Dissociable mechanisms govern when and how strongly reward attributes affect decisions

Attribute latencies causally shape intertemporal decisions

Intertemporal choices - decisions that play out over time - pervade our life. Thus, how people make intertemporal choices is a fundamental question. Here, we investigate the role of attribute latency (the time between when people start to process different attributes) in shaping intertemporal preferences using five experiments with choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. In the first experiment, we identify attribute latencies using mouse-trajectories and find that they predict individual differences in choices, response times, and changes across time constraints. In the other four experiments we test the causal link from attribute latencies to choice, staggering the display of the attributes. This changes attribute latencies and intertemporal preferences. Displaying the amount information first makes people more patient, while displaying time information first does the opposite. These findings highlight the importance of intra-choice dynamics in shaping intertemporal choices and suggest that manipulating attribute latency may be a useful technique for nudging.

Change in food choice during acute treatment and the effect on longer-term outcome in patients with anorexia nervosa

BACKGROUND

Restriction of food intake is a central pathological feature of anorexia nervosa (AN). Maladaptive eating behavior and, specifically, limited intake of calorie-dense foods are resistant to change and contribute to poor long-term outcomes. This study is a preliminary examination of whether change in food choices during inpatient treatment is related to longer-term clinical course.

METHODS

Individuals with AN completed a computerized Food Choice Task at the beginning and end of inpatient treatment to determine changes in high-fat and self-controlled food choices. Linear regression and longitudinal analyses tested whether change in task behavior predicted short-term outcome (body mass index [BMI] at discharge) and longer-term outcome (BMI and eating disorder psychopathology).

RESULTS

Among 88 patients with AN, BMI improved significantly with hospital treatment (p < 0.001), but Food Choice Task outcomes did not change significantly. Change in high-fat and self-controlled choices was not associated with BMI at discharge (r = 0.13, p = 0.22 and r = 0.10, p = 0.39, respectively). An increase in the proportion of high-fat foods selected (β = 0.91, p = 0.02) and a decrease in the use of self-control (β = -1.50, p = 0.001) predicted less decline in BMI over 3 years after discharge.

CONCLUSIONS

Short-term treatment is associated with improvement in BMI but with no significant change, on average, in choices made in a task known to predict actual eating. However, the degree to which individuals increased high-fat choices during treatment and decreased the use of self-control over food choice were associated with reduced weight loss over the following 3 years, underscoring the need to focus on changing eating behavior in treatment of AN.

Mapping expectancy-based appetitive placebo effects onto the brain in women

Suggestions about hunger can generate placebo effects on hunger experiences. But, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms are unknown. Here, we show in 255 women that hunger expectancies, induced by suggestion-based placebo interventions, determine hunger sensations and economic food choices. Functional magnetic resonance imaging in a subgroup (n = 57/255) provides evidence that the strength of expecting the placebo to decrease hunger moderates medial prefrontal cortex activation at the time of food choice and attenuates ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) responses to food value. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation linked to interference resolution formally mediates the suggestion-based placebo effects on hunger. A drift-diffusion model characterizes this effect by showing that the hunger suggestions bias participants' food choices and how much they weigh tastiness against the healthiness of food, which further moderates vmPFC-dlPFC psychophysiological interactions when participants expect decreased hunger. Thus, suggestion-induced beliefs about hunger shape hunger addressing economic choices through cognitive regulation of value computation within the prefrontal cortex.

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

The competition dynamics of approach and avoidance motivations following interpersonal transgression

Two behavioral motivations coexist in transgressors following an interpersonal transgression-approaching and compensating the victim and avoiding the victim. Little is known about how these motivations arise, compete, and drive transgressors' decisions. The present study adopted a social interaction task to manipulate participants' (i.e., the transgressor) responsibility for another's (i.e., the victim) monetary loss and measure the participants' tradeoff between compensating the victim and avoiding face-to-face interactions with the victim. Following each transgression, participants used a computer mouse to choose between two options differing in the amount of compensation to the victim and the probability of face-to-face contact with the victim. Results showed that as participants' responsibility increased, 1) the decision weights on contact avoidance relative to compensation increased, and 2) the onset of the contact-avoidance attribute was expedited and that of the compensation attribute was delayed. These results demonstrate how competing social motivations following transgression evolve and determine social decision-making and shed light on how social-affective state modulates the dynamics of decision-making in general.

