Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the subjective value of information

Neural Representations of Sensory Uncertainty and Confidence Are Associated with Perceptual Curiosity

Humans are immensely curious and motivated to reduce uncertainty, but little is known about the neural mechanisms that generate curiosity. Curiosity is inversely associated with confidence, suggesting that it is triggered by states of low confidence (subjective uncertainty), but the neural mechanisms of this link, have been little investigated. Inspired by studies of sensory uncertainty, we hypothesized that visual areas provide multivariate representations of uncertainty, which are read out by higher-order structures to generate signals of confidence and, ultimately, curiosity. We scanned participants (17 female, 15 male) using fMRI while they performed a new task in which they rated their confidence in identifying distorted images of animals and objects and their curiosity to see the clear image. We measured the activity evoked by each image in the occipitotemporal cortex (OTC) and devised a new metric of "OTC Certainty" indicating the strength of evidence this activity conveys about the animal versus object categories. We show that, perceptual curiosity peaked at low confidence and OTC Certainty negatively correlated with curiosity, establishing a link between curiosity and a multivariate representation of sensory uncertainty. Moreover, univariate (average) activity in two frontal areas-vmPFC and ACC-correlated positively with confidence and negatively with curiosity, and the vmPFC mediated the relationship between OTC Certainty and curiosity. The results reveal novel mechanisms through which uncertainty about an event generates curiosity about that event.

Non-instrumental information seeking is resistant to acute stress

Previous research has shown that people intrinsically value non-instrumental information, which cannot be used to change the outcome of events, but only provides an early resolution of uncertainty. This is true even for information about rather inconsequential events, such as the outcomes of small lotteries. Here we investigated whether participants' willingness to pay for non-instrumental information about the outcome of simple coin-flip lotteries with guaranteed winnings was modulated by acute stress. Stress was induced using the Socially Evaluated Cold Pressor Test (SECPT), and information-seeking choices were compared to a warm water control group. Our results neither support the hypothesis that stress decreases information-seeking by directing cognitive resources away from the relevance of the lotteries, nor the opposite hypothesis that stress increases information-seeking by driving anxiety levels up. Instead, we found that despite successful stress induction, as evidenced by increased saliva cortisol levels in the SECPT group, information valuation was remarkably stable. This finding is in line with recent findings that experimentally increased state anxiety did not modulate non-instrumental information seeking. Together, these results suggest that the aversiveness of "not knowing" is a stable cognitive state and not easily modulated by situational context, such as acute stress.

The availability of non-instrumental information increases risky decision-making

Contemporary models of decision-making under risk focus on estimating the final value of each alternative course of action. According to such frameworks, information that has no capacity to alter a future payoff (i.e., is "non-instrumental") should have little effect on one's preference for risk. Importantly, however, recent work has shown that information, despite being non-instrumental, may nevertheless exert a striking influence on behavior. Here, we tested whether the opportunity to passively observe the sequence of events following a decision could modulate risky behavior, even if that information could not possibly influence the final result. Across three experiments, 71 individuals chose to accept or reject gambles on a five-window slot machine. If a gamble was accepted, each window was sequentially revealed prior to the outcome being declared. Critically, we informed participants about which windows would subsequently provide veridical information about the gamble outcome, should that gamble be accepted. Our analyses revealed three key findings. First, the opportunity to observe the consequences of one's choice significantly increased the likelihood of gambling, despite that information being entirely non-instrumental. Second, this effect generalized across different stakes. Finally, choices were driven predominantly by the likelihood that information could result in an earlier resolution of uncertainty. These findings demonstrate the importance of anticipatory information to decision-making under risk. More broadly, we provide strong evidence for the utility of non-instrumental information, by demonstrating its capacity to modulate primary economic decisions that should be driven by more motivationally salient variables associated with risk and reward.

Prosocial learning: Model-based or model-free?

Prosocial learning involves the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for making decisions that benefit others. We asked if, in the context of value-based decision-making, there is any difference between learning strategies for oneself vs. for others. We implemented a 2-step reinforcement learning paradigm in which participants learned, in separate blocks, to make decisions for themselves or for a present other confederate who evaluated their performance. We replicated the canonical features of the model-based and model-free reinforcement learning in our results. The behaviour of the majority of participants was best explained by a mixture of the model-based and model-free control, while most participants relied more heavily on MB control, and this strategy enhanced their learning success. Regarding our key self-other hypothesis, we did not find any significant difference between the behavioural performances nor in the model-based parameters of learning when comparing self and other conditions.

Hedonism as a motive for information search: biased information-seeking leads to biased beliefs

Confirmation bias in information-search contributes to the formation of polarized echo-chambers of beliefs. However, the role of valence on information source selection remains poorly understood. In Experiment 1, participants won financial rewards depending on the outcomes of a set of lotteries. They were not shown these outcomes, but instead could choose to view a prediction of each lottery outcome made by one of two sources. Before choosing their favoured source, participants were first shown a series of example predictions made by each. The sources systematically varied in the accuracy and positivity (i.e., how often they predicted a win) of their predictions. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling indicated that both source accuracy and positivity impacted participants' choices. Importantly, those that viewed more positively-biased information believed that they had won more often and had higher confidence in those beliefs. In Experiment 2, we directly assessed the effect of positivity on the perceived credibility of a source. In each trial, participants watched a single source making a series of predictions of lottery outcomes and rated the strength of their beliefs in each source. Interestingly, positively-biased sources were not seen as more credible. Together, these findings suggest that positively-biased information is sought partly due to the desirable emotional state it induces rather than having enhanced perceived credibility. Information sought on this basis nevertheless produced consequential biased beliefs about the world-state, highlighting a potentially key role for hedonic preferences in information selection and subsequent belief formation.

Preferences for seeking effort or reward information bias the willingness to work

Research suggests that the temporal order in which people receive information about costs and benefits whilst making decisions can influence their choices. But, do people have a preference for seeking information about costs or benefits when making effort-based decisions, and does this impact motivation? Here, participants made choices about whether to exert different levels of physical effort to obtain different magnitudes of reward, or rest for low reward. Prior to each effort-based choice, they also had to decide which information they wanted to see first: how much physical effort would be required, or how large the reward would be. We found no overall preference for seeking reward or effort information first, but motivation did change when people saw reward or effort information first. Seeking effort information first, both someone's average tendency to do so and their choice to see effort first on a given trial, was associated with reductions in the willingness to exert higher effort. Moreover, the tendency to prefer effort information first was associated with reduced vigorous exercise and higher levels of fatigue in everyday life. These findings highlight that preferences for seeking effort information may be a bias that reduces people's willingness to exert effort in the lab and in everyday life.