A neural circuit model of decision uncertainty and change-of-mind

A neurocomputational model of decision and confidence in object recognition task

How does the brain process natural visual stimuli to make a decision? Imagine driving through fog. An object looms ahead. What do you do? This decision requires not only identifying the object but also choosing an action based on your decision confidence. In this circumstance, confidence is making a bridge between seeing and believing. Our study unveils how the brain processes visual information to make such decisions with an assessment of confidence, using a model inspired by the visual cortex. To computationally model the process, this study uses a spiking neural network inspired by the hierarchy of the visual cortex in mammals to investigate the dynamics of feedforward object recognition and decision-making in the brain. The model consists of two modules: a temporal dynamic object representation module and an attractor neural network-based decision-making module. Unlike traditional models, ours captures the evolution of evidence within the visual cortex, mimicking how confidence forms in the brain. This offers a more biologically plausible approach to decision-making when encountering real-world stimuli. We conducted experiments using natural stimuli and measured accuracy, reaction time, and confidence. The model's estimated confidence aligns remarkably well with human-reported confidence. Furthermore, the model can simulate the human change-of-mind phenomenon, reflecting the ongoing evaluation of evidence in the brain. Also, this finding offers decision-making and confidence encoding share the same neural circuit.

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Cognitive Modeling of Left-Turn Gap Acceptance Decisions in Human Drivers

OBJECTIVE

We aim to bridge the gap between naturalistic studies of driver behavior and modern cognitive and neuroscientific accounts of decision making by modeling the cognitive processes underlying left-turn gap acceptance by human drivers.

BACKGROUND

Understanding decisions of human drivers is essential for the development of safe and efficient transportation systems. Current models of decision making in drivers provide little insight into the underlying cognitive processes. On the other hand, laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. However, it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in these tasks are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving.

RESULTS

The drivers' probability of accepting the available gap increased with the size of the gap; importantly, response time increased with time gap but not distance gap. The generalized drift-diffusion model explained the observed decision outcomes and response time distributions, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that dynamic evidence accumulation is an essential mechanism underlying left-turn gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.

APPLICATION

Potential applications of our results include real-time prediction of human behavior by automated vehicles and simulating realistic human-like behaviors in virtual environments for automated vehicles.

Interpersonal alignment of neural evidence accumulation to social exchange of confidence

Private, subjective beliefs about uncertainty have been found to have idiosyncratic computational and neural substrates yet, humans share such beliefs seamlessly and cooperate successfully. Bringing together decision making under uncertainty and interpersonal alignment in communication, in a discovery plus pre-registered replication design, we examined the neuro-computational basis of the relationship between privately held and socially shared uncertainty. Examining confidence-speed-accuracy trade-off in uncertainty-ridden perceptual decisions under social vs isolated context, we found that shared (i.e. reported confidence) and subjective (inferred from pupillometry) uncertainty dynamically followed social information. An attractor neural network model incorporating social information as top-down additive input captured the observed behavior and demonstrated the emergence of social alignment in virtual dyadic simulations. Electroencephalography showed that social exchange of confidence modulated the neural signature of perceptual evidence accumulation in the central parietal cortex. Our findings offer a neural population model for interpersonal alignment of shared beliefs.

Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex

Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in the prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays to reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.

Attractor dynamics reflect decision confidence in macaque prefrontal cortex

Decisions are made with different degrees of consistency, and this consistency can be linked to the confidence that the best choice has been made. Theoretical work suggests that attractor dynamics in networks can account for choice consistency, but how this is implemented in the brain remains unclear. Here, we provide evidence that the energy landscape around attractor basins in population neural activity in prefrontal cortex reflects choice consistency. We trained two rhesus monkeys to make accept/reject decisions based on pretrained visual cues that signaled reward offers with different magnitudes and delays-to-reward. Monkeys made consistent decisions for very good and very bad offers, but decisions were less consistent for intermediate offers. Analysis of neural data showed that the attractor basins around patterns of activity reflecting decisions had steeper landscapes for offers that led to consistent decisions. Therefore, we provide neural evidence that energy landscapes predict decision consistency, which reflects decision confidence.

Choice selective inhibition drives stability and competition in decision circuits

During perceptual decision-making, the firing rates of cortical neurons reflect upcoming choices. Recent work showed that excitatory and inhibitory neurons are equally selective for choice. However, the functional consequences of inhibitory choice selectivity in decision-making circuits are unknown. We developed a circuit model of decision-making which accounts for the specificity of inputs to and outputs from inhibitory neurons. We found that selective inhibition expands the space of circuits supporting decision-making, allowing for weaker or stronger recurrent excitation when connected in a competitive or feedback motif. The specificity of inhibitory outputs sets the trade-off between speed and accuracy of decisions by either stabilizing or destabilizing the saddle-point dynamics underlying decisions in the circuit. Recurrent neural networks trained to make decisions display the same dependence on inhibitory specificity and the strength of recurrent excitation. Our results reveal two concurrent roles for selective inhibition in decision-making circuits: stabilizing strongly connected excitatory populations and maximizing competition between oppositely selective populations.