Framing Subjective Emotion Reports as Dynamic Affective Decisions

Self-reports remain affective science's only direct measure of subjective affective experiences. Yet, little research has sought to understand the psychological process that transforms subjective experience into self-reports. Here, we propose that by framing these self-reports as dynamic affective decisions, affective scientists may leverage the computational tools of decision-making research, sequential sampling models specifically, to better disentangle affective experience from the noisy decision processes that constitute self-report. We further outline how such an approach could help affective scientists better probe the specific mechanisms that underlie important moderators of affective experience (e.g., contextual differences, individual differences, and emotion regulation) and discuss how adopting this decision-making framework could generate insight into affective processes more broadly and facilitate reciprocal collaborations between affective and decision scientists towards a more comprehensive and integrative psychological science.

Deliberative control is more than just reactive: Insights from sequential sampling models

Activating relevant responses is a key function of automatic processes in De Neys's model; however, what determines the order or magnitude of such activation is ambiguous. Focusing on recently developed sequential sampling models of choice, we argue that proactive control shapes response generation but does not cleanly fit into De Neys's automatic-deliberative distinction, highlighting the need for further model development.

Episodic Memory Retrieval Affects the Onset and Dynamics of Evidence Accumulation during Value-based Decisions

In neuroeconomics, there is much interest in understanding simple value-based choices where agents choose between visually presented goods, comparable to a shopping scenario in a supermarket. However, many everyday decisions are made in the physical absence of the considered goods, requiring agents to recall information about the goods from memory. Here, we asked whether and how this reliance on an internal memory representation affects the temporal dynamics of decision making on a cognitive and neural level. Participants performed a remember-and-decide task in which they made simple purchasing decisions between money offers and snack items while undergoing EEG. Snack identity was presented either visually (value trials) or had to be recalled from memory (memory trials). Behavioral data indicated comparable choice consistency across both trial types, but considerably longer RTs in memory trials. Drift-diffusion modeling suggested that this RT difference was because of longer nondecision time of decision processes as well as altered evidence accumulation dynamics (lower accumulation rate and higher decision threshold). The nondecision time effect was supported by a delayed onset of the lateralized readiness potential. These results show that both decision and nondecision processes are prolonged when participants need to resort to internal memory representations during value-based decisions.

A unified neural account of contextual and individual differences in altruism

Altruism is critical for cooperation and productivity in human societies but is known to vary strongly across contexts and individuals. The origin of these differences is largely unknown, but may in principle reflect variations in different neurocognitive processes that temporally unfold during altruistic decision making (ranging from initial perceptual processing via value computations to final integrative choice mechanisms). Here, we elucidate the neural origins of individual and contextual differences in altruism by examining altruistic choices in different inequality contexts with computational modeling and electroencephalography (EEG). Our results show that across all contexts and individuals, wealth distribution choices recruit a similar late decision process evident in model-predicted evidence accumulation signals over parietal regions. Contextual and individual differences in behavior related instead to initial processing of stimulus-locked inequality-related value information in centroparietal and centrofrontal sensors, as well as to gamma-band synchronization of these value-related signals with parietal response-locked evidence-accumulation signals. Our findings suggest separable biological bases for individual and contextual differences in altruism that relate to differences in the initial processing of choice-relevant information.

A value accumulation account of unhealthy food choices: testing the influence of outcome salience under varying time constraints

People often engage in unhealthy eating despite having an explicit goal to follow a healthy diet, especially under certain conditions such as a lack of time. A promising explanation from the value accumulation account is that food choices are based on the sequential consideration of the values of multiple outcomes, such as health and taste outcomes. Unhealthy choices may result if taste is considered before health. We examined whether making a health outcome more salient could alter this order, thereby leading to more healthy choices even under time pressure. Two studies examined the time-dependent effect of outcome values and salience on food choices. Participants first completed priming trials on which they rated food items on healthiness (health condition), tastiness (taste condition), or both healthiness and tastiness (control condition). They then completed blocks of binary choice trials between healthy and tasty items. The available response time was manipulated continuously in Study 1 (N = 161) and categorically in Study 2 (N = 318). As predicted, results showed that the values of health and taste outcomes influenced choices and that priming led to more choices in line with the primed outcomes even when time was scarce. We did not obtain support for the prediction that the priming effect is time-dependent in the sense that primed outcomes are considered before non-primed outcomes. Together, these findings suggest that increasing the value and salience of a health outcome may be effective ways to increase healthy choices, even under poor conditions such as time pressure.

