The neuroconnectionist research programme

Helpless infants are learning a foundation model

Humans have a protracted postnatal helplessness period, typically attributed to human-specific maternal constraints causing an early birth when the brain is highly immature. By aligning neurodevelopmental events across species, however, it has been found that humans are not born with especially immature brains compared with animal species with a shorter helpless period. Consistent with this, the rapidly growing field of infant neuroimaging has found that brain connectivity and functional activation at birth share many similarities with the mature brain. Inspired by machine learning, where deep neural networks also benefit from a 'helpless period' of pre-training, we propose that human infants are learning a foundation model: a set of fundamental representations that underpin later cognition with high performance and rapid generalisation.

Compositionality in perception: A framework

Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or thoughts are thought to be composed. I suggest that the thesis that perception is compositional is not itself a concrete hypothesis with specific predictions; rather it affords a productive framework for developing and evaluating specific empirical hypotheses about the form and content of perceptual representations. The question is not just whether perception is compositional, but how. Answering this latter question can provide fundamental insights into perception. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics.

Philosophy of cognitive science in the age of deep learning

Deep learning has enabled major advances across most areas of artificial intelligence research. This remarkable progress extends beyond mere engineering achievements and holds significant relevance for the philosophy of cognitive science. Deep neural networks have made significant strides in overcoming the limitations of older connectionist models that once occupied the center stage of philosophical debates about cognition. This development is directly relevant to long-standing theoretical debates in the philosophy of cognitive science. Furthermore, ongoing methodological challenges related to the comparative evaluation of deep neural networks stand to benefit greatly from interdisciplinary collaboration with philosophy and cognitive science. The time is ripe for philosophers to explore foundational issues related to deep learning and cognition; this perspective paper surveys key areas where their contributions can be especially fruitful. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Robotics > Machine Learning.

Memorability shapes perceived time (and vice versa)

Visual stimuli are known to vary in their perceived duration. Some visual stimuli are also known to linger for longer in memory. Yet, whether these two features of visual processing are linked is unknown. Despite early assumptions that time is an extracted or higher-order feature of perception, more recent work over the past two decades has demonstrated that timing may be instantiated within sensory modality circuits. A primary location for many of these studies is the visual system, where duration-sensitive responses have been demonstrated. Furthermore, visual stimulus features have been observed to shift perceived duration. These findings suggest that visual circuits mediate or construct perceived time. Here we present evidence across a series of experiments that perceived time is affected by the image properties of scene size, clutter and memorability. More specifically, we observe that scene size and memorability dilate time, whereas clutter contracts it. Furthermore, the durations of more memorable images are also perceived more precisely. Conversely, the longer the perceived duration of an image, the more memorable it is. To explain these findings, we applied a recurrent convolutional neural network model of the ventral visual system, in which images are progressively processed over time. We find that more memorable images are processed faster, and that this increase in processing speed predicts both the lengthening and the increased precision of perceived durations. These findings provide evidence for a link between image features, time perception and memory that can be further explored with models of visual processing.

Finding structure during incremental speech comprehension

A core aspect of human speech comprehension is the ability to incrementally integrate consecutive words into a structured and coherent interpretation, aligning with the speaker's intended meaning. This rapid process is subject to multidimensional probabilistic constraints, including both linguistic knowledge and non-linguistic information within specific contexts, and it is their interpretative coherence that drives successful comprehension. To study the neural substrates of this process, we extract word-by-word measures of sentential structure from BERT, a deep language model, which effectively approximates the coherent outcomes of the dynamic interplay among various types of constraints. Using representational similarity analysis, we tested BERT parse depths and relevant corpus-based measures against the spatiotemporally resolved brain activity recorded by electro-/magnetoencephalography when participants were listening to the same sentences. Our results provide a detailed picture of the neurobiological processes involved in the incremental construction of structured interpretations. These findings show when and where coherent interpretations emerge through the evaluation and integration of multifaceted constraints in the brain, which engages bilateral brain regions extending beyond the classical fronto-temporal language system. Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence supporting the use of artificial neural networks as computational models for revealing the neural dynamics underpinning complex cognitive processes in the brain.

