when the physical stimulus changed and when the bistable Necker cube was presented. Ocular movements defined smaller time windows than time windows extracted from manual responses. The number of manual and ocular windows both increased between the spontaneous condition and the switch condition. However, only manual, and not ocular windows, increased in duration in the focus condition. Manual responses involve decisional mechanisms, and they may be decoupled from automatic oscillations between the two percepts, as suggested by the fact that both the number and duration of ocular windows remained stable between the spontaneous and focus conditions. In all, the recording of eye movements provides an objective measure of time windows, and reveals faster perceptual alternations with the Necker cube and less sensitivity to attention manipulations than manual responses.

What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It

Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of report, subjects might engage in post-perceptual cognitive processing. Therefore, to isolate the neural basis of consciousness, a no-cognition paradigm is needed. Here, I describe a no-cognition approach to binocular rivalry and outline how this approach can help to resolve debates about the neural basis of consciousness.

Interneuronal correlations at longer time scales predict decision signals for bistable structure-from-motion perception

Perceptual decisions are thought to depend on the activation of task-relevant neurons, whose activity is often correlated in time. Here, we examined how the temporal structure of shared variability in neuronal firing relates to perceptual choices. We recorded stimulus-selective neurons from visual area V5/MT while two monkeys (Macaca mulatta) made perceptual decisions about the rotation direction of structure-from-motion cylinders. Interneuronal correlations for a perceptually ambiguous cylinder stimulus were significantly higher than those for unambiguous cylinders or for random 2D motion during passive viewing. Much of the difference arose from correlations at relatively long timescales (hundreds of milliseconds). Choice-related neural activity (quantified as choice probability; CP) for ambiguous cylinders was positively correlated with interneuronal correlations and was specifically associated with their long timescale component. Furthermore, the slope of the long timescale - but not the instantaneous - component of the correlation predicted higher CPs towards the end of the trial i.e. close to the decision. Our results suggest that the perceptual stability of structure-from-motion cylinders may be controlled by enhanced interneuronal correlations on longer timescales. We propose this as a potential signature of top-down influences onto V5/MT processing that shape and stabilize the appearance of 3D-motion percepts.

The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?

The success of the Bayesian perspective in explaining perceptual phenomena has motivated the view that perceptual representation is probabilistic. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why does normal conscious perception not reflect the full probability functions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in cortical area MT that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. The standard solution in terms of sampling runs into the problem that sampling is an account of perceptual decision rather than perception. This paper argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Neural basis of somatosensory target detection independent of uncertainty, relevance, and reports

Research on somatosensory awareness has yielded highly diverse findings with putative neural correlates ranging from activity within somatosensory cortex to activation of widely distributed frontoparietal networks. Divergent results from previous studies may reside in cognitive processes that often coincide with stimulus awareness in experimental settings. To scrutinise the specific relevance of regions implied in the target detection network, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (n = 27) on a novel somatosensory detection task that explicitly controls for stimulus uncertainty, behavioural relevance, overt reports, and motor responses. Using Bayesian Model Selection, we show that responses reflecting target detection are restricted to secondary somatosensory cortex, whereas activity in insular, cingulate, and motor regions is best explained in terms of stimulus uncertainty and overt reports. Our results emphasise the role of sensory-specific cortex for the emergence of perceptual awareness and dissect the contribution of the frontoparietal network to classical detection tasks.