Value certainty and choice confidence are multidimensional constructs that guide decision-making

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.

Why and When Beliefs Change

Why people do or do not change their beliefs has been a long-standing puzzle. Sometimes people hold onto false beliefs despite ample contradictory evidence; sometimes they change their beliefs without sufficient reason. Here, we propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. Belief change can then be understood as an economic transaction in which the multidimensional utility of the old belief is compared against that of the new belief. Change will occur when potential outcomes alter across attributes, for example because of changing environments or when certain outcomes are made more or less salient.

The Games We Play: Prosocial Choices Under Time Pressure Reflect Context-Sensitive Information Priorities

Time pressure is a powerful experimental manipulation frequently used to arbitrate between competing dual-process models of prosocial decision-making, which typically assume that automatic responses yield to deliberation over time. However, the use of time pressure has led to conflicting conclusions about the psychological dynamics of prosociality. Here, we proposed that flexible, context-sensitive information search, rather than automatic responses, underlies these divergent effects of time pressure on prosociality. We demonstrated in two preregistered studies (N = 304 adults from the United States and Canada; Prolific Academic) that different prosocial contexts (i.e., pure altruism vs. cooperation) have distinct effects on information search, driving people to prioritize information differently, particularly under time pressure. Furthermore, these information priorities subsequently influence prosocial choices, accounting for the different effects of time pressure in altruistic and cooperative contexts. These findings help explain existing inconsistencies in the field by emphasizing the role of dynamic context-sensitive information search during social decision-making, particularly under time pressure.

Superior bias in trust-related decisions

Trust is conditional. Many studies have revealed its relative conditions in different situations, but when social status is characteristic of the person who receives trust (the “trustee”), our knowledge of how social status affects trust still remains limited. In this study, we used the trust game in order to: (1) characterize the effect of trustees’ social hierarchy on trust-related decisions in different trustworthiness situations and (2) explore the underlying computational process regarding the impact that social status has on trust-related decisions by using the computational modeling approach to integrate social status into trust-related situations. In Experiment 1, using a one-shot trust game with no feedback of information about reciprocity, we found that compared with inferiors, superiors gained more trust-related behaviors (investments) in spite of the fact that they were not rated as having higher trustworthiness. Then, in Experiment 2, when we controlled the trustworthiness of different social status partners by providing the same neutral reciprocity rate (50%) in a repeated trust game, the high-status partner gained more trust than the low-status partner. This superior bias extended to Experiment 3a and 3b, in which we set different levels of trustworthiness to match the different social statuses of partners. With respect to modeling results, we found that higher status holds an additional social value independent of trust profit, resulting in superior bias. Ultimately, this study has shed light on the superior bias that commonly leads people to grant high-status individuals goodwill in social interactions.

Older adults process the probability of winning sooner but weigh it less during lottery decisions

Empirical evidence has shown that visually enhancing the saliency of reward probabilities can ease the cognitive demands of value comparisons and improve value-based decisions in old age. In the present study, we used a time-varying drift diffusion model that includes starting time parameters to better understand (1) how increasing the saliency of reward probabilities may affect the dynamics of value-based decision-making and (2) how these effects may interact with age. We examined choices made by younger and older adults in a mixed lottery choice task. On a subset of trials, we used a color-coding scheme to highlight the saliency of reward probabilities, which served as a decision-aid. The results showed that, in control trials, older adults started to consider probability relative to magnitude information sooner than younger adults, but that their evidence accumulation processes were less sensitive to reward probabilities than that of younger adults. This may indicate a noisier and more stochastic information accumulation process during value-based decisions in old age. The decision-aid increased the influence of probability information on evidence accumulation rates in both age groups, but did not alter the relative timing of accumulation for probability versus magnitude in either group.

Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges

In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.