Temporal dynamics of short-term neural adaptation across human visual cortex

Neural responses in visual cortex adapt to prolonged and repeated stimuli. While adaptation occurs across the visual cortex, it is unclear how adaptation patterns and computational mechanisms differ across the visual hierarchy. Here we characterize two signatures of short-term neural adaptation in time-varying intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) data collected while participants viewed naturalistic image categories varying in duration and repetition interval. Ventral- and lateral-occipitotemporal cortex exhibit slower and prolonged adaptation to single stimuli and slower recovery from adaptation to repeated stimuli compared to V1-V3. For category-selective electrodes, recovery from adaptation is slower for preferred than non-preferred stimuli. To model neural adaptation we augment our delayed divisive normalization (DN) model by scaling the input strength as a function of stimulus category, enabling the model to accurately predict neural responses across multiple image categories. The model fits suggest that differences in adaptation patterns arise from slower normalization dynamics in higher visual areas interacting with differences in input strength resulting from category selectivity. Our results reveal systematic differences in temporal adaptation of neural population responses across the human visual hierarchy and show that a single computational model of history-dependent normalization dynamics, fit with area-specific parameters, accounts for these differences.

Human-like dissociations between confidence and accuracy in convolutional neural networks

Prior research has shown that manipulating stimulus energy by changing both stimulus contrast and variability results in confidence-accuracy dissociations in humans. Specifically, even when performance is matched, higher stimulus energy leads to higher confidence. The most common explanation for this effect is the positive evidence heuristic where confidence neglects evidence that disconfirms the choice. However, an alternative explanation is the signal-and-variance-increase hypothesis, according to which these dissociations arise from low-level changes in the separation and variance of perceptual representations. Because artificial neural networks lack built-in confidence heuristics, they can serve as a test for the necessity of confidence heuristics in explaining confidence-accuracy dissociations. Therefore, we tested whether confidence-accuracy dissociations induced by stimulus energy manipulations emerge naturally in convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We found that, across three different energy manipulations, CNNs produced confidence-accuracy dissociations similar to those found in humans. This effect was present for a range of CNN architectures from shallow 4-layer networks to very deep ones, such as VGG-19 and ResNet -50 pretrained on ImageNet. Further, we traced back the reason for the confidence-accuracy dissociations in all CNNs to the same signal-and-variance increase that has been proposed for humans: higher stimulus energy increased the separation and variance of the CNNs' internal representations leading to higher confidence even for matched accuracy. These findings cast doubt on the necessity of the positive evidence heuristic to explain human confidence and establish CNNs as promising models for adjudicating between low-level, stimulus-driven and high-level, cognitive explanations of human behavior.

Can large language models help augment English psycholinguistic datasets?

Research on language and cognition relies extensively on psycholinguistic datasets or "norms". These datasets contain judgments of lexical properties like concreteness and age of acquisition, and can be used to norm experimental stimuli, discover empirical relationships in the lexicon, and stress-test computational models. However, collecting human judgments at scale is both time-consuming and expensive. This issue of scale is compounded for multi-dimensional norms and those incorporating context. The current work asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be leveraged to augment the creation of large, psycholinguistic datasets in English. I use GPT-4 to collect multiple kinds of semantic judgments (e.g., word similarity, contextualized sensorimotor associations, iconicity) for English words and compare these judgments against the human "gold standard". For each dataset, I find that GPT-4's judgments are positively correlated with human judgments, in some cases rivaling or even exceeding the average inter-annotator agreement displayed by humans. I then identify several ways in which LLM-generated norms differ from human-generated norms systematically. I also perform several "substitution analyses", which demonstrate that replacing human-generated norms with LLM-generated norms in a statistical model does not change the sign of parameter estimates (though in select cases, there are significant changes to their magnitude). I conclude by discussing the considerations and limitations associated with LLM-generated norms in general, including concerns of data contamination, the choice of LLM, external validity, construct validity, and data quality. Additionally, all of GPT-4's judgments (over 30,000 in total) are made available online for further analysis.

