Cognitive cladistics and cultural override in Hominid spatial cognition

Magnetically driven formation of 3D freestanding soft bioscaffolds

3D soft bioscaffolds have great promise in tissue engineering, biohybrid robotics, and organ-on-a-chip engineering applications. Though emerging three-dimensional (3D) printing techniques offer versatility for assembling soft biomaterials, challenges persist in overcoming the deformation or collapse of delicate 3D structures during fabrication, especially for overhanging or thin features. This study introduces a magnet-assisted fabrication strategy that uses a magnetic field to trigger shape morphing and provide remote temporary support, enabling the straightforward creation of soft bioscaffolds with overhangs and thin-walled structures in 3D. We demonstrate the versatility and effectiveness of our strategy through the fabrication of bioscaffolds that replicate the complex 3D topology of branching vascular systems. Furthermore, we engineered hydrogel-based bioscaffolds to support biohybrid soft actuators capable of walking motion triggered by cardiomyocytes. This approach opens new possibilities for shaping hydrogel materials into complex 3D morphologies, which will further empower a broad range of biomedical applications.

Understanding others' preferences: A comparison across primate species and human societies

We investigated children's and non-human great apes' ability to anticipate others' choices from their evident food preferences-regardless of whether these preferences deviate or align with one's own. We assessed children from three culturally-diverse societies (Namibia, Germany, and Samoa; N = 71; age range = 5-11) and four non-human great ape species (chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and orangutans (Pongo abelii); N = 25; age range = 7-29) regarding their choices in a dyadic food-retrieval task. Across conditions, participants' preferences were either aligned (same preference condition) or opposed (opposite preference condition) to those of their competitors. Children across societies altered their choices based on their competitor's preferences, indicating a cross-culturally recurrent capacity to anticipate others' choices relying on preferences-based inferences. In contrast to human children, all non-human great apes chose according to their own preferences but independent of those of their competitors. In sum, these results suggest that the tendency to anticipate others' choices based on their food preferences is cross-culturally robust and, among the great apes, most likely specific to humans.

Relational reasoning in wild bumblebees revisited: the role of distance

In reasoning tasks, non-human animals attend more to relational than to object similarity. It is precisely this focus on relational similarity that has been argued to explain the reasoning gap between humans and other animals. Work with humans has revealed that objects placed near each other are represented to be more similar than objects placed farther apart. Will distance between objects also affect non-human animals' abilities to represent and reason about objects? To test this, wild bumblebees were presented with a spatial reasoning task (with competing object matches) in which the objects or features alone (colour, shape) were placed close together or far apart. Bumblebees spontaneously attended to objects over relations, but only when the objects were far apart. Features alone were not strong enough to drive object matching-suggesting that bumblebees bound colour and shape into their object representations. These findings question whether the ability to focus on and compare objects is what makes human abstract reasoning unique.

Frames of reference in small-scale spatial tasks in wild bumblebees

Spatial cognitive abilities are fundamental to foraging animal species. In particular, being able to encode the location of an object in relation to another object (i.e., spatial relationships) is critical for successful foraging. Whether egocentric (i.e., viewer-dependent) or allocentric (i.e., dependent on external environment or cues) representations underlie these behaviours is still a highly debated question in vertebrates and invertebrates. Previous research shows that bees encode spatial information largely using egocentric information. However, no research has investigated this question in the context of relational similarity. To test this, a spatial matching task previously used with humans and great apes was adapted for use with wild-caught bumblebees. In a series of experiments, bees first experienced a rewarded object and then had to spontaneously (Experiment 1) find or learn (Experiments 2 and 3) to find a second one, based on the location of first one. The results showed that bumblebees predominantly exhibited an allocentric strategy in the three experiments. These findings suggest that egocentric representations alone might not be evolutionary ancestral and clearly indicate similarities between vertebrates and invertebrates when encoding spatial information.

Over-reliance on English hinders cognitive science

English is the dominant language in the study of human cognition and behavior: the individuals studied by cognitive scientists, as well as most of the scientists themselves, are frequently English speakers. However, English differs from other languages in ways that have consequences for the whole of the cognitive sciences, reaching far beyond the study of language itself. Here, we review an emerging body of evidence that highlights how the particular characteristics of English and the linguistic habits of English speakers bias the field by both warping research programs (e.g., overemphasizing features and mechanisms present in English over others) and overgeneralizing observations from English speakers' behaviors, brains, and cognition to our entire species. We propose mitigating strategies that could help avoid some of these pitfalls.