Temporal dynamics of decision making: A synthesis of computational and neurophysiological approaches

As interest in the temporal dynamics of decision-making has grown, researchers have increasingly turned to computational approaches such as the drift diffusion model (DDM) to identify how cognitive processes unfold during choice. At the same time, technological advances in noninvasive neurophysiological methods such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography now allow researchers to map the neural time course of decision making with millisecond precision. Combining these approaches can potentially yield important new insights into how choices emerge over time. Here we review recent research on the computational and neurophysiological correlates of perceptual and value-based decision making, from DDM parameters to scalp potentials and oscillatory neural activity. Starting with motor response preparation, the most well-understood aspect of the decision process, we discuss evidence that urgency signals and shifts in baseline activation, rather than shifts in the physiological value of the choice-triggering response threshold, are responsible for adjusting response times under speeded choice scenarios. Research on the neural correlates of starting point bias suggests that prestimulus activity can predict biases in motor choice behavior. Finally, studies examining the time dynamics of evidence construction and evidence accumulation have identified signals at frontocentral and centroparietal electrodes associated respectively with these processes, emerging 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. These findings can inform psychological theories of decision-making, providing empirical support for attribute weighting in value-based choice while suggesting theoretical alternatives to dual-process accounts. Further research combining computational and neurophysiological approaches holds promise for providing greater insight into the moment-by-moment evolution of the decision process. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Economics > Individual Decision-Making.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Neural Representations of Food-Related Attributes in the Human Orbitofrontal Cortex during Choice Deliberation in Anorexia Nervosa

Decisions about what to eat recruit the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and involve the evaluation of food-related attributes such as taste and health. These attributes are used differently by healthy individuals and patients with disordered eating behavior, but it is unclear whether these attributes are decodable from activity in the OFC in both groups and whether neural representations of these attributes are differentially related to decisions about food. We used fMRI combined with behavioral tasks to investigate the representation of taste and health attributes in the human OFC and the role of these representations in food choices in healthy women and women with anorexia nervosa (AN). We found that subjective ratings of tastiness and healthiness could be decoded from patterns of activity in the OFC in both groups. However, health-related patterns of activity in the OFC were more related to the magnitude of choice preferences among patients with AN than healthy individuals. These findings suggest that maladaptive decision-making in AN is associated with more consideration of health information represented by the OFC during deliberation about what to eat.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT An open question about the OFC is whether it supports the evaluation of food-related attributes during deliberation about what to eat. We found that healthiness and tastiness information was decodable from patterns of neural activity in the OFC in both patients with AN and healthy controls. Critically, neural representations of health were more strongly related to choices in patients with AN, suggesting that maladaptive overconsideration of healthiness during deliberation about what to eat is related to activity in the OFC. More broadly, these results show that activity in the human OFC is associated with the evaluation of relevant attributes during value-based decision-making. These findings may also guide future research into the development of treatments for AN.

Reframing rationality: Exogenous constraints on controlled information search

Bermúdez argues that framing effects are rational because particular frames provide goal-consistent reasons for choice and that people exert some control over the framing of a decision-problem. We propose instead that these observations raise the question of whether frame selection itself is a rational process and highlight how constraints in the choice environment severely limit the rational selection of frames.

Sources of confidence in value-based choice

Confidence, the subjective estimate of decision quality, is a cognitive process necessary for learning from mistakes and guiding future actions. The origins of confidence judgments resulting from economic decisions remain unclear. We devise a task and computational framework that allowed us to formally tease apart the impact of various sources of confidence in value-based decisions, such as uncertainty emerging from encoding and decoding operations, as well as the interplay between gaze-shift dynamics and attentional effort. In line with canonical decision theories, trial-to-trial fluctuations in the precision of value encoding impact economic choice consistency. However, this uncertainty has no influence on confidence reports. Instead, confidence is associated with endogenous attentional effort towards choice alternatives and down-stream noise in the comparison process. These findings provide an explanation for confidence (miss)attributions in value-guided behaviour, suggesting mechanistic influences of endogenous attentional states for guiding decisions and metacognitive awareness of choice certainty.

