Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation

When do gossip receivers assess negative gossip as justifiable? A goal framing approach

Negative gossip is a double-edged sword, which can harm group members but also protect them from harmful others. Current theory proposes that gossip receivers assess gossipers' selfish and prosocial intentions based on different social cues, to determine whether the negative gossip behavior is morally justifiable. However, assessing gossipers' moral intentions does not fully clarify when and how justifiability of negative gossip is assessed by receivers. Using goal framing theory, I propose a parsimonious way of understanding when gossip receivers will be interested in determining whether sharing the negative gossip was justifiable, and how they assess justifiability. In line with predictions, results of two scenario experiments showed that in a hedonic and gain goal frame gossip justifiability was similar to a baseline level, suggesting that receivers had no particular concerns regarding gossip justifiability. However, in a normative frame receivers assessed negative gossip to be less justifiable when social cues indicated that the gossiper was motivated to harm others for self-interest compared to when such cues were absent (Study 1). In Study 2, gossip was more justified when social cues indicated that that the target broke the salient social norm and signaled that the gossiper has low motivation to harm. Moreover, in a normative frame, participants were more interested in further establishing gossip truthfulness compared to participants in a gain, hedonic, or control condition in Study 1, and in a hedonic condition in Study 2. These results show that individuals' goal frame determine their interest in gossip justifiability and how they assess it. This may help solve the paradox of negative gossip by drawing from goal framing theory to understand individuals can be avid gossip consumers, while holding widely disapproving attitudes towards this behavior.

A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation

Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down, as disagreements lead to the perception of unjustified behavior that ultimately undermines cooperation. Theoretical studies often assume population-wide agreement about reputations, invoking rapid gossip as an endogenous mechanism for reaching consensus. However, the theory of indirect reciprocity lacks a mechanistic description of how gossip actually generates consensus. Here, we develop a mechanistic model of gossip-based indirect reciprocity that incorporates two alternative forms of gossip: exchanging information with randomly selected peers or consulting a single gossip source. We show that these two forms of gossip are mathematically equivalent under an appropriate transformation of parameters. We derive an analytical expression for the minimum amount of gossip required to reach sufficient consensus and stabilize cooperation. We analyze how the amount of gossip necessary for cooperation depends on the benefits and costs of cooperation, the assessment rule (social norm), and errors in reputation assessment, strategy execution, and gossip transmission. Finally, we show that biased gossip can either facilitate or hinder cooperation, depending on the direction and magnitude of the bias. Our results contribute to the growing literature on cooperation facilitated by communication, and they highlight the need to study strategic interactions coupled with the spread of social information.

Motivated Cognition in Cooperation

Successful cooperation is tightly linked to individuals' beliefs about their interaction partners, the decision setting, and existing norms, perceptions, and values. This article reviews and integrates findings from judgment and decision-making, social and cognitive psychology, political science, and economics, developing a systematic overview of the mechanisms underlying motivated cognition in cooperation. We elaborate on how theories and concepts related to motivated cognition developed in various disciplines define the concept and describe its functionality. We explain why beliefs play such an essential role in cooperation, how they can be distorted, and how this fosters or harms cooperation. We also highlight how individual differences and situational factors change the propensity to engage in motivated cognition. In the form of a construct map, we provide a visualization of the theoretical and empirical knowledge structure regarding the role of motivated cognition, including its many interdependencies, feedback loops, and moderating influences. We conclude with a brief suggestion for a future research agenda based on this compiled evidence.

A pull versus push framework for reputation

Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation framework that centers the perspective of evaluators by suggesting that reputation systems can create two fundamentally different incentives for evaluators to reward positive reputations. Evaluators may be pulled towards 'good' actors to benefit directly from their reciprocal cooperation, or pushed to cooperate with such actors by normative pressure. I discuss how psychology and behavior might diverge under pull versus push mechanisms, and use this framework to deepen our understanding of the empirical reputation literature and suggest ways that we may better leverage reputation for social good.

