Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination

Imageless imagery in aphantasia revealed by early visual cortex decoding

Activity in the early visual cortex is thought to tightly couple with conscious experience, including feedback-driven mental imagery. However, in aphantasia (a complete lack of visual imagery), the state of mental imagery, what takes its place, or how any activity relates to qualia remains unknown. This study analyzed univariate (amplitude) and multivariate (decoding) blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals in primary visual cortex during imagery attempts. "Imagery" content could be decoded equally well in both groups; however, unlike in those with imagery, neural signatures in those with validated aphantasia were ipsilateral and could not be cross-decoded with perceptual representations. Further, the perception-induced BOLD response was lower in those with aphantasia compared with controls. Together, these data suggest that an imagery-related representation, but with less or transformed sensory information, exists in the primary visual cortex of those with aphantasia. Our data challenge the classic view that activity in primary visual cortex should result in sensory qualia.

Introspective psychophysics for the study of subjective experience

Studying subjective experience is hard. We believe that pain is not identical to nociception, nor pleasure a computational reward signal, nor fear the activation of "threat circuitry". Unfortunately, introspective self-reports offer our best bet for accessing subjective experience, but many still believe that introspection is "unreliable" and "unverifiable". But which of introspection's faults do we find most damning? Is it that introspection provides imperfect access to brain processes (e.g. perception, memory)? That subjective experience is not objectively verifiable? That it is hard to isolate from non-subjective processing capacity? Here, I argue none of these prevents us from building a meaningful, impactful psychophysical research program that treats subjective experience as a valid empirical target through precisely characterizing relationships among environmental variables, brain processes and behavior, and self-reported phenomenology. Following recent similar calls by Peters (Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience. 2022. Neurosci Biobehav Rev: 142, 104903), Kammerer and Frankish (What forms could introspective systems take? A research programme. 2023. J Conscious Stud 30:13-48), and Fleming (Metacognitive psychophysics in humans, animals, and AI. 2023. J Conscious Stud 30:113-128), "introspective psychophysics" thus treats introspection's apparent faults as features, not bugs-just as the noise and distortions linking environment to behavior inspired Fechner's psychophysics over 150 years ago. This next generation of psychophysics will establish a powerful tool for building and testing precise explanatory models of phenomenology across many dimensions-urgency, emotion, clarity, vividness, confidence, and more.

Indigenous Australian perspectives on the perinatal period: Social well-being, culture and early infant attachments

OBJECTIVE

Although social factors and culture are significant determinants of health in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, little is known academically about key interpersonal and social experiences of this population during the perinatal period, or how early attachments are formed through culture. This study addressed this gap in the literature.

METHODS AND MEASURES

A reflexive thematic analysis approach was applied to the data gathered from focus groups (N = 14) held with Aboriginal (N = 7) and Torres Strait Islander (N = 7) mothers and their kinship systems.

RESULTS

Five prominent interpersonal and social themes were identified: maternal-fetal attachment, infant-kinship attachment, caretaking roles/shared caregiving, traditional adoption, and ceremonies and rites of passage. Characteristics of maternal-fetal attachment were aligned with the construct in non-Indigenous literature. Post-utero, caretaking/shared caregiving roles such as 'big mum/dad' and 'small mum/dad' were identified. Ceremonies and rites of passage were understood to cement cultural roles within the kinship system, and the role of the maternal uncle was highlighted. A cultural obligation to help raise the child for biological mothers' other siblings, known as 'mums' and 'dads', was identified.

CONCLUSION

Discussion is centred around the necessity for 'grass roots' research from the perspectives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, and on suggestions for future research in further exploring the themes derived from this research.

Reality and imagination intertwined: A sensorimotor paradox interpretation

As a hypothesis on the origins of mind and language, the evolutionary theory of the sensorimotor paradox suggests that capacities for imagination, self-representation and abstraction would operate from a dissociation in what is known as the forward model. In some studies, sensory perception is understood as a system of prediction and confirmation (feedforward and feedback processes) that would share common yet distinct and overlapping neural networks with mental imagery. The latter would then mostly operate through internal feedback processes. The hypothesis of our theory is that dissociation and parallelism between those processes would make it less likely for imaginary prediction to match and simultaneously coincide with any sensory feedback, contradicting the stimulus/response pattern. The gap between the two and the effort required to maintain this gap, born from the development of bipedal stance and a radical change to our relation to our own hands, would be the very structural foundation to our capacity to elaborate abstract thoughts, by partially blocking and inhibiting motor action. Mental imagery would structurally be dissociated from perception, though maintaining an intricated relation of interdependence. Moreover, the content of the images would be subordinate to their function as emotional regulators, prioritising consistency with some global, conditional and socially learnt body-image. As a higher-level and proto-aesthetic function, we can speculate that the action and instrumentalisation of dissociating imagination from perception would become the actual prediction and their coordination, the expected feedback.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