Different reference frames on different axes: Space and language in indigenous Amazonians

Spatial cognition is central to human behavior, but the way people conceptualize space varies within and across groups for unknown reasons. Here, we found that adults from an indigenous Bolivian group used systematically different spatial reference frames on different axes, according to known differences in their discriminability: In both verbal and nonverbal tests, participants preferred allocentric (i.e., environment-based) space on the left-right axis, where spatial discriminations (like "b" versus "d") are notoriously difficult, but the same participants preferred egocentric (i.e., body-based) space on the front-back axis, where spatial discrimination is relatively easy. The results (i) establish a relationship between spontaneous spatial language and memory across axes within a single culture, (ii) challenge the claim that each language group has a predominant spatial reference frame at a given scale, and (iii) suggest that spatial thinking and language may both be shaped by spatial discrimination abilities, as they vary across cultures and contexts.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) navigate to find hidden fruit in a virtual environment

Almost all animals navigate their environment to find food, shelter, and mates. Spatial cognition of nonhuman primates in large-scale environments is notoriously difficult to study. Field research is ecologically valid, but controlling confounding variables can be difficult. Captive research enables experimental control, but space restrictions can limit generalizability. Virtual reality technology combines the best of both worlds by creating large-scale, controllable environments. We presented six chimpanzees with a seminaturalistic virtual environment, using a custom touch screen application. The chimpanzees exhibited signature behaviors reminiscent of real-life navigation: They learned to approach a landmark associated with the presence of fruit, improving efficiency over time; they located this landmark from novel starting locations and approached a different landmark when necessary. We conclude that virtual environments can allow for standardized testing with higher ecological validity than traditional tests in captivity and harbor great potential to contribute to longstanding questions in primate navigation, e.g., the use of landmarks, Euclidean maps, or spatial frames of reference.

Analytic and Holistic Thinkers: Differences in the Dynamics of Heart Rate Complexity When Solving a Cognitive Task in Field-Dependent and Field-Independent Conditions

Analytic and holistic thinking styles are known to be associated with individual differences in various aspects of behavior and brain activity. In this study, we tested a hypothesis that differences in thinking styles may also be manifested at the level of neuro-visceral coordination. Heart rate variability (HRV) was compared between analytic and holistic thinkers at rest, during a simple motor choice reaction time task and when solving cognitive choice reaction time tasks in conditions with varying instructions contrasting the role of the field when evaluating objects. Participants (N = 52) with analytic and holistic thinking styles were equally successful at solving the cognitive tasks but response times were longer in the analytic group, compared to the holistic group. Heart rate complexity, as measured by sample entropy, was higher in the analytic group during the cognitive tasks but did not differ from the holistic group at rest or during the simple motor task. Analytic participants had longer response times and higher heart rate complexity when evaluating objects in relation to the field than when evaluating objects irrespective to the field. No difference in response times or heart rate complexity between tasks was observed in the holistic group. Our findings demonstrate that differences in individual behavior, including those related to holistic and analytic thinking styles, can be reflected not only in brain activity, as shown previously using fMRI and EEG methods, but also at the level of neuro-visceral coordination, as manifested in heart rate complexity.

Anthropomorphizing Technology: A Conceptual Review of Anthropomorphism Research and How it Relates to Children's Engagements with Digital Voice Assistants

‘Anthropomorphism’ is a popular term in the literature on human-technology engagements, in general, and child-technology engagements, in particular. But what does it really mean to ‘anthropomorphize’ something in today’s world? This conceptual review article, addressed to researchers interested in anthropomorphism and adjacent areas, reviews contemporary anthropomorphism research, and it offers a critical perspective on how anthropomorphism research relates to today’s children who grow up amid increasingly intelligent and omnipresent technologies, particularly digital voice assistants (e.g., Alexa, Google Assistant, Siri). First, the article reviews a comprehensive body of quantitative as well as qualitative anthropomorphism research and considers it within three different research perspectives: descriptive, normative and explanatory. Following a brief excursus on philosophical pragmatism, the article then discusses each research perspective from a pragmatistic viewpoint, with a special emphasis on child-technology and child-voice-assistant engagements, and it also challenges some popular notions in the literature. These notions include descriptive ‘as if’ parallels (e.g., child behaves ‘as if’ Alexa was a friend), or normative assumptions that human-human engagements are generally superior to human-technology engagements. Instead, the article reviews different examples from the literature suggesting the nature of anthropomorphism may change as humans’ experiential understandings of humanness change, and this may particularly apply to today’s children as their social cognition develops in interaction with technological entities which are increasingly characterized by unprecedented combinations of human and non-human qualities.

Space in Hand and Mind: Gesture and Spatial Frames of Reference in Bilingual Mexico

Speakers of many languages prefer allocentric frames of reference (FoRs) when talking about small-scale space, using words like "east" or "downhill." Ethnographic work has suggested that this preference is also reflected in how such speakers gesture. Here, we investigate this possibility with a field experiment in Juchitán, Mexico. In Juchitán, a preferentially allocentric language (Isthmus Zapotec) coexists with a preferentially egocentric one (Spanish). Using a novel task, we elicited spontaneous co-speech gestures about small-scale motion events (e.g., toppling blocks) in Zapotec-dominant speakers and in balanced Zapotec-Spanish bilinguals. Consistent with prior claims, speakers' spontaneous gestures reliably reflected either an egocentric or allocentric FoR. The use of the egocentric FoR was predicted-not by speakers' dominant language or the language they used in the task-but by mastery of words for "right" and "left," as well as by properties of the event they were describing. Additionally, use of the egocentric FoR in gesture predicted its use in a separate nonlinguistic memory task, suggesting a cohesive cognitive style. Our results show that the use of spatial FoRs in gesture is pervasive, systematic, and shaped by several factors. Spatial gestures, like other forms of spatial conceptualization, are thus best understood within broader ecologies of communication and cognition.