Humans feel too special for machines to score their morals

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be harnessed to create sophisticated social and moral scoring systems-enabling people and organizations to form judgments of others at scale. However, it also poses significant ethical challenges and is, subsequently, the subject of wide debate. As these technologies are developed and governing bodies face regulatory decisions, it is crucial that we understand the attraction or resistance that people have for AI moral scoring. Across four experiments, we show that the acceptability of moral scoring by AI is related to expectations about the quality of those scores, but that expectations about quality are compromised by people's tendency to see themselves as morally peculiar. We demonstrate that people overestimate the peculiarity of their moral profile, believe that AI will neglect this peculiarity, and resist for this reason the introduction of moral scoring by AI.

Social incentives foster cooperation through guilt aversion: An effect that diminishes with primary psychopathic traits

The association between primary psychopathic traits and non-cooperative behaviors is well-identified. There is a lack of studies on how to motivate cooperative behaviors in individuals with primary psychopathic traits. This study investigated the effects of monetary incentives and social incentives on promoting cooperation in healthy adults with varying primary psychopathic traits. Participants played a one-shot public goods game (PGG) with other anonymous players in three different contexts: a social incentives context where participants' decisions would be judged by others, a monetary incentives context where participants' decisions would result in winning or losing money depending on their contributions, and a control condition where no additional incentives were implemented. We found that, compared to the control condition, both monetary and social incentives significantly improved participants' contributions to the public project-an indicator of cooperative behavior. However, the association between higher primary psychopathic traits and less cooperation was only observed in the context of social incentives. Computational modeling further revealed that this effect can be explained by the diminishing guilt aversion when participants deliberately violated their inferred expectations of themselves from others' perspectives. This study found that social incentives can encourage cooperative behaviors in non-clinical psychopathy, and identified the mental processes navigating this effect.

Nasty and Noble Notes: Interdependence Structures Drive Self-Serving Gossip

Much information people receive about others reaches them via gossip. But is this gossip trustworthy? We examined this in a scenario study (Nsenders = 350, Nobservations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment (Nsenders = 126; Nobservations = 3024). In both studies, participants played a sequential prisoner's dilemma where a gossip sender observed a target's (first decider's) decision and could gossip about this to a receiver (second decider). We manipulated the interdependence structure such that gossipers' outcomes were equal to targets' outcomes, equal to receivers' outcomes, or independent. Compared to no interdependence, gossip was more often false when gossipers were interdependent with targets but not when interdependent with receivers. As such, false positive gossip (self-serving when interdependent with targets) increased but false negative gossip (self-serving when interdependent with receivers) did not. In conclusion, the interdependence structure affected gossip's trustworthiness: When gossipers' outcomes were interdependent with targets, gossip was less trustworthy.

Discriminatory punishment undermines the enforcement of group cooperation

Peer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become ineffective and group cooperation deteriorates. Here we show that this happens in pluriform groups where members have different socio-demographic characteristics. In our public good provision experiment, participants were confronted with a public good from which all group members benefitted equally, and in-between rounds they could punish each other. Groups were uniform (members shared the same academic background) or pluriform (half the members shared the same academic background, and the other half shared another background). We show that punishment effectively enforced cooperation in uniform groups where punishment was conditioned on poor contribution. In pluriform groups, punishment was conditioned on poor contribution too, but also partially on others' social-demographic characteristics-dissimilar others were punished more than similar others regardless of their contribution. As a result, punishment lost its effectiveness in deterring free-riding and maintaining public good provision. Follow-up experiments indicated that such discriminatory punishment was used to demarcate and reinforce subgroup boundaries. This work reveals that peer punishment fails to enforce cooperation in groups with a pluriform structure, which is rule rather than exception in contemporary societies.