Centering cognitive neuroscience on task demands and generalization

Cognitive neuroscience seeks generalizable theories explaining the relationship between behavioral, physiological and mental states. In pursuit of such theories, we propose a theoretical and empirical framework that centers on understanding task demands and the mutual constraints they impose on behavior and neural activity. Task demands emerge from the interaction between an agent's sensory impressions, goals and behavior, which jointly shape the activity and structure of the nervous system on multiple spatiotemporal scales. Understanding this interaction requires multitask studies that vary more than one experimental component (for example, stimuli and instructions) combined with dense behavioral and neural sampling and explicit testing for generalization across tasks and data modalities. By centering task demands rather than mental processes that tasks are assumed to engage, this framework paves the way for the discovery of new generalizable concepts unconstrained by existing taxonomies, and moves cognitive neuroscience toward an action-oriented, dynamic and integrated view of the brain.

Replay-triggered brain-wide activation in humans

The consolidation of discrete experiences into a coherent narrative shapes the cognitive map, providing structured mental representations of our experiences. In this process, past memories are reactivated and replayed in sequence, fostering hippocampal-cortical dialogue. However, brain-wide engagement coinciding with sequential reactivation (or replay) of memories remains largely unexplored. In this study, employing simultaneous EEG-fMRI, we capture both the spatial and temporal dynamics of memory replay. We find that during mental simulation, past memories are replayed in fast sequences as detected via EEG. These transient replay events are associated with heightened fMRI activity in the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex. Replay occurrence strengthens functional connectivity between the hippocampus and the default mode network, a set of brain regions key to representing the cognitive map. On the other hand, when subjects are at rest following learning, memory reactivation of task-related items is stronger than that of pre-learning rest, and is also associated with heightened hippocampal activation and augmented hippocampal connectivity to the entorhinal cortex. Together, our findings highlight a distributed, brain-wide engagement associated with transient memory reactivation and its sequential replay.

Subtitled speech: the neural mechanisms of ticker-tape synaesthesia

The acquisition of reading modifies areas of the brain associated with vision and with language, in addition to their connections. These changes enable reciprocal translation between orthography and the sounds and meaning of words. Individual variability in the pre-existing cerebral substrate contributes to the range of eventual reading abilities, extending to atypical developmental patterns, including dyslexia and reading-related synaesthesias. The present study is devoted to the little-studied but highly informative ticker-tape synaesthesia, in which speech perception triggers the vivid and irrepressible perception of words in their written form in the mind's eye. We scanned a group of 17 synaesthetes and 17 matched controls with functional MRI, while they listened to spoken sentences, words, numbers or pseudowords (Experiment 1), viewed images and written words (Experiment 2) or were at rest (Experiment 3). First, we found direct correlates of the ticker-tape synaesthesia phenomenon: during speech perception, as ticker-tape synaesthesia was active, synaesthetes showed over-activation of left perisylvian regions supporting phonology and of the occipitotemporal visual word form area, where orthography is represented. Second, we provided support to the hypothesis that ticker-tape synaesthesia results from atypical relationships between spoken and written language processing: the ticker-tape synaesthesia-related regions overlap closely with cortices activated during reading, and the overlap of speech-related and reading-related areas is larger in synaesthetes than in controls. Furthermore, the regions over-activated in ticker-tape synaesthesia overlap with regions under-activated in dyslexia. Third, during the resting state (i.e. in the absence of current ticker-tape synaesthesia), synaesthetes showed increased functional connectivity between left prefrontal and bilateral occipital regions. This pattern might reflect a lowered threshold for conscious access to visual mental contents and might imply a non-specific predisposition to all synaesthesias with a visual content. These data provide a rich and coherent account of ticker-tape synaesthesia as a non-detrimental developmental condition created by the interaction of reading acquisition with an atypical cerebral substrate.