Intrinsic timescales of sensory integration for motion perception

A subject-specific process of perceptual decision making is of importance to how the brain translates its interpretation of sensory information into behavior. In particular, a number of studies reported substantial variation across the observers’ decision behavior, which may reflect different profiles of evidence accumulated by each individual. However, a detailed profile of perceptual integration has not yet been verified from human behavioral data. To address the issue, we precisely measured the time course of sensory integration, as the “sensory integration kernel” of subjects, using a coherence-varying motion discrimination task. We found that each subject has a distinct profile of sensory integration. We observed that kernel size (maximum sensory integration interval) is consistent within subjects, independent of external stimuli conditions. The observed kernel could accurately predict subject-specific perceptual behaviors and explain the inter-individual variation of observed behaviors. Surprisingly, the performance of most subjects did not improve in proportion to increased duration of the stimulus, but was maximized when the stimulus duration matched their kernel size. We also found that the observed kernel size was strongly correlated with the subject-specific perceptual characteristics for illusory motion. Our results suggest that perceptual decisions arise from intrinsic decision dynamics, and on individual timescales of sensory integration.

Parallel and functionally segregated processing of task phase and conscious content in the prefrontal cortex

The role of lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) in mediating conscious perception has been recently questioned due to potential confounds resulting from the parallel operation of task related processes. We have previously demonstrated encoding of contents of visual consciousness in LPFC neurons during a no-report task involving perceptual suppression. Here, we report a separate LPFC population that exhibits task-phase related activity during the same task. The activity profile of these neurons could be captured as canonical response patterns (CRPs), with their peak amplitudes sequentially distributed across different task phases. Perceptually suppressed visual input had a negligible impact on sequential firing and functional connectivity structure. Importantly, task-phase related neurons were functionally segregated from the neuronal population, which encoded conscious perception. These results suggest that neurons exhibiting task-phase related activity operate in the LPFC concurrently with, but segregated from neurons representing conscious content during a no-report task involving perceptual suppression.

Vishal Kapoor et al. identify a population of cells in the lateral prefrontal cortex that exhibits task phase-related activity during a no-report task. This cell population is functionally segregated from the population encoding conscious perception, although the two operate in parallel.

Inhibition-excitation balance in the parietal cortex modulates volitional control for auditory and visual multistability

Perceptual organisation must select one interpretation from several alternatives to guide behaviour. Computational models suggest that this could be achieved through an interplay between inhibition and excitation across competing types of neural population coding for each interpretation. Here, to test for such models, we used magnetic resonance spectroscopy to measure non-invasively the concentrations of inhibitory γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and excitatory glutamate-glutamine (Glx) in several brain regions. Human participants first performed auditory and visual multistability tasks that produced spontaneous switching between percepts. Then, we observed that longer percept durations during behaviour were associated with higher GABA/Glx ratios in the sensory area coding for each modality. When participants were asked to voluntarily modulate their perception, a common factor across modalities emerged: the GABA/Glx ratio in the posterior parietal cortex tended to be positively correlated with the amount of effective volitional control. Our results provide direct evidence implicating that the balance between neural inhibition and excitation within sensory regions resolves perceptual competition. This powerful computational principle appears to be leveraged by both audition and vision, implemented independently across modalities, but modulated by an integrated control process.

Response to Ruby et al: On a 'failed' attempt to manipulate conscious perception with transcranial magnetic stimulation to prefrontal cortex

Does disruption of prefrontal cortical activity using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) impair visual metacognition? An initial study supporting this idea (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010) motivated an attempted replication and extension (Bor, Schwartzman, Barrett, & Seth, 2017). Bor et al. failed to replicate the initial study, concluding that there was not good evidence that TMS to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs visual metacognition. This failed replication has recently been critiqued by some of the authors of the initial study (Ruby, Maniscalco, & Peters, 2018). Here we argue that these criticisms are misplaced. In our response, we encounter some more general issues concerning good practice in replication of cognitive neuroscience studies, and in setting criteria for excluding data when employing statistical analyses like signal detection theory. We look forward to further studies investigating the role of prefrontal cortex in metacognition, with increasingly refined methodologies, motivated by the discussions in this series of papers.