How ‘who someone is’ and ‘what they did’ influences gossiping about them

To understand, predict, and help correct each other’s actions we need to maintain accurate, up-to-date knowledge of people, and communication is a critical means by which we gather and disseminate this information. Yet the conditions under which we communication social information remain unclear. Testing hypotheses generated from our theoretical framework, we examined when and why social information is disseminated about an absent third party: i.e., gossiped. Gossip scenarios presented to participants (e.g., “Person-X cheated on their exam”) were based on three key factors: (1) target (ingroup, outgroup, or celebrity), (2) valence (positive or negative), and (3) content. We then asked them (a) whether they would spread the information, and (b) to rate it according to subjective valence, ordinariness, interest level, and emotion. For ratings, the scenarios participants chose to gossip were considered to have higher valence (whether positive or negative), to be rarer, more interesting, and more emotionally evocative; thus showing that the paradigm was meaningful to subjects. Indeed, for target, valence, and content, a repeated-measures ANOVA found significant effects for each factor independently, as well as their interactions. The results supported our hypotheses: e.g., for target, more gossiping about celebrities and ingroup members (over strangers); for valence, more about negative events overall, and yet for ingroup members, more positive gossiping; for content, more about moral topics, with yet all domains of social content communicated depending on the situation—context matters, influencing needs. The findings suggest that social knowledge sharing (i.e., gossip) involves sophisticated calculations that require our highest sociocognitive abilities, and provide specific hypotheses for future examination of neural mechanisms.

Gossip promotes cooperation only when it is pro-socially motivated

Humans are often shown to cooperate with one another. Most of the mechanisms that foster cooperation among humans rely on reputation, which itself relies on the acquisition of information about other people’s behaviors. Gossip has been proposed as a cheap yet efficient tool to acquire information, and it has largely been proved to be an effective means to foster and maintain cooperation. However, empirical studies supporting this claim have ignored two aspects: (1) they often compared gossip to treatments in which no reputation was available, impeding a direct assessment of whether it is gossip that promotes cooperation or rather the introduction of a reputation system; and (2) they focused on pro-social gossip (e.g., gossip aimed at helping the receiver), neglecting the impact of other types of gossip. We show here that, in contrast with the widespread notion that gossip promotes cooperation, gossip mostly depletes cooperation compared to first-hand information. If lying is fruitful for individuals or if a group’s behavior is largely uncooperative, gossip leads to negative reputational information and decreased cooperation.

Gossip and reputation in everyday life

Gossip-a sender communicating to a receiver about an absent third party-is hypothesized to impact reputation formation, partner selection, and cooperation. Laboratory experiments have found that people gossip about others' cooperativeness and that they use gossip to condition their cooperation. Here, we move beyond the laboratory and test several predictions from theories of indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection about the content of everyday gossip and how people use it to update the reputation of others in their social network. In a Dutch community sample (N = 309), we sampled daily events in which people either sent or received gossip about a target over 10 days (ngossip = 5284). Gossip senders frequently shared information about targets' cooperativeness and did so in ways that minimize potential retaliation from targets. Receivers overwhelmingly believed gossip to be true and updated their evaluation of targets based on gossip. In turn, a positive shift in the evaluation of a target was associated with higher intentions to help them in future interactions, and with lower intentions to avoid them in the future. Thus, gossip is used in daily life to impact and update reputations in a way that enables partner selection and indirect reciprocity. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms

Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is a friend and who is a foe. The need to overcome this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Reputation and socio-ecology in humans

Reputation is a fundamental feature of human sociality as it sustains cooperative relationships among unrelated individuals. Research from various disciplines provides insights on how individuals form impressions of others, condition their behaviours based on the reputation of their interacting partners and spread or learn such reputations. However, past research has often neglected the socio-ecological conditions that can shape reputation systems and their effect on cooperation. Here, we outline how social environments, cultural values and institutions come to play a crucial role in how people navigate reputation systems. Moreover, we illustrate how these socio-ecological dimensions affect the interdependence underlying social interactions (e.g. potential recipients of reputational benefits, degree of dependence) and the extent to which reputation systems promote cooperation. To do so, we review the interdisciplinary literature that illustrates how reputation systems are shaped by the variation of prominent ecological features. Finally, we discuss the implications of a socio-ecological approach to the study of reputation and outline potential avenues for future research. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences

Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences-including confrontation, gossip and ostracism-which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Reward, punishment, and prosocial behavior: Recent developments and implications

Reward and punishment change the payoff structures of social interactions and therefore can potentially play a role in promoting prosocial behavior. Yet, there are boundary conditions for them to be effective. We review recent work that addresses the conditions under which rewards and punishment can enhance prosocial behavior, the proximate and ultimate mechanisms for individuals' rewarding and punishing decisions, and the reputational and behavioral consequences of reward and punishment under noise. The reviewed evidence points to the importance of more field research on how reward and punishment can promote prosocial behavior in real-world settings. We also highlight the need to integrate different methodologies to better examine the effects of reward and punishment on prosocial behavior.

Constructing the Facets of Altruistic Behaviors (FAB) Scale

Abstract. Behavior is effectively altruistic to the degree that it is costly for the actor while benefiting others. In a series of preregistered studies, we constructed a 15-item self-report scale assessing three different facets of altruistic behavioral traits: help-giving, moral courage, and peer punishment. Item selection was performed with the help of Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) procedures as implemented in the stuart package for R. Confirmatory factor analysis of the three-factor measurement model showed excellent fit, outperforming classical item selection procedures. The scale was structure-validated in a second sample using a multiple group model that showed full measurement and structural invariance. A pilot study shows correlations of the subscales with economic game decisions. We discuss the scale structure and potential applications.

Human Cooperation and the Crises of Climate Change, COVID-19, and Misinformation

Contemporary society is facing many social dilemmas-including climate change, COVID-19, and misinformation-characterized by a conflict between short-term self-interest and longer-term collective interest. The climate crisis requires paying costs today to benefit distant others (and oneself) in the future. The COVID-19 crisis requires the less vulnerable to pay costs to benefit the more vulnerable in the face of great uncertainty. The misinformation crisis requires investing effort to assess truth and abstain from spreading attractive falsehoods. Addressing these crises requires an understanding of human cooperation. To that end, we present (a) an overview of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, including mechanisms based on similarity and interaction; (b) a discussion of how reputation can incentivize cooperation via conditional cooperation and signaling; and (c) a review of social preferences that undergird the proximate psychology of cooperation, including positive regard for others, parochialism, and egalitarianism. We discuss the three focal crises facing our society through the lens of cooperation, emphasizing how cooperation research can inform our efforts to address them. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Gossip drives vicarious learning and facilitates social connection

Complex language and communication is one of the unique hallmarks that distinguishes humans from most other animals. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of our communication consists of social topics involving self-disclosure and discussions about others, broadly construed as gossip. Yet the precise social function of gossip remains poorly understood as research has been heavily influenced by folk intuitions narrowly casting gossip as baseless trash talk. Using a novel empirical paradigm that involves real interactions between a large sample of participants, we provide evidence that gossip is a rich, multifaceted construct, that plays a critical role in vicarious learning and social bonding. We demonstrate how the visibility or lack thereof of others' behavior shifts conversational content between self-disclosure and discussions about others. Social information acquired through gossip aids in vicarious learning, directly influencing future behavior and impression formation. At the same time, conversation partners come to influence each other, form more similar impressions, and build robust social bonds. Consistent with prior work, gossip also helps promote cooperation in groups without a need for formal sanctioning mechanisms. Altogether these findings demonstrate the rich and diverse social functions and effects of this ubiquitous human behavior and lay the groundwork for future investigations.