Stable choice coding in rat frontal orienting fields across model-predicted changes of mind

During decision making in a changing environment, evidence that may guide the decision accumulates until the point of action. In the rat, provisional choice is thought to be represented in frontal orienting fields (FOF), but this has only been tested in static environments where provisional and final decisions are not easily dissociated. Here, we characterize the representation of accumulated evidence in the FOF of rats performing a recently developed dynamic evidence accumulation task, which induces changes in the provisional decision, referred to as “changes of mind”. We find that FOF encodes evidence throughout decision formation with a temporal gain modulation that rises until the period when the animal may need to act. Furthermore, reversals in FOF firing rates can be accounted for by changes of mind predicted using a model of the decision process fit only to behavioral data. Our results suggest that the FOF represents provisional decisions even in dynamic, uncertain environments, allowing for rapid motor execution when it is time to act.

A leaky accumulation model can predict rats’ changes of mind during decision making in a dynamic environment explaining reversals in frontal cortical activity and demonstrating a stable choice code despite environmental uncertainty.

An initial 'snapshot' of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made ('pre-decisional information') has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants' decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial 'snapshot' of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.

Confidence Modulates the Conformity Behavior of the Investors and Neural Responses of Social Influence in Crowdfunding

The decision about whether to invest can be affected by the choices or opinions of others known as a form of social influence. People make decisions with fluctuating confidence, which plays an important role in the decision process. However, it remains a fair amount of confusion regarding the effect of confidence on the social influence as well as the underlying neural mechanism. The current study applied a willingness-to-invest task with the event-related potentials method to examine the behavioral and neural manifestations of social influence and its interaction with confidence in the context of crowdfunding investment. The behavioral results demonstrate that the conformity tendency of the people increased when their willingness-to-invest deviated far from the group. Besides, when the people felt less confident about their initial judgment, they were more likely to follow the herd. In conjunction with the behavioral findings, the neural results of the social information processing indicate different susceptibilities to small and big conflicts between the own willingness of the people and the group, with small conflict evoked less negative feedback-related negativity (FRN) and more positive late positive potential (LPP). Moreover, confidence only modulated the later neural processing by eliciting larger LPP in the low confidence, implying more reliance on social information. These results corroborate previous findings regarding the conformity effect and its neural mechanism in investment decision and meanwhile extend the existing works of literature through providing behavioral and neural evidence to the effect of confidence on the social influence in the crowdfunding marketplace.

Adaptive neurons compute confidence in a decision network

Humans and many animals have the ability to assess the confidence of their decisions. However, little is known about the underlying neural substrate and mechanism. In this study we propose a computational model consisting of a group of 'confidence neurons' with adaptation, which are able to assess the confidence of decisions by detecting the slope of ramping activities of decision neurons. The simulated activities of 'confidence neurons' in our simple model capture the typical features of confidence observed in humans and animals experiments. Our results indicate that confidence could be online formed along with the decision formation, and the adaptation properties could be used to monitor the formation of confidence during the decision making.

Explaining distortions in metacognition with an attractor network model of decision uncertainty

Metacognition is the ability to reflect on, and evaluate, our cognition and behaviour. Distortions in metacognition are common in mental health disorders, though the neural underpinnings of such dysfunction are unknown. One reason for this is that models of key components of metacognition, such as decision confidence, are generally specified at an algorithmic or process level. While such models can be used to relate brain function to psychopathology, they are difficult to map to a neurobiological mechanism. Here, we develop a biologically-plausible model of decision uncertainty in an attempt to bridge this gap. We first relate the model's uncertainty in perceptual decisions to standard metrics of metacognition, namely mean confidence level (bias) and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments (sensitivity). We show that dissociable shifts in metacognition are associated with isolated disturbances at higher-order levels of a circuit associated with self-monitoring, akin to neuropsychological findings that highlight the detrimental effect of prefrontal brain lesions on metacognitive performance. Notably, we are able to account for empirical confidence judgements by fitting the parameters of our biophysical model to first-order performance data, specifically choice and response times. Lastly, in a reanalysis of existing data we show that self-reported mental health symptoms relate to disturbances in an uncertainty-monitoring component of the network. By bridging a gap between a biologically-plausible model of confidence formation and observed disturbances of metacognition in mental health disorders we provide a first step towards mapping theoretical constructs of metacognition onto dynamical models of decision uncertainty. In doing so, we provide a computational framework for modelling metacognitive performance in settings where access to explicit confidence reports is not possible.