Composite binocular perception from dichoptic stimulus arrays with similar ensemble information

We view the world through laterally displaced eyes that generate two streams of image signals differing slightly in their perspectives of the visual scene. The brain derives three-dimensional structures from these two image streams by establishing binocular matches and computing image disparities between the two eyes' views. Since the binocular matching problem can have multiple, alternative solutions, vision relies on several strategies to determine the most probable matches. The current study investigated whether the visual system might utilize regularities among neighbouring features (feature ensembles) when confronting this problem. We hypothesized that binocular perception with unlikely, anomalous ensembles would indicate unsuccessful binocular matches. We made dichoptic stimulus arrays of coloured circles and manipulated the colour similarity of stimulus items to produce probable or unusual ensembles when superimposed. Using binocular rivalry as a proxy index, we found that composite perception of dichoptic arrays was more stable when the stimulus items shared similar colours, and that unusual ensembles induced binocular rivalry. Our results suggest that binocular ensembles can be utilized to detect unsuccessful binocular matches, thus uncovering a potentially useful supplemental strategy for identifying binocular matches when viewing potentially confusing visual scenes containing redundant visual features.

Human single neuron activity precedes emergence of conscious perception

Identifying the neuronal basis of spontaneous changes in conscious experience in the absence of changes in the external environment is a major challenge. Binocular rivalry, in which two stationary monocular images lead to continuously changing perception, provides a unique opportunity to address this issue. We studied the activity of human single neurons in the medial temporal and frontal lobes while patients were engaged in binocular rivalry. Here we report that internal changes in the content of perception are signaled by very early (~-2000 ms) nonselective medial frontal activity, followed by selective activity of medial temporal lobe neurons that precedes the perceptual change by ~1000 ms. Such early activations are not found for externally driven perceptual changes. These results suggest that a medial fronto-temporal network may be involved in the preconscious internal generation of perceptual transitions.

Similar but separate systems underlie perceptual bistability in vision and audition

The dynamics of perceptual bistability, the phenomenon in which perception switches between different interpretations of an unchanging stimulus, are characterised by very similar properties across a wide range of qualitatively different paradigms. This suggests that perceptual switching may be triggered by some common source. However, it is also possible that perceptual switching may arise from a distributed system, whose components vary according to the specifics of the perceptual experiences involved. Here we used a visual and an auditory task to determine whether individuals show cross-modal commonalities in perceptual switching. We found that individual perceptual switching rates were significantly correlated across modalities. We then asked whether perceptual switching arises from some central (modality-) task-independent process or from a more distributed task-specific system. We found that a log-normal distribution best explained the distribution of perceptual phases in both modalities, suggestive of a combined set of independent processes causing perceptual switching. Modality- and/or task-dependent differences in these distributions, and lack of correlation with the modality-independent central factors tested (ego-resiliency, creativity, and executive function), also point towards perceptual switching arising from a distributed system of similar but independent processes.

The influence of action-effect anticipation on bistable perception: differences between onset rivalry and ambiguous motion

Perception is strongly shaped by the actions we perform. According to the theory of event coding, and forward models of motor control, goal-directed action preparation activates representations of desired effects. These expectations about the precise stimulus identity of one's action-outcomes (i.e. identity predictions) are thought to selectively influence perceptual processing of action-contingent effects. However, the existing evidence for such identity-prediction effects is scarce and mixed. Here, we developed a new paradigm to capture such effects and examined whether action-outcome predictions can bias the perception of binocular onset rivalry (Experiments 1a and 1b) and bistable motion (Experiment 2). Participants performed learning tasks in which they were exposed to action-outcome associations. On test trials, actions were followed by bistable stimuli that could be perceived as being either congruent or incongruent with the aforementioned associations (i.e. rivalrous oriented gratings in Experiments 1a and 1b and spheres with ambiguous rotation directions in Experiment 2). Across three experiments, we show that, whilst exposure to action-effect associations can bias the apparent motion direction of ambiguous spheres, it fails to influence perceptual selection of grating orientations in binocular onset rivalry. This pattern of results extends previous work on ambiguous motion by demonstrating that action-induced modulations do not generalize to all types of bistable percepts.