Unraveling the contribution of left-right language on spatial perspective taking

We examine whether acquiring left/right language affects children's ability to take a non-egocentric left-right perspective. In Experiment 1, we tested 10-13 year-old Tseltal (Mayan) and Spanish-speaking children from the same community on a task that required they retrieve a coin they previously seen hidden in one of four boxes to the left/right/front/back of a toy sheep after the entire array was rotated out of view. Their performance on the left/right boxes correlated positively with their comprehension and use of left-right language. In Experiment 2, we found that training Tseltal-speaking children to apply left-right lexical labels to represent the location of the coin improved performance, but improvement was more robust among a second group of children trained to use gestures instead.

The Relationship Between Tool Use and Prey Availability in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) of Northern Democratic Republic of Congo

A key feature of human behavioral diversity is that it can be constrained by cultural preference (“cultural override”); that is, population-specific preferences can override resource availability. Here we investigate whether a similar phenomenon can be found in one of our closest relatives, as well as the potential impacts of ecological differences on feeding behavior. Our study subjects were different subpopulations of Eastern chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) occupying two very different habitats, moist tropical lowland forests vs. moist tropical forest–savanna mosaic on opposite sides of a major river. Given differences in encounter rates of different kinds of tool sites on both sides of the Uele River, we predicted that these subpopulations would differ in their likelihood of using tools to prey on two insect species despite similar availability. In surveys conducted over a 9-year period at 19 different survey regions in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (10 in lowland forest and 9 in mosaic), we collected and analyzed data on chimpanzee tool-assisted exploitation of insects. To determine the availability of insect species eaten by the chimpanzees, we counted insects and their mounds on transects and recces at 12 of these sites. For stick tools used to harvest epigaeic Dorylus and ponerine ants, we evaluated seasonal, geographical, and prey-availability factors that might influence their occurrence, using nest encounter rate as a proxy to control for chimpanzee abundance. Across the 19 survey regions spanning both sides of the Uele, we found little difference in the availability of epigaeic Dorylus and ponerine ants. Despite this, tool encounter rates for epigaeic Dorylus, but not ponerine, ants were significantly higher in the mosaic to the north of the Uele. Furthermore, we found no evidence for termite fishing anywhere, despite the availability of Macrotermes mounds throughout the region and the fact that chimpanzees at a number of other study sites use tools to harvest these termites. Instead, the chimpanzees of this region used a novel percussive technique to harvest two other types of termites, Cubitermes sp. and Thoracotermes macrothorax. This mismatch between prey availability and predation is consistent with cultural override, but given the different habitats on the two sides of the Uele River, we cannot fully rule out the influence of ecological factors. Comparing our findings with those of similar studies of other chimpanzee populations promises to contribute to our understanding of the evolution of behavioral diversity in humans and our closest cousins.

What Early Sapiens Cognition Can Teach Us: Untangling Cultural Influences on Human Cognition Across Time

Evidence of cultural influences on cognition is accumulating, but untangling these cultural influences from one another or from non-cultural influences has remained a challenging task. As between-group differences are neither a sufficient nor a necessary indicator of cultural impact, cross-cultural comparisons in isolation are unable to furnish any cogent conclusions. This shortfall can be compensated by taking a diachronic perspective that focuses on the role of culture for the emergence and evolution of our cognitive abilities. Three strategies for reconstructing early human cognition are presented: the chaîne opératoire approach and its extension to brain-imaging studies, large-scale extrapolations, and phylogenetic comparative methods. While these strategies are reliant on our understanding of present-day cognition, they conversely also have the potential to advance this understanding in fundamental ways.

Sun, age and test location affect spatial orientation in human foragers in rainforests

The ability to know the direction of food sources is important for the foraging success of hunter-gatherers, especially in rainforests where dense vegetation limits visual detection distances. Besides sex and age, prior experience with the environment and the use of environmental cues are known to influence orientation abilities of humans. Among environmental cues, the position of the sun in the sky is important for orientation of diurnal animal species. However, whether or to what extent humans use the sun is largely unknown. Here, we investigated orientation abilities of the Mbendjele BaYaka people in the Republic of Congo, by conducting pointing tests (Nparticipants = 54, age: 6-76 years) in different locations in the rainforest. The Mbendjele were overall highly accurate at pointing to out-of-sight targets (median error: 6°). Pointing accuracy increased with age, but sex did not affect accuracy. Crucially, sun visibility increased pointing accuracy in young participants, especially when they were far from the camp. However, this effect became less apparent in older participants who exhibited high pointing accuracy, also when the sun was not visible. This study extends our understandings of orientation abilities of human foragers and provides the first behavioural evidence for sun compass use in humans.