Deep neural networks are not a single hypothesis but a language for expressing computational hypotheses

An ideal vision model accounts for behavior and neurophysiology in both naturalistic conditions and designed lab experiments. Unlike psychological theories, artificial neural networks (ANNs) actually perform visual tasks and generate testable predictions for arbitrary inputs. These advantages enable ANNs to engage the entire spectrum of the evidence. Failures of particular models drive progress in a vibrant ANN research program of human vision.

Clarifying status of DNNs as models of human vision

On several key issues we agree with the commentators. Perhaps most importantly, everyone seems to agree that psychology has an important role to play in building better models of human vision, and (most) everyone agrees (including us) that deep neural networks (DNNs) will play an important role in modelling human vision going forward. But there are also disagreements about what models are for, how DNN-human correspondences should be evaluated, the value of alternative modelling approaches, and impact of marketing hype in the literature. In our view, these latter issues are contributing to many unjustified claims regarding DNN-human correspondences in vision and other domains of cognition. We explore all these issues in this response.

Going after the bigger picture: Using high-capacity models to understand mind and brain

Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide a unique opportunity to move towards a generic modelling framework in psychology. The high representational capacity of these models combined with the possibility for further extensions has already allowed us to investigate the forest, namely the complex landscape of representations and processes that underlie human cognition, without forgetting about the trees, which include individual psychological phenomena.

The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience

Interactions with large language models (LLMs) have led to the suggestion that these models may soon be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the inputs to LLMs lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Secondly, the architectures of present-day artificial intelligence algorithms are missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Finally, the evolutionary and developmental trajectories that led to the emergence of living conscious organisms arguably have no parallels in artificial systems as envisioned today. The existence of living organisms depends on their actions and their survival is intricately linked to multi-level cellular, inter-cellular, and organismal processes culminating in agency and consciousness.

Compact deep neural network models of visual cortex

A powerful approach to understanding the computations carried out in visual cortex is to develop models that predict neural responses to arbitrary images. Deep neural network (DNN) models have worked remarkably well at predicting neural responses [1, 2, 3], yet their underlying computations remain buried in millions of parameters. Have we simply replaced one complicated system in vivo with another in silico ? Here, we train a data-driven deep ensemble model that predicts macaque V4 responses ∼50% more accurately than currently-used task-driven DNN models. We then compress this deep ensemble to identify compact models that have 5,000x fewer parameters yet equivalent accuracy as the deep ensemble. We verified that the stimulus preferences of the compact models matched those of the real V4 neurons by measuring V4 responses to both 'maximizing' and adversarial images generated using compact models. We then analyzed the inner workings of the compact models and discovered a common circuit motif: Compact models share a similar set of filters in early stages of processing but then specialize by heavily consolidating this shared representation with a precise readout. This suggests that a V4 neuron's stimulus preference is determined entirely by its consolidation step. To demonstrate this, we investigated the compression step of a dot-detecting compact model and found a set of simple computations that may be carried out by dot-selective V4 neurons. Overall, our work demonstrates that the DNN models currently used in computational neuroscience are needlessly large; our approach provides a new way forward for obtaining explainable, high-accuracy models of visual cortical neurons.