The attentive reconstruction of objects facilitates robust object recognition

Humans are extremely robust in our ability to perceive and recognize objects-we see faces in tea stains and can recognize friends on dark streets. Yet, neurocomputational models of primate object recognition have focused on the initial feed-forward pass of processing through the ventral stream and less on the top-down feedback that likely underlies robust object perception and recognition. Aligned with the generative approach, we propose that the visual system actively facilitates recognition by reconstructing the object hypothesized to be in the image. Top-down attention then uses this reconstruction as a template to bias feedforward processing to align with the most plausible object hypothesis. Building on auto-encoder neural networks, our model makes detailed hypotheses about the appearance and location of the candidate objects in the image by reconstructing a complete object representation from potentially incomplete visual input due to noise and occlusion. The model then leverages the best object reconstruction, measured by reconstruction error, to direct the bottom-up process of selectively routing low-level features, a top-down biasing that captures a core function of attention. We evaluated our model using the MNIST-C (handwritten digits under corruptions) and ImageNet-C (real-world objects under corruptions) datasets. Not only did our model achieve superior performance on these challenging tasks designed to approximate real-world noise and occlusion viewing conditions, but also better accounted for human behavioral reaction times and error patterns than a standard feedforward Convolutional Neural Network. Our model suggests that a complete understanding of object perception and recognition requires integrating top-down and attention feedback, which we propose is an object reconstruction.

Consciousness and sleep

Sleep is a universal, essential biological process. It is also an invaluable window on consciousness. It tells us that consciousness can be lost but also that it can be regained, in all its richness, when we are disconnected from the environment and unable to reflect. By considering the neurophysiological differences between dreaming and dreamless sleep, we can learn about the substrate of consciousness and understand why it vanishes. We also learn that the ongoing state of the substrate of consciousness determines the way each experience feels regardless of how it is triggered-endogenously or exogenously. Dreaming consciousness is also a window on sleep and its functions. Dreams tell us that the sleeping brain is remarkably lively, recombining intrinsic activation patterns from a vast repertoire, freed from the requirements of ongoing behavior and cognitive control.

Uncovering the Role of the Early Visual Cortex in Visual Mental Imagery

The question of whether the early visual cortex (EVC) is involved in visual mental imagery remains a topic of debate. In this paper, I propose that the inconsistency in findings can be explained by the unique challenges associated with investigating EVC activity during imagery. During perception, the EVC processes low-level features, which means that activity is highly sensitive to variation in visual details. If the EVC has the same role during visual mental imagery, any change in the visual details of the mental image would lead to corresponding changes in EVC activity. Within this context, the question should not be whether the EVC is 'active' during imagery but how its activity relates to specific imagery properties. Studies using methods that are sensitive to variation in low-level features reveal that imagery can recruit the EVC in similar ways as perception. However, not all mental images contain a high level of visual details. Therefore, I end by considering a more nuanced view, which states that imagery can recruit the EVC, but that does not mean that it always does so.

Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality

Perceptual reality monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish internally triggered imagination from externally triggered reality. Such monitoring can take place at perceptual or cognitive levels-for example, in lucid dreaming, perceptual experience feels real but is accompanied by a cognitive insight that it is not real. We recently developed a paradigm to reveal perceptual reality monitoring errors during wakefulness in the general population, showing that imagined signals can be erroneously attributed to perception during a perceptual detection task. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether people have insight into perceptual reality monitoring errors by additionally measuring perceptual confidence. We used hierarchical Bayesian modeling of confidence criteria to characterize metacognitive insight into the effects of imagery on detection. Over two experiments, we found that confidence criteria moved in tandem with the decision criterion shift, indicating a failure of reality monitoring not only at a perceptual but also at a metacognitive level. These results further show that such failures have a perceptual rather than a decisional origin. Interestingly, offline queries at the end of the experiment revealed global, task-level insight, which was uncorrelated with local, trial-level insight as measured with confidence ratings. Taken together, our results demonstrate that confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality during perceptual detection. Future research should further explore the different cognitive dimensions of insight into reality judgments and how they are related.

No clear evidence of a difference between individuals who self-report an absence of auditory imagery and typical imagers on auditory imagery tasks

Aphantasia is characterised by the inability to create mental images in one's mind. Studies investigating impairments in imagery typically focus on the visual domain. However, it is possible to generate many different forms of imagery including imagined auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, motor, taste and other experiences. Recent studies show that individuals with aphantasia report a lack of imagery in modalities, other than vision, including audition. However, to date, no research has examined whether these reductions in self-reported auditory imagery are associated with decrements in tasks that require auditory imagery. Understanding the extent to which visual and auditory imagery deficits co-occur can help to better characterise the core deficits of aphantasia and provide an alternative perspective on theoretical debates on the extent to which imagery draws on modality-specific or modality-general processes. In the current study, individuals that self-identified as being aphantasic and matched control participants with typical imagery performed two tasks: a musical pitch-based imagery and voice-based categorisation task. The majority of participants with aphantasia self-reported significant deficits in both auditory and visual imagery. However, we did not find a concomitant decrease in performance on tasks which require auditory imagery, either in the full sample or only when considering those participants that reported significant deficits in both domains. These findings are discussed in relation to the mechanisms that might obscure observation of imagery deficits in auditory imagery tasks in people that report reduced auditory imagery.