Alpha oscillations and event-related potentials reflect distinct dynamics of attribute construction and evidence accumulation in dietary decision making

How does regulatory focus alter attribute value construction (AVC) and evidence accumulation (EA)? We recorded electroencephalogram during food choices while participants responded naturally or regulated their choices by attending to health attributes or decreasing attention to taste attributes. Using a drift diffusion model, we predicted the time course of neural signals associated with AVC and EA. Results suggested that event-related potentials (ERPs) correlated with the time course of model-predicted taste-attribute signals, with no modulation by regulation. By contrast, suppression of frontal and occipital alpha power correlated with the time course of EA, tracked tastiness according to its goal relevance, and predicted individual variation in successful down-regulation of tastiness. Additionally, an earlier rise in frontal and occipital theta power represented food tastiness more strongly during regulation and predicted a weaker influence of food tastiness on behaviour. Our findings illuminate how regulation modifies the representation of attributes during the process of EA.

Accumulation of continuously time-varying sensory evidence constrains neural and behavioral responses in human collision threat detection

Evidence accumulation models provide a dominant account of human decision-making, and have been particularly successful at explaining behavioral and neural data in laboratory paradigms using abstract, stationary stimuli. It has been proposed, but with limited in-depth investigation so far, that similar decision-making mechanisms are involved in tasks of a more embodied nature, such as movement and locomotion, by directly accumulating externally measurable sensory quantities of which the precise, typically continuously time-varying, magnitudes are important for successful behavior. Here, we leverage collision threat detection as a task which is ecologically relevant in this sense, but which can also be rigorously observed and modelled in a laboratory setting. Conventionally, it is assumed that humans are limited in this task by a perceptual threshold on the optical expansion rate-the visual looming-of the obstacle. Using concurrent recordings of EEG and behavioral responses, we disprove this conventional assumption, and instead provide strong evidence that humans detect collision threats by accumulating the continuously time-varying visual looming signal. Generalizing existing accumulator model assumptions from stationary to time-varying sensory evidence, we show that our model accounts for previously unexplained empirical observations and full distributions of detection response. We replicate a pre-response centroparietal positivity (CPP) in scalp potentials, which has previously been found to correlate with accumulated decision evidence. In contrast with these existing findings, we show that our model is capable of predicting the onset of the CPP signature rather than its buildup, suggesting that neural evidence accumulation is implemented differently, possibly in distinct brain regions, in collision detection compared to previously studied paradigms.

Healthy decisions in the cued-attribute food choice paradigm have high test-retest reliability

Food choice paradigms are commonly used to study decision mechanisms, individual differences, and intervention efficacy. Here, we measured behavior from twenty-three healthy young adults who completed five repetitions of a cued-attribute food choice paradigm over two weeks. This task includes cues prompting participants to explicitly consider the healthiness of the food items before making a selection, or to choose naturally based on whatever freely comes to mind. We found that the average patterns of food choices following both cue types and ratings about the palatability (i.e. taste) and healthiness of the food items were similar across all five repetitions. At the individual level, the test-retest reliability for choices in both conditions and healthiness ratings was excellent. However, test-retest reliability for taste ratings was only fair, suggesting that estimates about palatability may vary more from day to day for the same individual.

Defensive freezing and its relation to approach-avoidance decision-making under threat

Successful responding to acutely threatening situations requires adequate approach-avoidance decisions. However, it is unclear how threat-induced states-like freezing-related bradycardia-impact the weighing of the potential outcomes of such value-based decisions. Insight into the underlying computations is essential, not only to improve our models of decision-making but also to improve interventions for maladaptive decisions, for instance in anxiety patients and first-responders who frequently have to make decisions under acute threat. Forty-two participants made passive and active approach-avoidance decisions under threat-of-shock when confronted with mixed outcome-prospects (i.e., varying money and shock amounts). Choice behavior was best predicted by a model including individual action-tendencies and bradycardia, beyond the subjective value of the outcome. Moreover, threat-related bradycardia (high-vs-low threat) interacted with subjective value, depending on the action-context (passive-vs-active). Specifically, in action-contexts incongruent with participants' intrinsic action-tendencies, stronger bradycardia related to diminished effects of subjective value on choice across participants. These findings illustrate the relevance of testing approach-avoidance decisions in relatively ecologically valid conditions of acute and primarily reinforced threat. These mechanistic insights into approach-avoidance conflict-resolution may inspire biofeedback-related techniques to optimize decision-making under threat. Critically, the findings demonstrate the relevance of incorporating internal psychophysiological states and external action-contexts into models of approach-avoidance decision-making.