Alternative spin on phylogenetically inherited spatial reference frames

People make use of different frames of reference (north-south; left-right) to talk about space. To explore the cognitive capacity that children bring to learning spatial language, Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, and Levinson (2006) examined children's ability to notice and abstract invariant frames of references across instances. They found that 4-year-olds and non-human great apes often noticed environment-defined allocentric relations and not body-defined egocentric ones, leading them to conclude that preschoolers are ready to learn environment-defined terms (e.g. "uphill"), but not body-defined ones (e.g., "left"). However, such a conclusion may be premature. In four new experiments we demonstrate that the previous findings could be an artifact of specific task constraints. With minor experiment modifications, similar-aged children readily noticed egocentric relations. Reviewing additional research, we provide an account of what makes acquiring frames of reference easy or difficult, and why full mastery of terms like "left" and "right" may take many years under normal circumstances.

A drama movie activates brains of holistic and analytical thinkers differentially

People socialized in different cultures differ in their thinking styles. Eastern-culture people view objects more holistically by taking context into account, whereas Western-culture people view objects more analytically by focusing on them at the expense of context. Here we studied whether participants, who have different thinking styles but live within the same culture, exhibit differential brain activity when viewing a drama movie. A total of 26 Finnish participants, who were divided into holistic and analytical thinkers based on self-report questionnaire scores, watched a shortened drama movie during functional magnetic resonance imaging. We compared intersubject correlation (ISC) of brain hemodynamic activity of holistic vs analytical participants across the movie viewings. Holistic thinkers showed significant ISC in more extensive cortical areas than analytical thinkers, suggesting that they perceived the movie in a more similar fashion. Significantly higher ISC was observed in holistic thinkers in occipital, prefrontal and temporal cortices. In analytical thinkers, significant ISC was observed in right-hemisphere fusiform gyrus, temporoparietal junction and frontal cortex. Since these results were obtained in participants with similar cultural background, they are less prone to confounds by other possible cultural differences. Overall, our results show how brain activity in holistic vs analytical participants differs when viewing the same drama movie.

Heterochrony in chimpanzee and bonobo spatial memory development

OBJECTIVES

The emergence of human-unique cognitive abilities has been linked to our species' extended juvenile period. Comparisons of cognitive development across species can provide new insights into the evolutionary mechanisms shaping cognition. This study examined the development of different components of spatial memory, cognitive mechanisms that support complex foraging, by comparing two species with similar life history that vary in wild ecology: bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Spatial memory development was assessed using a cross-sectional experimental design comparing apes ranging from infancy to adulthood. Study 1 tested 73 sanctuary-living apes on a task examining recall of a single location after a 1-week delay, compared to an earlier session. Study 2 tested their ability to recall multiple locations within a complex environment. Study 3 examined a subset of individuals from Study 2 on a motivational control task.

RESULTS

In Study 1, younger bonobos and chimpanzees of all ages exhibited improved performance in the test session compared to their initial learning experience. Older bonobos, in contrast, did not exhibit a memory boost in performance after the delay. In Study 2, older chimpanzees exhibited an improved ability to recall multiple locations, whereas bonobos did not exhibit any age-related differences. In Study 3, both species were similarly motivated to search for food in the absence of memory demands.

DISCUSSION

These results indicate that closely related species with similar life history characteristics can exhibit divergent patterns of cognitive development, and suggests a role of socioecological niche in shaping patterns of cognition in Pan.

The word order of languages predicts native speakers' working memory

The relationship between language and thought is controversial. One hypothesis is that language fosters habits of processing information that are retained even in non-linguistic domains. In left-branching (LB) languages, modifiers usually precede the head, and real-time sentence comprehension may more heavily rely on retaining initial information in working memory. Here we presented a battery of working memory and short-term memory tasks to adult native speakers of four LB and four right-branching (RB) languages from Africa, Asia and Europe. In working memory tasks, LB speakers were better than RB speakers at recalling initial stimuli, but worse at recalling final stimuli. Our results show that the practice of parsing sentences in specific directions due to the syntax and word order of our native language not only predicts the way we remember words, but also other non-linguistic stimuli.

Spatial mapping shows that some African elephants use cognitive maps to navigate the core but not the periphery of their home ranges

Strategies of navigation have been shown to play a critical role when animals revisit resource sites across large home ranges. The habitual route system appears to be a sufficient strategy for animals to navigate while avoiding the cognitive cost of traveling using the Euclidean map. We hypothesize that wild elephants travel more frequently using habitual routes to revisit resource sites as opposed to using the Euclidean map. To identify the elephants' habitual routes, we created a python script, which accounted for frequently used route segments that constituted the habitual routes. Results showed elephant navigation flexibility traveling at Kruger National Park landscape. Elephants shift strategies of navigation depend on the familiarity of their surroundings. In the core area of their home range, elephants traveled using the Euclidean map, but intraindividual differences showed that elephants were then converted to habitual routes when navigating within the less familiar periphery of their home range. These findings are analogous to the recent experimental results found in smaller mammals that showed that rats encode locations according to their familiarity with their surroundings. In addition, as recently observed in monkeys, intersections of habitual routes are important locations used by elephants when making navigation decisions. We found a strong association between intersections and new segment usage by elephants when they revisit resource sites, suggesting that intersection choice may contribute to the spatial representations elephants use when repeatedly revisiting resource sites.