A Hierarchical Attractor Network Model of perceptual versus intentional decision updates

Changes of Mind are a striking example of our ability to flexibly reverse decisions and change our own actions. Previous studies largely focused on Changes of Mind in decisions about perceptual information. Here we report reversals of decisions that require integrating multiple classes of information: 1) Perceptual evidence, 2) higher-order, voluntary intentions, and 3) motor costs. In an adapted version of the random-dot motion task, participants moved to a target that matched both the external (exogenous) evidence about dot-motion direction and a preceding internally-generated (endogenous) intention about which colour to paint the dots. Movement trajectories revealed whether and when participants changed their mind about the dot-motion direction, or additionally changed their mind about which colour to choose. Our results show that decision reversals about colour intentions are less frequent in participants with stronger intentions (Exp. 1) and when motor costs of intention pursuit are lower (Exp. 2). We further show that these findings can be explained by a hierarchical, multimodal Attractor Network Model that continuously integrates higher-order voluntary intentions with perceptual evidence and motor costs. Our model thus provides a unifying framework in which voluntary actions emerge from a dynamic combination of internal action tendencies and external environmental factors, each of which can be subject to Change of Mind.

Confirmation bias is adaptive when coupled with efficient metacognition

Biases in the consideration of evidence can reduce the chances of consensus between people with different viewpoints. While such altered information processing typically leads to detrimental performance in laboratory tasks, the ubiquitous nature of confirmation bias makes it unlikely that selective information processing is universally harmful. Here, we suggest that confirmation bias is adaptive to the extent that agents have good metacognition, allowing them to downweight contradictory information when correct but still able to seek new information when they realize they are wrong. Using simulation-based modelling, we explore how the adaptiveness of holding a confirmation bias depends on such metacognitive insight. We find that the behavioural consequences of selective information processing are systematically affected by agents' introspective abilities. Strikingly, we find that selective information processing can even improve decision-making when compared with unbiased evidence accumulation, as long as it is accompanied by good metacognition. These results further suggest that interventions which boost people's metacognition might be efficient in alleviating the negative effects of selective information processing on issues such as political polarization.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of prior-informed perceptual decision-making in humans

To interact successfully with diverse sensory environments, we must adapt our decision processes to account for time constraints and prior probabilities. The full set of decision-process parameters that undergo such flexible adaptation has proven to be difficult to establish using simplified models that are based on behaviour alone. Here, we utilize well-characterized human neurophysiological signatures of decision formation to construct and constrain a build-to-threshold decision model with multiple build-up (evidence accumulation and urgency) and delay components (pre- and post-decisional). The model indicates that all of these components were adapted in distinct ways and, in several instances, fundamentally differ from the conclusions of conventional diffusion modelling. The neurally informed model outcomes were corroborated by independent neural decision signal observations that were not used in the model's construction. These findings highlight the breadth of decision-process parameters that are amenable to strategic adjustment and the value in leveraging neurophysiological measurements to quantify these adjustments.

Perceptual change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence magnitude

To navigate the world safely, we often need to rapidly 'change our mind' about decisions. Current models assume that initial decisions and change-of-mind decisions draw upon common sources of sensory evidence. In two-choice scenarios, this evidence may be 'relative' or 'absolute'. For example, when judging which of two objects is the brightest, the luminance difference and luminance ratio between the two objects are sources of 'relative' evidence, which are invariant across additive and multiplicative luminance changes. Conversely, the overall luminance of the two objects combined is a source of 'absolute' evidence, which necessarily varies across symmetric luminance manipulations. Previous studies have shown that initial decisions are sensitive to both relative and absolute evidence; however, it is unknown whether change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence. Here, we investigated this question across two experiments. In each experiment participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli remained on screen for a brief period and participants could change their response. To investigate the effect of absolute evidence, the overall luminance of the two squares was varied whilst either the luminance difference (Experiment 1) or luminance ratio (Experiment 2) was held constant. In both experiments we found that increases in absolute evidence led to faster, less accurate initial responses and slower changes of mind. Change-of-mind accuracy decreased when the luminance difference was held constant, but remained unchanged when the luminance ratio was fixed. We show that the three existing change-of-mind models cannot account for our findings. We then fit three alternative models, previously used to account for the effect of absolute evidence on one-off decisions, to the data. A leaky competing accumulator model best accounted for the changes in behaviour across absolute evidence conditions - suggesting an important role for input-dependent leak in explaining perceptual changes of mind.