Functional neuroimaging as a catalyst for integrated neuroscience

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) enables non-invasive access to the awake, behaving human brain. By tracking whole-brain signals across a diverse range of cognitive and behavioural states or mapping differences associated with specific traits or clinical conditions, fMRI has advanced our understanding of brain function and its links to both normal and atypical behaviour. Despite this headway, progress in human cognitive neuroscience that uses fMRI has been relatively isolated from rapid advances in other subdomains of neuroscience, which themselves are also somewhat siloed from one another. In this Perspective, we argue that fMRI is well-placed to integrate the diverse subfields of systems, cognitive, computational and clinical neuroscience. We first summarize the strengths and weaknesses of fMRI as an imaging tool, then highlight examples of studies that have successfully used fMRI in each subdomain of neuroscience. We then provide a roadmap for the future advances that will be needed to realize this integrative vision. In this way, we hope to demonstrate how fMRI can help usher in a new era of interdisciplinary coherence in neuroscience.

Empirically Identifying and Computationally Modeling the Brain-Behavior Relationship for Human Scene Categorization

Humans effortlessly make quick and accurate perceptual decisions about the nature of their immediate visual environment, such as the category of the scene they face. Previous research has revealed a rich set of cortical representations potentially underlying this feat. However, it remains unknown which of these representations are suitably formatted for decision-making. Here, we approached this question empirically and computationally, using neuroimaging and computational modeling. For the empirical part, we collected EEG data and RTs from human participants during a scene categorization task (natural vs. man-made). We then related EEG data to behavior to behavior using a multivariate extension of signal detection theory. We observed a correlation between neural data and behavior specifically between ∼100 msec and ∼200 msec after stimulus onset, suggesting that the neural scene representations in this time period are suitably formatted for decision-making. For the computational part, we evaluated a recurrent convolutional neural network (RCNN) as a model of brain and behavior. Unifying our previous observations in an image-computable model, the RCNN predicted well the neural representations, the behavioral scene categorization data, as well as the relationship between them. Our results identify and computationally characterize the neural and behavioral correlates of scene categorization in humans.

Studying Psychosis Using Natural Language Generation: A Review of Emerging Opportunities

Disrupted language in psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia, can manifest as false contents and formal deviations, often described as thought disorder. These features play a critical role in the social dysfunction associated with psychosis, but we continue to lack insights regarding how and why these symptoms develop. Natural language generation (NLG) is a field of computer science that focuses on generating human-like language for various applications. The theory that psychosis is related to the evolution of language in humans suggests that NLG systems that are sufficiently evolved to generate human-like language may also exhibit psychosis-like features. In this conceptual review, we propose using NLG systems that are at various stages of development as in silico tools to study linguistic features of psychosis. We argue that a program of in silico experimental research on the network architecture, function, learning rules, and training of NLG systems can help us understand better why thought disorder occurs in patients. This will allow us to gain a better understanding of the relationship between language and psychosis and potentially pave the way for new therapeutic approaches to address this vexing challenge.

Computational and systems neuroscience: The next 20 years

Over the past 20 years, neuroscience has been propelled forward by theory-driven experimentation. We consider the future outlook for the field in the age of big neural data and powerful artificial intelligence models.

A Critical Perspective on Neural Mechanisms in Cognitive Neuroscience: Towards Unification

A central pursuit of cognitive neuroscience is to find neural mechanisms of cognition, with research programs favoring different strategies to look for them. But what is a neural mechanism, and how do we know we have captured them? Here I answer these questions through a framework that integrates Marr's levels with philosophical work on mechanism. From this, the following goal emerges: What needs to be explained are the computations of cognition, with explanation itself given by mechanism-composed of algorithms and parts of the brain that realize them. This reveals a delineation within cognitive neuroscience research. In the premechanism stage, the computations of cognition are linked to phenomena in the brain, narrowing down where and when mechanisms are situated in space and time. In the mechanism stage, it is established how computation emerges from organized interactions between parts-filling the premechanistic mold. I explain why a shift toward mechanistic modeling helps us meet our aims while outlining a road map for doing so. Finally, I argue that the explanatory scope of neural mechanisms can be approximated by effect sizes collected across studies, not just conceptual analysis. Together, these points synthesize a mechanistic agenda that allows subfields to connect at the level of theory.