Negative Gossip Decreases Targets' Organizational Citizenship Behavior by Decreasing Social Inclusion. A Multi-Method Approach

Ample experimental evidence shows that negative gossip fosters cooperation in groups by increasing individuals' reputational concerns. However, recent field studies showed that negative gossip decreases organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) among its targets (i.e., people whom gossip is about). Bridging these findings, we study the role of social inclusion in explaining how negative gossip affects targets' engagement in OCB. Based on social exchange theory, we predict that targets of negative gossip experience low social inclusion. In turn, we propose that low social inclusion leads to low OCB of gossip targets. Results of three studies, a correlational study (N = 563), a laboratory experiment (N = 85), and an online scenario experiment (N = 597), showed that being the target of negative gossip reduced social inclusion and indirectly decreased OCBs. Our multi-method approach bridges findings from research conducted in organizations and in laboratory experiments and offers a more nuanced understanding of the effects of negative gossip on targets' behavior. We show that due to its detrimental effect on targets' social inclusion, negative gossip may not be as effective for enabling sustainable cooperation as experimental studies claim it to be.

An Integrative Definition and Framework to Study Gossip

The omnipresence of workplace gossip makes understanding gossip processes imperative to understand social life in organizations. Although gossip research has recently increased across the social sciences, gossip is conceptualized in disparate ways in the scientific literature. This conceptual confusion impedes theoretical integration and providing practical advice. To resolve this, we systematically reviewed 6114 scientific articles on gossip and identified 324 articles that define gossip. From these definitions, we extracted two essential characteristics of gossip on which there seems to be agreement within the literature, namely, (1) that gossip is communication between humans involving a sender, a receiver, and a target, and (2) that the target is absent or unaware of the communicated content. These two characteristics formed the basis of a broad, integrative definition of gossip: a sender communicating to a receiver about a target who is absent or unaware of the content. Furthermore, some definitions include characteristics on which there is less agreement: gossip valence (from negative to neutral to positive) and formality (from informal to intermediate to formal). We incorporate these characteristics in a dimensional scaling framework that can guide future research. Our broad, integrative definition of gossip and the dimensional scaling framework provide the building blocks for a systematic, integrated knowledge base on the role of gossip in human social life in general as well as in organizations. This can foster future theory development and hypothesis testing, ultimately helping organizations to manage gossip.

Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm violation in 57 societies

Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.

Little is known about people’s preferred responses to norm violations across countries. Here, in a study of 57 countries, the authors highlight cultural similarities and differences in people’s perception of the appropriateness of norm violations.

Repeated Interaction and Its Impact on Cooperation and Surplus Allocation—An Experimental Analysis

This paper investigates how the possibility of affecting group composition combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation within groups and surplus distribution. We developed and tested experimentally a Surplus Allocation Game where cooperation of four agents is needed to produce surplus, but only two have the power to allocate it among the group members. Three matching procedures (corresponding to three separate experimental treatments) were used to test the impact of the variables of interest. A total of 400 subjects participated in our research, which was computer-based and conducted in a laboratory. Our results show that allowing for repeated interaction with the same partners leads to a self-selection of agents into groups with different life spans, whose duration is correlated with the behavior of both distributors and receivers. While behavior at the group level is diverse for surplus allocation and amount of cooperation, aggregate behavior is instead similar when repeated interaction is allowed or not allowed. We developed a behavioral model that captures the dynamics observed in the experimental data and sheds light into the rationales that drive the agents’ individual behavior, suggesting that the most generous distributors are those acting for fear of rejection, not for true generosity, while the groups lasting the longest are those composed by this type of distributors and “undemanding” receivers.