A neural algorithm for Drosophila linear and nonlinear decision-making

It has been evidenced that vision-based decision-making in Drosophila consists of both simple perceptual (linear) decision and value-based (non-linear) decision. This paper proposes a general computational spiking neural network (SNN) model to explore how different brain areas are connected contributing to Drosophila linear and nonlinear decision-making behavior. First, our SNN model could successfully describe all the experimental findings in fly visual reinforcement learning and action selection among multiple conflicting choices as well. Second, our computational modeling shows that dopaminergic neuron-GABAergic neuron-mushroom body (DA-GABA-MB) works in a recurrent loop providing a key circuit for gain and gating mechanism of nonlinear decision making. Compared with existing models, our model shows more biologically plausible on the network design and working mechanism, and could amplify the small differences between two conflicting cues more clearly. Finally, based on the proposed model, the UAV could quickly learn to make clear-cut decisions among multiple visual choices and flexible reversal learning resembling to real fly. Compared with linear and uniform decision-making methods, the DA-GABA-MB mechanism helps UAV complete the decision-making task with fewer steps.

Confidence drives a neural confirmation bias

A prominent source of polarised and entrenched beliefs is confirmation bias, where evidence against one's position is selectively disregarded. This effect is most starkly evident when opposing parties are highly confident in their decisions. Here we combine human magnetoencephalography (MEG) with behavioural and neural modelling to identify alterations in post-decisional processing that contribute to the phenomenon of confirmation bias. We show that holding high confidence in a decision leads to a striking modulation of post-decision neural processing, such that integration of confirmatory evidence is amplified while disconfirmatory evidence processing is abolished. We conclude that confidence shapes a selective neural gating for choice-consistent information, reducing the likelihood of changes of mind on the basis of new information. A central role for confidence in shaping the fidelity of evidence accumulation indicates that metacognitive interventions may help ameliorate this pervasive cognitive bias.

Changes-of-mind in the absence of new post-decision evidence

Decisions are occasionally accompanied by changes-of-mind. While considered a hallmark of cognitive flexibility, the mechanisms underlying changes-of-mind remain elusive. Previous studies on perceptual decision making have focused on changes-of-mind that are primarily driven by the accumulation of additional noisy sensory evidence after the initial decision. In a motion discrimination task, we demonstrate that changes-of-mind can occur even in the absence of additional evidence after the initial decision. Unlike previous studies of changes-of-mind, the majority of changes-of-mind in our experiment occurred in trials with prolonged initial response times. This suggests a distinct mechanism underlying such changes. Using a neural circuit model of decision uncertainty and change-of-mind behaviour, we demonstrate that this phenomenon is associated with top-down signals mediated by an uncertainty-monitoring neural population. Such a mechanism is consistent with recent neurophysiological evidence showing a link between changes-of-mind and elevated top-down neural activity. Our model explains the long response times associated with changes-of-mind through high decision uncertainty levels in such trials, and accounts for the observed motor response trajectories. Overall, our work provides a computational framework that explains changes-of-mind in the absence of new post-decision evidence.

Beyond reach: Do symmetric changes in motor costs affect decision making? A registered report

Executing an important decision can be as easy as moving a mouse cursor or reaching towards the preferred option with a hand. But would we decide differently if choosing required walking a few steps towards an option? More generally, is our preference invariant to the means and motor costs of reporting it? Previous research demonstrated that asymmetric motor costs can nudge the decision-maker towards a less costly option. However, virtually all traditional decision-making theories predict that increasing motor costs symmetrically for all options should not affect choice in any way. This prediction is disputed by the theory of embodied cognition, which suggests that motor behavior is an integral part of cognitive processes, and that motor costs can affect our choices. In this registered report, we investigated whether varying motor costs can affect response dynamics and the final choices in an intertemporal choice task: choosing between a readily available small reward and a larger but delayed reward. Our study compared choices reported by moving a computer mouse cursor towards the preferred option with the choices executed via a more motor costly walking procedure. First, we investigated whether relative values of the intertemporal choice options affect walking trajectories in the same way as they affect mouse cursor dynamics. Second, we tested a hypothesis that, in the walking condition, increased motor costs of a preference reversal would decrease the number of changes-of-mind and therefore increase the proportion of impulsive, smaller-but-sooner choices. We confirmed the hypothesis that walking trajectories reflect covert dynamics of decision making, and rejected the hypothesis that increased motor costs of responding affect decisions in an intertemporal choice task. Overall, this study contributes to the empirical basis enabling the decision-making theories to address the complex interplay between cognitive and motor processes.