Why Cross-Cultural Psychology Is Incomplete Without Comparative and Developmental Perspectives

We argue that comparing adult behavior and cognition across cultures is insufficient to capture the multifaceted complexity of cultural variation. We champion a multidisciplinary perspective that draws on biological and psychological theory and methods. We provide examples for ways in which cross-cultural, developmental, and comparative studies might be combined to unravel the interplay between universal species-typical behaviors and behavioral variation across groups and, at the same time, to explain uniquely human cultural diversity by identifying the unique and universal patterns of human behavior and cognition in early childhood that create, structure, and maintain variation across groups. Such a perspective adds depth to explanations of cultural variation and universality and firmly roots accounts of human culture in a broader, biological framework. We believe that, therefore, the field of cross-cultural psychology may benefit from combining efforts with comparative and developmental psychologists.

Intersection as key locations for bearded capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidinosus) traveling within a route network

There is evidence that wild animals are able to recall key locations and associate them with navigational routes. Studies in primate navigation suggest most species navigate through the route network system, using intersections among routes as locations of decision-making. Recent approaches presume that points of directional change may be key locations where animals decide where to go next. Over four consecutive years, we observed how a wild group of bearded capuchin monkeys used a route network system and Change Point locations (CPs) in the Brazilian ecotone of Cerrado-Caatinga. We built 200 daily routes of one wild bearded capuchin group. We used ArcGIS, the Change Point Test, Spatial Analysis in Macroecology (SAM), and statistical models to test the hypothesis that wild bearded capuchins use CPs located along routes in a different fashion than they use the CPs located at intersections of routes. A logistic regression model was used to determine the landscape variables affecting capuchins' directional changes at intersections or along routes. CPs at intersections were important points of travel path changes, whereas CPs along routes represented a zig-zag movement along the routes following the landscape features. CPs at intersections were associated with steeper terrains and shorter distances from important resources, along with better visibility of the home range. Our results support the hypothesis that intersections among routes in the route network system are located at points where monkeys have the best visibility available to make decisions on where to visit next.

The persistent sampling bias in developmental psychology: A call to action

Psychology must confront the bias in its broad literature toward the study of participants developing in environments unrepresentative of the vast majority of the world's population. Here, we focus on the implications of addressing this challenge, highlight the need to address overreliance on a narrow participant pool, and emphasize the value and necessity of conducting research with diverse populations. We show that high-impact-factor developmental journals are heavily skewed toward publishing articles with data from WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations. Most critically, despite calls for change and supposed widespread awareness of this problem, there is a habitual dependence on convenience sampling and little evidence that the discipline is making any meaningful movement toward drawing from diverse samples. Failure to confront the possibility that culturally specific findings are being misattributed as universal traits has broad implications for the construction of scientifically defensible theories and for the reliable public dissemination of study findings.

Competing perspectives on frames of reference in language and thought

A study found that Dutch-speaking children who prefer an egocentric (left/right) reference frame when describing spatial relationships, and Hai||om-speaking children who use a geocentric (north/south) frame had difficulty recreating small-scale spatial arrays using their language-incongruent system (Haun, Rapold, Janzen, & Levinson, 2011). In five experiments, we reconciled these results with another study showing that English (egocentric) and Tseltal Mayan (geocentric) speakers can flexibly use both systems (Abarbanell, 2010; Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman, & Papafragou, 2011). In replicating and extending Haun et al. (Experiment 1), English- but not Tseltal-speaking children could use their language-incongruent system when the instructions used their non-preferred frame of reference. Perseveration due to task order may explain the discrepancies between present English- and previous Dutch-speaking children, while not understanding task instructions using left/right language may explain why present Tseltal- and previous Hai||om-speaking children had difficulty with their language-incongruent systems. In support, Tseltal-speaking children could use an egocentric system when the instructions were conveyed without left/right language (Experiments 2-4), and many did not know left/right language (Experiment 5). These findings help reconcile seemingly conflicting sets of results and suggest that task constraints, rather than language, determine which system is easier to use (Experiment 2 vs. 3).

Sculptors, Architects, and Painters Conceive of Depicted Spaces Differently

Sculptors, architects, and painters are three professional groups that require a comprehensive understanding of how to manipulate spatial structures. While it has been speculated that they may differ in the way they conceive of space due to the different professional demands, this has not been empirically tested. To achieve this, we asked architects, painters, sculptors, and a control group questions about spatially complex pictures. Verbalizations elicited were examined using cognitive discourse analysis. We found significant differences between each group. Only painters shifted consistently between 2D and 3D concepts, architects were concerned with paths and spatial physical boundedness, and sculptors produced responses that fell between architects and painters. All three differed from controls, whose verbalizations were generally less elaborate and detailed. Thus, for the case of sculptors, architects, and painters, profession appears to relate to a different spatial conceptualization manifested through a systematically contrasting way of talking about space.

video abstract: https://youtu.be/w7dsVjWRitI

Are Categorical Spatial Relations Encoded by Shifting Visual Attention between Objects?