Women are more likely to expect social sanctions for open defecation: Evidence from Tamil Nadu India

Social sanctions can be effective for sustaining beneficial norms by harnessing the power of social pressure and peer monitoring. Yet, field evidence regarding how norms might be linked to perceived risk of sanction is limited. In this study, we focused on communities located in peri-urban areas of Tamil Nadu, India, and examined how people’s perceived prevalence of a socially desirable behavior (i.e., toilet use) relates to the perceived risk of sanctions for deviating from this behavior (i.e., open defecation) in the sanitation domain. Cross-sectional data from 2427 participants in 75 communities revealed that the majority (77%, n = 1861) perceived the risk of informal sanctions related to open defecation. Among those, verbal reprimand was the most common (60%), followed by advice (30%) and gossip (7%). Results from multilevel logistic regression indicated that those who believed toilet use was prevalent in their community were more likely to perceive the risk of social sanctions for open defecation. Moderation analysis revealed that this relationship was robust among women, but attenuated among men. Our findings suggest that women are more likely to expect social sanctions if they deviate from what is perceived as the prevalent sanitation behavior (e.g., toilet use) in their community. Open defecation practices are known to cause psychosocial stress among women due to their experiences with sanitation insecurity, which may include fear of disapproval from community members. Our results highlight the need for gendered intervention strategies when sanitation programs leverage social influence for behavior change.

The emergence of locally adaptive institutions: Insights from traditional social structures of East African pastoralists

Humans inhabit the widest range of ecological and social niches of any mammal. Yet each ecological and social environment presents a set of challenges that we must solve in order to successfully inhabit it. We are able to do so by building institutions that can flexibly respond to changing circumstances. Institutions that solve adaptive challenges necessary for human sociality, such as how to resolve conflicts, find mates, and extract and distribute resources, are termed locally adaptive institutions. The design of locally adaptive institutions promotes coordination and cooperation among unrelated individuals, reflecting the constraints of the particular ecological and social challenges to which they are responsive. Institutions generally are enabled by a suite of social and psychological mechanisms, including norm compliance, self-interested design, selective imitation, and cultural group selection among others. The development of locally adaptive institutions are likely to be especially shaped by self-interested design in which agents are sensitive to the payoffs from various norms and choose to enforce and follow those which they anticipate to be most beneficial to themselves. Exogenous shocks, including the advent of material and cultural technologies, population pressures, or even group conflict can contribute to the modification of existing social institutions and the development of new social structures. Using several case examples from traditional east African pastoralist societies, I illustrate how ecological and social pressures shape the development of social norms that underlie locally adaptive social institutions and facilitate continued cooperation in the face of change at scales ranging from local to global.

Direct and indirect punishment of norm violations in daily life

Across societies, humans punish norm violations. To date, research on the antecedents and consequences of punishment has largely relied upon agent-based modeling and laboratory experiments. Here, we report a longitudinal study documenting punishment responses to norm violations in daily life (k = 1507; N = 257) and test pre-registered hypotheses about the antecedents of direct punishment (i.e., confrontation) and indirect punishment (i.e., gossip and social exclusion). We find that people use confrontation versus gossip in a context-sensitive manner. Confrontation is more likely when punishers have been personally victimized, have more power, and value offenders more. Gossip is more likely when norm violations are severe and when punishers have less power, value offenders less, and experience disgust. Findings reveal a complex punishment psychology that weighs the benefits of adjusting others' behavior against the risks of retaliation.

Feelings of obligation are valuations of signaling-mediated social payoffs

We extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the long-run social consequences of a decision are sufficiently costly, obligation motivates the actor to forgo potential immediate benefits in favor of long-term social interests. Thus, obligation psychology balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision. This perspective can predict when and why obligation will be experienced.

Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from non-cooperation over cooperation, regardless of others’ choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others’ cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.

Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment

Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less cooperation in larger communities where people are less well known to each other. Some argue that institutions are, therefore, necessary to coordinate large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We conducted a donation game on a large naturalistic sample of 501 people in 17 communities, with varying religions or none, ranging from small villages to large cities in northwestern China. We found that more money was donated by those in small, stable communities, where reputation should be more salient. Religious practice was also associated with higher donations, but fear of divine punishment was not. In a second game on the same sample, decisions were private, giving donors the opportunity to cheat. We found that donors to religious institutions were not less likely to cheat, and community size was not important in this game. Results from the donation game suggest donations to both religious and non-religious institutions are being motivated by reputational considerations, and results from both games suggest fear of divine punishment is not important. This chimes with other studies suggesting social benefits rather than fear of punishment may be the more salient motive for cooperative behaviour in real-world settings.