Reality check: how do we know what's real?

How do we know what is real and what is merely a figment of our imagination? Dijkstra and Fleming tackle this question in a recent study. In contrast to the classic Perky effect, they found that once imagery crosses a 'reality threshold', it becomes difficult to distinguish from reality.

Inner speech and the body error theory

Inner speech is commonly understood as the conscious experience of a voice within the mind. One recurrent theme in the scientific literature is that the phenomenon involves a representation of overt speech, for example, a representation of phonetic properties that result from a copy of speech instructions that were ultimately suppressed. I propose a larger picture that involves some embodied objects and their misperception. I call it "the Body Error Theory," or BET for short. BET is a form of illusionism, but the particular version I favor is a cross-modal illusion. Newly described here, my hypothesis is that the experience of inner speech arises from a mix of interoception and audition. Specifically, there is the detection of slight but well-confirmed activities in the speech musculature that occur during inner speech, which helps to transform representations of normal but quiet nonverbal sounds that inevitably occur during inner speech, from breathing to background noise, into a mistaken perception of inner speech. Simply put, activities in the speech musculature mix with sounds to create the appearance of speech sounds, which thus explains the "voice within the mind." I also show how BET's cross-modal system fits with standard information processing accounts for speech monitoring and how it accommodates the central insights of leading theories of inner speech. In addition, I show how BET is supported by data from experience-sampling surveys and how it can be empirically tested against its rivals.

Carl Jung: a life on the edge of reality with hypnagogia, hyperphantasia, and hallucinations

Whether the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung (1875-1961) became psychotic after his mid-thirties is much debated. His recently published Black Books, a seven-volume journal, reveal new insights into this debate. Based on a phenomenological analysis of his self-reports in these books and in other writings, we here identify several types of anomalous perceptual experiences: hypnagogic-hypnopompic experiences, hyperphantasia, hallucinations, personifications, and sensed presence. We argue that these experiences were not indicative of a psychotic disorder, but rather stemmed from extremely vivid mental imagery, or hyperphantasia, a condition Jung's contemporaries and later biographers were unable to take into account because it had not yet been conceptualised. Recently, the degree of vividness of mental imagery and its potential to become indistinguishable from regular sense perception has been the subject of extensive studies. Unknowingly, Jung may have foreshadowed this line of research with his psychoanalytic concept of reality equivalence, i.e., the substitution of an external world for an inner mental reality that he encountered in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. There is a need for future research to investigate the possible role of hyperphantasia in psychotic experiences, but to Jung, psychosis was 'a failure to contain and comprehend' the content of one's experiences in the context of one's own life, whereas he himself did manage to put the content of his perceptual experiences into context, to find meaning in them, and to share them with others - to great acknowledgement and acclaim.

An active inference perspective for the amygdala complex

The amygdala is a heterogeneous network of subcortical nuclei with central importance in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Various experimental designs in human psychology and animal model research have mapped multiple conceptual frameworks (e.g., valence/salience and decision making) to ever more refined amygdala circuitry. However, these predominantly bottom up-driven accounts often rely on interpretations tailored to a specific phenomenon, thus preventing comprehensive and integrative theories. We argue here that an active inference model of amygdala function could unify these fractionated approaches into an overarching framework for clearer empirical predictions and mechanistic interpretations. This framework embeds top-down predictive models, informed by prior knowledge and belief updating, within a dynamical system distributed across amygdala circuits in which self-regulation is implemented by continuously tracking environmental and homeostatic demands.

Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences

Visual illusions and mental imagery are non-physical sensory experiences that involve cortical feedback processing in the primary visual cortex. Using laminar functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two studies, we investigate if information about these internal experiences is visible in the activation patterns of different layers of primary visual cortex (V1). We find that imagery content is decodable mainly from deep layers of V1, whereas seemingly 'real' illusory content is decodable mainly from superficial layers. Furthermore, illusory content shares information with perceptual content, whilst imagery content does not generalise to illusory or perceptual information. Together, our results suggest that illusions and imagery, which differ immensely in their subjective experiences, also involve partially distinct early visual microcircuits. However, overlapping microcircuit recruitment might emerge based on the nuanced nature of subjective conscious experience.

How does the primate brain combine generative and discriminative computations in vision?