Weighting on waiting: Willpower and attribute weighting models of decision making

Willpower is often conceptualized as incorporating effortful and momentary suppression of immediate but ultimately inferior rewards. Yet, growing evidence instead supports a process of attribute weighting, whereby normatively optimal choices arise from separable evaluation of different attributes (e.g., time and money). Strategic allocation of attention settles conflicts between competing choice-relevant attributes, which could be expanded to include self-referential predictions ("resolve").

Changes in brain and behavior during food-based decision-making following treatment of anorexia nervosa

BACKGROUND

Anorexia nervosa is a severe illness with a high mortality rate, driven in large part by severe and persistent restriction of food intake. A critical challenge is to identify brain mechanisms associated with maladaptive eating behavior and whether they change with treatment. This study tested whether food choice-related caudate activation in anorexia nervosa changes with treatment.

METHODS

Healthy women (n = 29) and women hospitalized with anorexia nervosa (n = 24), ages 18 to 40 years, completed a Food Choice Task during fMRI scanning at two timepoints. Among patients, procedures occurred upon hospital admission (Time 1) and again after patients had gained to normal weight (Time 2). Healthy controls were tested twice at an interval group-matched to patients. Choice-related caudate activation was assessed at each timepoint, using parametric analyses in an a priori region of interest.

RESULTS

Among patients, the proportion of high-fat foods selected did not change over time (p's > 0.47), but decreased neural activity in the caudate after treatment was associated with increased selection of high-fat foods (r₂₃ = - 0.43, p = 0.037). Choice-related caudate activation differed among women with anorexia nervosa vs healthy control women at Time 1 (healthy control: M = 0.15 ± 0.87, anorexia nervosa: M = 0.70 ± 1.1, t₅₁ = - 2.05, p = 0.045), but not at Time 2 (healthy control: M = 0.18 ± 1.0, anorexia nervosa: M = 0.37 ± 0.99, t₅₁ = - 0.694, p = 0.49).

CONCLUSIONS

Caudate activity was more strongly associated with decisions about food among individuals with anorexia nervosa relative to healthy comparison individuals prior to treatment, and decreases in caudate engagement among individuals with anorexia nervosa undergoing treatment were associated with increases in high-fat food choices. The findings underscore the need for treatment development that more successfully alters both eating behavior and the neural mechanisms that guide it.

Theory Integration for Lifestyle Behavior Change in the Digital Age: An Adaptive Decision-Making Framework

Despite the growing popularity of digital health interventions, limitations of traditional behavior change theories and a lack of theory integration hinder theory-driven behavior change applications. In this paper, we aim to review theories relevant to lifestyle behavior change from the broader psychology literature and then integrate these theories into a new theoretical framework called adaptive decision-making to address two specific problems. First, our framework represents lifestyle behaviors at two levels-one of individual daily decisions (action level) and one of larger behavioral episodes (reflection level)-to more closely match the temporal characteristics of lifestyle behaviors and their associated digital data. Second, the framework connects decision-making theories and learning theories to explain how behaviors and cognitive constructs dynamically influence each other, making it a suitable scaffold for building computational models. We map common digital intervention techniques onto the behavioral and cognitive processes in the framework and discuss possible contributions of the framework to both theory development and digital intervention design.

How peer influence shapes value computation in moral decision-making

Moral behavior is susceptible to peer influence. How does information from peers influence moral preferences? We used drift-diffusion modeling to show that peer influence changes the value of moral behavior by prioritizing the choice attributes that align with peers' goals. Study 1 (N = 100; preregistered) showed that participants accurately inferred the goals of prosocial and antisocial peers when observing their moral decisions. In Study 2 (N = 68), participants made moral decisions before and after observing the decisions of a prosocial or antisocial peer. Peer observation caused participants' own preferences to resemble those of their peers. This peer influence effect on value computation manifested as an increased weight on choice attributes promoting the peers' goals that occurred independently from peer influence on initial choice bias. Participants' self-reported awareness of influence tracked more closely with computational measures of prosocial than antisocial influence. Our findings have implications for bolstering and blocking the effects of prosocial and antisocial influence on moral behavior.