Why cooperation is not running away

A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.

The Bright and Dark Side of Gossip for Cooperation in Groups

Recent experimental studies seem to concur that gossip is good for groups by showing that gossip stems from prosocial motives to protect group members from non-cooperators. Thus, these studies emphasize the "bright" side of gossip. However, scattered studies point to detrimental outcomes of gossip for individuals and groups, arguing that a "dark" side of gossip exists. To understand the implications of gossip for cooperation in groups, both the dark and bright side of gossip must be illuminated. We investigated both sides of gossip in two scenario studies. In Study 1 (N = 108), we confronted participants with a free-rider in their group and manipulated whether the gossip recipient was the free-rider's potential victim or not. Participants showed a higher group protection motivation in response to gossip when imagining gossiping to a potential victim of a norm violator compared to a non-victim. They showed a higher emotion venting motivation when imagining gossiping to a non-victim compared to a potential victim. Both these gossip motives were related to an increased tendency to gossip. In Study 2 (N = 104), we manipulated whether participants were the targets or observers of gossip and whether the gossip was true or false. Results showed that targets of negative gossip intended to increase their work effort in the short run, but only when the gossip was true. Furthermore, gossip targets reported lower long-term cooperative intentions toward their workgroup regardless of gossip veracity. This paper demonstrates that gossip has both a "dark" and "bright" side and that situational factors and agent perspectives determine which side prevails.

Gossip in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games: Its Immediate and Downstream Consequences for Cooperation

In this research, we examine how cooperation emerges and develops in sequential dyadic interactions when the initial interaction varies in strategic considerations (i.e., fear of partner rejection) or potential gossip by one's partner that may affect subsequent interactions. In a lab experiment involving real-time interactions (N = 240) across 39 sessions, participants acted in different roles (i.e., Person A, B, and C) in two different games-Person A was first assigned to allocate an amount of resource to Person B in a dictator game or an ultimatum game. Afterward, Person C interacted with Person A (i.e., trustee) as a trustor in a trust game. Prior to their decisions, participants (a) learned that Person B could gossip by sending evaluations about Person A's behavior to Person C prior to the trust game or (b) did not receive this information. Findings replicate previous research showing that potential gossip by one's partner greatly increases cooperation that is revealed in the resources allocated to the partner. Yet, compared to the dictator game, the presence of strategic considerations in the ultimatum game does not significantly enhance cooperation, and even makes people less likely to reciprocate others' behavior in the subsequent interaction. Interestingly, when there is no gossip, those who have played the ultimatum game, compared to the dictator game, are more trusted by others but do not vary in reciprocity in the subsequent interaction. However, when there is gossip, those who have played the dictator game, compared to the ultimatum game, are more trusted and also more likely to reciprocate others' behavior in the subsequent interaction. These findings imply that gossip invariably promotes cooperation across strategic and non-strategic situations, but the potential rejection by one's partner weakly promotes cooperation, and even undermines future cooperation especially when paired with reputation sharing opportunities. We discuss the implications of these findings for implementing reputation systems that can promote and maintain cooperation cost-effectively.

Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

Content, structure, and dynamics of personal reputation: The role of trust and status potential within social networks

In this paper we examined the content, structure, and dynamics of reputation, a person’s agreed-upon character that is constructed within social groups. In Study 1, we examined longitudinally the content and structure of an individual’s reputation as distributed across a newly forming group. In Study 2, we examined how the dynamics of reputation shape gossip, a form of reputational discourse. In keeping with theoretical claims about the function of reputation, trustworthiness and status potential proved to be central to reputation content that is shared across a social network and emerged over the course of a year (Study 1). Gossip, a form of reputational discourse, was found to focus upon individuals who are untrustworthy and of questionable and undeserved status (Study 2). We discuss how the results from these studies shed light on how reputation is essential to cooperation and cohesion within groups.