Perceiving not just values, but relations between values, is critical to human cognition. We tested the predictions of a proposed mechanism for processing categorical spatial relations between two objects-the shift account of relation processing-which states that relations such as 'above' or 'below' are extracted by shifting visual attention upward or downward in space. If so, then shifts of attention should improve the representation of spatial relations, compared to a control condition of identity memory. Participants viewed a pair of briefly flashed objects and were then tested on either the relative spatial relation or identity of one of those objects. Using eye tracking to reveal participants' voluntary shifts of attention over time, we found that when initial fixation was on neither object, relational memory showed an absolute advantage for the object following an attention shift, while identity memory showed no advantage for either object. This result is consistent with the shift account of relation processing. When initial fixation began on one of the objects, identity memory strongly benefited this fixated object, while relational memory only showed a relative benefit for objects following an attention shift. This result is also consistent, although not as uniquely, with the shift account of relation processing. Taken together, we suggest that the attention shift account provides a mechanistic explanation for the overall results. This account can potentially serve as the common mechanism underlying both linguistic and perceptual representations of spatial relations.

Reading the landscape: Legible environments and hominin dispersals

Wayfinding, or the ability to plan and navigate a course over the landscape, is a subject of investigation in geography, neurophysiology, psychology, urban planning, and landscape design. With the prevalence of GPS-assisted navigation systems, or "wayfinders," computer scientists are also increasingly interested in understanding how people plan their movements and guide others. However, the importance of wayfinding as a process that regulates human mobility has only recently been incorporated into archeological research design. Hominin groups were able to disperse widely during the course of prehistory. The scope of these dispersals speaks to the innate navigation abilities of hominins. Their long-term success must have depended on an ability to communicate spatial information effectively. Here, we consider the extent to which some landscapes may have been more conducive to wayfinding than others. We also describe a tool we have created for quantifying landscape legibility (sensu Gollege), a complex and under-explored concept in archeology, with a view to investigating the impact of landscape structure on human wayfinding and thus, patterns of dispersal during prehistory. To this end, we have developed a method for quantifying legibility using a Geographic Information System (GIS) and apply it to a test case in prehistoric Iberia.

Differences in the Visual Perception of Symmetric Patterns in Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) and Two Human Cultural Groups: A Comparative Eye-Tracking Study

Symmetric structures are of importance in relation to aesthetic preference. To investigate whether the preference for symmetric patterns is unique to humans, independent of their cultural background, we compared two human populations with distinct cultural backgrounds (Namibian hunter-gatherers and German town dwellers) with one species of non-human great apes (Orangutans) in their viewing behavior regarding symmetric and asymmetric patterns in two levels of complexity. In addition, the human participants were asked to give their aesthetic evaluation of a subset of the presented patterns. The results showed that humans of both cultural groups fixated on symmetric patterns for a longer period of time, regardless of the pattern’s complexity. On the contrary, Orangutans did not clearly differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric patterns, but were much faster in processing the presented stimuli and scanned the complete screen, while both human groups rested on the symmetric pattern after a short scanning time. The aesthetic evaluation test revealed that the fixation preference for symmetric patterns did not match with the aesthetic evaluation in the Hai//om group, whereas in the German group aesthetic evaluation was in accordance with the fixation preference in 60 percent of the cases. It can be concluded that humans prefer well-ordered structures in visual processing tasks, most likely because of a positive processing bias for symmetry, which Orangutans did not show in this task, and that, in humans, an aesthetic preference does not necessarily accompany the fixation preference.

Cultural background shapes spatial reference frame proclivity

Spatial navigation is an essential human skill that is influenced by several factors. The present study investigates how gender, age, and cultural background account for differences in reference frame proclivity and performance in a virtual navigation task. Using an online navigation study, we recorded reaction times, error rates (confusion of turning axis), and reference frame proclivity (egocentric vs. allocentric reference frame) of 1823 participants. Reaction times significantly varied with gender and age, but were only marginally influenced by the cultural background of participants. Error rates were in line with these results and exhibited a significant influence of gender and culture, but not age. Participants’ cultural background significantly influenced reference frame selection; the majority of North-Americans preferred an allocentric strategy, while Latin-Americans preferred an egocentric navigation strategy. European and Asian groups were in between these two extremes. Neither the factor of age nor the factor of gender had a direct impact on participants’ navigation strategies. The strong effects of cultural background on navigation strategies without the influence of gender or age underlines the importance of socialized spatial cognitive processes and argues for socio-economic analysis in studies investigating human navigation.