Vision is widely understood as an inference problem. However, two contrasting conceptions of the inference process have each been influential in research on biological vision as well as the engineering of machine vision. The first emphasizes bottom-up signal flow, describing vision as a largely feedforward, discriminative inference process that filters and transforms the visual information to remove irrelevant variation and represent behaviorally relevant information in a format suitable for downstream functions of cognition and behavioral control. In this conception, vision is driven by the sensory data, and perception is direct because the processing proceeds from the data to the latent variables of interest. The notion of "inference" in this conception is that of the engineering literature on neural networks, where feedforward convolutional neural networks processing images are said to perform inference. The alternative conception is that of vision as an inference process in Helmholtz's sense, where the sensory evidence is evaluated in the context of a generative model of the causal processes that give rise to it. In this conception, vision inverts a generative model through an interrogation of the sensory evidence in a process often thought to involve top-down predictions of sensory data to evaluate the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. The authors include scientists rooted in roughly equal numbers in each of the conceptions and motivated to overcome what might be a false dichotomy between them and engage the other perspective in the realm of theory and experiment. The primate brain employs an unknown algorithm that may combine the advantages of both conceptions. We explain and clarify the terminology, review the key empirical evidence, and propose an empirical research program that transcends the dichotomy and sets the stage for revealing the mysterious hybrid algorithm of primate vision.

To be or not to be hallucinating: Implications of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming for brain disorders

The boundaries between waking and sleeping-when falling asleep (hypnagogic) or waking up (hypnopompic)-can be challenging for our ability to monitor and interpret reality. Without proper understanding, bizarre but relatively normal hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences can be misinterpreted as psychotic hallucinations (occurring, by definition, in the fully awake state), potentially leading to stigma and misdiagnosis in clinical contexts and to misconception and bias in research contexts. This Perspective proposes that conceptual and practical understanding for differentiating hallucinations from hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences may be offered by lucid dreaming, the state in which one is aware of dreaming while sleeping. I first introduce a possible systematization of the phenomenological range of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences that can occur in the transition from awake to REM dreaming (including hypnagogic perceptions, transition symptoms, sleep paralysis, false awakenings, and out-of-body experiences). I then outline how metacognitive strategies used by lucid dreamers to gain/confirm oneiric lucidity could be tested for better differentiating hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences from hallucinations. The relevance of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming is analyzed for schizophrenia and narcolepsy, and discussed for neurodegenerative diseases, particularly Lewy-body disorders (i.e. Parkinson's disease, Parkinson's disease dementia, and dementia with Lewy bodies), offering testable hypotheses for empirical investigation. Finally, emotionally positive lucid dreams triggered or enhanced by training/induction strategies or by a pathological process may have intrinsic therapeutic value if properly recognized and guided. The overall intention is to raise awareness and foster further research about the possible diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic implications of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming for brain disorders.

Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion

Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.

Neural Representations in Visual and Parietal Cortex Differentiate between Imagined, Perceived, and Illusory Experiences

Humans constantly receive massive amounts of information, both perceived from the external environment and imagined from the internal world. To function properly, the brain needs to correctly identify the origin of information being processed. Recent work has suggested common neural substrates for perception and imagery. However, it has remained unclear how the brain differentiates between external and internal experiences with shared neural codes. Here we tested this question in human participants (male and female) by systematically investigating the neural processes underlying the generation and maintenance of visual information from voluntary imagery, veridical perception, and illusion. The inclusion of illusion allowed us to differentiate between objective and subjective internality: while illusion has an objectively internal origin and can be viewed as involuntary imagery, it is also subjectively perceived as having an external origin like perception. Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, we observed superior orientation representations in parietal cortex during imagery compared with perception, and conversely in early visual cortex. This imagery dominance gradually developed along a posterior-to-anterior cortical hierarchy from early visual to parietal cortex, emerged in the early epoch of imagery and sustained into the delay epoch, and persisted across varied imagined contents. Moreover, representational strength of illusion was more comparable to imagery in early visual cortex, but more comparable to perception in parietal cortex, suggesting content-specific representations in parietal cortex differentiate between subjectively internal and external experiences, as opposed to early visual cortex. These findings together support a domain-general engagement of parietal cortex in internally generated experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain differentiate between imagined and perceived experiences? Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, the current study revealed enhanced stimulus-specific representations in visual imagery originating from parietal cortex, supporting the subjective experience of imagery. This neural principle was further validated by evidence from visual illusion, wherein illusion resembled perception and imagery at different levels of cortical hierarchy. Our findings provide direct evidence for the critical role of parietal cortex as a domain-general region for content-specific imagery, and offer new insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the differentiation between subjectively internal and external experiences.