Donors’ Social Class and Their Prosocial Reputation

Abstract. Donors’ social class may provide cues for others to judge their underlying motives and prosociality. We test whether donors’ social class affects their prosocial reputation through perceived authentic motivation. Across four studies, we find that low-class donors are perceived as more authentically motivated to care about others’ welfare, and thus gain more prosocial reputation as a benevolent person, compared to high-class donors. Moreover, prosocial impact salience moderates this effect: When donation is equal in the percentage of donors’ annual income, making the prosocial impact of donors’ contribution salient enhances high-class donors’ perceived authentic motivation and prosocial reputation to the same levels as those of low-class donors. These findings provide important insights into how to design efficient fundraising events or platforms.

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

Death Before Dishonor

Predicated on the notion that people’s survival depends greatly on participation in cooperative society, and that reputation damage may preclude such participation, four studies with diverse methods tested the hypothesis that people would make substantial sacrifices to protect their reputations. A “big data” study found that maintaining a moral reputation is one of people’s most important values. In making hypothetical choices, high percentages of “normal” people reported preferring jail time, amputation of limbs, and death to various forms of reputation damage (i.e., becoming known as a criminal, Nazi, or child molester). Two lab studies found that 30% of people fully submerged their hands in a pile of disgusting live worms, and 63% endured physical pain to prevent dissemination of information suggesting that they were racist. We discuss the implications of reputation protection for theories about altruism and motivation.

The evolution of stories: from mimesis to language, from fact to fiction

Why a species as successful as Homo sapiens should spend so much time in fiction, in telling one another stories that neither side believes, at first seems an evolutionary riddle. Because of the advantages of tracking and recombining true information, capacities for event comprehension, memory, imagination, and communication evolved in a range of animal species—yet even chimpanzees cannot communicate beyond the here and now. By Homo erectus, our forebears had reached an increasing dependence on one another, not least in sharing information in mimetic, prelinguistic ways. As Daniel Dor shows, the pressure to pool ever more information, even beyond currently shared experience, led to the invention of language. Language in turn swiftly unlocked efficient forms of narrative, allowing early humans to learn much more about their kind than they could experience at first hand, so that they could cooperate and compete better through understanding one another more fully. This changed the payoff of sociality for individuals and groups. But true narrative was still limited to what had already happened. Once the strong existing predisposition to play combined with existing capacities for event comprehension, memory, imagination, language, and narrative, we could begin to invent fiction, and to explore the full range of human possibilities in concentrated, engaging, memorable forms. First language, then narrative, then fiction, created niches that altered selection pressures, and made us ever more deeply dependent on knowing more about our kind and our risks and opportunities than we could discover through direct experience. WIREs Cogn Sci 2018, 9:e1444. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1444

This article is categorized under: 1

Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition

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Linguistics > Evolution of Language

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Neuroscience > Cognition

Something to talk about: Gossip increases oxytocin levels in a near real-life situation

Gossip is a pervasive social behavior. Its evolutionary survival seems related to its social functions, such as establishing group rules, punishing trespassers, exercising social influence through reputational systems, and developing and strengthening social bonds. We aimed at evaluating the effect of gossip on hormones (oxytocin and cortisol) and at identifying potential mediators of hormonal response to gossip. Twenty-two female students were randomly assigned to a gossip conversation or to an emotional non-gossip conversation. Additionally, all participants underwent a neutral conversation on the second day of the study. Salivary oxytocin and cortisol levels were measured. Oxytocin increased significantly in the gossip compared to the emotional non-gossip conversation. A decrease in cortisol levels was observed in all three conditions (gossip, emotional non-gossip, neutral). Change in cortisol levels was similar across conditions. Psychological characteristics (e.g. empathy, autistic traits, perceived stress, envy) did not affect oxytocin rise in the gossip condition. Our findings suggest that oxytocin may represent a potential hormonal correlate of gossip behavior.