Apes have culture but may not know that they do

There is good evidence that some ape behaviors can be transmitted socially and that this can lead to group-specific traditions. However, many consider animal traditions, including those in great apes, to be fundamentally different from human cultures, largely because of lack of evidence for cumulative processes and normative conformity, but perhaps also because current research on ape culture is usually restricted to behavioral comparisons. Here, we propose to analyze ape culture not only at the surface behavioral level but also at the underlying cognitive level. To this end, we integrate empirical findings in apes with theoretical frameworks developed in developmental psychology regarding the representation of tools and the development of metarepresentational abilities, to characterize the differences between ape and human cultures at the cognitive level. Current data are consistent with the notion of apes possessing mental representations of tools that can be accessed through re-representations: apes may reorganize their knowledge of tools in the form of categories or functional schemes. However, we find no evidence for metarepresentations of cultural knowledge: apes may not understand that they or others hold beliefs about their cultures. The resulting Jourdain Hypothesis, based on Molière’s character, argues that apes express their cultures without knowing that they are cultural beings because of cognitive limitations in their ability to represent knowledge, a determining feature of modern human cultures, allowing representing and modifying the current norms of the group. Differences in metarepresentational processes may thus explain fundamental differences between human and other animals’ cultures, notably limitations in cumulative behavior and normative conformity. Future empirical work should focus on how animals mentally represent their cultural knowledge to conclusively determine the ways by which humans are unique in their cultural behavior.

Does spatial locative comprehension predict landmark-based navigation?

In the present study we investigated the role of spatial locative comprehension in learning and retrieving pathways when landmarks were available and when they were absent in a sample of typically developing 6- to 11-year-old children. Our results show that the more proficient children are in understanding spatial locatives the more they are able to learn pathways, retrieve them after a delay and represent them on a map when landmarks are present in the environment. These findings suggest that spatial language is crucial when individuals rely on sequences of landmarks to drive their navigation towards a given goal but that it is not involved when navigational representations based on the geometrical shape of the environment or the coding of body movements are sufficient for memorizing and recalling short pathways.

Mapping spatial frames of reference onto time: a review of theoretical accounts and empirical findings

When speaking and reasoning about time, people around the world tend to do so with vocabulary and concepts borrowed from the domain of space. This raises the question of whether the cross-linguistic variability found for spatial representations, and the principles on which these are based, may also carry over to the domain of time. Real progress in addressing this question presupposes a taxonomy for the possible conceptualizations in one domain and its consistent and comprehensive mapping onto the other-a challenge that has been taken up only recently and is far from reaching consensus. This article aims at systematizing the theoretical and empirical advances in this field, with a focus on accounts that deal with frames of reference (FoRs). It reviews eight such accounts by identifying their conceptual ingredients and principles for space-time mapping, and it explores the potential for their integration. To evaluate their feasibility, data from some thirty empirical studies, conducted with speakers of sixteen different languages, are then scrutinized. This includes a critical assessment of the methods employed, a summary of the findings for each language group, and a (re-)analysis of the data in view of the theoretical questions. The discussion relates these findings to research on the mental time line, and explores the psychological reality of temporal FoRs, the degree of cross-domain consistency in FoR adoption, the role of deixis, and the sources and extent of space-time mapping more generally.

The evolution of self-control

Cognition presents evolutionary research with one of its greatest challenges. Cognitive evolution has been explained at the proximate level by shifts in absolute and relative brain volume and at the ultimate level by differences in social and dietary complexity. However, no study has integrated the experimental and phylogenetic approach at the scale required to rigorously test these explanations. Instead, previous research has largely relied on various measures of brain size as proxies for cognitive abilities. We experimentally evaluated these major evolutionary explanations by quantitatively comparing the cognitive performance of 567 individuals representing 36 species on two problem-solving tasks measuring self-control. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that absolute brain volume best predicted performance across species and accounted for considerably more variance than brain volume controlling for body mass. This result corroborates recent advances in evolutionary neurobiology and illustrates the cognitive consequences of cortical reorganization through increases in brain volume. Within primates, dietary breadth but not social group size was a strong predictor of species differences in self-control. Our results implicate robust evolutionary relationships between dietary breadth, absolute brain volume, and self-control. These findings provide a significant first step toward quantifying the primate cognitive phenome and explaining the process of cognitive evolution.

Comparative developmental psychology: how is human cognitive development unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.

Comparative Developmental Psychology: How is Human Cognitive Development Unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.

Can infants make transitive inferences?

Researchers have long been interested in the emergence of transitive reasoning abilities (e.g., if A>B and B>C, then A>C). Preschool-aged children are found to make transitive inferences. Additionally, nonhuman animals demonstrate parallel abilities, pointing to evolutionary roots of transitive reasoning. The present research examines whether 16-month-old infants can make transitive inferences about other people's preferences. If an agent prefers object-A over B (A>B) and B over C (B>C), infants seem to reason that she also prefers A over C (A>C) (Experiment 1). Experiment 2 provides indirect evidence that a one-directional linear ordering of the three items (A>B>C) may have helped infants to succeed in the task. These and control results present the first piece of evidence that precursors of transitive reasoning cognitive abilities exist in infancy.

On the antiquity of language: the reinterpretation of Neandertal linguistic capacities and its consequences

It is usually assumed that modern language is a recent phenomenon, coinciding with the emergence of modern humans themselves. Many assume as well that this is the result of a single, sudden mutation giving rise to the full "modern package." However, we argue here that recognizably modern language is likely an ancient feature of our genus pre-dating at least the common ancestor of modern humans and Neandertals about half a million years ago. To this end, we adduce a broad range of evidence from linguistics, genetics, paleontology, and archaeology clearly suggesting that Neandertals shared with us something like modern speech and language. This reassessment of the antiquity of modern language, from the usually quoted 50,000-100,000 years to half a million years, has profound consequences for our understanding of our own evolution in general and especially for the sciences of speech and language. As such, it argues against a saltationist scenario for the evolution of language, and toward a gradual process of culture-gene co-evolution extending to the present day. Another consequence is that the present-day linguistic diversity might better reflect the properties of the design space for language and not just the vagaries of history, and could also contain traces of the languages spoken by other human forms such as the Neandertals.

Chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit divergent spatial memory development

Spatial cognition and memory are critical cognitive skills underlying foraging behaviors for all primates. While the emergence of these skills has been the focus of much research on human children, little is known about ontogenetic patterns shaping spatial cognition in other species. Comparative developmental studies of nonhuman apes can illuminate which aspects of human spatial development are shared with other primates, versus which aspects are unique to our lineage. Here we present three studies examining spatial memory development in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (P. paniscus). We first compared memory in a naturalistic foraging task where apes had to recall the location of resources hidden in a large outdoor enclosure with a variety of landmarks (Studies 1 and 2). We then compared older apes using a matched memory choice paradigm (Study 3). We found that chimpanzees exhibited more accurate spatial memory than bonobos across contexts, supporting predictions from these species' different feeding ecologies. Furthermore, chimpanzees - but not bonobos - showed developmental improvements in spatial memory, indicating that bonobos exhibit cognitive paedomorphism (delays in developmental timing) in their spatial abilities relative to chimpanzees. Together, these results indicate that the development of spatial memory may differ even between closely related species. Moreover, changes in the spatial domain can emerge during nonhuman ape ontogeny, much like some changes seen in human children.

Spatial language facilitates spatial cognition: evidence from children who lack language input

Does spatial language influence how people think about space? To address this question, we observed children who did not know a conventional language, and tested their performance on nonlinguistic spatial tasks. We studied deaf children living in Istanbul whose hearing losses prevented them from acquiring speech and whose hearing parents had not exposed them to sign. Lacking a conventional language, the children used gestures, called homesigns, to communicate. In Study 1, we asked whether homesigners used gesture to convey spatial relations, and found that they did not. In Study 2, we tested a new group of homesigners on a Spatial Mapping Task, and found that they performed significantly worse than hearing Turkish children who were matched to the deaf children on another cognitive task. The absence of spatial language thus went hand-in-hand with poor performance on the nonlinguistic spatial task, pointing to the importance of spatial language in thinking about space.

Cognition is … Fundamentally Cultural

A prevailing concept of cognition in psychology is inspired by the computer metaphor. Its focus on mental states that are generated and altered by information input, processing, storage and transmission invites a disregard for the cultural dimension of cognition, based on three (implicit) assumptions: cognition is internal, processing can be distinguished from content, and processing is independent of cultural background. Arguing against each of these assumptions, we point out how culture may affect cognitive processes in various ways, drawing on instances from numerical cognition, ethnobiological reasoning, and theory of mind. Given the pervasive cultural modulation of cognition—on all of Marr’s levels of description—we conclude that cognition is indeed fundamentally cultural, and that consideration of its cultural dimension is essential for a comprehensive understanding.

Moving Forward in Space and Time: How Strong is the Conceptual Link between Spatial and Temporal Frames of Reference?

People often use spatial vocabulary to describe temporal relations, and this increasingly has motivated attempts to map spatial frames of reference (FoRs) onto time. Recent research suggested that speech communities, which differ in how they conceptualize space, may also differ in how they conceptualize time and, more specifically, that the preferences for spatial FoRs should carry over to the domain of time. Here, we scrutinize this assumption (a) by reviewing data from recent studies on temporal references, (b) by comparing data we had collected in previous studies on preferences for spatial and temporal FoRs in four languages, (c) by analyzing new data from dynamic spatial tasks that resemble the temporal tasks more closely, and (d) by assessing the co-variation of individual preferences of English speakers across space and time. While the first set of data paints a mixed picture, the latter three do not support the assumption of a close link between referencing preferences across domains. We explore possible reasons for this lack of consistency and discuss implications for research on temporal references.

From individual cognition to populational culture

In my response to the commentaries from a collection of esteemed researchers, I reassess and eventually find largely intact my claim that human tool use evidences higher social and non-social cognitive ability. Nonetheless, I concede that my examination of individual-level cognitive traits does not offer a full explanation of cumulative culture yet. For that, one needs to incorporate them into population-dynamic models of cultural evolution. I briefly describe my current and future work on this.

The original sin of cognitive science

Classical cognitive science was launched on the premise that the architecture of human cognition is uniform and universal across the species. This premise is biologically impossible and is being actively undermined by, for example, imaging genomics. Anthropology (including archaeology, biological anthropology, linguistics, and cultural anthropology) is, in contrast, largely concerned with the diversification of human culture, language, and biology across time and space-it belongs fundamentally to the evolutionary sciences. The new cognitive sciences that will emerge from the interactions with the biological sciences will focus on variation and diversity, opening the door for rapprochement with anthropology.