Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity

Exploring new technologies for the future generation: exploration-exploitation trade-off in an intergenerational framework

Decision making on exploring or exploiting technology was studied by means of a laboratory experiment with a two-generation framework. In this framework, the design of a virtual tool is transmitted from the first to second generation, and hence, the former can help the latter by frequently exploring better tool designs but at the cost of reduced opportunities to exploit the existing tool to increase its own benefits. We set two experimental conditions ('repaid' and 'unrepaid') as well as a control condition (asocial), in which the second generation is absent. In the 'repaid' experimental condition, participants received an extra payment proportional to the score gained by the second generation, such that they were monetarily incentivized to help the second generation. Such an incentive was not given in the 'unrepaid' condition. An analysis of a formal model and computer simulations predicted that rational participants should increase investment in exploration only in the repaid condition when compared with the asocial control. The prediction was confirmed by the results of the experiment. These findings together suggest that humans may not have a propensity to invest in costly exploration of new technologies solely to help future generations.

Individuals reciprocate negative actions revealing negative upstream reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is widely recognized as a mechanism for explaining cooperation and can be divided into two sub-concepts: downstream and upstream reciprocity. Downstream reciprocity is supported by reputation; if someone sees you helping someone else, the person who sees this will think higher of you, and you will be more likely to be helped. Upstream reciprocity is helping someone because you are being helped by somebody else, which often happens in everyday life and experimental games. This paper focuses on the behavior of "take" and examines negative upstream reciprocity using an upstream reciprocity framework. The term "take" is defined as "to steal rather than give resources to others." "If something is taken from you, do you take from others?" is an important extension for indirect reciprocity research; subsequently, this paper discusses experiments conducted on whether negative upstream reciprocity is chained and what causes it. The results demonstrated differences between positive and negative upstream reciprocity. In analyzing the data of nearly 600 participants to determine the extent to which negative upstream reciprocity is observed and the causes of negative upstream reciprocity, the study found that If individual A takes resources from individual B, then B is more likely to take resources from a third-party, individual C. Notably, some causes of positive upstream reciprocity were found to have no effect or the opposite effect on negative upstream reciprocity. The results also demonstrate that the first person to take can cause a chain reaction. This paper demonstrates the importance of the first person not taking from someone else and suggests the need to consider various behavioral options for future research on cooperation.

Intergenerational sustainability is enhanced by taking the perspective of future generations

The intergenerational sustainability dilemma (ISD) is a situation of whether or not a person sacrifices herself for future sustainability. To examine the individual behaviors, one-person ISD game (ISDG) is instituted with strategy method where a queue of individuals is organized as a generational sequence. In ISDG, each individual chooses unsustainable (or sustainable) option with her payoff of [Formula: see text] ([Formula: see text]) and an irreversible cost of [Formula: see text] (zero cost) to future generations in [Formula: see text] situations. Future ahead and back (FAB) mechanism is suggested as resolution for ISD by taking the perspective of future generation whereby each individual is first asked to take the next generation's standpoint and request what she wants the current generation to choose, and, second, to make the actual decision from the original position. Results show that individuals choose unsustainable option as previous generations do so or [Formula: see text] is low (i.e., sustainability is endangered). However, FAB prevents individuals from choosing unsustainable option in such endangered situations. Overall, the results suggest that some new institutions, such as FAB mechanisms, which induce people to take the perspective of future generations, may be necessary to avoid intergenerational unsustainability, especially when intergenerational sustainability is highly endangered.

Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models

Reciprocity toward a partner’s cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one’s partner’s previous action but also one’s own previous action—such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning—has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used to explain the variances in cooperative behavior among people. To do this, we considered games involving either direct reciprocity (an iterated prisoner’s dilemma) or generalized reciprocity (a gift-giving game). Multilevel models incorporating inter-individual behavioral differences were fitted to experimental data using Bayesian inference. The results indicate that for these two types of games, a model that considers both one’s own and one’s partner’s previous actions fits the empirical data better than the other models. In the direct reciprocity game, mutual cooperation or defection—rather than relying solely on one’s partner’s previous actions—affected the increase or decrease, respectively, in subsequent cooperation. Whereas in the generalized reciprocity game, a weaker effect of mutual cooperation or defection on subsequent cooperation was observed.

A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

Behavioral Intention Promotes Generalized Reciprocity: Evidence From the Dictator Game

Generalized reciprocity is the phenomenon that individuals treat others in the same way that others treated them in the past. Besides the behavioral outcomes, whether intention information also manipulates generalized reciprocal behavior remains unclear. By conducting two rounds of the dictator game, the current research investigated the influence from the dictator's intention on the receiver's following resource allocation performance. In the games, in order to allocate, either tokens in Experiment 1 or jobs in Experiment 2, a general tendency was shown to treat others better if one was generously treated than greedily treated. Regarding the intentionality, participants who received a generous offer (vs. greedy offer) from another person (i.e., intentional) would perform more generously to another person. However, if the offer was randomly given by a computer program (i.e., unintentional), the way in which one was being treated previously, became somewhat irrelevant to the participants' generalized reciprocal behaviors. Those findings verified the influence of the manipulation of intention on generalized reciprocity, and provided enlightenment for promoting friendly social interactions.

Universals and cultural diversity in the expression of gratitude

Gratitude is argued to have evolved to motivate and maintain social reciprocity among people, and to be linked to a wide range of positive effects-social, psychological and even physical. But is socially reciprocal behaviour dependent on the expression of gratitude, for example by saying 'thank you' as in English? Current research has not included cross-cultural elements, and has tended to conflate gratitude as an emotion with gratitude as a linguistic practice, as might appear to be the case in English. Here, we ask to what extent people express gratitude in different societies by focusing on episodes of everyday life where someone seeks and obtains a good, service or support from another, comparing these episodes across eight languages from five continents. We find that expressions of gratitude in these episodes are remarkably rare, suggesting that social reciprocity in everyday life relies on tacit understandings of rights and duties surrounding mutual assistance and collaboration. At the same time, we also find minor cross-cultural variation, with slightly higher rates in Western European languages English and Italian, showing that universal tendencies of social reciprocity should not be equated with more culturally variable practices of expressing gratitude. Our study complements previous experimental and culture-specific research on gratitude with a systematic comparison of audiovisual corpora of naturally occurring social interaction from different cultures from around the world.